Naslov
Thinking about phenomenal concepts

Autori
Malatesti, Luca

Izvornik
Synthesis philosophica (0352-7875) 26 (2011), 2; 391-402

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u časopisima, članak, znanstveni

Ključne riječi
consciousness; qualia; zombies; a posteriori physicalism; phenomenal concept strategy; David Chalmers’s master argument

Sažetak
Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument and different conceivability arguments, advanced by Saul Kripke, David Chalmers and Joseph Levine, conclude that consciousness involves non-physical properties or properties that cannot be reductively accounted for in physical terms. Some physicalists have replied to these objections by means of different versions of the phenomenal concept strategy. David Chalmers has responded with the master argument, a reasoning that, if successful, would undermine any reasonable version of the phenomenal concept strategy. In this paper, I argue that the master argument does not advance the debate between the supporters of the anti-physicalist arguments and those of the phenomenal concept strategy.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

POVEZANOST RADA