Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 745175
Rigidity and Inconsistent Beliefs
Rigidity and Inconsistent Beliefs // Analytical and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives / S. Rinofner-Kreidl and H. A. Wiltsche (ur.).
Kirchberg am Wechsel: Wissenschaft Forschung Niederösterreich, 2014. str. 68-70 (predavanje, međunarodna recenzija, cjeloviti rad (in extenso), znanstveni)
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Naslov
Rigidity and Inconsistent Beliefs
Autori
Dožudić, Dušan
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u zbornicima skupova, cjeloviti rad (in extenso), znanstveni
Izvornik
Analytical and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives
/ S. Rinofner-Kreidl and H. A. Wiltsche - Kirchberg am Wechsel : Wissenschaft Forschung Niederösterreich, 2014, 68-70
Skup
Analytical and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives
Mjesto i datum
Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austrija, 10.08.2014. - 16.08.2014
Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje
Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija
Ključne riječi
Belief reports; Fregeanism; inconsistency; Lycan; propositional attitudes; rigidity
Sažetak
In this paper I will discus William Lycan’s objection to Fregeans who grant name’s rigidity, explaining it by the appeal to rigidity of other expressions (descriptions or predicates). Lycan argues that proponents of such a view face the same problem of reconciling the truth of particular propositional attitude reports with agent’s rationality, as anti-Fregeans, i.e. Millians do. I will analyse Lycan’s objection and argue that it fails to threaten such Fregeans.
Izvorni jezik
Engleski
Znanstvena područja
Filozofija
