Naslov
Causation and intensionality in Aristotelian logic

Autori
Kovač, Srećko

Izvornik
Studia Philosophiae Christianae (0585-5470) 49 (2013), 2; 117-136

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u časopisima, članak, znanstveni

Ključne riječi
Aristotle; syllogism; proof; necessity; cause; intension

Sažetak
We show that Aristotle's general conception of syllogism includes, as its essential part, the logical concept of necessity, which can be understood in a causal way. This logical conception of causality is more general then the conception of the causality in the Aristotelian theory of proof (“demonstrative syllogism”), which contains the causal account of knowledge and science outside formal logic. Aristotle's syllogistic is described in a purely intensional way, without recourse to a set-theoretical formal semantics. It is shown that the conclusion of a syllogism is justified by the accumulation of logical causes applied during the reasoning process. It is also indicated that logical principles as well as the logical concept of causality have a fundamental ontological role in Aristotle's “first philosophy”.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

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