Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 833453
Intentionalism as a Theory of Self-Deception
Intentionalism as a Theory of Self-Deception // Balkan journal of philosophy, 7 (2015), 2; 145-150 doi:10.5840/bjp20157218 (međunarodna recenzija, pregledni rad, znanstveni)
CROSBI ID: 833453 Za ispravke kontaktirajte CROSBI podršku putem web obrasca
Naslov
Intentionalism as a Theory of Self-Deception
Autori
Cerovac, Ivan
Izvornik
Balkan journal of philosophy (1313-888X) 7
(2015), 2;
145-150
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u časopisima, pregledni rad, znanstveni
Ključne riječi
Self-deception ; Intentionalism ; Anti-Intentionalism ; Mind partitioning ; Attentional strategy
Sažetak
Is self-deception something that just happens to us, or is it an intentional action of an agent? This paper discusses intentionalism, a theory claiming that self-deception is intentional behavior that aims to produce a belief that the agent does not share. The agent is motivated by his belief that p (e.g. he is bald) and his desire that not-p (e.g. not to be bald), and if self-deceiving is successful, the agent will end up believing not-p. Opponents of intentionalism raise two different objections: it seems that self- deceiver should then simultaneously hold two incompatible beliefs (namely, that p and not- p), as well as simultaneously intend the deception and be unaware of it. This paper reviews possible answers to anti-intentionalist objections (temporal partitioning, psychological partitioning, and the attentional strategy account) and offers guidelines to strengthen intentionalist claims.
Izvorni jezik
Engleski
Znanstvena područja
Filozofija
Citiraj ovu publikaciju:
Časopis indeksira:
- Web of Science Core Collection (WoSCC)
- Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI)
Uključenost u ostale bibliografske baze podataka::
- Central and East European Online Library - CEEOL
- Philosopher's Index
- ERIH PLUS
- EBSCO Discover
- Emerging Sources Citation Index of Thomson Reuters, Google Scholar
- Philosophy Research Index
- PhilPapers