Naslov
Reasons: A Naturalistic Explanation

Autori
Jurjako, Marko

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Ocjenski radovi, doktorska disertacija

Fakultet
Filozofski fakultet u Rijeci

Mjesto
Rijeka

Datum
31.10

Godina
2016

Stranica
201

Mentor
Nenad Smokrović ; Luca Malatesti

Ključne riječi
Normative reasons ; hypothetical and categorical reasons ; rationality ; evolutionary debunking arguments in metaethics ; psychopathy and irrationality

Sažetak
The thesis has two aims. The first one is to discuss the nature of normative reasons and to investigate which account of them would be compatible with a broadly naturalistic world view. The second aim is to show how a naturalistically constrained account of normative reasons and rationality can be fruitfully applied to some practical contexts that involve interfacing normative constraints and empirical data. The structure of the thesis is the following: in the first chapter, I introduce the concept of a normative reason. Following the literature, I distinguish between object-based and subjectbased theories of normative reasons and discuss their attractions and disadvantages. In the second chapter, I defend one type of subject-based theory, the response-dependentist view of normative reasons. In the third chapter, I argue that subject-based theories of reasons receive support from evolutionary and naturalistic considerations. Moreover, I argue, on the basis of evolutionary considerations, that the object-based theories of reasons face serious difficulties, and therefore that we should adopt an attitude-dependent conception of normative reasons. In the fourth chapter, I further develop a positive account of one type of subject-based theory of normative reasons. I develop a naturalistically based account of reasons that is able to account for an important distinction between hypothetical and categorical reasons. Finally, in the fifth chapter I apply the developed framework to the case of psychopathy in order to discuss the question whether some recent neuropsychological studies show that psychopaths are irrational in their decision-making processes and behavior. I argue that current neuropsychological data do not warrant the conclusion that psychopaths are on average more irrational than other non- psychopathic individuals.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

Napomena
Teza je napravljena u sklopu projekta CEASCRO 8071, doktroska stipendija od HRZZ-a 9522

POVEZANOST RADA