Naslov
Agency costs and principal control mechanisms

Autori
Cerović, Ljerka ; Zaninović, Vinko

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u zbornicima skupova, cjeloviti rad (in extenso), stručni

Izvornik
Methodology, methods and tools of financial and economic, organizational and legal regulation of reproductive processes based on the innovative and investment model / Pryadko V. V. - Chernivtsi : Bukovyna State Finance Academy, 2011, 354-357

Skup
International scientific and practical internet- conference "Methodology, methods and tools of financial and economic, organizational and legal regulation of reproductive processes based on the innovative and investment model"

Mjesto i datum
Chernivtsi, Ukrajina, 24.11.2011. - 25.11.2011

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija

Ključne riječi
principal; agent; agency costs; control mechanisms

Sažetak
By the establishment of agency relationship between the principal and agent, assuming that both principal and agent are acting with the goal of utility maximization, and due to appearance of asymmetric information, moral hazard and wrong choices, it comes to the emergence of agency costs. Dichotomy of interest between owner and manager of company, theory tries to control by different mechanisms, but the most common solutions have been developed in terms of monitoring and various incentives by which the principal tries to control and direct the behavior of agent.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Ekonomija

POVEZANOST RADA