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The Moral Self and Its Brain: The Case of Deontology


Bracanović, Tomislav
The Moral Self and Its Brain: The Case of Deontology // Identity in the Context of Practical and Theoretical Philosophy
Dubrovnik, Hrvatska, 2012. (predavanje, nije recenziran, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni)


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Naslov
The Moral Self and Its Brain: The Case of Deontology

Autori
Bracanović, Tomislav

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni

Skup
Identity in the Context of Practical and Theoretical Philosophy

Mjesto i datum
Dubrovnik, Hrvatska, 12.04.2012. - 13.04.2012

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Nije recenziran

Ključne riječi
Neuroscience; moral psychology; deontology

Sažetak
Naturalistic research projects like the neuroscience of morality, evolutionary moral psychology and social intuitionist theory raise challenge to and attempt to revise traditional philosophical accounts of the nature of moral reasoning. One of the most serious naturalistic challenges is faced by deontology. Whereas deontology is typically portrayed as the non-consequentialist, universalizable and rationally motivated moral decision making, a number of neuroscientists and moral psychologists reverse this picture and claim “that deontological judgments tend to be driven by emotional responses and that deontological philosophy, rather then being grounded in moral reasoning, is to a large extent an exercise in moral rationalization” (Greene). This is a serious threat not only to deontology as the unique philosophical doctrine, but also to the way most people experience morality (so called “moral phenomenology” which is in many respects deontological). After outlining the basics of this naturalistic turn in the science of moral reasoning, I will examine which features essential to deontology are particularly endangered and which defense strategies deontologists have at their disposal. I will try to show that the most reasonable deontological defense is not to dismiss naturalistic approaches altogether but to utilize some of their theoretical and conceptual inventory (e.g. the distinction between ultimate and proximate psychological mechanisms or the distinction between adaptations and evolutionary byproducts) in order to retain both deontology and naturalism.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija



POVEZANOST RADA


Ustanove:
Fakultet hrvatskih studija, Zagreb

Profili:

Avatar Url Tomislav Bracanović (autor)


Citiraj ovu publikaciju:

Bracanović, Tomislav
The Moral Self and Its Brain: The Case of Deontology // Identity in the Context of Practical and Theoretical Philosophy
Dubrovnik, Hrvatska, 2012. (predavanje, nije recenziran, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni)
Bracanović, T. (2012) The Moral Self and Its Brain: The Case of Deontology. U: Identity in the Context of Practical and Theoretical Philosophy.
@article{article, author = {Bracanovi\'{c}, Tomislav}, year = {2012}, keywords = {Neuroscience, moral psychology, deontology}, title = {The Moral Self and Its Brain: The Case of Deontology}, keyword = {Neuroscience, moral psychology, deontology}, publisherplace = {Dubrovnik, Hrvatska} }
@article{article, author = {Bracanovi\'{c}, Tomislav}, year = {2012}, keywords = {Neuroscience, moral psychology, deontology}, title = {The Moral Self and Its Brain: The Case of Deontology}, keyword = {Neuroscience, moral psychology, deontology}, publisherplace = {Dubrovnik, Hrvatska} }




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