Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 887738
The Self-Ascription of Conscious Experience
The Self-Ascription of Conscious Experience // Perspectives on the Self / Berčić, Boran (ur.).
Rijeka: Sveučilište u Rijeci, 2017. str. 123-137
CROSBI ID: 887738 Za ispravke kontaktirajte CROSBI podršku putem web obrasca
Naslov
The Self-Ascription of Conscious Experience
Autori
Malatesti, Luca
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Poglavlja u knjigama, znanstveni
Knjiga
Perspectives on the Self
Urednik/ci
Berčić, Boran
Izdavač
Sveučilište u Rijeci
Grad
Rijeka
Godina
2017
Raspon stranica
123-137
ISBN
978-953-7975-57-9
Ključne riječi
phenomenal concepts, experience, introspection, concept of self
Sažetak
We can have thoughts that are expressible with sentences such as “I am having the experience of a pain in my elbow, ” “I am having a conscious experience of red.” These thoughts involve the self-ascription of conscious experiences of a certain type on the ground of having such mental states. Philosophers investigate what is involved in the understanding of these thoughts to account for special features of our first personal knowledge of conscious experience and their nature.1 In this article, I elucidate some aspects of our understanding of these self- ascriptions by focusing on the concepts that concern the type of conscious color experiences that we have and the self. Within a controversial area of investigation, I characterize concepts, minimally and intuitively, as ways of thinking about objects, properties, and other entities. I introduce concepts so understood by means of that-clauses reporting ascriptions of beliefs or thoughts. I take that concepts are individuated by the conditionsv that a thinker must satisfy to possess them.
Izvorni jezik
Engleski
Znanstvena područja
Filozofija
