ࡱ> >A9:;<=[Mbjbj ΐΐf-&  Iqqq8 beD"W!W! #.N#b# aaaaaaadNg>aeqK%"" #K%K%aW!W!zb?_?_?_K%,RW!qW!a?_K%a?_?_O"?_W!-2Q ?_`b0b?_g}[ g?_gq?_n#Z#@?_$4<$n#n#n#aa]n#n#n#bK%K%K%K%gn#n#n#n#n#n#n#n#n# :MANAGING CRISIS IN THE EUROZONE PhD Luka Brki( E-mail: luka.brkic@zg.htnet.hr Kristijan Kotarski(( E-mail: kristijan.kotarski1@kr.htnet.hr  Abstract: Euro crisis displayed its full blow in the spring of 2010. Its dynamic revealed deep-seated structural flaws at the core of the EMU. The productive Germany is tied via the euro currency union to countries that have lower productivity rates and inefficient economies. This union has been beneficial to southern Europe so far since the EMU inception as it provided them with cheap credit. EMU showcased its problematic institutional design. Compared to mature federations the institutional design of EMU is incomplete. On the one hand there is strong ECB that decides monetary policies for the entire euro area. At the same time there is lack of macroeconomic policy coordination for that same area. The budgetary and fiscal policies are set by governments of national states. This is of great concern for the vitality and robustness of the EMU in the context of soft constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact. This paper will highlight basic structural problems that led to the current crisis of confidence in the common European currency in the first part. The second part intends to discuss the lack of monetary and fiscal policy coordination while third part analyzes monetary and fiscal responses to the crisis by the EU institutions and national actors. The fourth part seeks to portray some possibilities for overcoming deep-seated structural imbalances and questions the likelihood of gouvernement conomique as a new stage in European integration. KEY WORDS: EURO, FINANCIAL CRISIS, MONETARY POLICY, FISCAL POLICY, ECB, ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE PHASES AND ORIGINS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE EUROZONE The global financial crisis came at Europe in three phases. The first phase was part of the American subprime crisis. Many financial institutions based in Europe were fully complicit in causing the financial turmoil by buying and selling derivatives as well as by acquiring risky assets. The second wave was a uniquely European crisis. European banks had taken massive positions in the Eastern European banking systems. For example, the Czech system was almost entirely foreign owned. Outstanding loans issued by Austrian banks in Eastern and Southeastern Europe climbed up to 293 billion which could be translated to a liability for each man, woman and child in Austria of 35.075.2 These banks began lending to Eastern European homebuyers, with mortgages denominated in euros and Swiss francs rather than in the currencies of the countries involved. Doing this allowed banks to reduce interest rates, as the risk of currency fluctuation was pushed over to the borrower. But when the zlotys and forints began to plunge, these monthly mortgage payments began to soar, as did defaults. Industrial production in Czech Republic in September 2009 fell 13 % while Czech koruna depreciated 7.1% against December 2008.3 The same happened with Hungarian forint and Polish Zloty. Hungarian forint lost almost 20% of its value and industrial production shrank by 9.9%.4 Poland suffered greatly in terms of exchange rate depreciation as Zloty plunged 23.3% at the time when industrial production decline amounted to 7.7%.5 The European core, led by Germany, refused a European bailout of the borrowers or lenders even though the lenders who created this crisis were based in eurozone countries. Instead, the IMF was called in to solve the problem.6 This raised the political question in Eastern Europe as to what it meant to be part of the European Union. The third wave is represented by crisis in sovereign debt in countries that are part of the eurozone but are not in the core of Europe (PIIGS countries). This wave showed that eurozone governments have failed to place common currency on a solid political and economic foundation. Blaming the speculators garnered some applause but this anaytical approach appears to be too one-sided. Even without deep scrutiny it is obvious that leaders of the eurozone countries behaved like speculators. Some because they were in too much debt and were cooking the books, and others because they turned a blind eye to the malefic dealings for too long. In the spring of 2010 a full-scale crisis erupted in the peripheral country with shakiest public finances. Greek crisis made it obvious that the sovereign debt crisis and banking crisis have become intertwined and could feed off each other in the near future. There are four major factors which caused European banking crisis and preceded global financial turmoil.7 The first factor refers to the euro adoption which is directly linked to the Europe's local subprime bubble. The cost of borrowing in peripheral European countries (PIIGS) was greatly reduced due, in part, to the implied guarantee that once they joined the eurozone their debt would be as solid as Germanys government debt. Construction along the Valencian coast outpaced the building boom elsewhere across Spain, and accounted for more than 12% of the region's economy in 2008 (more than twice what it had a decade earlier). 8 The industry created so many jobs that in 2006, near the peak of the boom, unemployment in the region, now a staggering 24% (September 2010), dropped below the national average which is unusual in an area with big seasonal job swings.9 As a further example, in 2006 there were more than 700,000 new homes built in Spain, more than the total new homes built in Germany, France and the United Kingdom combined.10 Europes carry trade and crisis in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) can be identified as a second and third factor which are tightly interrelated and all of which augmented and accelerated the crisis. Because of this, Swiss francs and euros served as the basis for most of such lending across Europe. Loans in these currencies were then extended as low interest rate mortgages and other consumer and corporate loans in higher interest rate economies in CEE without analyzing the possibility of a sharp devaluation.11 Troubles of overexposed banks in Italy, Austria, Sweden and Greece have been solved by the IMF and the EU as they ended up bailing out several countries in the region, including Romania, Hungary, Latvia and Serbia. And before the eurozone ever contemplated a Greek or eurozone bailout, it was discussing a potential 150 billion-euro rescue fund for CEE countries at the urging of the Austrian and Italian governments. 12 The fourth factor, the exposure to toxic assets, culminated in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse. In October 2009, RGE estimated total potential eurozone bank losses to amount to 700-900 billion, a large share of which stemming from U.S. and CEE exposures. According to IMF estimates, German banks face total write-downs of US$314 -338 billion, of which US$260 billion already recognized by end-2009, and with recapitalization needs of at least US$36 billion among public sector banks. In addition, German banks hold claims of US$514 billion on the most imperiled periphery countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland), whereas French banks hold claims of US$387 billion on these periphery countries (and a further US$508 billion on Italy). LACK OF MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY COORDINATION Problems facing European financial sector were merely compounded by deep structural problems at the heart of EMU characterized by the absence of prudent macroeconomic coordination. The capital-poor and inefficient South was not as competitive as the efficient and capital-rich North and ended up importing capital to make up the difference. Meanwhile, the eurozone had a political logic but was economically flawed from the start because it attempted to wed 16 fiscal policies with one monetary policy. The need for coordination arises in contexts characterised by interdependencies, due either to collective goods problem or to externalities. In such contexts, decentralised decision-making in the absence of coordination devices will lead to suboptimal, non-cooperative, Nash equilibria. They result from the existence of collective goods, such as monetary stability or reputation on financial markets and vis--vis private agents in general, or from spillovers. Spillovers are to be interpreted as unintended consequences of national macroeconomic policies on other member states economies, and such spillover effects may be positive or negative. In the first category, spillovers may be either positive the so-called traditional Keynesian spillovers, that result from the multiplier effects of fiscal policies and their locomotive effects through trade or negative, mostly through induced rise in long term interest rates and fall in the external exchange rate of the common currency when budget deficits increase, as well as the short-term interest rates hikes that the central bank may want to impose as a retaliatory move when national fiscal authorities appear not to exert enough political will to contain budget deficits. Because the European monetary union was conceived at a time when monetary stability was widely held to be the single, most desirable objective, and with the aim of minimizing centralisation, that is transferring only monetary powers at the supranational level, while leaving fiscal and tax policies almost intact in the hands of national governments, interdependencies stemming from the use of these instruments were given most attention in the debate over economic policy. The precise rules and institutions that have been chosen for the eurozone in the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties have been decisively influenced by the inflationary context of the seventies and eighties in the EU, as well as by the then dominant macroeconomic theories (rational expectations macroeconomics). But this specific context also predetermined problems associated with the lack of coordination. Also, from the beginning it was obvious that the eurozone is not an optimal currency area (OCA) as it did not satisfy some basic criteria regarding OCA. At the point when the euro was introduced as a means of payment, eurozone fullfiled only two criteria regarding OCA index, trade openess and production diversification. Other two important criteria remained beyond the reach for 12 different economies, namely labour mobility and fiscal transfers. It is contestable whether EU members developed certain level of homogeneity of preferences in approach to solving macroeconomic issues. Commonality of destiny is also questionable since the EU is an association, at most an alliance, and not a transnational state. As an alliance, it is a system of relationships among sovereign states so they participate in it to the extent that it suits their self-interest or fail to participate when they please. That means that they approach the financial crisis in a national, as opposed to European fashion.  Another serious isssue is the stability culture imposed by Stability and Growth Pact. Although the SGP has undoubtedly made fiscal policies a common concern of the euro zone by focusing attention on fiscal aggregates of member states, it cannot be said to have significantly improved economic policy coordination. At the same time, the SGP turned out to be highly pro-cyclical, because it was mainly focused on fiscal discipline during cyclical downturns and thus provides wrong incentives since it didn't tackle the tendency to run expansionary pro-cyclical policies in good times and does not reduce the political inclination to spend the money when it comes in. From the very beginning, the euro was actually far more vulnerable than investors and politicians were willing to admit. Several member states used the faade of a strong global currency primarily to blatantly live beyond their means. But it were precisely France and Germany that broke the fiscal deficit rule and denied credibility to the application of the same rule in the time to come. In March 2005, the EU Council relaxed the rules under the pressure of those two countries which were facing high fines for not obeying the SGP.  The EC said it was to respond to criticisms of insufficient flexibility and to make the pact more enforceable but in reality it was an eutanasia of an already half-dead Treaty. The Bundesbank ruled that the changes would decisively weaken the rules of sound financial policy. The ceilings of 3% for budget deficit and 60% for public debt were maintained, but the decision to declare a country in excessive deficit was to be based on a new set of parameters: the behaviour of the cyclically adjusted budget, the level of debt, the duration of the slow growth period and the possibility that the deficit is related to productivity-enhancing procedures. Excessive deficit procedure is not to be enforced when deficit occurs as a result of some unexpected negative shock. Under the new provisions previous definition of shock as a result of influence beyond government impact is eliminated in favour of governments' autonomy to determine what really constitutes it. Since joining the eurozone, the 16 euro countries have violated the deficit rule 43 times. The Greeks fudged their statistics by including prostitution, black-market trade and gambling in the calculation of economic output. As a result, GDP rose by a stunning 25 percent in 2006, and the deficit dropped to 2.9 percent.  When it comes to better monitoring the member states' compliance with SGP rules an important role is to be attributed to Eurostat. A regulation reinforcing the audit powers of Eurostat has recently been agreed by the Council of Ministers on 26th of July 2010. But this cource of action which envisages more frequent and comprehensive regular statistical visits in the context of the standard Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) is under threat from undermining its efficiency unless financial derivatives market is to be supervised. Credit lines disguised as a swap didn't show up in the Greek debt statistics so the conclusion that the Maastricht rules can be circumvented quite legally through swaps is ineluctable. This means that fiscal policy coordination has to go hand in hand with sophisticated oversight of financial markets. With regard to fiscal policies, the one-size-fits-all character of the rules may also prove harmful in a number of contexts, as illustrated by the case of Ireland in 2001, formally in line with the deficit and debt requirements of the SGP, but in practice having too expansionary a fiscal stance, given the high growth, high inflation situation of the country at the time. Although GDP per capita in Ireland and Greece rose from 1999 to 2007 by astonishing 59.6%, respectively 39.3%, (compared to Germanys 12.4 %) this was only due to a credit bubble which signifies divergence instead of convergence among eurozone countries. Wages grew faster than productivity, thus unit labor costs and inflation rose while real exchange rates based on such unit labor costs appreciated sharply. These structural problems and flawed conception of economic policy had only been exacerbrated by challenges endemic to Club Med countries such as corruption, non-transparent banking systems, large social welfare outlays, overreliance on the real estate and construction industries for recent economic growth and lack of manufacturing capacity. CRISIS MANAGMENT IN THE EU The fact that the EU is based on the exclusive power of member states national authorities and that these have shown to be extremely reluctant to give more power to the Union, results in the fact that dealing with systemic crises becomes almost impossible, unless there is not a large degree of coordination among them, which it has not been the case until today. EUs response to the crisis so far can be characterized as discordant, with essentially every country looking to fend for itself (capital nationalism). With each banking system tightly integrated into the political economy of each EU member state, an EU-wide solution to Europes banking and sovereign debt problems is far from certain. An approach to banking problems was largely conducted on an ad hoc basis, as each government has taken extra care to specifically tailor its financial assistance packages to support the most and upset the fewest constituents. The European Commission has only very limited latitude when it comes to combating the crisis. When fair competition within the EU market is not the issue, the Commission simply lacks the necessary tools to deal with the crisis. As a result, Europe today is only as strong as the 27 heads of government in the EU allow it to be. But views on many issues differ widely in Berlin, London, Paris, Rome, Vienna or Bratislava, especially after the immediacy of the crisis is perceived to have passed. The EU member states are notorious for ignoring the commissions attempts to reprimand them, and they tend to band together against the Commission, which has no public to answer to and no real enforcement powers against a sovereign nation. It is also very rare that one member state will vote to sanction another for fear that it will have to deal with repercussions when it is in the hot seat itself. When analyzing the financial crisis management in the EU one must observe that the wrong approach has been rooted in the financial supervisory failure, monetary policy failure and fiscal policy coordination failure. It has enabled the uncontrolled leveraging of financial institutions, bloated public sector and the break-up of ECBs independence during the crisis.. The European banking and sovereign debt crisis can be divided into period preceding the introduction of the EFSF (European Financial Stability Fund) and the period afterwards. The following pages shed light on Germanys role in managing the crisis since it is the biggest economy in the eurozone and almost explicitly shaped the eurozones responses in this turbulent period. The overall approach to crisis preceding European-wide bailout in May 2010 can be labelled as non-coherent and showed the strong prevalence of national political concerns in tackling systemic challenges. While the Greek debt problem was expanding into a risk to the global financial system, the coalition government in Germany remained stubbornly focused on other problem: state elections in North-Rhine Westphalia. Angela Merkel, German chancellor, stirred up resentment against the Greeks by resisting to approve an early financial bailout for Athens and sent completely different signals than the most important member of her cabinet, Finance Minister Wolfgang Schuble. Namely, he was tasked with reassuring the markets, while Merkel was trying to reassure the German public that she was not being soft on the Greeks. On the other hand, German Finance Minister wanted to establish an European Monetary Fund while Chancellor was against it. In the course of taming the sovereign debt and European banking crisis in the spring of 2010, two basic reactions emerged. Their sheer size and the broad scope cannot overshadow its partiality and the lack of coherence. The first of them was to set-up the eurozone-wide 750 billion bailout plus 110 billion rescue package for Greece (see Table 1).28 The European leaders and the IMF made 750 billion available to help eurozone states teetering on the verge of abyss, in case they find themselves in a financial emergency when market-imposed interest rates on government bonds spiral out of control. They have not been bothered by the fact that the EU treaties don't contain provisions for such aid. Indeed, they had already ignored the no-bailout clause in the Maastricht Treaty when they agreed to rescue Greece. In February 2009, German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrck openly stated that if one of the euro countries encountered financial difficulties, the community will have to come to its aid. There is a de facto bail-out agreement among the euro countries, says Hamburg economist Dirk Meyer, noting that the no-bailout clause is not workable.  The second response came in the form of ECB provided unlimited volume of loans to any bank that could offer qualifying collateral, while national governments offered their own guarantees on newly issued debt. The independence of the European Central Bank, once held a taboo in order to keep the value of money stable, has been sacrificed in order to restore liquidity to the banking sector and to ease pressure on the price of PIIGS government bonds. Essentially it was conducted in five major steps: 1. Governments incur debt: The competition between investors bids the bond prices up, in turn lowering the bond's yield. 2. Private banks buy government debt: Since October 2008, the ECB has offered to fully accommodate banks' demand for liquidity, provided they pledged eligible collateral such as government bonds, and has offered to lend the liquidity for periods up to three, six or even 12 months. 3. Private banks use government debt as collateral: The ECB decided to lower the threshold at which it would accept government debt (from A- to BBB-) - giving all countries, but especially those in crisis like Greece and Portugal, a breather. Further credit downgrades would make its bonds ineligible as collateral at the ECB, but even barring further downgrades, the lowered collateral threshold is set to expire on Jan. 1, 2011, which would mean that as it stands, Greek bonds would be ineligible unless they get back up to A- by then. 4. Banks purchase more debt: European banks have jumped at this opportunity to refinance their assets with the ECB at the very attractive fixed rate of 1 percent. The one-year liquidity operations have been very popular -- in 2009, banks took out 442 billion euro in June, 75 billion euro in September and 96 billion euro in December. 5. Government debt yields kept low: This "loans-backed-by-bonds-to-purchase-loans-backed-by-bonds" cycle keeps the yields low due to continued demand to use them as collateral with the ECB. By buying up debt of Club Med countries, ECB kept the price of bonds artificially high. French banks benefited in particular from this policy because it enabled them to sell their Greek bonds to the ECB, an inexpensive way of cleaning up their balance sheets. The continuation of this policy effectively poses a serious risk to ECB becoming a so-called bad bank or a bank that buys up toxic assets as a means of helping out other institutions. The central bank's capital, currently about 70 billion, most of which is invested in the national central banks, would be severly affected in the case of default. Economists who have always believed that a few days of robust ECB market intervention would be enough to reassure market players and bring yields back to a normal level were mistaken. Without the immediate installation of any sovereign default mechanism such as some sort of European Monetary Fund, the ECB would have to bear the burden. It would risk to degenerate towards the bad bank of the euro area if timid investors offloaded sovereign bonds with uncertain repayment values on the ECBs balance sheet.  The next step to combat the magnitude of the financial crisis in Europe with a view to bolstering ECB's actions and the credibility of the newly established European bailout package was seen in the austerity mesures. EU governments have undergone rounds of belt-tightening measures, including cutting social services and raising retirement ages. Even Germany, Europe's strongest economy, pushed through its own far-reaching savings package. Announced austerity measures in Spain climbed up to 65 billion, in Italy 24 billion, Greece 35 billion, Ireland 15 billion and Germany 80 billion. To resolve the bloated budget deficits of the ClubMed countries and as an assurance that it would not have to bail out every southern country like Greece. Berlin has HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100514_germany_creating_economic_governance?fn=2917140695"demanded these countries implement severe budget cuts and that southern European countries begin implementing German-style labor market and public sector reform. This kind of direction establishes some sort of credibility for the EFSF but it denies the potential risks of such conception. Prolonged bickering over the Greek bailout led to market uncertainty that spread to the rest of the eurozone, forcing Germany to eventually underwrite the 750 billion euro bailout for the eurozone as a whole. Near the end of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, Germany realized that it needed to develop a mechanism to enforce its will without acquiring the approval of other EU states if further eurozone countries were to be bailed out. Not only was it obvious that Germany was sitting in the same boat with other member states breaking the SGP rules but it also wanted to obtain a mechanism to help their own banks under threat of bearing the costs of unorderly proclaimed bacrupcies. Its solution was the EFSF. The EFSF is not an EU institution like the European Commission or any other bureau. Rather, it is a limited liability corporation registered in Luxembourg. Specifically, it is a Luxembourger bank. This arrangement allows the Germans to evade pre-existing EU Treaty law. The EFSF can therefore bail out member states, indirectly regulate the banking sector, set up a bad bank to rehabilitate European financial institutions, or favor one member or penalize another without an unanimous vote which clearly represents actions explicitly or implicitly barred by EU Treaty law. The EFSF requires no act by the Commission, no additional approval from 27 different parliaments and no unanimous vote among the various EU heads of government to forward its loans. The eurozone has thus far been exceedingly economically beneficial to Germany and Germany. Berlins 151 billion euro contribution to the two bailout funds pales in comparison to the overall boost in exports that Berlin has received since forging the eurozone. Furthermore, Germanys banks are looking at approximately 520 billion euros worth of direct exposure to various forms of debt in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy. The crisis has spurred member states toward economic reform for different reasons. The ClubMed countries will do anything to get financial support, while Germany and Northern European economies will give less priority to sovereignty of legitimate concerns that a Greek collapse will harm their own economies. This kind of crisis managment shows an underlying HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100510_europe_nationalism_and_shared_fate?fn=8116244174"nationalist calculus, and not an integrationist European one. After a long and protracted debate on the need of imposing automatic sanctions against fiscally irresponsible EU governments which was essentially Germany's rationale, German Chancellor Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy came to a compromise on reforms to European fiscal rules. On 19th of October in Dauville Germany accepted the French demand that a permanent stability fund be set up to prevent future existential crises in the eurozone. This amounts de facto to the inception of the European Monetary Fund under Germany's control which outraged other member states which were held aside. French side accepted German demands for stricter enforcement mechanisms regarding fiscal policy rules and for the reforms to be written into the EU Constitution via a Treaty adjustment. EU member states would still retain the ability to vote whether to give the European Commission the authority to first launch an excessive budget deficit procedure against the offending eurozone member state, a concession France and a number of Mediterranean countries wanted in exchange for agreeing to reform the Treaty along the proposed lines. The process of trying to impose new sanctions could be affected by the "reverse majority" rule. Lack of coherence in the overall approach to financial crisis managment can be seen in the stance of German Chancellor who displayed an elastic loyalty to principles when the European common currency experiences turbulence. She initially spent weeks postponing the idea of aiding Greece. In the end, Germany shouldered the largest share of the bailout. As the euro crisis became increasingly dangerous, and additional countries ran into difficulties, she resisted a bailout package for the entire euro zone. In the end Germany once again had to pay the largest contribution. Her latest U-turn when it comes to automatic sanctions certainly does nothing to instill confidence in the embattled euro. It seems as though a blend of ideological prejudices, financial interests and dogmas cloaked as national interests, political calculation and the lack of common historical experience in financial crisis managment have produced a wrong set of answers. In fact, the only idea worth of praising was that bondholders and investors would be expected to shoulder the costs of bailing out EU member states in the future as some member states such as Greece and Ireland are insolvent. E.g. Professor Morgan Kelly of University College Dublin estimates that the cost of Irish financial sector bailout amounts to 70 billion which means that under this scenario every singe eurocent paid in income tax in the next seven years is earmarked for that purpose. The instrumentalisation of the euro as a common currency shows the extent to which banks still hold the power. The ECB has never given way to politicians when they ask it to lower rates or to privilege growth over the fight against inflation, but this time it has caved in to pressure from the banks. This is only the first of many misconception affecting the eurozone. Second and even more dangerous one is to impose drastic austerity measures in order to cut public debt and fiscal deficit in a deflationary context. In sum, both of the following statements are true: countercyclical spending worsens government finances, and austerity compounds an already miserable unemployment situation. But cutting spending in the middle of a recession is no solution especially when market participants conflate stimulus spending with bailouts of the financial system. Such a strategy may sound sensible, but it relies on the same fallacy of composition that brought on the banking crisis. Economist Michel Aglietta said: To impose crushing austerity measures on Greece and pretend that it will pull through by itself in a context of internal recession, likely deflation and the feeblest European growth rates, is to set a time bomb that could cost Europe dearly. Final misconception manifests itself in the sense that new regulatory bodies with brand new names but no teeths replace the old ones in the hope that the gap between regulators and financial markets could be bridged. Since the euro crisis erupted this sort of paliative measure has been introduced e.g. European Systemic Risk Board. It is also worthwhile to mention other three important bodies which started to operate on 1th of January 2011: European Banking Authority, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and European Securities and Financial Market Authority. Still, none of the statesmen and EU citizens can rest unless key problem remains unsolved. Last June, parliamentarians of various political stripes asked for help as they published a warning that the asymmetry between the power of this lobbying activity and the lack of counter-expertise poses a danger to democracy. They called on NGOs, trade unions, academic researchers and think-tanks to get together to counter the financial lobbyists. The urge to act is severe all the while it is obvious that Europe has no long-term and broad vision when it comes to solving the financial crisis and rebalancing its economies. Therefore, better economic governance which entails fiscal policy coordination together with financial market regulation and supervision is desperately needed in order to build a stronger EU which is will be discussed in the following chapter. SHORT HISTORY OF THE ATTEMPTS TO CREATE GOUVERNEMENT CONOMIQUE At the 1969 summit in The Hague, the heads of states and government decided to explore a possible path to EMU. Pierre Werner, Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Luxembourg, drafted together with a group of experts the blueprint. The plan encompassed three stages to reach EMU by 1980. On the institutional side it envisioned setting up two supranational bodies: a 'Community System for the Central Banks' and a 'Centre of Decisions for Economic Policy'. The former would pursue monetary policies and the latter would coordinate macroeconomic policies. Nevertheless, the combination of the first oil shock impact and the crumbling of the Bretton Woods arrangment postponed this efforts to a later date. Ten years later, a new attempt at creating EMU was pushed forward by launching the European Monetary System. Germany insisted that a further monetary integration could occur only after other participating countries reduced their inflation rates to German levels and pledged to create a European institution on technocratic and anti-inflationary rules: a politically independant European central bank to replace the Bundesbank and strict rules governing national fiscal policies. The other major participants in the EMS, France and Italy, resisted these demands until the early 1990s, since implementing them would have required politically painful tightening of monetary and fiscal policies to reduce inflation. French and Italian decion-makers preferred that the EMS evolve in a more politicized direction that would require participating governments to set common economic policy priorities, which would provide a platform from which French and Italians could press Germany to soften its monetary policy and influence aggregate demand. Preferences regarding European monetary institutions did not converge during the 1990s. The French and Italian continued to propose the centralization of economic policy authority in political bodies and giving greater weight to employment and the coordination of countercyclical economic policies, whereas German preferences leaned in the opposite direction, toward buttressing the independence of the European Central Bank and limiting fiscal policy flexibility. German negotiators succeeded in pushing through the Stability Pact's requirements for the managment of the single currency against the opposition of most other states, although they did concede that states could temporarily run excessive deficits under certain circumstances and that the EcoFin would have a modest degree of leeway in interpreting national fiscal policies. The German government also succeeded in curtailing the long-standing French desire for a political counterweight to the European Central Bank by insisting that the Euro Council remain an informal consultative body that would not question the central bank's power to make decisions regarding monetary policy. Any system of economic management has to balance competing aims and proposals for reform of the ECB and the SGP. Even so, a cursory look at how policy is being coordinated in the EU shows not only that there is much of it going on, but also that it is being done through an eclectic range of approaches. The underlying question, however, is whether current arrangements provide a policy framework that is robust enough for what EMU will become five, ten or twenty years hence. There are four different scenario when is comes to coordinating economic governance (See Figure 1). Bounded coordination describes a scenario in which the rules for policy coordination are becoming dead letters, at best symbolically followed and routinely ignored when formulating national responses to economic policy challenges. This scenario amounts to a status-quo ex-ante minus. Loose coordination means that participants are following largely opportunistic strategies and comply when the benefits are obvious and the costs negligible. With regard to the question of scope for policy coordination, we would find only little changes. Tight coordination can be seen as an upgraded status-quo ex-ante scenario, where the EU level institutions, procedures and goals of economic governance enjoy strong support, where participants are ready to accept costs for reaching common goals, and where political actors are adhering to and extending the spirit of policy coordination.53 Finally, one can envisage a transformation scenario, in which member states and EU institutions alike are increasingly being socialised into collective coordination. This is understood as a governing arrangement, which builds up mutual trust through deliberative problem-solving rather instrumental bargaining and does only rarely need to use the provisions for qualified majority voting.54 Collective coordination might also be viewed as the fulfilment of demands calling for the establishment of a gouvernement conomique, although the actors of this evolving core network would encompass not only national governmental actors but also European institutions such as the Commission and the ECB and European social partners. In the wake of the crisis Herman van Rompuy told the press: We consider that the European Council should become the economic government of the EU and we propose to increase its role in economic surveillance and the definition of the EU's growth strategy.55 At the moment the fear of financial Armageddon has dissapeared and crisis managment rules haven't been institutionalized. This means that Europe is currently heading towards a loose coordination which means fragmentation scenario in the future. CONCLUSION The fact that the European Union is based on the exclusive power of member states national authorities and that these have shown to be extremely reluctant to give more power to the EU, results in the fact that dealing with systemic crises becomes almost impossible today. The recent experience casts into question whether any economic recovery can occur as long as the financial markets are able to bet massively against the European integration project in the absence of coherence and congruence among key political decision makers. Adding to the standard line of conflict between supranational authorities and member states we have to point out to the second line of conflict which is almost impossible to solve without further integration steps and that is the conflict between nation states and financial markets. This effectively undelines the need for EU's integrated measures for macro-economic stimulation such as integrated tax structure, a central bank dedicated to economic prosperity, and a reduction of the financial sector. Cutting down the financial sector can be achieved by regulation, by taxation and by restructuring the debts of the Mediterranean states.56 A more ambitious reflection would try to explore the possibilities of developing an original brand of highly decentralised federalism in which the central budget would remain relatively small, but where an appropriate mix of rules and financial incentives, in the European budget, is set up in order to induce national governments to undertake actions that are collectively considered to be in the common interest. The past decade has been a lucky time in Europe but the ongoing downturn will test the eurozone cohesion. Barry Eichengreen claims: A crisis is a terrible thing to waste.57 Europe must choose. The choice is between the disastrous radicalism of budget cuts and a constructive radicalism of full employment. Or between a disastrous radicalism of bank bailouts and a constructive radicalism of social development. 58 Table 1. 750 billion bailout EUROSSOURCEDESCRIPTIONAVAILABILITY60 billionEU Balance of Payments FacilityOriginally a fund to help Central/Eastern Europe states, expanded in volume and purpose to now also apply to the eurozoneImmediate, the fund is already set up Up to 150 billionIMFIMF resources that can be tapped to help eurozone states in need, with conditions to be set on an individual basisImmediate, available from the IMFUp to 440 billionIndividual EU member states participatingNew facility that will issue debt guaranteed by contributing states so that it can purchase the debt of the troubled eurozone economiesGuarantees must be officialty pledged by contributing states' governments firstTo be determinedEuropean Central Bank (ECB) Securities Markets ProgramReintroduced unlimited liquidity for three-and six-month durations in addition to directly purchasing government debtAlready operationalSource: STRATFOR Source: Commission (2004, August) Figure 1. Possible scenarios for economic governance in th EU REFERENCE LITERATURE 1.Begg, I., 2003. Hard and soft economic policy coordination under EMU: problems, paradoxes and prospects, Center for European Studies Working Paper Series #103 2.Belkad, A., 2010. The high price of the euro, Le Monde diplomatique, June 3.Bilas, V., 2005. Teorija optimalnog valutnog podru ja: Euro i Europska monetarna unija, Zbornik Ekonomskog fakulteta u Zagrebu, God. 3, pp. 39-53 4. Cini, M., 2007. European Union Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 4.Commission (2004, August). EU Governance by self co-ordination? Towards a collective gouvernement conomique, Directorate-General for Research, Directorate L Science, economy and society 5.Galbraith, J.K., 2010. The wolf pack stalks Europe, Le Monde diplomatique, June 6.Ivi i, L., Cerovac, S., 2010. I plae su krive, Banka, Rujan 7. Roubini, N., Menegatti, C., Ziemba, R., 2010. Global Economic Outlook Overview July 2010, Roubini Global Economics 8.`imovi, H., 2005. Fiskalna politika u Europskoj uniji i Pakt o stabilnosti i rastu, Zbornik Ekonomskog fakulteta u Zagrebu, God. 3, pp. 75-88 9.onje, V., 2010. Eurozona: istina, pogreke i zablude, Banka, Lipanj 10.Walsh, J.I., 2001. National Preferences and International Institutions: Evidence from European Monetary Integration, International Studies Quaterly, 45, pp. 59-80 11. HYPERLINK "http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201009/20100908ATT81662/20100908ATT81662EN.pdf" http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201009/20100908ATT81662/20100908ATT81662EN.pdf [Accessed 06/11/10] 12.  HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.html [Accessed 05/09/10] 13.  HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,694784,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,694784,00.html [Accessed 14/05/10] 14. HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432,00.html [Accessed 05/09/10] 15. HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.html [Accessed 01/06/10] 16. HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,725079,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,725079,00.html [Accessed 25/10/10] 17. HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,705959-2,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,705959-2,00.html [Accessed 13/07/10] 18. HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,728699,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,728699,00.html [Accessed 12/11/10] 19. HYPERLINK "http://www.roubini.com/briefings/47577.php" http://www.roubini.com/briefings/47577.php [Accessed 12/11/10] 20. HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,719723,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,719723,00.html [Accessed 27/09/10] 21. HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697098,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697098,00.html [Accessed 27/05/10] 22. HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,725835,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,725835,00.html [Accessed 29/10/10] 23. HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612608,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612608,00.html [Accessed 1010/10] 24. HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.html [Accessed 1010/10] 25.  HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,708241,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,708241,00.html [Accessed 20/12/10] 26.  HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,676634,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,676634,00.html [Accessed 20/12/10] 27. HYPERLINK "http://web.stratfor.com/images/charts/Europe_austerity_measures_800.jpg" http://web.stratfor.com/images/charts/Europe_austerity_measures_800.jpg [Accessed 30/10/10] 28. HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101104_german_designs_europes_economic_future" http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101104_german_designs_europes_economic_future [Accessed 05/11/10] 29. HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100514_germany_creating_economic_governance" http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100514_germany_creating_economic_governance [Accessed 16/05/10] 30. HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_system" http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_system [Accessed 03/06/10] 31. HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100510_europe_nationalism_and_shared_fate" http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100510_europe_nationalism_and_shared_fate [Accessed 17/05/10] 32. HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101019_remaking_eurozone_german_image" http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101019_remaking_eurozone_german_image [Accessed 23/10/10] 33. HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100503_global_crisis_legitimacy" http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100503_global_crisis_legitimacy [Accessed 16/06/10]  HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100224_eu_extended_liquidity_support_ecb" http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100224_eu_extended_liquidity_support_ecb [Accessed 26/02/10] 34. HYPERLINK "http://www.econ.ku.dk/okombe/intmonecon/slidesch13part2.pdf" http://www.econ.ku.dk/okombe/intmonecon/slidesch13part2.pdf [Accessed 10/11/10] 35. HYPERLINK "http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704476104575439783253733728.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_LEFTTopStories" http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704476104575439783253733728.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_LEFTTopStories [Accessed 30/09/10] 36. HYPERLINK "http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/7521434/EU-draws-up-plans-for-single-economic-government-to-prevent-crisis.html" http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/7521434/EU-draws-up-plans-for-single-economic-government-to-prevent-crisis.html [Accessed 20/09/10] 37. HYPERLINK "http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117236.pdf" http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117236.pdf [Accessed 03/01/11] 38. HYPERLINK "http://www.ripe.hanfa.hr/edukacija/tekstovi/nova-struktura-za-nadzor-financijskog-sektora-eu-a/" http://www.ripe.hanfa.hr/edukacija/tekstovi/nova-struktura-za-nadzor-financijskog-sektora-eu-a/ [Accessed 03/01/11] 39.  HYPERLINK "http://www.financialregulationforum.com/wpmember/european-systemic-risk-board-5233" http://www.financialregulationforum.com/wpmember/european-systemic-risk-board-5233 [Accessed 03/01/11] ( Institution/Affiliation: Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb ( ( Institution/Affiliation: Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb   HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_system" http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_system 2  HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612608,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612608,00.html 3  HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.html 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6  HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100503_global_crisis_legitimacy" http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100503_global_crisis_legitimacy 7  HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_system" http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_system 8 HYPERLINK "http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704476104575439783253733728.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_LEFTTopStories" http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704476104575439783253733728.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_LEFTTopStories 9 Ibid. 10  HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_system" http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_system This was in stark contrast to the conservative approach to development that long held sway here. Spain until recently was so frugal and had so little purchasing power that Spaniards referred to "Europe" as the continent beyond the Pyrenees. 11 In Latvia 90% of total bank loans were held in foreign currency, in Hungary 67% (Footnote 10). 12  HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.html  Roubini et a.l (2010)  Roubini et a.l (2010)  Ibid.  Commission (2004, August). EU Governance by self co-ordination? Towards a collective gouvernement conomique, Directorate-General for Research, Directorate L Science, economy and society  Ibid.   HYPERLINK "http://www.econ.ku.dk/okombe/intmonecon/slidesch13part2.pdf" http://www.econ.ku.dk/okombe/intmonecon/slidesch13part2.pdf   HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100510_europe_nationalism_and_shared_fate" http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100510_europe_nationalism_and_shared_fate  imovi, H., 2005. Fiskalna politika u Europskoj uniji i Pakt o stabilnosti i rastu Zbornik Ekonomskog fakulteta u Zagrebu, God. 3, pp. 75-88  Ibid.   HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.html  onje, V., 2010. Eurozona: istina, pogreke i zablude, Banka, Lipanj  The behaviour of the cyclically adjusted budget is an arbitrary decision because it depends on econometric approach and model assumptions. Excessive deficit procedure is not to be activated if there is a big difference between real and potential GDP which is also subject to the same criticsm as the structurally adjusted deficit. By that point, the pact had clearly been weakened because revenues were antedated, expenditures were concealed and debts were hidden.   HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.html  Ibid.  But further steps, including to strengthen further the professional independence of the European Statistical System as well as Eurostat's audit powers should be considered. Sanctions for repeated statistical problems, such as lack of validation of data by Eurostat, should also be considered. The binding nature of the European statistics code of practice should be reinforced and some of the minimum standards should be enshrined in a legal act.  HYPERLINK "http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117236.pdf" http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117236.pdf  In the Greek case the US bankers devised a special kind of swap with fictional exchange rates. That enabled Greece to receive a far higher sum than the actual euro market value of 10 billion dollars or yen. In that way Goldman Sachs secretly arranged additional credit of up to $1 billion for the Greeks.  HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,676634,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,676634,00.html  Commission (2004, August). EU Governance by self co-ordination? Towards a collective gouvernement conomique, Directorate-General for Research, Directorate L Science, economy and society  Ivi i, L., Cerovac, S., 2010. I plae su krive, Banka, Rujan  From 2003 to 2007, the Irish banking system imported funds equivalent to over 50 percent of GDP to fund a runaway property and construction bubble. ( HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,719723,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,719723,00.html) 28  HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,694784,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,694784,00.html   HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432,00.html  Ibid.   HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100224_eu_extended_liquidity_support_ecb" http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100224_eu_extended_liquidity_support_ecb  Ibid.  France's banks and insurance companies had a total of about 80 billion in Greek government on their books. ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet caved in to massive pressure from French President Nicolas Sarkozy. ( HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.html)  The member states could then inject new capital into the ECB which is problematic regarding the level of their indebtedness. Other two solutions are recapitalization by issuing bonds or firing up the printing press. The German finance minister will feel the effects of this policy as Bundesbank regulary transfers its profits to the federal government at the end of each year. ( HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.html)  HYPERLINK "http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201009/20100908ATT81662/20100908ATT81662EN.pdf" http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201009/20100908ATT81662/20100908ATT81662EN.pdf   HYPERLINK "http://web.stratfor.com/images/charts/Europe_austerity_measures_800.jpg" http://web.stratfor.com/images/charts/Europe_austerity_measures_800.jpg   HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697098,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697098,00.html   HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101104_german_designs_europes_economic_future" http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101104_german_designs_europes_economic_future  Ibid.   HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100514_germany_creating_economic_governance" @\^  . 0 2 íw_w_G/G.h{:6B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH.hHm6B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH.hE6B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH4h_hs6B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH4h_hs5B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtHh_hs5CJOJQJaJ j*h"= hs0J5h_hs5.hs5B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH@`  VW$0ddd[$\$^0a$gds$ddd[$\$a$gds $da$gdHm$a$gds $dha$gds$[$\$a$gds$a$gds   > 5uUVWb͵͝兝o_F1h_hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtHh_hs5CJOJQJaJ+hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH.hs6B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH.hke6B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH.hE6B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH.hHm6B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH4h_hs6B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH  NT~(н~iWiWiWiEi"h{:CJOJPJQJaJnHtH"hsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH(hghsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH#h<hs5OJPJQJnHtHhxV5OJPJQJnHtHho5OJPJQJnHtHhs5OJPJQJnHtH%hs5CJOJPJQJaJnHtH1h_hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH E2#''..15yy$d`a$gdxV$d7$8$H$a$gdxV$d7$8$H$`a$gdxV$d`a$gdxV$ddd[$\$`a$gdxV$0ddd[$\$^0a$gdxV$0ddd[$\$^0a$gds^drt*bcLt'4^_EկvvկvՈvկկvd] hghs"hNCJOJPJQJaJnHtH"h,CJOJPJQJaJnHtH"h{:CJOJPJQJaJnHtH(hghsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH&hs0JCJOJPJQJaJnHtH"h]lkCJOJPJQJaJnHtH"hsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH/jhs0JCJOJPJQJUaJnHtH#K/012uw>?@AB-ιι}}kTkk,hO_hs0JCJOJPJQJaJnHtH"hsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH"h\pCJOJPJQJaJnHtH(hthsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH(h]lkhc+CJOJPJQJaJnHtH(h]lkhsCJOJPJQJaJnHtHh]lkhsCJOJQJaJ hs0J hhs h ]hshc+ hghshs -./d ųŤ|cM7M'h]lkhsCJOJQJ\aJ+h]lkhsCJOJPJQJ\aJnHtH+h]lkh\pCJOJPJQJ\aJnHtH1h,hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH%h=hsB*CJOJQJaJph)h=hs0JB*CJOJQJaJphh,hsB*OJQJph#h\pB*CJOJPJQJaJph)h=hsB*CJOJPJQJaJph"hsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH&hs0JCJOJPJQJaJnHtH  $ !!!!"A"P"Q"a"f"i""ƭƒygR@R@R"hsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH(h1ghsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH"h\pCJOJPJQJaJnHtH1hwhsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH5h]lkhs0JB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1h]lkh\pB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1h]lkhsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtHh]lkhsCJOJQJ\aJh]lkh\pCJOJQJ\aJ">#Q###########淠waHa2+hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1h|hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH(h1ghsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH&hs0JCJOJPJQJaJnHtH,h=hs0JCJOJPJQJaJnHtH1h!yhsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+h\pB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1h=hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH ####$$6%8%:%%%%&&''''}mVVF8hs5B*OJQJphhsB*CJOJQJaJph,jh0JB*CJOJQJUaJphh.GB*CJOJQJaJph%h.Gh.GB*CJOJQJaJph%h}hsB*CJOJQJaJph#jh0JCJOJQJUaJhCJOJQJaJh!yhsCJOJQJaJ+hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1h!yhsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH''''(#(f(h(j(((()))))))**!*8**ٶّmّaRaFaRh.GCJOJQJaJhKghsCJOJQJaJhsCJOJQJaJ(hKghsB*CJOJQJ\aJphh.GCJOJPJQJ\aJ#hKghsCJOJPJQJ\aJ%hsCJOJPJQJ\aJnHtH+hKghsCJOJPJQJ\aJnHtHh]lkCJOJQJ\aJhKghsCJOJQJ\aJ,hNlhs5B*OJPJQJnHphtH****q++++0,1,}.~...//00O1h1i1j1o1111111122=4>4q4555Dz٣ǣ٣ǣxhxh8CPB*CJOJQJaJph%hhsB*CJOJQJaJphh8CPCJOJQJaJh]lkCJOJQJaJhhsCJOJQJaJ(hKghsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH#jh0JCJOJQJUaJhsCJOJQJaJhKghsCJOJQJaJh,CJOJQJaJ%55555566z8{888g9}9999:;:::::);,;E;F;G;T;s;;ܶtdhVEhs6CJOJQJaJhbXCJOJQJaJhVECJOJQJaJhsCJOJQJaJ#jh0JCJOJQJUaJh8CPCJOJQJaJh4/hsCJOJQJaJ,jh0JB*CJOJQJUaJph%hhsB*CJOJQJaJphhsB*CJOJQJaJph5::BQGRGSGTGUGVGrGN~QQ/U&WZ\$7ddd[$\$`7a$gdxV$ddd[$\$`a$gdxV$d`a$gdxV$d7$8$H$a$gd1L$d7$8$H$`a$gdxV;;<8<T<!="=+=M=Y=h=%>'>(>7>X>Y>Z>[>>>>۱ۥۖr_L_%hOhVEB*CJOJQJaJph%hOhsB*CJOJQJaJph)jhOh0JCJOJQJUaJhOhVECJOJQJaJhOhsCJOJQJaJhVECJOJQJaJ#jh0JCJOJQJUaJhsCJOJQJaJhiCJOJQJaJh4/hsCJOJQJaJ)jh7Xh0JCJOJQJUaJ>>??????!@@@@@歚nU5U>jhbXhbX0JB*CJOJPJQJUaJnHphtH1hbXhOB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1hbXhyQpB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH%hbXh8BB*CJOJQJaJph%hbXhyQpB*CJOJQJaJph%hOhyQpB*CJOJQJaJph%hOhsB*CJOJQJaJph%hOhsB*CJOJQJaJph2jhOh7X0JB*CJOJQJUaJph @A^BjBkBlBmBBBCCXDYDZD[DDDDDDXEYEZE[EEF>FCFHFZFkFsFtFF/G{qmfmfmfmfmqm_m[m[m_mWm_hihxR hRhs hNqlhshsjh7X0JUhVE hp6hs%hbXh8BB*CJOJQJaJphhbXB*CJOJQJaJph,jhbX0JB*CJOJQJUaJph%hbXh2 B*CJOJQJaJph%hbXhqLB*CJOJQJaJph1hbXhX B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH"/GOGPGQGUGVGWGrGGHHvIxIIIIJJ5JɺoZHZHZ6ZH"hiCJOJPJQJaJnHtH"hsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH(h hsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH"hsCJOJPJQJaJmH sH (h"9GhsCJOJPJQJaJmH sH "hiCJOJPJQJaJmH sH #hl#hs5OJPJQJnHtHhs5OJPJQJnHtHhg5OJPJQJnHtHh1L5OJPJQJnHtHhhsB*phjh7X0JUhs5JPJTJ\JfJKKKK LLLLMMkMMNNNPλنt[F4"hsCJOJPJQJaJmH sH (h hsCJOJPJQJaJmH sH 1h(hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH"hxRCJOJPJQJaJnHtH(h.WJhsCJOJPJQJaJnHtHhsB*CJOJQJaJphhiB*CJOJQJaJph%h+YhsB*CJOJQJaJphh+YhsB*ph"hsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH(h FhsCJOJPJQJaJnHtHP;PuPvPPPPP~QQQQR?RRR'S@S T!TGTTTZTTTT.UɹܧܑxbxbxbxbxIbxbxbxb1h"9GhsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1h7hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+hiB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH"hiCJOJPJQJaJmH sH hxRB*CJOJQJaJph%h hxRB*CJOJQJaJph"hsCJOJPJQJaJmH sH "hxRCJOJPJQJaJmH sH .U_U`UUUUUXVVVVVV W$W&WNW`WfWhWWWWWXXXJYcY}YYYZZZZZ|tttlb^h"jh7X0JUh_[hs6hsB*phh{RB*phhhsB*phh_[ hhshs&hs0JCJOJPJQJaJnHtH(hxhsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH"hiCJOJPJQJaJnHtH(h FhsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH"hsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH$ZZZZZZZZ[[[\\'](])]O]B^C^x^]`^`_`}`paqaaaооydyRFRh{RCJOJQJaJ#jh7X0JCJOJQJUaJ(h jkhCJOJPJQJaJnHtHhsCJOJQJaJh jkhsCJOJQJaJ(h jkhsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH(hhsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH"hsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH(hHhsCJOJPJQJaJnHtHjh7X0JUhsh"h"h"6\(])]C^D^_```aapbgmsDw|${ $da$gd1L$7ddd[$\$`7a$gdxV$7d`7a$gdxV$7ddd[$\$^`7a$gdxV$7d7$8$H$`7a$gd$ddd[$\$^a$gdxVaaaobpbbbsctcuceelffNgǵǝDŽgQ:-hwhsB*CJOJQJaJnHphtH+hwKB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH8jh7X0JB*CJOJPJQJUaJnHphtH1hwhsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH/jh7X0JCJOJPJQJUaJnHtH"hCJOJPJQJaJnHtH(hwhsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH(h jkhsCJOJPJQJaJnHtHh jkhsCJOJQJaJNgXgYgigjgggggghh/iͶ~eSAS/#hK]hs0J5CJOJQJaJ"hwKCJOJPJQJaJnHtH"hsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH1hwhsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH8jh7X0JB*CJOJPJQJUaJnHphtH5hjhs0JB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH-hwhsB*CJOJQJaJnHphtH3hwhs6B*CJOJQJ]aJnHphtH0hwhsB*CJOJQJ]aJnHphtH /i0iijjj.k0k2k\kkl4l@lAlllllMmmmmmmέΔ~~vrvv_O?OhwKB*CJOJQJaJphhsB*CJOJQJaJph%h hsB*CJOJQJaJphhsjhsU+hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1hhsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH&jh7X0JCJOJQJU\aJhsCJOJQJ\aJh hsCJOJQJ\aJ#hK]hs0J5CJOJQJaJhs0J5CJOJQJaJmmnnnpppqqbrrrrrsss3u4u5uuuuvWvvvǘ{eLeLeLeL1h hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH8jh7X0JB*CJOJPJQJUaJnHphtH1h hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtHhND hsB*phhs hND hshQfhsB*phh hsB*phjh7X0JB*Uphh7hsB*phhsB*phvvwwwwwwBwDww4xbxixkxxxyyyyyyĴybR=(h.3h.36B*CJOJQJaJphh.3B*CJOJQJaJph,jh7X0JB*CJOJQJUaJph(hMhsB*CJH*OJQJaJph%h:OhsB*CJOJQJaJph%hJhsB*CJOJQJaJphhsB*CJOJQJaJph+hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1h hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtHhsjhsUyyyYy[yyyyyzWzYz{{||||~~ ɹɦɦɦɍp]F6]F]hsB*CJOJQJaJph,jh7X0JB*CJOJQJUaJph%hChsB*CJOJQJaJph8jh7X0JB*CJOJPJQJUaJnHphtH1hChsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH%hJhsB*CJOJQJaJphh.3B*CJOJQJaJphhsB*CJOJQJaJph(hMh.36B*CJOJQJaJph"h.36B*CJOJQJaJph Epox "$G﹢wdK21h+`hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1huhsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH%hwhsB*CJOJQJaJph'hsB*CJOJQJaJnHphtH-hhsB*CJOJQJaJnHphtH,jh7X0JB*CJOJQJUaJph%hhsB*CJOJQJaJphh.3B*CJOJQJaJph%hChsB*CJOJQJaJphhsB*CJOJQJaJph GLfgxyz{AзМ{eO61hgh;hB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+hQDB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+h;hB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtHAjh+`h7X0J6B*CJOJPJQJUaJnHphtH4h+`hs6B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1h+`hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1h+`hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+h+`B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH ARSTUWrɉ͔ͭ~hRjhgh)0JB*CJOJPJQJUaJnHphtH1hgh;hB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1hghZnB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH ɉʉˉщՉ։&(89 )*ǮdK8(hB*CJOJQJaJph%hghMB*CJOJQJaJph1hghl^B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH4hghB*CJH*OJPJQJaJnHphtH1hgh1LB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+hl0B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1hghMB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1hghB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH>jhgh1L0JB*CJOJPJQJUaJnHphtH*Lo~23EWdݍJLɴفhO6O661hghsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1hghqB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1hgh;hB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1hgh~B*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH2jhgh1L0JB*CJOJQJUaJph(hhl^6B*CJOJQJaJphhB*CJOJQJaJph%hghMB*CJOJQJaJph%hghl^B*CJOJQJaJph{LNЎ:;<GH !"gds$d7$8$H$a$gds$7d7$8$H$`7a$gdxV$d7$8$H$a$gdxV$7d`7a$gdxV $da$gdxV$ddd[$\$^a$gdxV$7d`7a$gd1LLN̎ΎЎ123ܑݑ89:j&ŮrfrZrrC,hZhsCJOJPJQJ^JaJmH sH htCJOJQJaJh.3CJOJQJaJh7hsCJOJQJaJhsCJOJQJaJ#jh7X0JCJOJQJUaJhBhsCJOJQJaJ,hDYhs5B*OJPJQJnHphtH/hDYhs56B*OJPJQJnHphtHhDYhs5OJQJ+hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH&' PQ(MN(UVYZhjŸŚykhm80JCJOJQJaJ#jh7X0JCJOJQJUaJhGt?hsCJOJQJaJ"hGt?hs6CJOJQJ]aJhsCJOJQJaJhsCJOJQJ]aJhwshsCJOJQJ]aJ,hZhsCJOJPJQJ^JaJmH sH &hsCJOJPJQJ^JaJmH sH *VW ^_x CDABDSsw<жĪЪЪĚĶākUk+hfB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1hRhsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtHhRhs6CJOJQJaJhtCJOJQJaJhm80JCJOJQJaJhsCJOJQJaJhGt?hsCJOJQJaJ"hGt?hs6CJOJQJ]aJhs6CJOJQJ]aJ<FGHإ٥&'WX]^yzӻǢs]G+hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1hkh8BB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+h8BB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1hVhsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtHhBrCJOJQJaJhsCJOJQJaJh hsCJOJQJaJhs5CJOJQJaJh$hs5CJOJQJaJTUVީԫثзwh\hP>,>"hOCJOJPJQJaJnHtH"hsCJOJPJQJaJnHtHhsCJOJQJaJh{CJOJQJaJh/"hsCJOJQJaJhhhsCJOJQJaJ/hm80JB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1hVhsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1hVhsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+hsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH1hhsB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH,.C !#+(*x ɱlhYM>:/:/:/hUhm8CJaJhm8hxVhsCJOJQJaJhRLCJOJQJaJhxVhxVCJOJQJaJh %(h.UhsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH&hm80JCJOJPJQJaJnHtH(h2lhsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH+hhs6CJOJPJQJaJnHtH"hsCJOJPJQJaJnHtH,hm8hm80JCJOJPJQJaJnHtH+h.Uhs6CJOJPJQJaJnHtH"#*6D\vd$&`#$/Ifgdm8gdsvxή¯T?????d$&`#$/Ifgdm8kd$$Ifl\#    t 6`0644 laytm8 T????d$&`#$/Ifgdm8kd$$Ifl\#    t 6`0644 laytm8ǰyɱT????d$&`#$/Ifgdm8kdR$$Ifl\#    t 6`0644 laytm8ɱʱ۱T????d$&`#$/Ifgdm8kd$$Ifl\#    t 6`0644 laytm8ɱʱIJݲ޲34HIèthhXK3.h8.hsCJOJPJQJ\]aJmH sH hs5CJOJQJaJh~hs5CJOJQJaJhl(CJOJQJaJhxVhsCJOJQJaJ+hxVhxVCJOJPJQJ]aJmH sH hxVhxVCJOJQJaJ4jhxVhxVCJOJQJUaJmHnHtHuhxVCJOJQJaJhsCJOJQJaJhxVhsCJaJhxVhxVCJaJhUhm8CJaJhm8TO>>>>>$d7$8$H$a$gdsgd0kd$$Ifl\#    t 6`0644 laytm8޲߲ !"#$%&'()*+,-./$d7$8$H$a$gds/01234Inٶ,|jG4)ؼ.ؾ $dha$gdgs$dh7$8$H$a$gdgs $dha$gdgs$d7$8$H$a$gds"45ضٶ$,bҽґydUEU2$h8.hsCJOJQJaJmH sH h8.hs6CJOJQJaJh8.hsCJOJQJaJ(h8.h8.CJOJPJQJaJmH sH .h8.hs6CJOJPJQJ\aJmH sH +h8.hsCJOJPJQJ\aJmH sH +h8.hs6CJOJPJQJaJmH sH (h8.hsCJOJPJQJaJmH sH +h8.hsCJOJPJQJ]aJmH sH .h8.hs6CJOJPJQJ]aJmH sH bl޸6j 3FG$4زt_P@Pt*t+h8.hs6CJOJPJQJaJmH sH h8.hs6CJOJQJaJh8.hsCJOJQJaJ(h8.h8.CJOJPJQJaJmH sH (h8.hsCJOJPJQJaJmH sH +h,GThs6CJOJPJQJaJmH sH %h,GTCJOJPJQJ\aJmH sH +h8.hsCJOJPJQJ\aJmH sH h8.hsCJOJQJ\aJ$h8.hsCJOJQJaJmH sH 'h8.hs6CJOJQJaJmH sH 478)-.~¼ü׼ؼܼݼ+,-޷񨕆p_P:+jh8.hc CJOJQJUaJh8.hoCJOJQJaJ h8.hc 0JCJOJQJaJ+jZh8.hc CJOJQJUaJh8.hc CJOJQJaJ%jh8.hc CJOJQJUaJh8.h`fCJOJQJaJ h8.hs0JCJOJQJaJ+jMh8.hsCJOJQJUaJ%jh8.hsCJOJQJUaJh8.hsCJOJQJaJ-mnpֽ׽ؽ-.12¾þ׾ؾ۾ܾ*+klmտֿ-.;zhzzz#j h8.hc CJUaJh8.hc 0JCJaJ#jTh8.hc CJUaJh8.hc CJaJjh8.hc CJUaJh8.h`fCJaJh8.h`fCJOJQJaJh8.hc CJOJQJaJ%jh8.hc CJOJQJUaJ h8.hc 0JCJOJQJaJ(.RNJu:5y4 $da$gdEgdsx $dh7$8$H$a$gdgs $dha$gdgs.12<=QRUVNO޾񫚫τ޾yjyj]jyh8.h`f0JCJaJjh8.h`fCJUaJh8.h`fCJaJ+jF h8.hc CJOJQJUaJ h8.h`f0JCJOJQJaJ%jh8.h`fCJOJQJUaJ h8.hc 0JCJOJQJaJh8.hc CJOJQJaJ%jh8.hc CJOJQJUaJh8.h`fCJOJQJaJ!89:MNPQRJ徯wf[LAh8.hoCJaJjh8.hoCJUaJh8.h8.CJaJ h8.ho0JCJOJQJaJ+j h8.hoCJOJQJUaJh8.hoCJOJQJaJ%jh8.hoCJOJQJUaJh8.h`fCJOJQJaJh8.h8.CJOJQJaJh8.h`fCJaJh8.hc 0JCJaJh8.hc CJaJjh8.hc CJUaJJKL34NONO_`ƾtit\tiitit\th8.hc 0JCJaJh8.hc CJaJjh8.hc CJUaJh]CJaJ hsx hsx 0JCJOJQJaJ%jhsx hsx CJOJQJUaJhsx hsx CJOJQJaJhoCJaJh8.h`fCJaJh8.ho0JCJaJjh8.hoCJUaJ#j8h8.hoCJUaJ$`auwxy$%9:<=>pqrsbP#jh8.hc CJUaJ h8.hc 0JCJOJQJaJ+jh8.hc CJOJQJUaJh8.hc CJOJQJaJ%jh8.hc CJOJQJUaJh8.h`fCJOJQJaJh]CJOJQJaJh8.hc 0JCJaJjh8.hc CJUaJh]CJaJh8.h`fCJaJh8.hc CJaJ,-uv +-.0456岪sf[[LAh8.hc CJaJjh8.hc CJUaJh8.h8.CJaJh8.ho0JCJaJ#j+h8.hoCJUaJh8.hoCJaJjh8.hoCJUaJh8.h`fCJaJh]CJaJh8.hc CJOJQJaJ h8.h`f0JCJOJQJaJ%jh8.h`fCJOJQJUaJh8.h`fCJOJQJaJh]CJOJQJaJ?@A|}ƻ|oƳ]oƎQh]CJOJQJaJ#jh8.hoCJUaJh8.ho0JCJaJ#jIh8.hoCJUaJh8.hoCJaJjh8.hoCJUaJh8.h`fCJaJh]CJaJh8.hc CJaJh8.h8.CJaJh8.hc 0JCJaJjh8.hc CJUaJ#jh8.hc CJUaJ12+,z{|abwxyvvvfvvfUfvv hghsx 0JCJOJQJaJjhsx CJOJQJUaJhsx CJOJQJaJ hsx hsx 0JCJOJQJaJ%jhsx hsx CJOJQJUaJhsx hsx CJOJQJaJh]CJOJQJaJh`fCJOJQJaJ h8.h`f0JCJOJQJaJ%jh8.h`fCJOJQJUaJh8.h`fCJOJQJaJy}~1234FHIJKLMNSjӺӣӺyuqbSOC?4hhsmH sH hs j*h"= hs0JhFuh'hsCJOJQJaJh'hoCJOJQJaJhoh`fhsx hECJOJQJaJhECJOJQJaJhEhEB*CJaJph,hEhE0JCJOJPJQJaJnHtH1hEhEB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH:jhEhEB*CJOJPJQJUaJnHphtHhEhECJOJQJaJ4HIJKLMMN@Ic$a$gdsgds$d7$8$H$a$gdsdhgd`f$dh7$8$H$a$gdgsjk[\] JKLMNOP\Ȫ􊜁vj5hsUh$hs0JjhsU hg0hsjhsU hs0Jh"= hs0Jjh"= hsU h"= hsjh"= hsUjho0JUhhsmH sH  j*h"= hs0JhshsmH sH .EFGLMNOP\>?@AIKLM »¤»s¤hh=hsB*phj5$h45HhsUh$hs0Jj"hsU hO_hsjhsUh45Hhs0Jj' h45HhsU h45Hhsjh45HhsUhg0hs0Jjhg0hsU hg0hsjhg0hsUhs hs0J(Qbcefgs  !#)*+345OP˰즢}qh2h\mH sH h2h]mH sH  h6\h}h6\h}h\hjh0JUh$hs0Jj&hsU hg0hsjhsUhsB*phh=hsB*ph hs0Jhsh,hsB*CJaJph(*30"*qEZ lgdsgd1L $da$gd1L$d7$8$H$a$gd1L$a$gdgdP FHIJ./0123*,<>@BTV`dfhprtv׾׳Ū׾ןŪחhGvh\mH sH hGvh\j(hUh$h0Jj'hU hGvhjhUjh0JUhh2hmH sH h2h\mH sH h2h6\mH sH 6"$&(@()*+,chpqrsDEFGHTռձèաաաաՏjh7XUh7Xjh7X0JUhOh6 hOhh$h0Jj*hU h]yhjhUjh0JUh hGvhhGvhmH sH hGvh\mH sH hGvh\1TVWXYZ[\{{`{J+h1LB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH5h+`hbX0JB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH:jh+`hbXB*CJOJPJQJUaJnHphtH1h+`hbXB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtHh+`hbXB*ph"jh+`hbX0JB*Uphjh7X0JUh$h7X0Jjh7XUj,h7XUh7X h]yh7X\ !"<=blԬԙ{oaoVVJVC h'vh7Xh'vh7X6mH sH h'vh7XmH sH h'vh7X6\mH sH h'vh7X\mH sH h'vh7X]mH sH h7Xjh7X0JUhbX%h+`h(T\B*CJOJQJaJph)h+`h(T\0JB*CJOJQJaJph%h+`h(T\B*CJOJQJaJph.jh+`h(T\B*CJOJQJUaJph%h+`hbXB*CJOJQJaJph'()ijlnopTUVǾ}NjNjrk]rj1h? h7XU h? h7Xjh? h7XUj0h'vh7XUjh7X0JUh'vhs0Jj/h'vhsUjh'vhsU h'vhsh'vhs0Jh7Xh'vh7X0Jj-h'vh7XUjh'vh7XU h'vh7Xh'vh7XB*ph#')*6vxyz789:F@BCϸ譢ϸ|hOh7X0J h7Xh7Xj5h$h7XUh7XB*phh? h7XB*phh? h7XB*phh$h7X0Jj3h$h7XUjh7XU h? h7Xjh7X0JUh7Xjh? h7XUh? h7X0J/LP}ǒRח"ǘgd1L $da$gd1L dgd1L $da$gd1L$a$gd7X$a$gdwKJKLMNO[?ABNOPQRS_;=>79:z{}~h=qh7XB*ph h=qh7XU hND h7Xjh7X0JUh'h7X0Jjh7XUh7X h #h7XKhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100514_germany_creating_economic_governance   HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,725835,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,725835,00.html   HYPERLINK "http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101019_remaking_eurozone_german_image" http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101019_remaking_eurozone_german_image  In practice this would mean that any recommendations of the European Commission to impose sanctions on a member state could be contested if rejected by a qualified majority of finance ministers. The sanctions do become quasi-automatic if EU states authorize the European Commission to go forward with an excessive debt procedure and the offending country does not remedy the excessive deficit within six months. In that case, only a qualified majority vote of member states or compliance will be able to halt the clearly defined, automatic sanctions, so Berlin still retained an element of what it wanted.   HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,725079,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,725079,00.html   HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,705959-2,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,705959-2,00.html   HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,728699,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,728699,00.html  Belkad, A., 2010. The high price of the euro, Le Monde diplomatique, June   HYPERLINK "http://www.ripe.hanfa.hr/edukacija/tekstovi/nova-struktura-za-nadzor-financijskog-sektora-eu-a" http://www.ripe.hanfa.hr/edukacija/tekstovi/nova-struktura-za-nadzor-financijskog-sektora-eu-a  ESRB is an independent EU body responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system within the Union. Its seat is in Frankfurt am Main. Its secretariat is ensured by the ECB. The ESRB contributes to the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks to financial stability in the Union that arise from developments within the financial system. It takes into account macroeconomic developments, so as to avoid periods of widespread financial distress.  HYPERLINK "http://www.financialregulationforum.com/wpmember/european-systemic-risk-board-5233" http://www.financialregulationforum.com/wpmember/european-systemic-risk-board-5233   HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,708241,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,708241,00.html  Expert Group on Banking, which was recently formed to advise the European Commission's directorate general in charge of EU policy related to the financial services sector faced the same obstacle when the group held its first meeting, on June 14. Only four of its 40 members did not have the background from the world of banking and financial markets.  HYPERLINK "http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,708241,00.html" http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,708241,00.html  Cini, M., 2007. European Union Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press  Walsh, J.I., 2001. National Preferences and International Institutions: Evidence from European Monetary Integration, International Studies Quaterly, 45, pp. 59-80  Walsh, J.I., 2001. National Preferences and International Institutions: Evidence from European Monetary Integration, International Studies Quaterly, 45, pp. 59-80  Commission (2004, August). EU Governance by self co-ordination? Towards a collective gouvernement conomique, Directorate-General for Research, Directorate L Science, economy and society 53 Ibid. 54 Commission (2004, August). EU Governance by self co-ordination? Towards a collective gouvernement conomique, Directorate-General for Research, Directorate L Science, economy and society 55  HYPERLINK "http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/7521434/EU-draws-up-plans-for-single-economic-government-to-prevent-crisis.html" http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/7521434/EU-draws-up-plans-for-single-economic-government-to-prevent-crisis.html 56 Galbraith, J.K., 2010. The wolf pack stalks Europe, Le Monde diplomatique, June 57  HYPERLINK "http://www.roubini.com/briefings/47577.php" http://www.roubini.com/briefings/47577.php 58 Galbraith, J.K., 2010. The wolf pack stalks Europe, Le Monde diplomatique, June     PAGE  PAGE 26 ΐАѐefBcd’ÒǒȒɒ󯫣v]1hgh1LB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtHhgh1LB*ph"jhgh1L0JB*Uphhgh)0J h)h)jh)Uh)jh)0JUh|=h7X]mH sH hwh7X0Jjhwh7XUjh7X0JUh'h7X0J hwh7Xh7Xjh7XU!۔OPQRSTU϶ϔ~oWDW/WD)hgh1L0JB*CJOJQJaJph%hgh1LB*CJOJQJaJph.jhgh1LB*CJOJQJUaJphhgh1LB*CJaJph*jhgh1L0JB*CJUaJphhgh1LB*ph,hghE0JCJOJPJQJaJnHtH1hEhEB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH+hEB*CJOJPJQJaJnHphtH4jhEB*CJOJPJQJUaJnHphtHFGԗ՗֗חؗٗ!"#$ƘǘȘɘ>\klmnииznzznzcWchVh7X6mH sH hVh7XmH sH hjh7X6mH sH hjh7XmH sH h7Xjh7X0JUh1Lh1LCJOJQJaJ)hgh1L0JB*CJOJQJaJph.jhgh1LB*CJOJQJUaJph%hgh1LB*CJOJQJaJphhgh1LB*ph"jhgh1L0JB*Uphǘl-6fϜ"#%&()+,./89:FGHIh]hgds* &`#$gds* dgds$a$gd$nܙޙ,-/689STJ_efhijvwndnhVhm86aJhVhm8aJh'hm80J hVhm8jhm8UhVhamH sH hVha6\mH sH hVha\mH sH hVha]mH sH hm8 hm80Jh7XhVh7XmH sH hVh7X6\mH sH hVh7X\mH sH hVh7X]mH sH '͜ΜϜќҜ!"#$&')*,-/0678:;ABDEFHIJKLMμΣhFuh0hshoXA0JmHnHuhs* hs*0Jjhs*0JUjhc&Uhc&hVhm86aJhVhm8aJ hm80Jhm8jhm8Uh'hm80J#IJKLM< 0 01h:po?P . A!"#$% @=Zieu<+I)i(xߋcٵ߷ 7Cn ~:y0L\?  .6C` :@&V0injs$I燤)Tsk:J)'?MROI[_׿IĮnyJ?ÿ"g?oqcۍebo4H\~+}۾]|y2A000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 "6e{}SyD(Oy``8leMih5 @O` dlY)yߔ7@&M*]wף(3;M4*8$L7Mbt{8esO{)7mRI+e``````` |>=}ӻ:߷;M3gzf -oqYzhS[vnܲϳ~ٜ/gӣk./Sݳ{t\}z|^O6̜>:؜Azan9Oʻ8@־T_l`7no:/U>4 OI星 L[:]{}tc/\b/ 96~7C˷ր}I@v=0brҚϏxw{fCrITƻ {3[gCٲR}y"zY伺)O! 6OlZ_M<c3d-37;){ph띟|<+=jx<#Uxߞ?&[\;qcղgv&p߱/OҬTZge,=^Y;뫜F?>^at<{>q秓׬+̧/[Vʺz=3nSb@"cgӟk߯jևG艹G$KC6l}c` ΏʸEO+/i06q,}DZ<u9ښٶ#;fY18c˱ mRٞ&ט_l(ϋKi~ݳlhEG=E? hpntZqt[=/bgeJYUwV }bS^>"ހq>-s{hg%^W/{n ˯ꆽaz|iJ>zc͝c?(C+/zCa``*>6nΒ<[Z~{mzޤͫ3W1h˭l؏ɜpA߱ > o7mF}Xd ql=^\mi=q hmQQOOLbz4Gf.?M|ʖS[ec-[6>2[gS|ۼ1Kc7k-hpQ:۪6L&H 6O&[/ҿ1Ooڳ"8^--;#ksvϿ1^m<|'En=G'ַ~g} 'sfĮ2.]d'/En{m,[mU6]*li/g/uk9#V֜8"2L`````fٺgxdz--j?lAƝŚ^cVXu (jG0>{x|Eʦ-ϖviyٿ7:1MQQOOӓ~[O3c"C2Kꀋu@ٲ!~/j:3y 1\Nxn/hytlRfp~Z^OSQןkce˱ ֱه1ehesIť|Ǵy.-;McٌeE{ tolوkTǨhzKc.g`^+Jg&~> lюT;7q3;q>g'5؞@kV5Eyqb˱:6O|ԿwAavTqX6mY[sRiK+?=e1:cٴ3w>w}{ٲ̡Ep6rW7H.'ut)M5).]^>v5s&orǥ} b ߦ'm/y;wfP=>k>Tnc{YϞXmzk59dOy;)'flz~CW\ўW\= 핽zc\^=>{*=wv2mxsy-N,k|}OOSex-+m[O{n컊g&|q闡|^#+E|p.<n 4@'E[/cޖ7_G﹑ǹGƶtvF{Mj~twӾ= FG_W+2Sm٩E{SZ i;0 L6ا[qU7xDZ|m7GS2x٣?Mgmi-Nyrm-S<4OG'o*+:-+eבM#B! g\:3hZ74w0ۜN}pZK{lL9(Iy{Ѵ>} JiZ.l鸏wtims3N{tˤ1kOq2l۲emѺgK+yL4]=as0ˑKX+-7kK+گk}>I]41i=`M/oԯw[%mDm&o 0@'lilb;Ws2>=--yF{:#zkքo˖YveVdK+[ħ^a殬pD````554wX;{a|Uo{zꨋ7ǻL:-,[Y^߷y)gu@7u hɆwt|=4;݊6։~y3Ҹ4e~>kQ/;; +^'ys@`````6켾4=_e,0.Y2<ڧuN`` >Ѷ3ږQV(+maqA"a` >i~(?OٲR=nEtAyjN('```}B2h˖M( w{ 00nh[?lY)]G} zX4eJYwYme[m00000000000000<`zۘ&?0 0ׯzE!mN P`eQVp+00u1 ;:F+nMb [N}V˺(+2eS``} ̳_f=L,[2eJTv̢A=W?lCw@00M{6y^morڥ&?/NQ=я_/\ ʬm׻ϻw3ۯa+u\ &06RǶyޚ~8 0k7kvE䳸.{Ͻhbn9sl h{w[e=125< f2t{i~7Lf671;Lu=5e ````cS8ojn9\Ue<(5u7הXuM. c]oއw=!;:|k޽o$.Udyޞ:˟͙200001Z1d{]rlܚ2y!3 V ΰ000e@4eG׽^ skᲽ\֩6({wfe @y^hnF3 2k<(kޙ```ƾV&Gu `bЖyQ/Y0001 Uv>Mٲ 9SeߦyQG9z Tŀ ^_KU$\PY8,v&8 @MцxDY/2[H*ΟY[7ws000@扺M:!߬9Z~ }W3wS3}ܢt0000ж4Oup\nXXMw' !#׼PۢEѶ%csX_T^p,]mkٵMll8^A````[hؕwұ-r&WgYY5ߺ1b`cz @3 ^U۾k*n[邍f@]Vgjxo6텰|^20vm&lj,HzB>Sޜl/"n~W>mմ㿽ݠ]a4NUw}<;Bcw7;}G=PVl2tVMAڏVF @mx)LΎ{7%e@veRiewUjU1 hr >v6}سl&u˻//S;t]\zh|˓1zۯ=u^hvvE= T6 cѸw&a```PYmuCٮUJv|VOSֆ|Y:]29>nF~̶|x8I{=Lf&U6ɖYLPeN] pf h?M]Z8瓰tv&2왬=.=r{O;|flUGo|S y9ƥgW4iάju[%7`````ul/d[fO~a~9=?#3.Oa W]-ҕ޻gϧ: ´xd}9Iٔ)/yENV|Zvۍؽ悻;ɧ?Mm|I}d+Q,})hKlc_CT~N1|jtbv^ʮh}=:߿'}qmt~ӧ"oͶyӹ^4d6l7}-}Un^}UœE\s''!.|h*meV~vt]mи7ںh8n;ݖv=݆ԎqnK#O1hkvoz&6k6ɔ=vVkiw ```b69ˎꫯnةu(>쟙մ7YO>[`zu[뗏?tbKO34+{3;[(8.az.ksnz>;.W1W6]띕 ~hzkgǡ9.˨3lǶϛ>'nI1ׁ~ҵ}l}SpȮǓ}y{yc[l{Z}p=]˃ߞ}9q#{rla|Cۋ'W{ű_fjOM^پe:eߣ[vQ6֍zw{q|l_=8#?Qz'ֽw^i`5aN>m/okKb?-=|زv<~1.7iU{C ˀh?m&↳z9C```M BѤ,,xuM;V#?X&۽{-+FV€5vuڦtR 49Jz\^ٵ&ʚ۪ E=000aɵG 4I[~tCC````Mme7j8) B^b@־M-d}.e```gە7n}x{VםWkut.49.@0006+auЖlBY!p;>:|￮3U  n26O~ɞM{a~7G{궧~0^F hj4M)K9hC9 㰩y2^'6k8l 1>_Wa2IEd@{iI7~~&DpMv1>_5棶*\ >ƀX^ [m: = 0000p@|rehк#Q6oN|GmӺuܤ _w^o;zmNq_0W u￮2 1{f6bzx5cDgl>}TWݽ{;<^2y9e```e o̥J(>M 2_,w_UR4o'֙U ϻ3G000N4/Rk4umxoњCqƺMxN|˺4gFG6<+\y60_'o000PjjNڂ:ks\uY#UX ^W:RiqbU 4ˀw:Vʞ?~\[ͲX~}嶲곢z]WUdQܧ @5 ?ꫯ&m6,jG.o l8 \iړM[ԟ6yo9=)0000>.T[R듣un|U_/F;?cnKlnk]/wH]$>P```` xvee`'eGGN zA/@O[6p/uHՑmu^EnO2vldS^0oz^8<m#ݎEdef};~E"N```9^m6]g.ҏ{so0xmO@VQTɆև_{B=y| k+ πd;DZfupv&o&m߬;2G0pŀۼnOՍ4{>Af@fm\͟ɛ{&.bG2/ C@-p~[ jh|yvQScn6c|5 ϲg.-J;n~Qdt5e```e \6"a*,,Ϛ#cz/&G]Ջc./n(0000^]9M:mEp0^=#O g p$5֝ݯX8y~#Sd 000 ڈn/bO)Y9! 2gh/쳼ml|_hyk&t[c/g|o :P==cׁ/l7zy ;d000P5>.]=k:o1udېU)#0M1 ;ZUXd_ձMx)C0000EkF>ra@lh>ɢ5o:+t0008_h:ecѺ>0 ̮m)?Y/r"_000@^OAĹF =o?m@ZhﳌJ` ```6hoeiS]~7G ]@ <~~Ƣz} cd 000Pyk}ux```=$|dSobH3e```f36rR0{/>zLa@xy85 q.b}oX_þ 2 {ZiLE|M, UdKN8 ``````````````````````````g` !$@H $P(tƀ*PN````eXl ],v $@H di >G#$@H B `Kcf# 䰰@H $q `KӆD/m``ǫG@H $ %-4â}S_ @u dƒd^̑-Tn" x[ GDza`{z"{F۫stna``` 6!|y! d 2! 0000 x[@<&by 62&ֽm+y j d \W+C~0000y x[ҡtyDgjȞƛ͔@Y2J`9.(w_SmR%0Vry~yrW!2+/uKay"2tܖ[Y>t&J*E؛:Mƺ"^:fAuˬlR{tX^Ȭ̪lp9"V*/Cңt泅wSey|~ay"2+[T!2+/9.>:\Nm9JPn2]la+uYc6tX^Ȭ-UGuˬjˆ!r[Nne":x(=:Lao>[p7ux]!2+/uKay"2tܖ[Y>t&J*E؛:Mƺ"^:fAuˬlR{tX^Ȭ̪lp9"V*/Cңt泅wSey|~ay"2+[T!2+/9.>:\Nm9JPn2]la+uYc6tX^Ȭ-UGuˬjˆ!r[Nne":x(=:Lao>[p7ux]!2+/uKay"2tܖ[Y>t&J*E؛:Mƺ"^a:fluy:8$t6ߨN/ӝ^']s{&a_ՅiؽItkg[wYԽȮcM׉Qt uJC'v字,O^z秩; 3L2Ꙍ:{)AzǞg־dwug^ow.bԛuN<7{6eWV3&>k߰|*Տ+~h:?LwaXyy1 L1Ip?A5o΍FuW~nu^eUE~vzo(]o~{kY~(X/[-2r0>9 ^tZnf=퇎p>N[/lk+c?l_{N{~9oyy([_Qxܿ.CYlqY6\k.$ ޿jKQٽqf|n?p`ڶ,v_ TfwұpZ﫝"{Uy:۝i݅<o}$V{4=4}32w<Oo{(2qor:Fʁ+>{_N؍m|7t{Ig_ GVߎGIessK/^|?C\a]zu/?|m+SKޝIۦW߿4)s~k˗߽2Ñf_+\}˞YggeܞOwttdᓉGQdeTcj;_o{/+*ϭr6q/p'¿E\60e&exS{) G_O >֎U߫Um =c$Ȇ->v{[ǹ>?:1/O4yaqEwmmz\EΒ"ps]*/EوJwUrK&}?ϬGyy45ORrmnSॱmOnȇ-z1hןٰ"z5}^}O[-^G0뼳t1 .etAL5O6*B㪊{<<6B<;45ɽd'¿E9]v 2VBUql~yQ?/.tǝ{d=l$:#6Y1ߖlnDt=fn}l)fK<-ca+EJ"ps]:E٨{z6ݣ<~M,Oex1>ߧ(^9#^806yz:v z:YlQ}M+f$}`KS$"v}3rnPUܸ,y^ԏfȏfw{|qll3dlxC  Y䒅` I z!`.f/\3wč1;?r֏ѧ`[UNStUW[}QfL?}^ƯPurl qmȢˋ#m {>x p]#3e<9SKl/m}Xz6XתpO~}L"ߌq.>6x 'Kapes_4c3/6ibii}Dް?:/K϶.:̢<~=KXY܏ eֳ ܣYc@V>iGHͼc+Zn=]/I&M33Ce8f mg^Y>eZEY|_dޑ{ΠߗnZ^8y;#t~ީXxa8AvIzmc>#ێvl?˱NwBɗu,fbdF̲y`}=`l6~c۹~j_ }G׾[bC>h77>^+9ya:e>Ydgy1E8yc5=<Ң<~q4OmY~yӞ/L 0W~?c~cM=_Di&hyd" 8S1s>.Z )Gvr^뽽ki 91mX>D}m;6g^x>AqƩVgmqw?Xli#ܧq:vQ\vmWظ7O)vM>l !/%O>7|S[12yXOskJڃ>= {Nz[ 3"4wfYUٴ>!/͜~40k5}7N5{ͳ~"9oDP.ycٕɅiNbV籝5N-v_t,{?L׿&[uy^?ꌑKǬepϸؚ_G]ǼB߾3O}c/^ ip#e_K3Ey:W( 9? -}yKF?ɾwu0ݢԴp^:/{ۓ>TY:Uaz+T/SlUu E${cGEqZ$_ A1m+8}}a,.,k^r^:/{݊={ĽҪ\cEd8|z,2Q|(O)פe1ќ~-_]=YDi&h:%I۫gg*fNcu1e8|apo̷cͻXAm l7˶HX<@< ss눥䣏>Jc|+3~wpO>ց*X_{.Yxs3{~ n<]UL6Awm=.҈#Cb9{:powGXzq0-| €338@2(i;=~[4]Kw|48/MeGEWoqm}}:ϭɕ|"u~8GXyos̱̄{`x$/V2mikߓjZeedLYV; ˆ(3{~z.e_FEb.ǰ능^$Oܸ&05I'I0bHUeC~EtfrB?[qvb4V([[t~0°%{Zo]_*c|hVWq|4EG YgL!͛{AlRm dp9YoxaInX]=tHwi&hEtuJM33mC2ʿY}J2jgIJwVy W!*e[W!|{*1Ϻye_̼t^ ɱjg ⪎Yu>GZ_ !"O3EIӣd-Yo 9c(ft S/|zYL[mRYre_6Q>S:ijemi23%l<]ngEt<>AHiL%e1m?l*t8on"Oʿl_VVՓG!:CwXU,^pTê2-l_r࿈'I:Fx0m?mleu]j̩(~ IJGỊ2>QEiV!u)_=rY"ju3e궪O"O#<%d1m?leu t,v֝>!$eY֧*tW?LE1uV!wp~n}rO"| cܫSDG~,I!m<ŇliY/GriEڊ.b + ٘?U6L,QHKtza#I&<(6C;^IEzNukYQz^3I46^F|VĮ7R>0>'are)_FVeЈ2yb _2~QVXrcS3X(bZ{l'_NqNewx -oPnFVb]/ /-sc:$co=ʊ؏}?yCf]o}bǫѴwWkjC[`\yzJ&k[Y Xsg'kWѶh Uyk:oKz:8G Uƒ^?5<&]#";}:س㔅Іx̿dp56S{c mk;8P^goM }sa UCw߼U Cxm~l}#wn3#\^ } / aK[B䬻o~=Fbᓁl~lyS`,*bye]/xIJs2pb`{ Vfbqk$'a5Rckt.fλV'žhv,/>c e!{_̖eX>|b>liwf*MU4})Flbk?c9߃+۰gMk{#VB+my[^^:X6W890'~'Ou,"A+y'oePO0G,2w46g?6X7 )+t ?5uvS\uه8*_̪GL,=ϟq mk,צϠrlUԯb<=3uAUu'\L]4oL>?17=ϿYKmɿF}0yBB<&GL~gYn=Nߞs y)a`1m?*m㴹k?26}[gs`uÚ%dž=g񀿋ҜnM,OH1>oyfk0W>Ve[j'##zn2F{xIGbi! be=cOKkw(ZDC lC^{:\'Ѿ*hj2/ x{biwegHOtg눥wUG*Z}?<'xse i>vvkoІYdq$/G x[cۿJx>-_m uc<I5`fͱ¿/M|鶽 zQp畏EhcٲEa*U+s2 ,>Avn,Mێ|鳥066Nܼq5|Αahtװ>WWgU:\sU2[7/aҤ{{cp C{'XߦU&ixZ̍){.yl}W7ObiɲYÄa!O}-[<= ~}tl瓵Et<>wQ9ŕŀޟ췒'xg{>%V#!EL~cZ*Fv*3bi ΛF;Miݳq/ j]tr@B?_}jw=NgOywٲZn[dKs Bz;L\ޗ6aͻiXo6S"4dx? ̊A#N{x^m j4! $xgϲ^{u ӢYDy|B~Et?·$o+ylVicX(ƶc8/Kw1*u:2#`^,Mamƶ,/.#KwC*ϷEI}V yؼYaLX:_7gEy(C Ba`71m?*m#?qHt9,R*3pS16Uf{3+Z۷߮F"4ŷ~7-MpeySn~?3ktGvx5>6Iu\Sk5E1,fa o-_n# €0 }ac$Z:NDx\nfӚ ˟دQOvdSE[a@c`0$#Z$ 붛尯{C|T1$ܗǽd'T 8S1s=IݔٷP6nCƠM.ڰx0JFGO&+}edAz4"eMm8/|'ZĮ?e7ľ8DW]WvqxavmK9`Fq2m:vv'3ӻkʶ#~'3Ox>~tl&~ lGfc.]־Ő4+'C!`/Kcs"??p)d/$/]X)<$+K=3s{6ݵh$TYLch\)y hەF$іf'n;!w;jur MrXKq{yО:'vg:nVIjw,VOo؞I~>=J>9.}יY󁊯spe0½λ߸ƹvllҶ50 ׾&gIyJgk 8$ɷw,j0<ڽћAi:: I, 7o G'T:t8'frr؜Ai=7d؇3NÉ] Uڻlw@{X>;Md/y=wf|qu3ls+ؿKm[͞OZ}'/Nc&\^R0ҧ.~8ːkϬa$ _joQȫ;Ldtvxn?o&Ṇ~}_4̼l/ 9Ѿgܶk/_ޟY;viF'K!ϻn;ye/>h{pmb:l^̛gIajkaCk7uIBK_hYi?Iqb{8~t>L1~b tjƘ^/Ͷ%%3""aA{ B>b/oŘrxmy,r̲LjI˳k34S@OoS?<' e m/k m3eE9yܐwaϑShv|xma>)/CxӰ?|>v왈Ka~ezsaGfѣ؆ķŘ Q?٧i'#*®5r)g?}d.yM!QG"V!6|@/Gb'{~ryƕτ|IEy9^E楞/?u޸f!Mqј:aݞ6/,_| ^G+gK}y +Ͼf<^Yc~x48g1觾ƞo .IF./| kaÞEX,Y!yGmv8~xrn-8M{՚MO觢-G^)yy"S~lcQq^,wN~a{Q'16 =c"O_1o(g_UIGZXB.k)sOU4 q(O^>3f\1ï}0>8fNX7iG9Mfl.Ryӄ/հ{='Z#>ϮS>Ov}Nٖy6e >Ecy\C/e΍ZHTl{"H.ێc~T.o2"}jTMQ &c+0VsO*5/Yɘ}}K{ybnslxDȻ5 !_7b8F,ZYײ1O1?yv-/s_7GǭtׯS.9mK{ɲd3#Ye)#=Z > #lW܌zOtO ۋc~TS+ up @MC(\=MZWFo^,i|^,Kcw3|e-Lu2lZ>~eBȹy{%ʣn?(mwmr S^g"u=OԛgsVE}6?1 ul3uKS&˴4Z,*.e},\4یZe>~5(aϵ2a<cQȿizV=!,fʺ%ǰ?_/Tryv=kX?uY<6Yiymk~kn]?Y6Pϼ~{z|fpdЗ[| MXI0yebX)>1e|E1(ƙ&p\EsOr`њH<TXdLIJFgq߷w1FSGd͵{pnc6Vc퟿6"n7K<_䟲x^d7h1Z~-#߳EKS'z`[D\({];r)Sr|9 ̰|8=A޶69ib_Nzl_||/s|K~'ːgN9IZ9MEڛ7fzf{i?iteO2ygX9'CP4hI'WV_+g(m+F^L(ފص~{!voڞ#ۇ~_kX߇=70KO cGV4XycۗWB{y1fFw?rhMyMyKGue;vqlV,1-v7>Ј! 9-ͯ}tWď6  2P~} UgA}o+Z@uZ_h&{B|Ҵmg^5MB>Dv} ~gX Vd}=!?}|Xy?,r$-mHV;.my6e56L<=}7}o #n&hgƆl?+B9|;6 w`J!ޗ{-W"}@J-$k'{2ci˫M+wDV_K~eN{v62#c\^g9Olt;Fp/ȇTY(Bł/,<׋:B>!-σoc{VYwyBNgW w8%u-;`,׽J2|۽;﫠O_3o8w<rl?|P>_Ę.n+}H!}ݴY]Q}#gk[8O( =>4=:иi^>p=!o5;m7\Eڋkt:;uGXeXi/ij_CLa7i}{m1/tt cb7y]~ewҼ~eyE/E}\v -c<.0#/ǠM15cż63+>l!\C"uobUя8el?mw2uC_^M阴hl_Ɔ!ڸ<} ֪yPgywsV::ڳ4y \zc2w;K;ԧz ›ˡCY{mM>X޺vu.v {]gU75FЏfVUf*s~U_[gUeeĸrQǔ]h/[2O播d+ €0 fb0^ubv"<'խ>! €0 €0 dĸ^T0Ko7Ga@az 2Fd*n;h'㶷Ko €0 €0 b 'ƵX:/ 7o^:a@a@}a!$iVN! Lmm?J6€0 €0 qd HC?-_n# €0 @CHӵt*.^tU^a@a@6 #m[;į0P?h't$I@$I@$Y (?Q'o+f~I$ H$ H%XZq޶y~N( H$ H$ HP,]{‡0 €0 l C z . :a@a`1 UD\ƥn__a@m|Vtp*w Ko奄?N>~^&o7n.onowKYwK6`@vI8V#꯾*yizr1g%? uhmot|+닟FhR^OCe[<:qh:̊I G^Q67g f9i7.i'E}bk_NCOC><3w6N^>^ۍNX sH;,Z]~rfA8b~70ex94qXa,bWĨ_arxx51g7Ic{7v"> F=ov %,p:H$A2:=2^' h6j=$f',I7e|2en.نm@[6D$ Y?C6g^6_m+ݸ 3 nN !Bl'Œ1xA xH!2Cqcl$(ei&30d!>7M#zگ樦$UG#x>y}ϩf~? s.xZ?B_2%g5]s{7耏J6nz8xMVV\ʐ3m=ux ?fN\[~lqIYm5U{>;KUշڭ1rH2g5.OҌ>B 4l4vo}kw|V>mgVsMsY_?{}mgzk/ϯ/o bw[k7پ]*b ɸzQ=G%v|o<~Ŷ<=bH;}Y-n"-.8'fqCGZG}9[f}=.uF\9cYS2da__!ɍ}O;m=-_t3߁nA+D.|&-Ƨ5VKʿ Y幙F}162SIwW^ `4)=y0~j=ns?䯾/~urؼb/ƛ7QasuvMN_.\O};X}>K{~)\{<GsQm;@.5l#Gn>/_e\\]xwpV[*ƃ`(mQ;/9u$Nl ¨00? ?06PBI`_Ʈ/oVϸ蕲ÞUg\7n/1FL-dUدQqtOq8-? ޅmvonɻOAڷ|.jPnn[ywO<( }{ϔ6NCã>;Ⱦŵl{f۷z%}wtү0= I+[gֲjdjƥ(^d].~s9{u곫`iǥUЍXI+#eql澖&0RȖU\:#~\jqIXY=iqy։dW.*Ҥ-.y4x4./=VGcYvNUrj ozIw]~&Ne44i‘={O_NhK֗mݳ4t>$VA7jcqƀ48MZa8-c44i`Ḑ-_i77٭и$|ֶ48MZ+_G@v0澖&li մe h\>yɖI;/T00? I+Fҥt9 _ip<"1qIZ$Rv~&mV'9ԏGHs_KV:~cBX_eNu w0qI\KÏӤ-~E@ZEґڢ>G yĭd.6n5.۾gMÏӤ~a }-MZ:{MV&Aԕ6nJVq^[nkqa` h\߸{zvuI+g&}-MZaju1%gCܡfu<+.50\IVy,i" @Zb%JI1<n@\Z\ZH,Kw|l҆IA. ?Nvu/fN#ή44iem#J` ivϭWj6Su^k;b+}-񒫖v\Yy<ߨ8WI'p{>ꭇX(Bӡ5٣H[ Bm[mp0F{^ vB_G[6զ;h71;tރί}r+fb?4Q0j稏W_FϊM"G~&mQv ikiIGj|1r0rd=vEQ-v\BtT]z6wa6ƍA7A{ݦG9ŕn;p ﵜQem#h;v#5}0%)Za}6 nJG^f!toM'&OʰΫ֠~ۀm4lV~ ilX?>S`f'JUħ`7d[xQ*o2#y[>CW>߃*n-(F̞V8w5bcJ?[#Lv}`x4i ɜ<ˆm澖&>^ҏh $',ӟ{j0we&WrJ]x/ϵNQ58gONZa(nq!o>>ʰ/ח?ݸ_{z6}R^_NkGO[Ym@:2yune0{{{!nnBqk>ƥ|/;~(>iY>ˈYrZ;t;輌ڠs=/k7n&ҽoEpqma9y1`]3~<~i9#Ѧ7.awft~@5eR'۱q㳉2CП]gtiOǥT>Ƶ׻[?8B\?o8pC.&>65}m>c"u8~qq$w㺣~hyxoo4iɺkIL6iJ' @JN8jof|nB#i5]\KSgm*Wj7upMCfBbVlzmodװwd6?ϱ8h|iAuǖEkonteߓ:X(sۜ n/,oۃ.>sj@1e+eضR ײGʷJ9:cp3r)_f3te\-=ױXK44i‘={f&ȥ{{:7ܻM\t>Kyl7|Z|:;c$|ez~&mV'9'GH3NV:~cBX_;[˸eh|˨8کSLz:u.M~WxNI~&td}- i&-S``+Z[{^: fKSGmo&t9vm6dQik #:ꗱ$ϦmSs\~ɧyGyӹ]=v^4iթkog\:'̷Ӥ/a`P]_xȥw~ܞxN4ix}K/21f&2ۤէtɤ/a@8 K[7I$#iqIW:aU8? iʆgCZÀp .+7KθI/c8agIv"xLviF_$wR١w+E^/?W)9 jAg&Bp>lHV}ȣߝ%G>qW_%[3NCvΧe7ٍ`6 t76W&xzzr.r,jNв\Qrɥ?$ֻqJkC݄a@a`H2gan[_PڏJc|dk?]\Ge\aq7q}{Tv/WG[C겫"ӝf]5qC81|Rm L[- 󿌂7߬§B=\[,6< 6o5&-죲\0kb}-m%SާNX۷Kҍ'4Ӱø7j6It`b |5D7@Ael?Ӧtg]CC;a^¥[_*9oZN;SDlۧnQޭ }Quӕt+08="^Reѧ^6~_Inqj}fNݭo{k]\;;(\{7򙜳|Y3/4c铞g*Kta@a@4sV6I[\)yk7+ ?j78Cir 9:uwK |jQX6as _Cp?0 av0e;Xi7V8^|t6UN [@̱gk&OWƴv_$e[oK|a~Qph G!b^dc}aK7k~?rw+/N8,Czo?*qDGM$eb'ʈDki:8u~?mS779:891lI Κxb>r>h8?=⹴Mö!Po뵩2h{Y{i/~ _MNNs21%dW&9k"kk,{ƥǵʝM7K9ʛҙt& €0 @2 ?-#gWlm< ZY/cYgT_ƙh\:I؉z?k_<>@uČwnqQMIm֑74%'I/7jnww7ӏ*{9AOa@@9ȔKs_:V㚔ʲx_ڗ7k駷[:-oYYeL?N^P&нZkKc{\t;Ym* gz}&ks4dIeL&a8۰ee2 ]ELzUpĴ\%Dqs˵sk8 $ ~G{vC=렏zρl=q9"'O&{7믿~/?~/_vshd|qv}lo_?yx% ٤(#m.OEߗ30~t-68{0w=jCkm'y~{%5&ϳv+Ǩ_o̵Ɖ&qA#{r}߅ߕmcqM׾6=њ@ʰNk'ӣFFx$]!ȵbmo:?|&l=19&lAb"ziÍa>7>5l4Y\/~ே^h{wgA=|'[Zh{C݃~cch%#7],}ZjA\>Y׼R9 Yg5߯ω9/![}g7eVFL${t;X 9#2VrXJ/<61,M_!CwqoK/޷JC{މhMo"}}o&7mm?:&mq|W9J톻2(eiγi)ϣ']HENxO>$#ӷOsc^:~י_r 9lp`Qƽz C;snN{jYa@ࠗ6/#qy;s2q4Xz%GcCm_7 >*m]'Č4YOґtT O\~NX3…  P3>INUel|'sυ3}>/bXj#7']k;尶Pf6K;޴Ŗ˷qڰ:8ȓu.61 aOgV6MjŸ_IT;ǫ[[x1ȭeG\OS:!ٺ6Lu\KoMe\OSfyro$g$gmZg+flrlx4k4їW7wgә^|.ͼ~rye}Skw=&qށ-Z]{oekt,jF֮GśX_~/\{1sxǸ&Ācs /hqwCDD?$y2}Q>7 b~arEq2W%O5~Vdk=QM<џM|1vxqZvY $6z"kgT}(x*z_S4+f\r/͆{u4r˥-F;jX-@3qfJD.eƝ#OfK5<.OL>̓hx"(7mǍǶ/>k|n`ct9]Jң00 h\Gq2:|;!)"gyMLI.ZF mQM| ^xOˇqq  } Y%a1+X\59|LxZ>Xɇs43+{?mkj~gKkīŊĹ[ZUb^sS>1qiv $ X6y>o&wҺm]~'}^ug>3y^Wf;}~M?p 5NCu]!x ‚0 d ,(ܿ? Tz]%s9rf{|У=Oiz!,om#f ~}2  s~.Ka`v h\]¡tHW]rUFyϡ%*5Ӝ5Ω}݌gZ#KYa@МU8 d ɬa2pnO>Ƚy<἟OO64ߪ#%yjwM`c}+ 8r^WT:ǀƥu'ܭsJqMqgkB1rOnǥյѺrfêxb<+ؾ|bWg,}wm9j__"4. Ye~̶Σ^JcQ}7Gϫܼ[1zk˾`PsUx^1qiz wzxb^>US9g+8oя*%N$}}ӓqk[ow]a>u]m[rΪCi@վ7lq/ =ːq]+9׳J?ϸgq26<k"wzS}a@a@ܳ({&q./Z~uTtQO;79oZ>/ Op\=2H/ €0 €qZ?oI1݋q{ĥc1l5W߃]xa@a߾|{oqMw/ͻU+xfE7|i@Ș2ƪŝp]+Vp:[ƣ^hl__aOq?mvl{0pzA}!{`?#w…p]ğ &DMJkfl8p<9NqfZĥշcX8ָT,{bJ_?H$IF\-cW|5/=t=9kkΪ>5LJaR0qnx%m tZ ^eVp)c9໫9ea SyoW?KŲg'}6xbi$x:?.H#>}6c9qZ<ݧ&?Yä&5. =>ho+OP;;;Ioӳiqޯ%_}-J}jGqq8rAs=[|~ ;s\:]˞D|zy6Z,߻&/Yä&5. l/~Z3ZJ˃bj,oںj[{s\xu;4ga_< k\*MOo^yq3G=fƧ6~xp^e/g>EG(dRVV{{{`,άUsxrij|jY8;xs˷? ׿{8.bVI笷:}W*oudh+ʍ}|/nbƒ,koAjx^)r^-N&d/['Z FŹrmXY qnm]3TDqǧwmKc;Uw ~=}wis yڽSWB^Jq5;淛]w Wڍy=*o.%mt ewg *|o/ypB|\˟'eckţcM}'phM[<){9tmwjnzRw }np\k9h64.8"nk ǝ}gu[Mg>@fX߿qCڵJஃ _o8]Ճde{P5<'د1w|z |xp ~_f]Wlzٹ^ky}m ܹIkGɽ/S=6.q_Җ>rQ,/|~>;G}.m[` ܹ8(NOOw/*#ӯ#` ||?۽3?Glyx6v3|7ZWT^|8ɸ$kuq8~9bCoѴ0y48K9ʛM5]6M_rjچ|}0_/}Vmo9kJ}U%׼㺓p>1x6]Gӏ%;N:a̶ͺOG_2zw&__~~yƨwnw,\~Kc۳>~_uogIy-_<+>6.˳GuO94w^y^c"1g,zxvq/qjݫlnc>þhuȍv)f}6egK?/rmp@?G/C&/~;0{Rި>|]19z[Cg{.= ;5ų8{O{i+LZUXY-hd\}k7n b6~L}76:@~Wݕm7_(f{>9w/wcEb\zua}(|_s`sָyaϛ؛_=3 NZvti1U847i;uI^Ľ-̓ Y>lF;8}5/-esErig>Uu?oKk8oeKEaڻ4wϼ9)DZn=)mb`t~ʳ\uEO x4뵘"k׃/w~uɆjE,|Wŋ^)JWK^4-eIN@N… nooO{~˘r}ozwb{f}ܕrh[~;f^ϳyɬrV?_Ƹׯavo; ̡[7Z6VLC1xo{rlzלu6 ҟ00 h\NS~ґcq?eU`!yqz.n!P(z;>9{jJ$5g&DiĀƥ'|Ρ7p*qձ"y ?ZRrj Լ/CuΜc֜UYTp5 4.g:K[7/0OkWS~cgEj3|x˗/}?5Ȗ^4g6 CX4.[?({ݓO>w ğ#1&W.Icy~b 6p-5_([eGԛ9kyFI(>4.K?3W_uQφ={xjmfEٶSΎ{4K+Mq߳{5o^4gkkW 4.KMMOOׇ߿]7<W,4Um5x;^yI^2s9C9kt'yOy9QV-Qړ',yԓri[e|ZdG9!U9ny%j )^Ҧ8wNͧ£G)NlN뮒̃fshozu4{SͣY|.ͶO3[|zi{q3"Ug4{5p&0z_>l~Wt ?J|؄ g~b *2~SeԛNiLí﹒/z洓89NׅY0@4=Y܇[U{ڶx4:渓$_pr0>8CcMwA=pG~vM~|wa9|{ȩ :8` .Z_ENNJ W/^kw9ۃf(C ܃ҔCN6gQGߊSk롮ȝnT =INr53;8F;X:ގ7{~U(LV'comCDlm:BhkpmRgQЂsɽ< m50һٕZ12gejyK9dm41x(r*\o;uDep<w['ǥ-pymaA/"MXC>!(05D+a noU-JUx@lޝm^![ҫ\e#Dkz֣gf͏gfcq9ϙ:}R_)3l/#¨4>t>4gJSI:|/,]NKx>Hŭ i Eg{eM6El[XlJkfG~Yg}Q<*-ϻψW=+dzxB)Q NdaqэsqtEI[,t.wx.(*m?>㾟ӟ9aL$WvZZYsoLκ-7 7E4;6Vkߵ84is$8:.3tt sY ۻd~9աϢx̦m.-l<4Y,QN֖e弋/ߋfSylv&.~#XOhgѬ6 w )ض5euؑ :)<͸dqC/2x;P餭Nںy̭5wjhʦ  [*&/^wӷ)7?`G}ƍ=Wyy Ѷ>Ck=)A{lwڥi ;k_CX3m1ڃja[8]؂~v~@ψcm- E4 G[}:W3#`0}ShGa&͓PΏ gd1Yδe3m[Xy%YV|glhj6S? zX~qk jFyׯ^%.MLL8N8۷*3VޫN4|Dw-2t(Fbi=-EŘXv4c~ GU+wWfu)E|UFO5,QEi]x`l2%O\?9֕N-ҁrܬ'ہ\~Ę6cU|R h;l+ESΕ)s:bᙰבb"c.>նќ+~|k.]r~5jSVf)KD#l5J }10#D/ϵ`Tg v\ {>h׉B6Zi).Oq-Kjmn,6X vZŨ[_针iSwxS痃{5r?|2ŕ@SYw ψ׀ǁ/m+Ɩs'fIG>|ޜp峳xMkE&W>Nt;; {b2Wy0Y׾ݩ4㞖<>ӽ <=v_A+%Os8~|JVt;/=,SKg˂e\^)C+*6cK -&F3K3ض#"O+V#cLehH?bǝR`b0i 51]NT8397N^1W=?[p#XUSj`e^|H.9R_ qK3nO?ޫN< `2a x?wu1x#La,my&Wg&Hc.tڿZmP;SĘܺnzbJoSjY^t]fShK.}/I8JLotHnu4__<?a.I")&v8ώZ<'40V$F&\r,сћ-Otؗ2fsԉ:UG;*[g/;?Vy,y GY8ݯZgtz$bhOjĶ÷~ 淲*x[,%wwڥ/[r5*9m¯d.*Oόx=uV燀ckwIi5c2߳~7iKKwgZk=0j p4׽SviKC\ GS֭K Gjm8dL"$ /AGZ}Yk?n>m?1Go2mܳ鎯yݶ,+@X,j^g/c405LZXcwͽ Ngį]H!_,_np{|d>8v>k :Ż8ߌqRw޿d1zsfqR5v 816sf&&A^Dk'f[ٶ%,櫶9uuY\?GFۼ߶>Վ1ka^,yљs/s+uwYז ~!l^/m\v,,ɵK@_xb<n.XeyVoyA *s)=E:?zT_,|^biE Dեg3>ޤҥKcؑ>駟o׮]֗xcooG߆ $i\z&WƱ0?o9G=~( N@1ź&&̱v+[XڲU7Q ZofoWlΞkUK+ljv!bnMj?&WscY^>_y}}V$KK G.zݏ~#ߕ4lԞX6_GIQm1yra, Ga:ҶOϯs6M9> boXT4wLm:|ȍȚk{5j̗wTOhxx bHҸ$,8vv1ƒ5#v3m#jK};/VbY٣X/MrMzy#_4QX>=wtLNQHE;㌿Ef?d\Y~߽3g ꒝9I:kxx|@@%bi_w[Gc^߬o}7kE?qp>1/nTq9o~k|(7✝wZԣS|$oO>TWοNMbw;s )V b}vkWW2t& >V4%:>I Ӥd~}jۘ_.1վG\o8Vc^| zwWXvt+hAlEY,xsieͽ19ӻu s?GŃoT:uv=7pu-5G 2?$RLgu=D: o,Şa+FfV"銢ϸvIwV/tRu5Ug욓} 3ÐNEgnjx=Y_[%?CۮU巻^|4.5Gt`ѯ6tzs=8}ܶVoWcLUZayHᮛ|<;E5QoyE;qu܋g7h}t{["=nѯz\U{A3=mn{T%?vKvav熝۹WrM,3w]>ځ~s77֣e4ܭ-hE \S<ݕ!Lw sx~G~u6a9cjW#.Gխm2}|_{)~.𱻌wznbO\Ж囟S>̼{#͹`󜻔r(pQ6y]:W> KW)du ym<)m^pV qU8T >w|>@^:}۶;+Cșe4ާmzMf1uznOo~omv/~ @WzVu4.@# 3\#kquOm06̆YpcxLGn d#ZXr #EHLK ۙ,v+Uv|{k.gP]|F_G&?_8}O勦pɝ=>_luqNMYi\~v ʼ|sZ<8G)170 o-FܹEѠ:%wX\[ ʰƽ&}qtWY7hmr܃(q| ^ߧ%iP2ܗ;]s^|sLq~_}~W#:b-)q^` >.L U,䁥գ{%Xg{.ۮᾖ}/L{^XEە-aM6LxJx)K٦ڋs)d4Am.|ðu 4WGGmQiDUWa{?\Cx oaEwk><9W4u-YF}[ ,(T&徇99/]퐼o׽_w|,=~b bsӲ"$^tx<O^uп|.|lה߾p6A\gCx:Z~1g~qo%VY)ף}a?[߃x+[&S#^PݗψXzXZxk(9 ]2/%rnOv(~X.\ɽ9GTM,-%.Sx* *Ũa~xo,&J~.,Iڷ԰+]=CJš>ɨLm{Wĩ4g+g[Fio/{[ѝB;yKd{Ks^IYڎsnt><ԑ R'6?O93ZCz'#ϝ}L/E|q+5MXoe1OcuVz׵2wWS#;&)}:|/#,<򽕎{)l^u?+~KXU K#XψIXZӖ! SM[8_7֖-Y >U_TzYm*.= mx`y;`F]_N!p'~ ^U'k3 n`zKc,/S(O\=3ʭ^,=/WjۊA yٱ|6{Ͼl^ݵkMAYJ=ebu<^bס|W]_QeR ^ f%K_v|trz{<}TVkb3W6Z kR\̵cG,5Ӥu׉nΥζ^tsu.s~Oc~O෬^؅~|0Yzx.Ѻaﻨc*GJ4ϳ<ʁ}3q&7`;ڞXfGZ@81h,Eډ׳)3bʱ3>✱qB_|묾\~yzim `Mr'cN}j ghw&O~5T"7vCݴ:(&M4^֚3Hnit󛷴Ĺ Ħ3MBZ))HhPĨ6b" {1wuq&; XU33 n|:+x$|?'&vaOa[}\Z|L/|@o_6 ˔EjRQ1 N̠™ ;x~eM`MgO:02.OR~Ҕºb? !qSOȽv]7XXZ<ԯe?+"(njnA&',]O,XC8*QMWP{ž=E| m~[ (Ɲ#=W1Ekghw6h8z 7.l-hN,?w뼊rw*=ϡ$8Ng'!6vie͝[B͵øeemM^A !uRl~OYm"\%~r~1[(L Z~օ˿0dif:|; - 42XwoA,MCBuY+(gnlP߇f>!}"N~OIǢžgt?j:o -.¬)WVU7NYF6Cbmhq;HlOv΅TH9. 7|}$4ڢ2lyQ;4=Y߯A5sRGJ[uNlOjscjfڧV52.+koSVǨQ?'\Wm#Hm&pT6ǁgʸ>E،+X ʾ9nA˫rĦ[+n Ɓ%y, Wgn[®Lf>*_Ra鯐8i[m%;7ؽEgT집+/*֭:yf:kE\oIo;;s0o鯾*6D}dxwOG j3k! ltqil?QYՒ)z*_rH,ͼ\Ӟ҈ ,ٶEޱmu3g$bj-w˲_( N]X[i- Z ,mm[LƟLgF42ց_{!?kcխK7n1tI9sns 7J\a5=o-Qg:|{vvRDkXo~=Ipx鞴su˲ou3ˮ{ ~Cuaoa`|Y cpŴz ;BZmiZx4|c1,ո+s3_z]f^g6>>ǥ>p?яjF,I|F[quO#unbj~O`iҚ\CSNuociK+}c/OU8=y: Uu4==fX,w˫=]ͼJעY*뽙Nf-|>:ώ5FXdc\~+m+:ioaxb$IOe{;KmcV/3/3Ԙloܸ`(?QnII~Av8EXi~4sfͼ-m|?.[7iVߖpJC|LԹSXZT6دSoE=v~5}=Iaz]^{O`Y~\^\S [eK@dhNkٔ;q)^Z^ԛi$C(Z4SIwnmx~|ƒuleiҊlGL~ Xg4vZt]4]CP&^5=ccA:u?W`W?.o>gcN\mV5Y㈫5y V";r`s|W,muqnnkjgiǘ^o8:茶TF:isqt5=rqi_oZ6=)XڷbZ9ʿ^}18 /iz]>^gǥ+{q$G_ռuԭZǰIKJpNe^8q J ^Ym{ozoqzg? 0P/a?[߽@+תhҭzVM~+>5}: '?X~D^^^ K9iۥXbGC ~guOڥ}>@ϗ$ӾXvVp,{v rLkq5΍7ql/mv8cɎX߅ok-j0 {'z{2IzG|>K?i jґDZ}}l-ݮ1i?5'Feӑq… 6݇鄹uzr Nǫv>G[m@I]Z JyoԟΟ ^˻ym}ő1(z!MR4G}t٧ee@m8%WB.ɺF0WэfcYuV^gퟶlU>>ǥr|]bZ4|-?Q[Ν0PFqs˥3y<bm1O\EmNN>TKX[އ6\$O#[[ŠUwʊsCLCέ\ŻrYoOha,zIhk=GXm?ɷoV?.=s7F4xz4\Ϣ[1CWֶ2E5ySAV6+e؏P:h[ ǥWm(ik IV57wY /ηBgetW۠m>ǥg?q꥟uT^t=\B_'g N_um8aV"G001 n,E`D؍e]3[-OZ<,Jx[Ŭc[Ŧ[L|DnbqX.Q,ٷŕdgu4Co1(y&Zy_㮧U[ ,dznxky 1vvX0my ==ut9-^yiϽL[mbx] _ jXZ p^)üF[[+_\9K',^k῟ܒdvQufoȺ}a=ún?s+,dܳmߗz/y5Iq) rM%uO3^@=Qv'aNCkohl*S _pҰtjq͖ zjk4/Ĺjr|KƬF Lih^Oκ-ї}x8, l?MsՍ&w*}=):|=q[͗Z/|,,bg/^Ǻ#߇|UwN[/}oٯg$h qV|z>Ck¹~$ҿR>, t@y2mKZZd5qxF9w{N󨵎z|GǕ?+AЍym$p,G#9&z,N}/ﺉJzV2vR=إ'{\m`]\2J4]#3_Y7 bݛkڹs>.{~p휻F2T@ciC?֟)h}M?^DQ_GeC{~Da,Q>mM̸OgɘP?,˷At^2z6+5ͥɸ]w;ȻXX3Aǭ~TWv1h}^aŠxtnvO]Vstmvnk~~ z27Ap@m & yjy}]ȕ~gחmje7H״IW8/FiecmSai:NB,6ն\ &ccFzbZ:c3&b10ߕc‡L}Yg>ɊE`*QӁ87JFtIb(ljc1m X^g-yk̳˦X)v{;[r%X PL0^%z~ c}Gv$yGteRk~uϜ93:O?wgA|^XH Zu X &)=ԙm)>,g8H]TCpIp#96Sp﨣Vka7q;_'ʼS\*l+CJBm]@39hICq3O죞{nxܹ,aϵڭZWq19y z/zsNV L˜W<ԏ=s x }d|_,^^7ٹ*g~oI^'M oiNg$_+\h qi~&^~Ҭ+Gm|ňXny>'+ٷݩtyNGշL~tO,<9{WCܝJqx<uʸQ|\`o=a,xmv(bQ[90n^ԓGgxlzi]:~B݈EF_4W dۭ9vmLihel * [cXܾ_1ߋGXM*-{W`ipU>{lN=kKqP'V/ {vQ6ijתꦟWJ_F{[XOAӧ_@|KjSC^Ez/5g#,g΁𙭇2;aj(WZ^9Ls& QߐZa~7cm7A{_szyakxXSǠZRaz}jk _G{ciUmqQX|G8jcWo+}ҪyuFtV᪨/Lk6Wʌ3®Q4wB~ѥ9;Ö,\of4b!ZWWYհ4/L+ eRza`>Ni~~>0nT96\S8AXL1֖CL.0=I+VhT.ens ᶵג;e(!3ӜAA? y+l[rq_dߒ#&#=}Z|닭JcΣ`OiZhgu34Dajv8GaVzi9I޷cF{NϷp_tE$>Y-]Zxm_tQʌUҫsC1Mρ3X)4}֧GHXψӄOcD4V?dת"}ͣQXZtkM]U9KG>03l.wZd.ҵw-Ld%9 ? EDzrGjD?$vCnN&6jqK\v~y#Б[={rX:qMR:7mc5Cql^:Nf}[IojZg>DZ|w͍GǕ>}jEj\ZOtwz?ˈ?X0Vץ_pmz~/sxG >87RA2zֿmLu҄akOYd\nab"=_/Ҷ-Ԯ+DM>̹}`r'0w _a; & Tqc6kinK_B;=.Tֹsʮ~C>[F a[H)'L~Go*‚Dz׏|{H[#45r+e8P8.GG߷kmQD8u }чS-_Tmt@(N`0!utEIS1%9B' NmZ] [;1BclY3gim1ڿz׻޵Ye>G㶱tF)?J{nڵBǧI>KIW_}u?Fp֨|KKoybGF+[]꣹1C>A|-u#6\ۂ/YГ pPnI*l/B ԩ2ۭU0Y۠-]{ɟYs2t騧lvUl6˘//(j&C&:lo# le#nǔqv76e F)9i:Fג{vs42xS~s/s@ϊnJ:XOz'76vme09y\[ZX޶|-}YeY?92.;;Vx>jai7o?iDKt='^cl,ps4/};0}o?Q|?ݼnaXڭG\獞IfKi~9nǷ:jGDͧ=lbbNOoIm\nI?s@\}^>Ygqq+cfƬQpU4e`{tkRheJk6OcS3R3tӘ\{$~zn?l/N;YZ>MǼ&# >O:lZUiM} ǗI͋Bw40ϱhO1ۭi MsŶNI-Khl+NRVh7j7\~hz_UZmXnU~iϕ>nw:u:MqM'xe hsS?(4ph@Ҕ/ʘUfq]|K&z2IHԒ1Y𘴮z:KkۣSuE2Ć/Վs?ynǶSZyٮ/gsU|:ժ/~@wێ4Es,&=y;ˈwM] u)^.O)6 ondeŹQƲNa0Yc:wQ7^J}_7`=xPs2S8w23k qI-tw˘繻%^ay/---gNwK~\ʵ^),ٱ+JS(nW4{xm osqCM7k׼nKteqN|82>pXKSSSαB_.7WM~̹Dm' PGHul$Un}[nWn?s9AEZ~<2f%؎>pXK/B0KX4Է[x񱒙K:<-]6^~6>m>6=? k>ڇeԎ1ee(>>l8 /|;I 6j!Mmc=+-|G{0NǂswK%3HL @mvv,CW߿7M7ClO~]A72JMftWv1޿W*S <ݓ5Jc.{a7oz4EF'g7}-~9fmm릻Λfǹ>FiZ ^6"dx\lKȷ]7o+rpcr[ZKR|$lY꥟\X7=f\]_ q< JzKR[y?[jAk 9߽BU۔{ld'xa5o? C]3Ӳ9/!M{,Z'=鞍i㝖ajTW;c5e~xa9|};uh|ok:JkciS?߫ux4 5ӹrPi-n>3yhu ު n[x7dN:o}1:=~X|Rg.aYu_1Q%`'?``-ZQlob{l?lcnKn8WLo7xyu8"g2Ϛl~{aI1L-fh|181,D9z).'V|+^sJgfxbtrY/?9 _P _ 4)(wh87Pc^ ?ʾWgB> F[KSziOҏTY琳h:5C(6~QD[ѷ4izfpm- ʠV`S=EJcD1QS.͘*7o2FkWpkOf~7uq/Ho|6S>DP_-)ȅcg\Dc u nJu#߼^YkPϵsbqs\.6Pۈ8u}s z^tOek`zr{[.mo{ZXqe&S ,?鲿K#0!4 }36=0 u-U3^g^: ?X׃hc~:'pfLlХ2=j0G]p~7ci服ơ>w2Vnӟ4InVfe SUx|G0$q c/J~[=+“ Y3jf4ѢyWW- [ޅ8 Y Gg#uve3Wac]1cN{-u sdcAq55wgF=#3kvY#< ~kۻHD Eg\ZMs[Nn~ߋqK3wsZ'C5F=l6 Gs-]rO?^j5%rYz3y3ٱ&@7e.{k5 T=S-L׷0 g-C,(-<ǭ[L6ӛ}K{7i{'?uĸ>3X'񖎘}-0:a=7%s=,M=J2 Ayϖ\̬4.n`N`0c#.unu8wӭw~.@k6SrWE7ӡ=+ zo%o'犖x(αUhqgNJ~ ϋ:$I(p0OX< ds F}{_a#눵fVOx208}]cnNeYo?3OϘnp;㗫u@_u>HAxBvC+x&g+8hBhc*߾cs^#`q<_zC`Wsz +C4ml7͛\G;l牶ͯ˃$F0f,|6V=7{ ˠ 1y.HN`4c2JlƾvӊgrGÎ" <.4?FO>>f\®eπL~'T~Ճ?xmu/6%Jbz`Nm5D{ֹ']/ĿQ W>ҐFZzia\|Kn`7}upskbtXv}F{hأy۶!w/c΍ x[h-5⚏$N:ߓ>^hw-J]EeMSg@+^p|?Gaa.^q[z=<ݺ0{aO-ilSu&ZQOc0~z*ORXZiY+<U9|c&߬eXsoz4.K$gX6F6ѡ<[}^L;SXWxXץT@e\T@};:3=uoW0 -4 \a7r>8D {7~?{nټQӳ3Ni;%1;]xI~bmY3Q4qb(7_x(e?l1{ Tw.Aú*fˠhVZ-."r~f~We :xn[o-c>)҇ve8s>όo&;Ze0fӽгޝ<2wf]8u<7ʋ1N܅]8{}9Ze75{Az{z2O,S> 6aal*| u^PS7W߫'+~{x:8e\,-oqis{ Cp~}e'n{967!5tұĭoaOpt+ePĉ#U±Lļvk>ң:O;Ȁ( v(SIlocʋr6Bi<,u%pxS1˹s׼^Z\\Ďcg {lŷ]RLbszM~&l=@}='Jb"YB 8/rݹ viQ\;؎(\,(utw/VzgaFOfr[MƯ*Zv) %0n'ewԍm{gv&}Giuv(vKt1vv <˾[Pki,XdM7h_P̹ ژUziFKp-it/7qp㋰Ǿ0ixjzzy#~V W4*|SnUOS(pɭY,-9Ju?l/,L0:5K'95?8naV6_ د>mbK9m}4)ٴ.Icvh{,9̚t۶J?{UobJo}q;҅M:?>ǡMsSxu??(Y4Z9>q[?p[y>[eҝBosU+^<~ov@~ #˰~jAqQ4P;~ɊxQSe< f=m'+yվoF9$Mg߿rʁcܕtQʠ+}Fop<=?ײk}Ybi:x[Qӧ (adaFrK{<^FY8a夯qi.(F; /O;s/}/Pc'm?gaĝ(ԆyU7ק?5;[s-/tpO`O3lcYLsdp,,q^8 ĸ-̫> 4\}i2s=2/?:xҥKw/u'=yo|I+j\{O`8ښ6a>Ixh__gO}`XOIJa܇X'*mLNT\K,ըg0"ӧpczD-Nw>,'] 4Ed{ԣzqe6c1|ౚҾ$961"DŽlSC=mäϾPons.qA| ~3˖ZQixUkUӏ|;vz|)mE'N\im{i6蝅|Etҵ }䛰 FB^C._@z:gɠ2pm)#bb.A8qƏ#xXڨmS/]Mܣ]ƹs~t҅ bE.slʍyڙ~X6 䱝8eu$`jkկV>ui72yÜ>xWk^t[fwq훈=wfg93ph.ҧε:׹3xwb}inU&i1õUxv#2PuIXzĊbid9Tŀs49^pK_F`Ʀؠp,xcvk^6IMn{7#s+ךӼ`34IK61^ąy+ΔXGo+~3^BdwWkoF~I,ba .na4[uje+ T:soaqѶ['zf'+ OJsn쪹\^6cÉۚT?g;Hcp_9F^$4fƩnZٸ>꩞͝!Hgsȵ]042]0}#9\߉c<Ϥݟ09n<}$6$cIkhݗz:sۇ1,]M^ec#X&;`Q&ۿPu9]_kᩴ>ek v_;4ݛĻcƵ~ѷo^/b}GvK$fc#k("<aYm(P޾Z,6=Ї0F-cm'a;yqovPsXm?Lޗo+~hx<(֥|C> Q_t vI/GpIQ˿?) >=wZz,}Ƭ 6Joo_W櫯SwK]W&~+\9:nzXZ:fx a^k֥FMc׋yG?& /af?0YW %$7O|˜ܢFL2S<}8>tzǪ|o^|>-ꫯƂu*[pkwQʣ'[ѵ*GЭOa\#oťmóvqNsNU,MkӢ]e8.郍EFoTw'LKszMz,q?Q7Mof-kyMb6ʳ{韐(>no/nYOZrˣn^֧^۲m=3ȋfhEöy8n'8oiFVp}'꿅a׷V\?+yݕ? 5e4³gOiV|zɼ#[|X>[Oll_b[n_ױN/qZKif̝ 7azfّS]LIU (67)`];ˋ o땕{rܙ 9$,l<|< 70/bF*? ̹ы2..'0C{3Om}Q612U)noΑ|jkХsa+e|ǕsV,.#aaOokkk?qNaiS[KJ[^dVZf"+sQ a2>C|,b<}݄Wv,gޤV\#6Q4kV8|/qkG&Mϖ祽 焒w$ rqf< n_Ә5(<SOG]S2و|<ҹGަGqy f*e;K%딆KeҨΜ/Ysp]Ιq۬OQ~п9 pQ8B:\yW' GY? \)A SKr\uPFЦT:x7͵ru]|{tĪ]uz/?bZm+ >L6^}hd)w mK~*G{a`7V$Dymf`=Q"O؍۴|H 6̄˖x,49ƻ6:oZ-=PcRD^-5{bٸ؍Gfciuꊿ;R}iؾxjEt{1B=g꣣G~L; L(i=ne;=eGALY,`[`.M/a.`1&( rq:eW;[gr|qƋk!3Bk ?6z5ށ.e:wpNݦtwq{nq-YKrOHIX쵰ˣێ9姑l뵭]0e'ks_+ӕ5iJvtnTڋXsI# nCD3 }{dG-m Kwm]=±~>lv.Ĵӎ/#Wo^Z6d:Q\+@Nj-fl//pKB| lQi-JI{I_8[a&&~VJ]$WbGM{ow; =Q^@l#֒[k[a2_mћK5kı[Үxʤ<9]\(oKgk=vYi:&i!,7﵂i/fێm:~w @6-ˇ1R0,8JUX5,7נl;<,=P۶7_\,9o; ymZ<>Vo:98iqyi|?5[pd?k [$}LOn. Y۝j%"j҃Ř ,vw{a.;-Nr[yиPjƆGLa=Etp@;96#7p 46?iB~VsmU jo3$݉9ynk;Ickl'}Yd̖4>\bi{ W|SIrhT{Tu%H/oe>١ټ;Sۏuq{֡yo*3]t93? m.ZarOmC{kAgGInŇݵ&}fS-3&7k[z%F_`vB}kǸOYT6}kgoXVxsv QȟSB?`'otLl XczKS=S7҉P yҬ+?ƶ7p9h<}c9--lGǕw=Fijݧ}0-ӨE_;K7aC#Ot;sǾv+k#O[a&J<_9 x7& {ƌΙFq$XbIW>uF&>#sH4@_F_"1-bFDM1ȗ6u7p-s?>4ukdǹLփӲ8<)]+v'9-{}`ߋƒ쎥G.fI.S=njg6/y\@\,sX7Ҳfon-f^[Ӭ_;v(.?12'Yvg閁O/W2ǠI:Iĥ0.Is ۇKC'#lg\]߇입-pm5ZRYyt+7DXe~f¿gk 7D9a|Z:riq<{qOSl,F1v| }zAn8ñNG68MԽb}jO1%[ҶV66Im,s 976 _LUw^q]k?4q'=OLoڋS'ꞷK^5f{Kٮ}9}–cC|3o|t<?c2u֮s'{Woۆ .տǽ=V;'#bfE^|w]Ǟ}'mihoIw ۸8[X N6kǍi~ i͔| '?i8h8Ǘ>&\6qȅ>ȶ_{GQhPEYa]Yt~z7{ۖz4^X\;keE+Wz8y,<gdZw,)bhҥ:N~!>Iw\ unV,&+z_3UA〧lR,=gV:Wd{f=9|cEܙS^_6yXqx~H(c&Ǿel\\}ht{8Yby,t8))q?m>1 l>ñ(KXZ(酣-Xĩ=q LK8XF<'bO­RV?R3]E,l &+hmkciYxJfEݾuE~\s|@,,X'0o8ƛy5\፪z^l|e~=Ƒ<_Vo#F^"&&#m˔4IzﱴIЏ{bYyM=[Nbi$2rZ}߬~ҴZw;:W}{;Tq| sZLcC; L|?M֐?ۇa;廿woxO򮛛_w򿆜<6]<}4ws^)oҡ^z/K3&q4fްǏwdt/`iX߲lػbk*XbVaQ5}[MHqګힰQQZo_BֈFD J}_֏n}Qms.AgG-Qmk:^U/-- }2/o?#yskMVJ&eÉߑ>]o+s.7= 9myYuK.TO^z/K3;iMf֫Okk}a^+7׷5E-f ߘGڨkjި:QxZQ4}/7#zbi K[ܬuˣps5ζmegf[~ W0䒤O4I@R2{'qpKKnX4p:Bǧ-oǸZbG8~y-#e7JSn>щ˧Gq]jJhH#]}T sO)$֩eG?ԊOpܓ\~Mmק2W ΃]9'7\r` u\}~/] Sey eު\J4> ÃB]ycvCg[rڼ|/B^ wP;[t4ڗ}}勺sOj:WmQ"FK\a2cήͿ[EрGx0o YW-ry7'N%CXG{5V1Fot_C ]zs˔>Fv !ҝUf| m`g1tLOq8c*yI[T}biG7_#v:e }Ƀ:&嫵GiV\3F;fKWl3d2=+S~2xlW}۫aizs> 7țX6uGTZ=G߭'Yr:;=}n3Of0RQtY`kp[\,,OZFuvp:m/0 #!y [|,2eնVY6ZE]oLu>^*ޙjj^kLMWg9zn>$߭=&OZnhgG;M|ك<8^]www:qG2\:r <{k,] r8 ;ƧAfLSsA;([&hUەOQؐGMU| UHmǺ}ha}G1 6ٲ8?a1id-IxF+L[c0oᶭɤ3¤ֹ~\CFju%}otyo{zp>Wwo~󛡱z&k{z&! 6d'X^om{ZN;i混]~Xz⿌-<u<Tca> k'؁\yY}C8$_+^_MӜFX䥾ZO>Xb;ϭ-c>m'.˧S.luKxa? K!HV>93y=os.^ kxcQK.C1Fj[uٖW@=LdZSɻO TRB}y-N*^;Q-֔_8\ZxO,ryExL=>cvikM5 4 :3,1Gu}50ž@c|ۣst,ܿjvBO2(}S+A]W9˟]^9~ے,=yt:Hb'.fk}%.ؚ[81E/Orvg(8eY>WvK_gԁ쓧}1&*<1՞qgGݰm{>=Nٰ:3/`v.P%}wwM-JDML3?WqQ\.jE3~p?-L-?jakW>ɣ+/ c<> PMØ2sA>Zì´%?Kben['K2qfKXX^mN}vyґn;sT>jrѳ$Zݨ1zp㌩'V[]lM,-Z>fH<ە}c/^Zͨ08 wN\덜 ¿\93qۛ`=*ה#.Z,-,臰Y琫Lq޵hʑn&_XG \;3)IJo+P &lqR1`ύ,sɧ^a)}J&oU֡k2/˵|ٮU=cgW8eCr4acb<SE9Ž'y3JmmcuLwȇu 9F1V?< 0.9TTpApNga3tڏ_YRh??4J3;SX_1%>S.\\K^qDf KzK1ފ+x/Zr45k቟6X-B%S}uI.W902ˣN*@dt>K)=fsS号:SjSI,'B' ^:AwO?tK~i/V\;[<bob]ۣ W|6.]ȫ:AG225ctnG[ sl?;-zq[q6XZm{ ~xkcZo`-^eW u_;|ثc\UV>F@>CFɍultaV ׷{r$NiR&'OkζrW\[̱>gŅYw v{![1~䍇 wVtV]Tkj((\S[IYcgg?{`: >Ҍw|F`% rsB]r9&'Ɨ{>wݼ~hWq$^Ծ,pK'*yчxB 3y*nyo"קh oBX7Vh^@~̢Cr;˛2ƞy+'??<_-Nl9~ou~/ d:iQ5SǖY/t9\{{K{{zc8v wak#c $٩1^J_@ڵk{J::y:$ڟIi.+[xAn?!Ӿx,xl's;ug'T} =x(bM_sˑ9H>F8_}vkn >l# '@vZq1= YG$O:ucZ5~/&OyElTZA$z}扠+s[յd&Ͳ~ Sgf=K߮vn'ǔz3lfv5MSmXbPƌIsu6pM&xOJ>caiV-f>e{]eY_xyog1LG wuwxEa ?ŕ¿'l-}Eez>fGv.B}Ӽg]^{)=nLouZ}αC|.٬\kia uKaAm}%ZvcibmGnW{wb E4{d4~a[4{,{Sc/ygy,G\_܋=nCwZ>U7EϟCYՁd늖0dvS E Z<%\I| :®I$Oqt8vp{@2+g+aH+!m'Z `i혇Q 2/AV9gAƤېؐ#NO]ǭS:0%M7\wkZ;GofT/v~PX'ެm½\K5з~5,9aIҰSm|`qbZumi7qԿ]AŇGai5WK_T2.g5?`dm[~HGҶcO'y,jƦ7㭹 6rq-V1ɓ/s="C{5WO>XRO:ev<:u  {sӜ\;cj=vIBъN>.!;CwDźp*1ַW+q6l=O,lsGp[Xx ˜A[&0;V.2R-ҳm.f@?|drcFQ1N3n Lg+|\p ko¾]Q,M<~-jȅO,}OS;x]׈3W7@3_;7·o.ZSjf,y,uu e<wZ[MO'{ok{Zcwc`G;w*<{W>ES­Ċ??q_V O̞Ƿ =x~V s$<='*+;=]Z V{pvy]o'{Vzؗ k-ib?`O'~aκw>^oc/CSYGM\~xձ<E7VܲcOlYÞXd#8xϷg zPO}>Oz0lkJّ-?~Ձa/s4hNg7Ii;w.7!{<q ׮h<,zikmv|D! KdZ4=;72feq.1h'۬^>|9wPfNm mLJ2\3 ǤGM}O}Rm,/.+LSX~i4?X?9 +F_ }Me VՃ)r[[/O1|ceʻ[ni蔛un{sO[\A ̔+.^$ww d\\~͍vmܛR #.^qwq}ljN>3(Vg:0c8>_%e :?v[ [}O/dui4q |%v<"Re12KAc,1 .N/ \[ns}6Q.^JQ:iM ĹOt+^mGq~>^ssv0F~4옐.a5b=Ŵ;rVߔRcCuwǏ}9mW{()U)<}~)G_X}<+<u(40~pC Z()6FKbɒ+X(*FZ4-//P+U'k3!Z{-^c}q?:g\[C>lE_1-]Ǡ؁}ulN~V\D'Nq}Y7w/ϽINָ 6nY20N=xaZ/K Q Ws%D:Yݩys³"|isBTWʬ^sM90|dYJ^<%4G{a, PI,1VQI)Ȓ[Kֻw_8Ʌ3ؚˏ]&sDظ{x⎏o uZK˿'΅[+mW.26|\ /0 xqR/siiTUyB승/*c?-mJXWYLUӘJ>x3]sxoݞa=v!k_U,m'PvHak'}חᔕQ[KKc}Zhw clXRv?(gN#7e(,k9wceLە=QZt7qu<⒎Vٙy3ەb3n4ƛs uZ?895>.8[X@AY{3 ɏ;?ķm0njhd<9 vpW u-9;V@GXq 3זP+#x:;&&%Ƽ2rb*s"'$Ζ<\r%-%/VYņ.1\~. 5oosU_xyT|me-e]Ef‡]lKn:anaMf)<_!YkClqֱ Ghyu[Ƥ(9ǝe⮗^yUym1ޒD&ȇb?\ͤE2OK?$ 4(T@!S*hgεyθ~-25]'O^}gw%$Zm{Ksu/\ l 7[?31r1Y"sg-'Î\r]-?pNlYm-xZ=/},z D9+Od7\\domX}v8GKr}2"M>طWެmݟ̵L,v<+#mh=_~8q'.nd/ 27߶i5ێGai]#eMxy}Y|l66k0|&=T?RwAL/DbR6Gx=+->|0 nVᤰ,yn1xS࿇ʸ]M `+c@)٣X,M#0.-|;$%+mX,.\Xz2^F =2Z-|k-܎6&ԡ/K:ֻ1©g?KwF U}lFajmu)1Ã9>ׯv]333.e.a;Vge2oKCM"㈽%T1p̺wv`iH/!F~Ta[ƸPbiypͥc?s^lR/n^}b't3- Gsu^?g ?VNJy1 Sc\d'qcOlb&SKZeQΝ[-9c=,myV_Ӯr֟8oWš ecIk/XX~<{{<{i|_ n q~u4bf_r䧕]uXWL;hlհ-c#yk籨xx%v\229Ɛ+k|r\ӰvZ+ZԻg}zv>-~_ڮ)g}~W׍=znԹ'=/ݍ؇(kÁoz8ƹs#>i.OLL?2No؏`/{q-V6E#6Bmezpw<7.i]ldΙyy|58۬lVռtN{)ɓnNHF>^~no]|_#~$۬7惤/\v I(ڼ'=c-}׷x^}5?H_cg铮^{gݭ*bf@I`Pޱ|{eц-AxcX0oK/)}>zZ}G{ -ηuӁVtzv?n5*b7X{Vl^mV#^j.O7S'1 Y Cx1c_K/慨wdq~_emV]^Nxg\ubzNzMf~.ǰtz?C]fGw[۬^WA}K{swɆt-[}}"O3&q“c0u9E_qIs~uG>'bovfmu|}?VâY]tǞkv23Nr&^&tKG6HӃasq8zԎ^{|}Mmh-Rx};׭WqmVaSn4u:ֺӽ"!|ww+*ﺩu\ nSmpʈ%XrSMXB\E<*?*p[ jU8O֡&po})JWNlm2P;fV .heR`d=#~vyG>=߯2r[\s c q>Sv`Dpz&'建6Ƨ/s(o/L}Gc܏.bE^Fkcge6g7\~;NfN* q\79~={4aK$Γpbq6Gwm~\UL m+#O<˥=|K,F '8%1f. lW>rǁP^8o~.?sKr-`7db [.Ko?FĔsn{;W<.o߾Vz)&4qV.smwfe?6QHa[cpczAR=ٟF}E'vo Im3{䜈?ÎiLљp>cmfffcݳ/IqmV4MrX8Q )#,5a/z&&>lYwξM8׉?6q!#>\6]N|iaMϹ*6@ZCuo%#X?ۿ̄ő=)XZ<{',mm݅OX[؛>񹮅}1,X97= jڷ}wk cH㌁Eͻm+̇??w ~ ȵd\S7C=;c3&i32*?OmxZ>f~~tVkS9h^ڬg)%Uag'.(a4bꭌ#n$6 ˈ8}8= g`=E2 MH DZc&Cȴ ə204c&">`L#NN7.O#D4}SWlI{疴#iUv}V&Nq8*y=סLzQqqiD|U]F/׷ls!>n~e vɽ([[8>γM! 1'/K 9[{j v"ߌƞ[qԟ5=?a^p(rI(Zz԰oj: TRǏm ^;=9_ޣ|cd;F9VF:lp {뭷%6iES] !&L l+sJ3-@m|\tet|W2}%v+EkW(F|]x4\OMuNkveURk53^F1r.k5؍:' bT' /,]kڽge!Ju/Ci{|\\bݙ^{aُťţt\ ~} uDziV~o\e<ʮѣ6~Cd}AD\fIC{8+d,Lnm}Y;f\4+9{[̓,#1M|;hm39$k76?%U#KX'{o5K:Ϣ^J5rЇe{Myyha5*\[{G󺋽{Eroi8-߭ }^b >,ϏHgQZ)%%?T错״/~FG_ RO`ݸb:)+ Zud%kiҬ{/{aKyp6NO,+g80V{K:T?5ֱ7NjCleϖ5r8>=4=EF, NSa$3.=Þ{ף}Q98ק=f-88 .vn>m"fsRӳk7!],-~~,6>ؘu|6.3}/!q41j/GE|'ٷqxtơgܣgLG߆3 6Vm,kr[^۞Kueh_2}~g먓'w 39;nC3 F)gG/_4ôwF!c٘հ+ΰ2- X4Xo>>g[6.8j3%I2!&wf, 'iML~6f5\L [akX X4}IǑ7-qubg[% 1@)/\f@h{#f>I0i`@ DqE"۹184ۏ<׋at G}]ʊ &cxϑK.ٺh[,S6f]1qP`²N>j3yυ|m꯫cyo.;.3[z3E/`ƭ"`m08~iqlK:܇8S*ݻ4[Ou-/]s_jrH_mIk\_l'r8?=W_}ս1Nľ/8ajcV<6NΩ+劄ut5Uig:{x)IH_bW~V5.WC~1ܔ|pe 7;wp'z/w{߸}?حwbKO gQr>O>Ns_ϗ8uI]hw`uz:sR%Kmاٸ,F߿oJ=?PB8l1.pS(mGYm@n65cOuc[d#whr]=kgu#~NdOU{] k#QpӚg1;];EyϷ8L;V=gjF5o=I9帒caV~x{rT>#ɭ?UAK>}J);xn>fXqJ/ow>lF|D<^;6:9l/<+%Z^́׺|4r8?>[Zzn=Uq]p\qVwiEz >Wr^rc#XaSԛa\qq(P<Ұ ~˹8A|w=:y.]PH)]KSɭPg 3oX~]H7A튕]Za 3 upn|ҵWgSVkrv~ݤ' F<!_g anwg~l-cO.SV19Ld<DžܯcayՌ+'e~sqI!)3Ǧ=;7_erkXrVZ|ڼ53?U̟|<}+,$}~⹧L kRG NIdzG?m7WI'1< <*y9c^ '曵iUOr5_>z{TFܧ*IҼG$qнӫ< Sw-y߾|*C]y(lSq]Ybh-yl u/8J]9g'cYfY=gM~wRs~8c=91 Dž<1$ƽ,KcQr|?j̛^8a0c}3)#/5~7g_?d^3yc`ig|6$zكP:fLr1oqcAB܀qɥɗ73|[Qv#.z @/.z8pRrr'&_f|w\{rވK97 ?? ?/v>kۙ|2[kq|~KT|f\~!?Խ*z?n K4oy %|˽[ tϑe1>q )ܯړG_~w7NN8{h~i2Z/>Oƭ]^zh5*֘Sܖ9E8$A%iN)o}2 za@^ys|G⸟˦u̱CG.µ7q#i7ɑZ,߅\.;V !Oߩ7kKs4Q3uCqGmب{)?ng[q[q4Jշ*+.ߐ8`zGuCۨ|aI%Oۗ|]q˺ߏ bCth]  qr0y=u4򋳫tI%ޟ7T~V>brܘN 8α]:iy8vwqLa00`%Ϥ'zi?cV*BƘq= ypU^_Y]1Կ{؃_rrc/0?C^ziM&~5vZcY?!SGqa4,]k:U0qg 觾݌ _UY[ŠPWGw`]y0{uA_?~lXd0; !|ڞ|]cIY?+zy'q\:.͸Υ*g.q'Ҟ cg|*#߳s_i|t4:XyFӣqjÇcxm0 ơ'LkǬa\ _:A;A ƥz4}ŷ#10yǙf8eI*ڣMq?'||vcVh1 :GnQwYqʯ,k~ATWhʟE1c=tDnFO{{oϘle2 LԾSCsyQ51֎vk`3uqiIuX]՚Q~M?JU]^UZ> 9&f+[{'}֛5` T,O_E3ȩs代m>ql؟C}7m_n:1rڿ?Rw`_g~7oNѻU'2;?_W6~q2Q̢\+ڠa0 Y~mriዜ^~e77 ~~>ȱ?Uj63 =Eƥ ,K6-m/ϻvOƇL熁lc"B<9ON:YeZT d_"ۏ?}7> õ~<h2&qk-'fEg^Y^b K4w/_\ Wd"_}(Mdž`k`q/3.gk,YTsN5z3#,fb;KS&i̊&8W믿N-;;|\f 1ϱc/{/9&GI.]U)?Uo5s꥞ Ap A90-Hlm_f7^g&ſ;_䫶u?2cA_c79d1cIZf]z?ad%oF4>ӷ00o"4g #iƬa4XՁOkhIvrtw'qr-sJ]9yq.;>8A\-䐮s,KV!R%rw/yǐkX=((qgHV**$8/7i*b9tw[qmi^e7NʙwUʗk+?-[q.WP׸0l9͙o.oGjuPvrnM,/ߝ;P?ruV-(O",l}lقbekwkwͅ?~<=YTP^mS A{e2qURqMDtFPV.}f;΂do~3]кK.E{~ᇎ16mo3&O째7-[ݻznzJaƬ8]tC\yaq{mQ]6\In haU\xYYݨ9I VWw}vq2~-%>ORtr%} q+^0N^\38?"<0Mizt2{h?_j`BdN;ĊV2Onk9W+czxG^܂wTF^.+bTG lmcPa/GU.}RάK}YƧ˽mo޼x,|2<0~ 7l/y6b`1\Ʌ1omYij4N;=it@Ri:~]upƱF'.oq^A1>%/Z9XK_'Y;@9˖ťutzSIIxͯcrc}8\s.$䫺+J^C2T`D&‚tHԹ߿^yNuQzU>>J1 1>iWe˦8Ҝ)psY_e}ħɩ-n.'NhkJ2v[oE9&әa`8 ?b94g5n+8A*d^5]/;G>iwt^܃6WyQo됋sW'S C+o,m jMRx[A=__ٍ(6XKSg?;^;n_sP'_?\(l_Q^Eht~ .~ZrkO*P/a,ח =9^yɖ~_eez fG\l'Y# ɞž:ǫB~~rXD,_ҽJ5>dgerpi{ܺx[\TK&}8:V/źepj&BKٍ9ePl:eT 9oc}s?.:ŕkt4U\eeZqt#WےlYRK˟g{4p8k;d|gūǻ;q'ӏa?ğg{dᙷ2 3fV:XNS0N]kZ{(kNWj{[mtc!-x?|VUW@mg?1V|ܜ@0OMuTiw) Kk?KAUqȸU:"`nZ֥W_|x:XsQ\#[YGyyrϚO"OdA1 |vJke_s6 ԼJ-qMf&.}y^zl;_G<2=M~vGUCuѺm,_ٜ~JϷO-rkޝ+_ϫkK~ <'̏3\wM^{Z>%[q<Ȍ[b.p˯OG6G>ɟnt%/-|)|ʪ{tQSa#n3/ÓWV\'ў[*-N}mdUP:Z{T-ңƥK~?>bR-2w^9?r b27':Cmww7uļmީWz={weW6MٹtrK/8;fu9@u[7?Ͻ$vDjc޶-~_E ?e$s%iqi5kl EQ~#հyFBE۾Fi7ӼﭩV{`_z%[cm~JSY` (v~UMߵL@R.>kr31jurCfeՁc y_]·h q%]L5 kZEե篻D}ţY<£fģ9$gy.3ob: wX>3~jVbN؎ٞy(vcsALw`pwA-uW7[zYԝÅ7v'rv}~״;-[kkX~='YW.U__2F͛85qow4׻M=-yN–z}}1:ky6~m h3+ۭ{yX'ƀ2; iqZ1Gxq V=~Q3,3Iۼa`0.=[M1~?6m{J&沣grhrg'Zi87oތkm >g.>N^xp38l|`W{g1̙3ggo~io&y9XO7>~X|Ċ5?gb^|QvReunӱR`%_G.<̚hŁqqj3sϯEkEk7|t^gxr:d6y3J3Cg0wQnsF;b__1f#pզVWJY3]kr 0$-cQ+)ߛr9%w5ؓƽu+_3qH<<~_Fx%nśuޛvB_nT0;~ڧKר Gڍ8O8:]lD^p䘘sv/#}~qN֋0eyҨN+Ew9 _iեG]ɴS._vdS-rȻuǐjm:ʹq NXg[+]<4s<b/?wNL#n2M&>Okآru vK=y;+Hce mq<"Ljrs)|!@8qk?Ϻ>N%s+.`l6?}x"MAMmĵu٤rjiޓ,K7lmǾ) RVcz@0>%o\ȿ_ao) Ni9ݛ%ۮq>BN#<}Y$O].o'x8x:u_[ڔKHe㸟!|Hx}*#S?ՍɧwgX=\6$8prP>穕(>?a~dy2|=x_r!W g7yWބdY'Gy/E\i ?k]_k(_k 8?;&G=̓\Z6Oët!~vӿQPG#+z 5NKL7]\[y{l~ęK[qePѧVyn:ضT!\zqW1r ) qqQY|G]GslMb~Qߑ|M_rm)y,|;'N]i_ڙд2 ƥ_VŶ;6:{FʋBOQ~؇ 4<([ ɻ~iq# t\Zx {}}.?O p+\b>|t\}Z]b,r/VO}=vg2|>0igT.-qBXeUZ&xPg+'r|!OU\Վ*C|UF |ؿ[ 壟\ĥ5~ʦҏ^?C:ƴknO#[ Bb~> .͘[Ww'Ҫ#m? ϹŸ•{B/|+5~.})oGǥ^ Zh-FX~9a- :cq^b~Yt*\[zΝhk"?ޣW^orD-(kW'qρ}yU}2/z"?޸Nz>%: FMc\ڞMb<ŻI\s wG+ā]װ>kuQwL)@jB[&bb)ÝG?Wk[鴢J+>|XCZY\Fܒykt 5qاZۭyb:NZ:"XyK<ֲFuW0ЊFtX#|D'k~\*e#:lƤġzq륅?)U^.-[laOݗ @a7LĮ-]rpߔz}TF~(^eťO՛g=Q=6+Y(G{q*6y?x:aGN{ݟ٤Mb޸to]3foI$ǼtM`|3{L(X~c={y c׬c\z6k5yӾ쇓>K\=s<9e{3U{>0 W^癳#rɠ|ɋ=߲S-ENsm;! 㗫򧸚 ϯ zbZ;0}pv.ZlWޗyudrr;gu](Nlo70|.•hpa\MyokmP/88%%_ڗSuL7yh lwj潋Bi;Jo5{B-:.C9 \כ*$)[:SyyՅ(C 8vAkOSMucO7vr>i1o\z~p.~>yo\z~biy$t1y$y-R| { F~O/.4^r*vcJ;̧(YߣI;M4k=X;uƥ_ԡtu 6f&_zy~˥iC]F̨q3)ƝCN 1:?O'~QxԴ4,Vc:f\&G->H< :ZQ0Ыi^ytƥgg+k'a1`\ڰ3,vb'[K&_:m _)3mZr,Ể+tSZŭ֪Gz)W/.Gʥ_ީ,,G=c|9Rc;bmže;F믵|T=at}]żqڝ(ĀqiD =H/3QxTV{SG~yޓ>~!G ~_n]?m_:;B_j%}a]=wׄàj3i6(߬] ayUNt<>- b޸{ǢոEiߦsݙ.L`]żqڙ٦K6za/6>kkn^0`au^:.9b޸qaKOO׆k0=-kŀKkemi1o\Ȳyqik_=iߦx=^L/ap9LyaWkf'ƥ >b!v7; Y$dKyF&Cs2.=Y~M@,d2m /-}7.mmaڙl>g s~04*7.mmd0n:n,> 4k~05LNZ7.mmdҘǏ1שt:k mi4`Țf7Z|&Ҕg\/6x1. ;X{0; Àa0`X 3ߦ߆r>mI.=ff0  Àa0`0  Àa0`0  Àa0`0  Àa0`0  Àa0`}AkIu N̦Wl 70Z4x?(4cPih0O 3g1[?!cD,U8*K*SFȈ瞸qoDd9`9`9`9`9`9`9`9`9`9`9`9`9`90o3#`0F4͇<+́svz0s0́ԋۋ2kܴ1E#`0FE:?]Fs`8P׎80F#`i81u2/i5F#`0up,m^61\kG#`0F4K_:Tyr9`9`\RߘsUsXBкs0s H\18ىx躸͚9`9`@OkuusYH7̛]U8'm?`:es{'9l F:n39`\^?d nYEgc?eG>9xEjKkv߳~pQaF]ޠm|d"v~ڊ>􎳃\_,4́cjynWgbP/E@}ơE5ZQ{v,>-uwx [X?k+ޣ<~v~lCs$Y6b9HbC\vǁ^|QuXz8\׃kG[{0}\}sz-OC ]6d=Z;ؗ^Ә[{'Egm;R{:.{?/5&ݓ3^Ͳ1O6XscYg7ήe\ﳳ};ke'猸)^:͇i"Mx;ҏPFyt{a>j w>&^9=+lyceEVHYyo&Ogzme֖]W~QObS;2"x'}'s;(3ϞBiYٻ1 31X[uocL9B9Kgya:?egO@_Z|o|“')>=u3gkчy '-1O:xߘkAtFr1MNe;źཏQș'b{uצow#vx-yqDFy3 m\ʕVxuyX_^ㄹ  :?O)/$3'vw?ϰUAug31AѩeCuSzUQl-A;8}LI8Sc%_O{8(5lF7:SNlߴu?Comqiy1m|p뫍-f_g^]Ime˪ԾBFx6urq$a^̱LOs`_J~v>ot~a?ڽ%;B_G$.~xGb\n'!`9{Pv|pRWcg`ﷳ}mERʵ@zq} ї~2XzyPWx^t:݃{Kp4و!nyFf7;>xxc ,Su^f~kgQkČf>p,\Q|)^q ǧ}ԣ8WF:0?A=k#F3Z.:~3<? ?o*7Sq]<%g?Ĺ:<*.SR:d=~ <l:Ćc'9NΚp 5/M^ }ySD]c4Aͽ嵢+=Ji]Q* ?N1MJfaqXP[؉|%tΌyF.ծ{+hg_;;s">gF9pc>KdLX5Z?R=cZdo(!uL\c0A1rZ̑1^Uc(42pܣPJ թXvԡU7^ gȴz^e:׏r|qzT[L'^zV:yxH13]B3:uc>eQ:V=nf<v&TNx3 1.? m{c8nV[+qL8G=XcTk9*~CV.7]rR],e|uAGcl!Ω̩/ii:G>u~trNr9pXIqW>:t|^uٳ1M1dy)RL=iˏʁ_ټt( ({w~gؿi){yW}>(Q;sl;p}iѓWWVذM=9ʞz~QXˮX>g<8/x Cчo#Q>IEYE>eADz:(]<:b=F#l ?ཌྷwka1M'x?QʳQ#)ýuʯ*LG^v/ބOz1|OW*'8T)Uz z6=F=^} )wo[Ŝ,s~øM!s7^v*q kŚQ1o=s^>8Ufjױϱ+:B/cYe|W?F+#t pUv*ߺmXٗS?7VB WOW'V?=cYQ1~zlʟƉKDHvs2#lQ'we<pM~{:X0u#Pf}xi8C\8U_U,>((Gy=YW-`nDSQe~{` Lч)(O8J~n❋^ ?ؾA9kH},]lB:+^V׸޽!( _C:V3Nf嫹VuR.֝yxꢬeܯS~UQNayFu}R>F,G}o~Rش89 %c>u\(g`ێSmYޔqYQKO}X7ƍ7<]GX7e..}窯XzctqTQϜO1{ee +Qy1.ﾬ5,}b9'}?|1tQveN҆%{ّ}Z0 ?ei}fQֿmE> 7b\ce{ƴ߰|eeʮNbi~/B}b<9(VkJ$#N+ƓQSQMY8|>##F|ٶHu*O); &K3QߨXp}OzԳOϫ )Q(b_g1%}Vm߆NFuqC]M7s0X{xZo焁9؃.[AdZycG;Yd~R>ǼװWOAGz i^Ueu.I5IQ?+Yɲ6{ mrC C3rx wb#+UQiQ:l=2MZ73OW7S$6);u4Y6]:X]Sq-gH?|=d:og˄s,u+oƻQ0"|{ZoG&9#jת%GѳJip7.{.T1< 3/LOYZ_+и^|8KqdBl{/qˣ5CNqtܣBc_}L|U{xp\*|>U278OU='GFyi1W|8JgSDؗ=A8Π6}`]ixFz>^r-ԑc*K:9!FLm*_;|K_x=B&8}kk\qW@}rmRkM49l-~a?O㔵$Q&fax- ׍%1qg8[' '7c{պ Ef('ug"]6>CUJe|J\xsUԟMҿMچUnzd'MOyjLM@$8ĸ.Ƙq}V߾h}@grhW7.?ƻAciooY1Fo]yc\Xo^t*~ebr{~0M vʇGVCNLEb(ScF6]6tp;0h O)[Fɲ,ƫ,sւ>}淔bK=n>9~/MsWR&>Hw=q*fWxgk)_b6~z$4FXyqz׃u23K6 i~#K]> gUe!#^013㍺&y>yT[>iv_Tv=~>Y"a1-)?c Ia]{;*pw~[QV"QؾUHa;=!秌ʷʖuN#1feCF)ͧq,u\?Y#EۜrDQ%̎Qv7b0if^韰ӑIS쌉1iHcKOGvKsi, XzZo*b29m-:-''7Se$eIKҹ94ar5ŏW|.ki>K_u?nĠ~i|NJS Ƒ: $489}՟Zxe:MӔ3kM49ל1h1WN>uci$k1I祵>]s9IN[mgťjgJXӔo wOBRӿ~.>>{Y<^g6~b׹MeK׵}6E0'ceVuꐾkL&ɣ,MZx\f,]kd1Ɯ)<)FKG-;X-qo`4ɳMoXczc:/Ћcɝo6洟bfՃԬ`/!~c*zNiSi!<~[\&/3oc=xo~ܯo{o}n"/VձWeڼy?W˨gcqNyr9pbi=_MF>4e~eqѼ=hG[3 ,h~bQ9=..(_y^mv,=6+h\́Hch+ce9`|aW~_z&d'4p^9`9`"p'E2Wˁ^zZ=om9`9 _XGfyDz79-ێ9`9`es'.q :.O֙uf9`8 _XGɏq]GNXWm0s0s`|b^S@j/|n0F#`H8VnJ#`0F#`RK;KGj/|n0F#`7;Vrl0F#`08v,5*͏rF#`0F8ٱceh!G=0s0s&sWߣF#`0FFDudq4ci~S}}\?p,y ch9`9`1tNxSi,h ?e?cs0s0&@=Ǵ'4f3]|mJL[9`9`׍OCu:vH+cO>?iyN?_>s0s0|4QE8?߆0_'c6jL?㰍~Ee۝dY1I^Wi<s0s _/ɸsy~w,=}*u]gUݱyr9`9`D_$&b:ۆ3v'ye3?s0s`p,m͒.X69`9`ןݎcry`[`9`90=8楱g86?癟4s0́Ecisv8kyY|3n9`9`ep,m^׮/K_?Z9`9`̎gyo쯒ͷ2s0ss9~9 8Xmm0s0s`zp,==,Kc9p,m~3?-i9`q򞏳χfs0s08Xڼ(ㅯ]?^8~:u;Ns0sK{_%KoW7e9`ucisspܱۺۂ9`9`8XzzXr9Xg~Z60s0nj~/Hhun k뼯0s0sv;c<]۷qGcbLkv.{g^m0s0s0s0s0s0s0s0s0́Ł#`0F#P[֧90]lbj<9`9`,:#Ëao_6l'ͱ7s0́}әۙuf\-l'ox9`"p>y<,9`;i͒.3s0S/n/֋90?]]X9`90/h. -847畛4s0f޼7bpvr1d=9`Ur>v|sY"rvҼ]D.?|݃ZM[A׿S|]ǖ:6N.N-Fvm^i[yz kKQYe upoZ]_ns$|qe![^meF{C_A?k66Ow׌t07z:%F([ɖ7L=}Gj G3̘77Knog􅏇0竿lgk|z^?ko% 椗|N:mc_#y748#7h'_~/ ef'Yzrr-Ys1~kϭ5ypm WOkyB5bR(َpoֹ- ʉ ֲ ȷ]!YOĭCT qZ[{8[ʶή7}n/5Ò5vܲҧ̸xȺ'zd{{q7\g*{i!o+.5dfvUzFʗ*~# sKFveŝPK\#҃Ok|_ZYq2?l- 6qÌO<>잩+`r7RG)?8q"?< SQG-ώ!W=d5DĴ\E:J<`(r^F[O9o tO风s)QF(׾}Q֋_Ce}6.BYV|{ 8xF[rqt%h?vJc?qRjku ױJc*1ؾeSiBTfٶf=R|2PVUFjtE(.+g{)a7#5k\͎S90v:|]CQYp75'fWps/X~^K!]ms0~aK*K?^zg3Roz }C^c6qe(x2;ǂQe *<bgG'~u;{ͮ/>wm;F{P|3Wlr%F[%m2eKc]y-Q>=^eɆ ,⁞8JcQ|~M}a.Q&tNFW(Q|̯{j^1Qa'G89,|źO90vRXX 3Pr\gd}(M ߂?4g',5ʦ4eϗq9y(O˧dL;՘~[_a}qc_|>G~ źe/ńyIX}8$(}EY}g=rxU8 }G7tE˨*.>Qw;~@_R~3ǸxBԅ5)?s% |: *GN|^t^=ϪS^Bl7 $^+ˆyD4'`emi B4/R8$4}?BSgفWl'oW#YT4e1i64ZO(c\>y^Xl;\Tf?o+OZwkغ*}lCT/e{mhVϱMMp WC Q~G^j~ .܆=9;F=$|dSHFa:<9e2R-lW1Sh~bֲO}xcbĹs`ʘ~>VGucii+0_g߈ӸWyg>9b͛ŦKӏ1F0FSxdm42?:2JXc^UWW[ʿē9)GșXQS,-˪Ki zSy;Z8w˹)륾@_q1 U=Y~||>??}J_c!<&=vXoC`a-I6{:GUO&ǽ}6j4lb^idD#~_:{dmI/D;_69¼, .}Ps mW{#1Nz MP,.~SNf{^Oż+uȇ?,S\بnXk5>uü~7'Ky!bޔ⽭b:GI钱Hp#}4ǧmWӾ\ MR91=^ܣC{r? ySs_F'_!5cY~EWfCh﵏ִS>~ ו 3?pMS~e6Usچ%sm=G Qe|__ I%GGٟ Z>YSm }=+U}*ż>|7LÏH9Cj΅e}:kN&=(XƎ9>yXy8HZ|Z4z/ 㺸40&:yw{3]]|wPM?=})0.8ή}AEkB>ҙ9|C꽢Nci=J_7WGƂ9 ]>ceKkn3b{m5}s$_W=#˱WZc=ڣY ?&1Ƣ|?[ZwͼԥֱF YhS &=/x8'nV:CSle ԶſX:[Wĥ~8f#O9XVF1Ưr\6\duvU2o_<>@GܴƜzmhf'KF{`'T'g[$7ȀCXeyșmek֚E[jlCҬjeU>ej ceQ|w{6e(2A' ){i䢸ReCqQ(#f]*;_Ol*۰#8^ԟt~~s lIVnW,8ޫkM8% gy$,e;2́y"&߹}PvO[ZeyM^~{c6IiZ)I ts?|L:_WGյ1>t{^bt ԏ/Köz hZc_"Ŀlo\p7<"/"{ٳYy_%UJ]iOUy^ z~]u:BEgt|g"IqnUu{rWts?XbGZZ2>EdJsY:8O;Ҍ8G϶muĿQvT{H=/;6鳗QЮ>i4Hq,=k*ppa&:o],;zŸ;XZn{4o`qPkuLx.4rbu'׵o}g`"Os^JF;TW7΢8Zk`qiuT=q~>WM~^Ƽ7+\soQ8`;i. W-j9`\#^浱6~P ftBE?!o 07 ˷J0Or8f``րq6O>@}22 03"CP$  H@` 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0S?*r$$If!vh5 5 5 5 #v :V l t 6`065 ytm8$$If!vh5 5 5 5 #v :V l t 6`065 ytm8$$If!vh5 5 5 5 #v :V l t 6`065 ytm8$$If!vh5 5 5 5 #v :V l t 6`065 ytm8$$If!vh5 5 5 5 #v :V l t 6`065 ytm8 DyK fhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201009/20100908ATT81662/20100908ATT81662EN.pdfyK http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201009/20100908ATT81662/20100908ATT81662EN.pdfDyK Chttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.htmlyDyK Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,694784,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,694784,00.htmlyDyK Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432,00.htmlyDyK Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.htmlyDyK Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,719723,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,719723,00.htmlyDyK Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612608,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612608,00.htmlyDyK Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.htmlDyK Yhttp://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_systemyK http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_systemDyK Khttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100510_europe_nationalism_and_shared_fateyK http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100510_europe_nationalism_and_shared_fateyDyK Ahttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100503_global_crisis_legitimacyyK http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100503_global_crisis_legitimacyDyK Lhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100224_eu_extended_liquidity_support_ecbyK http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100224_eu_extended_liquidity_support_ecbeDyK <http://www.econ.ku.dk/okombe/intmonecon/slidesch13part2.pdfyK xhttp://www.econ.ku.dk/okombe/intmonecon/slidesch13part2.pdf5DyK phttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704476104575439783253733728.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_LEFTTopStoriesyK http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704476104575439783253733728.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_LEFTTopStoriesDyK Yhttp://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_systemyK http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_systemyDyK Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612608,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612608,00.htmlyDyK Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.htmlyDyK Ahttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100503_global_crisis_legitimacyyK http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100503_global_crisis_legitimacyDyK Yhttp://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_systemyK http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_system5DyK phttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704476104575439783253733728.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_LEFTTopStoriesyK http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704476104575439783253733728.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_LEFTTopStoriesDyK Yhttp://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_systemyK http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_systemyDyK Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.htmleDyK <http://www.econ.ku.dk/okombe/intmonecon/slidesch13part2.pdfyK xhttp://www.econ.ku.dk/okombe/intmonecon/slidesch13part2.pdfDyK Khttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100510_europe_nationalism_and_shared_fateyK http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100510_europe_nationalism_and_shared_fateDyK Chttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.htmlDyK Chttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.htmlyDyK Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,719723,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,719723,00.htmlyDyK Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,694784,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,694784,00.htmlyDyK Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432,00.htmlDyK Lhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100224_eu_extended_liquidity_support_ecbyK http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100224_eu_extended_liquidity_support_ecbyDyK Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.htmlyDyK Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.htmlyK http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.htmlj 666666666vvvvvvvvv6666>6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666H666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666662 0@P`p2( 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p8XV~ OJPJQJ_HmHnHsHtHJ`J sNormal dCJ_HaJmHsHtH ll s Heading 1ddd@&[$\$&5CJ0KH$OJPJQJ\aJ0mH sH DA`D Default Paragraph FontRi@R 0 Table Normal4 l4a (k ( 0No List ^^ sHeading 1 Char*5CJ0KH$OJPJQJ\^JaJ0mH sH `^@` s Normal (Web)ddd[$\$CJOJPJQJaJtHD@D s List Paragraph ^m$X@"X s Footnote Text dCJOJPJQJaJtHX1X sFootnote Text CharCJOJPJQJ^JaJtH@&@A@ sFootnote ReferenceH*6U@Q6 s Hyperlink >*B*ph4 @b4 sFooter  !>q> s Footer CharOJPJQJ^J.)@. s Page Number*W@* sStrong5\PK![Content_Types].xmlj0Eжr(΢Iw},-j4 wP-t#bΙ{UTU^hd}㨫)*1P' ^W0)T9<l#$yi};~@(Hu* Dנz/0ǰ $ X3aZ,D0j~3߶b~i>3\`?/[G\!-Rk.sԻ..a濭?PK!֧6 _rels/.relsj0 }Q%v/C/}(h"O = C?hv=Ʌ%[xp{۵_Pѣ<1H0ORBdJE4b$q_6LR7`0̞O,En7Lib/SeеPK!kytheme/theme/themeManager.xml M @}w7c(EbˮCAǠҟ7՛K Y, e.|,H,lxɴIsQ}#Ր ֵ+!,^$j=GW)E+& 8PK!Ptheme/theme/theme1.xmlYOo6w toc'vuر-MniP@I}úama[إ4:lЯGRX^6؊>$ !)O^rC$y@/yH*񄴽)޵߻UDb`}"qۋJחX^)I`nEp)liV[]1M<OP6r=zgbIguSebORD۫qu gZo~ٺlAplxpT0+[}`jzAV2Fi@qv֬5\|ʜ̭NleXdsjcs7f W+Ն7`g ȘJj|h(KD- dXiJ؇(x$( :;˹! I_TS 1?E??ZBΪmU/?~xY'y5g&΋/ɋ>GMGeD3Vq%'#q$8K)fw9:ĵ x}rxwr:\TZaG*y8IjbRc|XŻǿI u3KGnD1NIBs RuK>V.EL+M2#'fi ~V vl{u8zH *:(W☕ ~JTe\O*tHGHY}KNP*ݾ˦TѼ9/#A7qZ$*c?qUnwN%Oi4 =3ڗP 1Pm \\9Mؓ2aD];Yt\[x]}Wr|]g- eW )6-rCSj id DЇAΜIqbJ#x꺃 6k#ASh&ʌt(Q%p%m&]caSl=X\P1Mh9MVdDAaVB[݈fJíP|8 քAV^f Hn- "d>znNJ ة>b&2vKyϼD:,AGm\nziÙ.uχYC6OMf3or$5NHT[XF64T,ќM0E)`#5XY`פ;%1U٥m;R>QD DcpU'&LE/pm%]8firS4d 7y\`JnίI R3U~7+׸#m qBiDi*L69mY&iHE=(K&N!V.KeLDĕ{D vEꦚdeNƟe(MN9ߜR6&3(a/DUz<{ˊYȳV)9Z[4^n5!J?Q3eBoCM m<.vpIYfZY_p[=al-Y}Nc͙ŋ4vfavl'SA8|*u{-ߟ0%M07%<ҍPK! ѐ'theme/theme/_rels/themeManager.xml.relsM 0wooӺ&݈Э5 6?$Q ,.aic21h:qm@RN;d`o7gK(M&$R(.1r'JЊT8V"AȻHu}|$b{P8g/]QAsم(#L[PK-![Content_Types].xmlPK-!֧6 +_rels/.relsPK-!kytheme/theme/themeManager.xmlPK-!Ptheme/theme/theme1.xmlPK-! ѐ' theme/theme/_rels/themeManager.xml.relsPK] .ab ^ 0A-}#&=)*z-/0!2Y3345j7X9Y:O<KNN]TUsWXZ'],`xbefjDmmap?rOs7xyy{=|sҌ'ܛ}  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:Rj<: t |  \ 0 E :fn!xbjR G!!q""#&&(()6**++,0----}} %%%( - "#'*5;>@/G5JP.UZaNg/imvy GAɉ*L&<ɱb4-.J`yjPT\nMy{|~5\{"vɱ/4ǘIMz}]9^o^,hhhPť+FۦE1JۨC1Jت*UngQjd LggȰ'x=V0ճE8NY/JθDzJ}XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX !(!!hlR:>gi8 < ~  2 Ax7=#dpGWvzk`lkP !D!I!!!!/"o""-##e%%&&l&&(^((+W,,3-l---XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXl  ,"$ieu<b>@* (     FA?"Picture 23"`?B S  ?} ;"T OLE_LINK1 OLE_LINK2~ââ~jRj,RjlRjRjRj,Re~ j~8*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttagsCity9*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttagsplaceC*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttagsmetricconverter Phl2010 a ProductID$.8OYal'+>C5?uy",.UWbi HOTY~')HQ@ E K M Y `    * 2 ? I b d  $ L M e f t x     ' + 4 9 E O ^ ` E G EIKQ/27<KMgqzuw>C-/%),ABEJMQajrv>@EHQUegEJLV]_2634#235fh36"8:;?; ? q x 0!4!;!>!;"E";#?#}##:$?$$$$$$$$$%%X%Z%%%%%&&O&R&h&s&&&&&&&&&&& '$'m't'''''''''''''=)K)q)u)))********++++++,,,,,,z------......//4/9/;/=/E/I/K/O/\/]/n/o/y/z///)0-0E0K0s0~000001 15191I1J1T1a1!2-2M2U2Y2b2h2l222%3(3.313V3[333333344444444444444455!5v5w5~555555666666666677Z7^7j7r777777777888888X9c9999999X:[:::::;(;:;?;C;I;Z;d;k;o;s;x;;;;;/<0<O<W<q<=v>x>>>>>>>>????#?/?1?3?=?P?U?\?g???@@@@A AzAAAAAAAAAAAABB^BcBBBCvEE%F-FOFYFFFFFGG!G%G*G5G?GyG{GGGGG'H.H@HIHyHH I)I*I,IGIKITIZIyI|IIIIIIIIIII.J3JBJHJ_JiJwJ{JJJJJ,K1K?KDKYK\KdKhKjKoKvK{KKKKKKKKKKKKKLLL&LyL}LLL"M(MJMRMcMdMuM}MMMMMNN#N%NNNNNNNNNNN O$OOOOOOO P(PPPPPPP Q)QOQUQQQBRGRvRxRRRSS]T`T{T}TTTpUrUUUUUoVpVVVsWyW}WWXXYYYYNZSZWZYZiZmZZZZ[[[[[[[/\6\\\\\\\]]'],]>]@]i]n]]]]]]]]C^o^u^^^__!_&_Z_f_g_p_t_y___,`3`H`R`HaIaaaaa bbxbbbbbbbb4c8cYc[ccc*d3dYd`dddiddde eieneueweffffUgYgjgtg}gggggg hhh!h,hhhhhhhh iiiiiiiiii jjuj~jjjjjjjjjjj-k5k9kCkokvkkkkk ll mm-m1mDmJmmmBnMnnnooapfpppppqqqqq'q/q7qqrrr?rFrrrOsUsssttttttuu vv>vGvvvvv$w&w'w0w?wFwHwPwww7x:x=x@xxxxxyyyyyy1y2y7yQyRyeyfyjykyyyyyyyyyyyyy@zBzKzLzzzzzzz {{{{#{'{.{9{H{L{{{=|@|Z|^|a|h|i|k|||||} }}}@}I}M}X}y}}}}}}}}~~'~*~.~}~~%/9V_z}ׄ؄EMsS̋֋_lČҌڌ dqэڍkrŽʎ*nvΏЏmuȐϐ,69?B^dkmr}ɑΑ?B2367>CGN]fJRcn^cbgՖٖ89eq"?EŚǚ'ۛܛޛ &'25R]̜ל }ܝdoƞϞu}˟ԟޟ35<=GHPQY`abjktuz|[ghrĢƢѢ%,:?@BCHQVZagpv| $&-.89BEL`ai5=MO8@BFݦFb3>GJݨ3=GJڪWakn S]gi LY[cgİŰưIRSU#-.DF и{~+M_f׻ vμмѼҼdfgh ghX[b&(bc jm{ #)-589<BEKcGKLQTU^fgor{|7y}vx16:>FR_yX^4:@GUZ[]^clqw 42}[tvkwv0~njC&pu{/6 16DJu  ]_fh(*ACEQz} 69KMQRSSUUVVXY[\^_gjuxy{~ /0NOcdUW DE12AC~##&&**//4477P<W<q<=CEEEEF.J0JKKNNPP'Q)QBRDR^T`TUUoVpVZZ[_\_eehhmmPsQs9x:x}}&~'~tSэԍܛ %'12QR˜̜ |}۝ܝcdŞƞtuȟ˟34:ՠޠ") DĢͣΣ `MABFFFGFGjkfg bcg İŰRS,-M LM`fvϼ#e ` fX[a'({)-BEKNhicHK^|7z}.16:Y.psw62~w7v0njD-v `eiBFQSSUUVVXY[\^_xy~33333333333333333333355:x?x1yHyQyQyTyUyfyjyyyzzH{H{{{?|?|ưǰSU-/ {`ef Ҽdh hX((ss7RSSUUVVXY[\^_gju~55:x?x1yHyQyQyTyUyfyjyyyzzH{H{{{?|?|ưǰSU-/ {`ef ҼdhhX-BCssR~jil(Sn{02 J sx tbXhc&l0`fwzK# %c+8.m:1.3m8{:|=oXAVE.GeG!HwKqLRLNO8CPxR{R,GTs~TxV_[(T\&^l^nK`ndke;hi]lkyQp\pgsFuW)HmaO.~"kos*1LE-ffTdk)8Bgr,]7XM6E$BZn-&QD,~c 8>i+`Brq{X 6Nsfh@` KLXY\]rs}~QQ44440}@(@$L@V@d@j@@ @`@l@t@@@@@UnknownG*Ax Times New Roman5Symbol3. *Cx ArialWTTA20CB508t00MS MinchocTimesNewRomanTimes New Roman7.@ CalibriA BCambria Math"01&&n_T"w!02QHP $Ps2!xx6830s6830sOh+'0 px  6830sNormal6830s2Microsoft Office Word@@p2@p2n՜.+,D՜.+,, hp|  T_  Title,6 8@ _PID_HLINKSA5!z]Shttp://www.financialregulationforum.com/wpmember/european-systemic-risk-board-5233 =Z`http://www.ripe.hanfa.hr/edukacija/tekstovi/nova-struktura-za-nadzor-financijskog-sektora-eu-a/0 WOhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117236.pdf65Thttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/7521434/EU-draws-up-plans-for-single-economic-government-to-prevent-crisis.html%kQphttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704476104575439783253733728.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_LEFTTopStories3zN<http://www.econ.ku.dk/okombe/intmonecon/slidesch13part2.pdfX+KLhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100224_eu_extended_liquidity_support_ecb=WHAhttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100503_global_crisis_legitimacy\EIhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101019_remaking_eurozone_german_imageH3BKhttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100510_europe_nationalism_and_shared_fate{/?Yhttp://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_systemM<Ohttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100514_germany_creating_economic_governance0G9Qhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101104_german_designs_europes_economic_futures_6Hhttp://web.stratfor.com/images/charts/Europe_austerity_measures_800.jpgM3Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,676634,00.html`;0@http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,708241,00.htmlJ-Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.htmlJ*Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612608,00.htmlO'Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,725835,00.htmlF$Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697098,00.htmlB!Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,719723,00.html-d+http://www.roubini.com/briefings/47577.phpn6@http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,728699,00.htmld&Chttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,705959-2,00.htmlKAhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,725079,00.htmlGAhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.htmlIAhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432,00.htmlD Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,694784,00.htmld. Chttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.html[fhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201009/20100908ATT81662/20100908ATT81662EN.pdf!^Yhttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100510_europe_nationalism_and_shared_fate?fn=8116244174'z]http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100514_germany_creating_economic_governance?fn=2917140695-di+http://www.roubini.com/briefings/47577.php65fhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/7521434/EU-draws-up-plans-for-single-economic-government-to-prevent-crisis.html`;c@http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,708241,00.html`;`@http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,708241,00.html!z]Shttp://www.financialregulationforum.com/wpmember/european-systemic-risk-board-5233 =Z_http://www.ripe.hanfa.hr/edukacija/tekstovi/nova-struktura-za-nadzor-financijskog-sektora-eu-an6W@http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,728699,00.htmld&TChttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,705959-2,00.htmlKQAhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,725079,00.html\NIhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101019_remaking_eurozone_german_imageOKAhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,725835,00.htmlMHOhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100514_germany_creating_economic_governance0GEQhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101104_german_designs_europes_economic_futureFBAhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697098,00.htmls_?Hhttp://web.stratfor.com/images/charts/Europe_austerity_measures_800.jpg[<fhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201009/20100908ATT81662/20100908ATT81662EN.pdfG9Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.htmlG6Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.htmlX+3Lhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100224_eu_extended_liquidity_support_ecbI0Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432,00.htmlD-Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,694784,00.htmlB*Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,719723,00.htmlM'Ahttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,676634,00.html0 $Ohttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117236.pdfd.!Chttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.htmld.Chttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.htmlH3Khttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100510_europe_nationalism_and_shared_fate3z<http://www.econ.ku.dk/okombe/intmonecon/slidesch13part2.pdfJAhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.html{/Yhttp://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_system%kphttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704476104575439783253733728.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_LEFTTopStories{/ Yhttp://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_system=W Ahttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100503_global_crisis_legitimacyJAhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.htmlJAhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612608,00.html{/Yhttp://www.stratfor.com/memberships/166322/analysis/20100630_europe_state_banking_system  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~      !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~      !"#$%&'()*+,-./012345678?@CRoot Entry F-2BData 61TablegWordDocument SummaryInformation(DocumentSummaryInformation8X7MsoDataStore +-2-2NFBNCKQ1RIQ==2 +-2-2Item  PropertiesUCompObj y   F'Microsoft Office Word 97-2003 Document MSWordDocWord.Document.89q