Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 745410
At the Brink of Millianism: Proper Names and World-Indexed Properties
At the Brink of Millianism: Proper Names and World-Indexed Properties // Language, Mind, and Knowledge: Program and Book of Abstracts / Kudlek, Karolina (ur.).
Zagreb: Udruga za promicanje filozofije i Hrvatski studiji, 2014. str. 12-13 (predavanje, domaća recenzija, sažetak, znanstveni)
CROSBI ID: 745410 Za ispravke kontaktirajte CROSBI podršku putem web obrasca
Naslov
At the Brink of Millianism: Proper Names and World-Indexed Properties
Autori
Dožudić, Dušan
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, sažetak, znanstveni
Izvornik
Language, Mind, and Knowledge: Program and Book of Abstracts
/ Kudlek, Karolina - Zagreb : Udruga za promicanje filozofije i Hrvatski studiji, 2014, 12-13
Skup
Language, Mind, and Knowledge
Mjesto i datum
Zagreb, Hrvatska, 18.06.2014. - 20.06.2014
Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje
Vrsta recenzije
Domaća recenzija
Ključne riječi
Fregeans; Millians; proper names; rigidity; world-indexed properties
Sažetak
Fregeans hold that proper names express identifying properties in virtue of which they refer to a particular object – the one that satisfies such a property. And it is this property, rather than the object referred to itself, that enters the semantic content of sentences they are part of ; so identify- ing properties make the meaning of a name. Anti-Fregeans deny this, and argue that the semantics of proper names has to be built on a different ground – typically, on a version of a causal theory of reference. Fregeans, it is commonly believed, would have a hard time dealing with numerous 12 counterexamples to their theory offered by Kripke, donnellan, and others who initially motivated the anti-Fregean “revolution” in the 190s. On the other hand, Fregeans can easily deal with semantic puzzles, such as Frege’s identity puzzle, the puzzle of empty names, (negative) existential statements, and the puzzle of substitution failure in intensional contexts, which initially motivated Frege and Russell to discard a simple Millian “denotation without connotation” conception of (ordinary) proper names. These semantic puzzles appear to be a stepping-stone for any anti-Fregean striving to restore the Millian conception. All this led to a frustrating condi- tion with both Fregeans and anti-Fregeans trying to accommodate and/or explain away insights and objections of the rival side. In order to resolve this problem Plantinga argued that a better Fregean view could be offered once the anti-Fregean insights were taken into account and built into a Fregean view. In what follows I will consider Plantinga’s view, I will state its merits, point to its problems, and then try to see how a proponent of his view might deal with these problems.
Izvorni jezik
Engleski
Znanstvena područja
Filozofija