Naslov
John Perry e l’argomento della conoscenza
(John Perry and the knowledge argument)

Autori
Malatesti, Luca

Izvornik
Epistemologia (0392-9760) 31 (2008); 57-74

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u časopisima, članak, znanstveni

Ključne riječi
argomento della conoscenza; qualia; concetti fenomenici; John Perry
(knowledge argument; qualia; phenomenal concepts; John Perry)

Sažetak
In this paper, I reply to John Perry’s response to Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument (KA). The KA aims to prove, by means of a thought experiment concerning the hypothetical scientist Mary, that conscious experiences have non-physical properties. Mary has complete scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision without having had any colour experience. The central intuition in KA is that by seeing colours Mary will learn what it is like to have colour experiences. Perry has argued that what Mary learns is just a new way of thinking about facts described by her scientific knowledge. Particularly, he maintains that she will acquire just indexical knowledge of certain physical properties of her experiences. This knowledge involves a demonstrative way of thinking about these properties by means of demonstrative concepts. My reply proceeds in two stages. Firstly, I attack Perry’ s model of introspective knowledge of colour experiences. Secondly, I argue that adapting his type of response to a more promising model of introspection does not succeed. Mary’ s knowledge of what it is like to have colour experiences involves concepts of colours that are not indexical.

Izvorni jezik
Ita

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

POVEZANOST RADA