Naslov
Philosophical and rational Intuition

Autori
Butković, Ana

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, sažetak, znanstveni

Izvornik
Language, Mind and Knowledge: International Philosophical Conference / - Zagreb, 2014, 11-11

Skup
Language, Mind and Knowledge

Mjesto i datum
Zagreb, Hrvatska, 18.06.2014. - 20.06.2014

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija

Ključne riječi
Intuitions; a priori juatification; rationalism

Sažetak
According to the received view, intuitions are, in epistemological and methodological sense, important as a source of a priori evidence in contemporary analytic philosophy. There is, however, an apparent ambiguity in the usage of the term ‘rational intuition’, which by some rationalists covers a so-called philosophical or classification intuition as well. This ambiguity makes difficult to understand what is actually asserted about intuitions and what is disputed. Rationalists frequently explain rational intuition by means of necessity and abstractness concepts, without clearly indicating why they do so. In this paper I will try to show that rationalists’ accounts are deficient because they fail to justify and explain the use of these concepts, together with the concepts of other properties standardly attributed to intuitions. Consequently, they exclude philosophical intuition from their accounts, contrary to their claim that this type of intuition is of special interest to philosophy as a source of philosophical knowledge.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

POVEZANOST RADA