Naslov
Indirectly and Directly Evaluative Legal Theory: a Reply to Julie Dickson

Autori
Burazin, Luka

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, sažetak, znanstveni

Izvornik
LegArg 2011 - International Conference on Legal Theory and Legal Argumentation / Novak, Marko ; Avbelj Matej - Nova Gorica : Evropska pravna fakulteta v Novi Gorici i Fakulteta za državne in evropske študije, 2011, 4-5

Skup
LegArg 2011 - International Conference on Legal Theory and Legal Argumentation

Mjesto i datum
Nova Gorica, Slovenija, 11.11.2011. - 12.11.2011

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Pozvano predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Nije recenziran

Ključne riječi
Dickson; indirectly evaluative legal theory; directly evaluative legal theory; value of importance

Sažetak
Owing to its methodological approach, legal theory is usually divided into descriptive, presumably non-evaluative, and normative, i.e. evaluative and justificatory, legal theory. In her "Evaluation and Legal Theory" Julie Dickson rejects this dichotomy. She argues that all legal theory is evaluative in one way or another. Therefore, she introduces a dichotomy between indirectly evaluative and directly evaluative legal theory. Whereas directly evaluative legal theory has the task of evaluating law morally, indirectly evaluative legal theory makes evaluative judgements as to what features of law are most important and significant to explain. In my paper I first set out Dickson's account of the “evaluative-but-not-morally-evaluative“ view of legal theory and then consider some of the criticism of this account. Finally, I make my own remarks concerning Dickson's dichotomy, focusing on the fruitfulness of the “indirectly evaluative legal theory“ concept.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Pravo

POVEZANOST RADA