Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 683327
Responsibilism and the identity of cognitive character
Responsibilism and the identity of cognitive character // Identity in the Context of Practical and Theoretical Philosophy: Program and Paper Abstracts ; Dubrovnik : University of Graz – Department of Philosophy, University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies, Society for the Advancement of Philosophy – Zagreb, Center for Advanced Academic Studies Dubrovnik
Zagreb : Graz: University of Graz – Department of Philosophy, University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies, Society for the Advancement of Philosophy – Zagreb,, 2012. (predavanje, međunarodna recenzija, sažetak, znanstveni)
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Naslov
Responsibilism and the identity of cognitive character
Autori
Čuljak, Zvonimir
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, sažetak, znanstveni
Izvornik
Identity in the Context of Practical and Theoretical Philosophy: Program and Paper Abstracts ; Dubrovnik : University of Graz – Department of Philosophy, University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies, Society for the Advancement of Philosophy – Zagreb, Center for Advanced Academic Studies Dubrovnik
/ - Zagreb : Graz : University of Graz – Department of Philosophy, University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies, Society for the Advancement of Philosophy – Zagreb,, 2012
Skup
Identity in the Context of Practical and Theoretical Philosophy
Mjesto i datum
Dubrovnik, Hrvatska, 12.04.2012. - 13.04.2012
Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje
Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija
Ključne riječi
cognitive character; identity; reliabilism; responsibilism;
(cognitive character; identity; reliabilism; responsibilism)
Sažetak
Various versions of contemporary responsibilist virtue epistemology (by L. Code, J. Montmarquet, L. Zagzebski and others) assume that knowledge derives from stable dispositions to produce true beliefs. According to responsibilists, these dispositions are like intellectual virtues, and constitute that what is usually labeled as virtuous “cognitive character” or virtuous “epistemic character”. In this paper responsibilist approach is confronted with skepticism concerning the existence of moral character as a consistent and robust collection of moral virtues (e.g. by J. Doris and G. Harman). If skepticism about moral character is right, then responsibilist virtue epistemology, analyzing and explaining knowledge by means of the analogous idea of cognitive or epistemic character, faces analogous difficulties. Moreover, some examples are provided to show that having a responsibly or conscientiously produced true belief, or a true belief produced by a virtuously motivated cognitive agent, is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for knowledge.
Izvorni jezik
Engleski
Znanstvena područja
Filozofija
POVEZANOST RADA
Projekti:
191-0091328-1103 - Znanje i kontekst (Čuljak, Zvonimir, MZOS ) ( CroRIS)
Ustanove:
Fakultet hrvatskih studija, Zagreb
Profili:
Zvonimir Čuljak
(autor)