Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 597597
The Sarajevo Ceasefire – Realism or strategic error by the Croatian leadership?
The Sarajevo Ceasefire – Realism or strategic error by the Croatian leadership? // Review of Croatian history, 7 (2011), 1; 103-123 (podatak o recenziji nije dostupan, članak, znanstveni)
CROSBI ID: 597597 Za ispravke kontaktirajte CROSBI podršku putem web obrasca
Naslov
The Sarajevo Ceasefire – Realism or strategic error by the Croatian leadership?
Autori
Marijan, Davor
Izvornik
Review of Croatian history (1845-4380) 7
(2011), 1;
103-123
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u časopisima, članak, znanstveni
Ključne riječi
Republic of Croatia; Yugoslav People’s Army; Homeland war; strategy; Sarajevo Ceasefire
Sažetak
The topic of this work is the post-war controversy centred on the view that the Croatian political leadership made an error in January 1992 when, with mediation by the United Nations, it agreed to and signed a ceasefire with representatives of the Yugoslav People’s Army in Sarajevo. Those who hold this view are retired Croatian Army generals, who maintain that the war should have been continued during 1992, which would have achieved a military victory and the liberation of Croatia’s occupied and rebellious territories. Since these speculations are systematically promoted by influential media outlets, the author has attempted to respond to the extent allowed by historical scholarship
Izvorni jezik
Engleski
Znanstvena područja
Filozofija
POVEZANOST RADA
Projekti:
019-0190609-0586 - Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat (1991.-1995.-2000.) (Marijan, Davor, MZOS ) ( CroRIS)
Ustanove:
Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb
Profili:
Davor Marijan
(autor)
