Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 744968
The Moral Self and Its Brain: The Case of Deontology
The Moral Self and Its Brain: The Case of Deontology // Identity in the Context of Practical and Theoretical Philosophy
Dubrovnik, Hrvatska, 2012. (predavanje, nije recenziran, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni)
CROSBI ID: 744968 Za ispravke kontaktirajte CROSBI podršku putem web obrasca
Naslov
The Moral Self and Its Brain: The Case of Deontology
Autori
Bracanović, Tomislav
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni
Skup
Identity in the Context of Practical and Theoretical Philosophy
Mjesto i datum
Dubrovnik, Hrvatska, 12.04.2012. - 13.04.2012
Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje
Vrsta recenzije
Nije recenziran
Ključne riječi
Neuroscience; moral psychology; deontology
Sažetak
Naturalistic research projects like the neuroscience of morality, evolutionary moral psychology and social intuitionist theory raise challenge to and attempt to revise traditional philosophical accounts of the nature of moral reasoning. One of the most serious naturalistic challenges is faced by deontology. Whereas deontology is typically portrayed as the non-consequentialist, universalizable and rationally motivated moral decision making, a number of neuroscientists and moral psychologists reverse this picture and claim “that deontological judgments tend to be driven by emotional responses and that deontological philosophy, rather then being grounded in moral reasoning, is to a large extent an exercise in moral rationalization” (Greene). This is a serious threat not only to deontology as the unique philosophical doctrine, but also to the way most people experience morality (so called “moral phenomenology” which is in many respects deontological). After outlining the basics of this naturalistic turn in the science of moral reasoning, I will examine which features essential to deontology are particularly endangered and which defense strategies deontologists have at their disposal. I will try to show that the most reasonable deontological defense is not to dismiss naturalistic approaches altogether but to utilize some of their theoretical and conceptual inventory (e.g. the distinction between ultimate and proximate psychological mechanisms or the distinction between adaptations and evolutionary byproducts) in order to retain both deontology and naturalism.
Izvorni jezik
Engleski
Znanstvena područja
Filozofija