Naslov
Normative Reasons : Response-Dependence and the Problem of Idealization

Autori
Jurjako, Marko

Izvornik
Philosophical Explorations (1386-9795) 20 (2017), 3; 261-275

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u časopisima, članak, znanstveni

Ključne riječi
Idealization ; why idealize ; response dependence ; normative reasons ; color/value analogy ; David Enoch

Sažetak
David Enoch, in his paper “Why idealize?”, argues that theories of normative reasons that hold that normative facts are subject or response dependent and include an idealization condition might have a problem in justifying the need for idealization. I argue that at least some response dependence conceptions of normative reasons can justify idealization. I explore two ways of responding to Enoch’s challenge. One way involves a revisionary stance on the ontological commitments of the normative discourse about reasons. To establish this point, I argue by analogy with the case of color perception. To make the analogy, it suffices to show that even if colors are response dependent properties, it does not follow that some kind of idealization cannot be introduced to specify the truth conditions of color ascriptions. The second route involves the denial of Enoch’s contention that our normative discourse is implicitly committed to a realist ontology. I adduce reasons for thinking that our normative discourse only presupposes a possibility of misrepresentation. However, this feature of the normative discourse does not favor robustly objectivist as opposed to response dependence accounts of normative reasons. Thus, I argue that proponents of response dependence accounts can use this feature to answer the question of why to idealize.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

Napomena
Rad je dobio nagradu: Winner of the Philosophical Explorations Essay Prize 2017

POVEZANOST RADA