Naslov
STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS: PROJECT MANAGERS' PERCEPTIONS

Autori
Cerić, Anita

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u zbornicima skupova, cjeloviti rad (in extenso), znanstveni

Izvornik
Working Paper Series, Proceedings of the Engineering Project Organization Conference / Javernick-Will, Amy ; Malingham, Ashwin - : The Engineering Project Organization Society (EPOS), 2012

Skup
Engineering Project Organizations Conference-EPOC 2012

Mjesto i datum
Rheden, Nizozemska, 10.07.2012. - 12.07.2012

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija

Ključne riječi
principal-agent theory; information asymmetries; risk-minimization strategies; project managers; multi-attribute utility theory

Sažetak
Communication risk is of crucial importance in construction projects. The situation in which one of the project parties is better informed than another is known as information asymmetry. This problem is addressed by the principal-agent theory. According to this theory, information asymmetries cause three problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and hold up. The focus here is on strategies for minimizing information asymmetries in the construction phase. A survey of project managers was conducted to establish an understanding of the relative importance of risk-minimization strategies established in the literature: bureaucratic control (contracts), information systems, incentives (bonuses), corporate culture, reputation, and trust. The multi-attribute utility theory was used to analyze the responses. According to the project managers who participated in the survey, trust is the most important strategy in the construction phase, followed by bureaucratic control (contracts) and information systems.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Temeljne tehničke znanosti

POVEZANOST RADA