Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 964161
Subnational government investment and dynamic fiscal rules
Subnational government investment and dynamic fiscal rules // Proceedings of the 35th International Academic Conference, Barcelona
Barcelona, Španjolska, 2017. doi:10.20472/IAC.2018.935.013 (predavanje, nije recenziran, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni)
CROSBI ID: 964161 Za ispravke kontaktirajte CROSBI podršku putem web obrasca
Naslov
Subnational government investment and dynamic fiscal
rules
Autori
Drezgić, Saša
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni
Izvornik
Proceedings of the 35th International Academic Conference, Barcelona
/ - , 2017
Skup
35th International Academic Conference, Barcelona International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences,
Mjesto i datum
Barcelona, Španjolska, 15.05.2017. - 18.05.2017
Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje
Vrsta recenzije
Nije recenziran
Ključne riječi
subnational government, investment, fiscal rules, public borrowing, deficit sharing mechanism
Sažetak
The paper tries to deal with issue how to increase local government investment finance without jeopardizing fiscal position of local government as well as overall macroeconomic stability. One of the key challenges is to resolve an everlasting conflict between central and subnational government tier related to different perspectives of each jurisdiction. Namely, central government level is more concerned for macroeconomic position and usually is more inclined to centralise debt management and limit borrowing powers of subnational government. On the other hand, subnational government utilizes borrowing for large local communal infrastructure needs but faces short-term perspective of political mandate, which demands control aimed for prevention of excessive borrowing. In addition, heterogeneity of local governments in terms of fiscal capacity and fiscal position makes general deficit sharing mechanisms as poor solution to intergovernmental fiscal management. General deficit sharing mechanisms usually base on fixed budgetary limits, which do not enable control for weak subnational government units and exert too high limitations for more progressive ones. Introduction of more precise dynamic fiscal rules, which account for specific fiscal standing of each local government and fiscal system, would provide incentive for more productive borrowing policies. Such mechanism overcomes short-term financing perspective that comes from short- term political horizon and mid- term focus of budgetary documentation. The results of the research brings clear policy recommendations. It is possible to replace existing deficit sharing mechanisms by more productive and efficient dynamic system. This would bring not just improved debt management control but provide incentive for more efficient borrowing.
Izvorni jezik
Engleski
Znanstvena područja
Ekonomija
POVEZANOST RADA
Projekti:
IP-2013-11-8174 - Porezna politika i fiskalna konsolidacija u Hrvatskoj (TPFCC) (Blažić, Helena, HRZZ - 2013-11) ( CroRIS)
Ustanove:
Ekonomski fakultet, Rijeka
Profili:
Saša Drezgić
(autor)