Naslov
Quine's Platonism and Antiplatonism

Autori
Kovač, Srećko

Izvornik
Synthesis philosophica (0352-7875) 14 (1999), 1; 45-52

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u časopisima, članak, znanstveni

Ključne riječi
extensional Platonism; intensional Platonism; linguistic Platonism; algebra; predicate-functor; denotation; hierarchy

Sažetak
Quine rejects intensional Platonism and, with it, also rejects attributes (properties) as designations of predicates. He pragmatically accepts extensional Platonism, but conceives of classes as merely auxiliary entities needed to express some laws of set theory. At the elementary logical level, Quine develops an ontologically innocent logic of predicates. What in standard quantification theory is the work of variables is in the logic of predicates the work of a few functors that operate on predicates themselves: variables are eliminated. This predicate-functor logic may be conceived as a peculiar sort of Platonism - ontologically neutral, reduced to schematized linguistic forms.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

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