ࡱ> q`ZbjbjqPqP .::}&F F F R <  ***8$+$H+\ =h+L+",,,,,,R<T<T<T<T<T<T<$k>h@\x<E .,,..x< ,,<333.l , ,R<3.R<33 ; ;,+ OӘ* 0Z;;\<0=;/Az1/A(;/A ; ,,h3-Tl-H,,,x<x<.3^,,,=....  * *  The Economic Theory and Motivation and Communication inside the Firm Jana Soukupov,, Zuzana Hubinkov, Ljubica Bak-Tomi Eng. Jana Soukupov, CSc., University of Economics, Faculty of Business Administration, Prague, Czech Republic,  HYPERLINK "mailto:jasoukup@vse.cz" jasoukup@vse.cz PhDr., Ph.D., Zuzana Hubinkova, University of Economics,Faculty of Business Administration, Department of Managerial Psychology and Sociology, Prague, Czech Republic  HYPERLINK "mailto:hubzuz@vse.cz" hubzuz@vse.cz;  HYPERLINK "mailto:hubinkova@quick.cz" hubinkova@quick.cz Ljubica Baki-Tomi, Ph.D., Faculty of Teacher Education, University of Zagreb, Croatia,  HYPERLINK "mailto:lj.bakic-tomic@ufzg.hr" lj.bakic-tomic@ufzg.hr Abstract The paper deals with the selected aspect of the theory of the firm in the context with the motivation and communication of the people. The point of view of the neoclassical microeconomics is quite simple: the motivation of the people results from their goals, usually maximum of utility. In fact the economic environment is complicated and uncertain. Some economists argue that firm is organism with internal structure, individuals decided in conditions of lack of information. Moreover access to information is asymmetric. For that reason is good communication inside of firm and well functioning system of motivation is for success of the firm condition sine qua non. An important ask of economics theory is to the incorporate process inside the firm including communication and motivation into the analysis. The paper started theory of transaction costs and its influence on the internal structure of the firm. The paper also deals with the control and ownership separation as an important factor of the potential diversion in the interests of owners and dominated group in the firm and agency theory. The identification with the firm as an important factor of staff motivation is regarded in the article. Key Words: Theory of the firm, alternative theories of the firm ownership and control, agency theory Introduction The system of motivating people involved in a company and the methods of communication among them contribute to the successful functioning of the company as a whole. Traditional economic theory based on neo-classical assumptions, however, does not always pay due attention to these issues. For this reason, let me mention several examples of the, by now almost classic, alternative theory dealing with the issues of processes inside a company, including motivation and communication. Transaction costs My first example is R. Coase, who dealt with transactional costs. As their sources, Coase lists mainly the uncertainty related to economic contracts as well as the complexity of the contracts derived from the complexity of the production process. The uncertainty related to the contracts and their complexities necessarily results in the necessity to monitor the performance of the contracts as well as the fact that the performance of the contracts is difficult to enforce. As indicated above, a more fundamental causal ground has to be sought behind the listed sources of transactional costs. In this respect, the human factor can be considered the primary source of transactional costs for two reasons. The first quoted reason is the so-called limited rationality, or a discrepancy between the economic subjects effort to act rationally on the one hand, and their capacities and abilities to act rationally on the other hand. In the real economic environment, this disagreement is common due to insufficient information, uncertainty, and limited human capabilities. Since production is a largely controlled process inside a company, the effect of limited rationality is reduced. No less important a factor, contributing to transactional costs, is peoples reliability (so-called opportunism) and endeavour to press their own interests. It is precisely in the complex setting of uncertainty and asymmetric information that people involved in transactions can pursue their own interests not company interests. Here we clearly see the crucial importance of staff motivation as a tool to reduce the negative impacts of opportunist behaviour on a company. In addition, a well-chosen communication system allows improved information of all individuals involved in a company as well as monitoring of contractual performance. Motivation and enforcement mechanisms exist inside a company which are unavailable for ordinary market transactions. From transactional costs, the theory thus inevitably moves to the issue of motivating people involved in a company and the related seeking of paths of reducing transactional costs. In a sense, options and tools are sought for enforcement and contract performance either only available within a company or applicable to ordinary market transactions to a limited extent. Ownership and control Berle and Means distinguish between company ownership and factual control. They proceed from the assumption that ownership of property and control over it are increasingly less in the same hands as corporate ownership is dispersed. Ownership without control and control without an adequate ownership share appear to be the logical consequences of corporate development. The cardinal conclusion resulting from detachment of control from ownership is evident: goals of the owner are different from goals of the group witch firm controls. Detachment of control from ownership has serious implications for the nature of the economic environment. Berle and Means consider the concentration of economic power detached from ownership to be such an implication. That was how economic empires were formed, in which owners were left out in the cold. According to Berle and Means, there is no room left for individual initiative in large corporations with thousands of employees; activity is group activity. An individuals activity is relatively unimportant except the subject in control. Even decisions are collectivised. That is why the application of behaviourist approaches is one of the possible responses to detachment of control from ownership. As will be discussed further on, behaviourist theories deal with the companys goals, accentuating interest groups and coalitions of subjects involved in a company. Berle and Means regard their theory as the basis for a new corporate concept based on the notion of corporation as an organisation. In their opinion, the corporation must be analysed as a social organisation as a consequence of depersonalised ownership. On the other hand, the corporation as an organisation encompasses the mutual relationships of various economic interests of groups involved in the corporation: the owners, who offer their capital, the employees, who create the product, the consumers, who lend value to the product, and the group in control above them all, who have the power. Behavioural theories of the firm Detachment of control from ownership is but one of the manifestations of the fact that a company is a complex organism. Behaviourist theories put emphasis on this aspect of companies. H. Simon may be regarded as the godfather of behaviourist theories. Simon derives his principal postulates to explain the efficient functioning of an organisation from four organisational phenomena, which I am going to discuss in due order. Authority is the first mechanism for asserting the organisations goals. Reward remains an important motivating instrument in Simons concept; Simons greatest contribution is seen in his emphasis on corporate identification and loyalty; co-ordination is a significant condition for the functioning of an organisation. Authority Simon illustrates the issue of authority on the employment contract. He cites the employment contract as an example of contract in which one of the subjects here, the employee accepts authority. That is the difference between an employment contract and ordinary purchasing and selling; the contract establishes an authoritative relationship instead of a market one. Of course, this authority is limited by the freedom to quit the employment. However, that requires some costs, and the significance of such authority is therefore not negligible. At the same time, the employment contract is a typical example of an incomplete contract: employees pledge to work according to instructions, but they do not know the instructions when signing the contract. Uncertainty is the common argument for incomplete contracts even in neo-classical theory. As a rule, the employees wage includes a reward for the willingness to bear the burden of uncertainty. The uncertainty relates to the specific instructions that the employee will receive when it is time to fulfil his or her specific work duties. However, the uncertainty factor is also present when the employees are assigned specific tasks. To overcome uncertainty is one of the notable skills required from all who make autonomous decisions as part of their jobs. Decision-making is by far not only an issue for the top manager. Uncertainty grows with the growing amount of time between the start of employment and the moment when action is required. The employment contract is thus an example of an incomplete contract. As has been mentioned earlier in this paper, and as is further going to be emphasised, a contract cannot possibly envisage all contingencies in an environment of uncertainty. That is why the so-called zone of acceptance is of importance in Simons concept. The employment contract has certain implicit (and explicit) limitations, defining the room for the employees actions. These limits define the zone of acceptance, within which the employee can be expected to obey orders. The zone of acceptance is also sometimes called the zone of indifference for its choice of various alternative actions which are of great importance to the employer and little or no importance to the employee. The combination of the employers uncertainty (concerning what is to be done in the future) and the employees broad zone of acceptance (or what the employee is ordered to do) makes it highly attractive for both parties to negotiate the contract. Here, Simon mentions the idea of new institutional economy, which regards as important the saving of transactional costs due to using a generally formulated employment contract as opposed to a specific contract for each action. Simon emphasises a different aspect of the relation between authority and an employment contract. In an organisation, authority is not applied only (and maybe not even mostly) in orders intended for specific actions. More frequently, orders are in the form of expected output (repair the machine), principles to be applied (all purchases have to be made via the purchase department), or restricting instructions (produce at the lowest cost while maintaining quality). The order is in the form of the final goal, and usually does not contain the method to achieve the goal. Employees mostly but not exclusively the managers are responsible not only for assessing possible options and choosing one, but also for recognising all circumstances crucial for their decisions. Work well done is not merely obeying orders, but rather initiative contributing to the achievement of the organisations goals. An employer might issue a simple order like, Always decide so that the company makes the most profit. However, such an option is illusional given the difficulty of enforcement and monitoring of performance of such generally formulated instructions. Where the authority prefers decision-making rules to specific orders, it contributes to individual decisions with its knowledge of many different experts. Information may flow through various channels within an organisation and is used as inputs decision-making rules in a number of situations important for the company. The more complex the information flow and the looser the formulation of instructions and rules for employees conduct, the greater the danger of problems stemming from limited rationality. The above explanation of the employment contract and authority leads Simon back to the question of motivation. For an organisation to function well, it is not enough that the staff is given literal orders; that may even be damaging. In fact the main point is that the employee should show initiative and apply their knowledge and skill in order to achieve the organisations goals. In most organisations, the employees work towards the organisations goals harder than follows from their vaguely formulated employment contract. Then, of course, Simon asks, why dont the employees substitute work with leisure? Why do they so often work so hard for the benefit of their organisation? Reward as Motivation The answer to the question of motivation is typically as follows: the employees may be motivated to accept authority by means of material rewards, promotion, and recognising their contribution to the achievement of the organisations goals as defined by the owners or managers. According to Simon, such rewards are of a motivational nature and only work satisfactorily if certain conditions are met. The crucial condition for a simple linking of an employees reward with his or her performance is the possibility to measure with sufficient accuracy the employees contribution to the achievement of the organisations goals. An example of a reward related to an employees performance is the salesclerks reward, if it is in the form of a commission at least in part. Manual workers are rewarded with piece wage in some cases however ever less frequent. It is evident that as the individuals contribution is ever more difficult to measure (see below) and due to other difficulties such as the ignoring of safety rules, piece wage regardless of quality, etc., piece wage may result in a worsening of the companys competitive position. For managers and other employees, the material motivation may be in the form of bonuses which are assumed to reflect their contribution towards the corporate profits. Nevertheless, such a system of rewards is only fruitful as long as an organisations profits (or other goals) can be attributed to the conduct of individuals. Unless the individuals contributions can be measured, the above system of rewards is ineffective and may even be counter-productive. Generally speaking, the higher the degree of interdependence among the various members of an organisation, the more difficult it is to measure their individual contributions to the organisations goals. Notwithstanding, the interdependence of involved individuals is what makes organisations more profitable than pure market transactions. Simon does not see the difficulty of measuring individuals contributions to the achievement of an organisations goals as unsubstantial: it follows from the very essence of organisation. An attempt to resolve the above difficulties may be to divide the organisation into relatively self-contained segments: independent profit-making centres called divisions or otherwise, in each of which the balance serves as a basis for measuring the performance and determining the rewards. Naturally, establishing divisions only makes sense as long as the divisions are truly independent. Where a division operates mainly as a supplier for another, conditions for intra-corporate business have to be set. This is where transfer pricing principles and rules come into play that either allow or rule out the possibility to purchase or sell outside the company. For these reasons, the establishment of divisions only makes sense in most companies at short distances inward within the structure, and only resolves the problem of individuals contributions to the achievement of the organisations goals at the highest level. Although rewards play an important role in ensuring loyalty to the organisations goals and the managers authority, their effectiveness is limited. Organisations can be much less effective if material rewards are the sole or the predominant available means of motivation. In fact, research into organisations reveals other significant methods of motivation which make the employees accept the organisations goals and authority as the foundation for their conduct. Simon focuses on the most prominent of these mechanisms: identification with the organisation. Loyalty: Identification with the Organisations Goals Pride on ones work and organisational loyalty are widespread phenomena, more pronounced among skilled employees and managers than among workers doing the routine work: the latter are usually easier to control and sometimes may be rewarded with piece wage. In many cases, a link can be observed between the overall success of an organisation and the personal career and reward of its staff. However, this explanation ignores the problem of the common cases where the reward is achieved together and divided among all whether they have or have not contributed to the achievement of the goal. The independence of an individuals reward from their contribution to the goal may register as the stowaway problem. In fact, an organisations success rarely depends on an individuals effort (perhaps with the exception of top managers). As a result, there is often no clear and direct link between an individuals reward and their contribution. Simon asks, why then do employees work hard even in cases where they could benefit almost equally regardless of their effort. The stowaway problem is common in organisations. According to Simon, the important theoretical task is not to search for an answer to the question why there are employees who work below their maximum. After all, that is rational behaviour in an environment of imperfect information about ones contribution. The fundamental task, on the other hand, is to find an explanation for the converse phenomenon: why there are the others; someone else than the stowaways. Why many maybe even most employees work harder than is the enforceable minimum. These questions are particularly important in the insecure economic environment, where the possibilities to monitor and enforce contract performance are limited. Simon sees the explanation in the fact that the employees identify themselves with the organisations goals.  Their identification with the organisation becomes the motive for the employees to work actively towards the organisations goals. Of course, this is not the only source of motivation; it co-exists with the reward and enforcement mechanisms, which are part of the employment contract. Simon points out that the employees willingness to carry out their superiors orders and instructions is not only the result of loyalty: a significant cognitive element is present. Limited rationality does not allow one to grasp the complex of situations provided by the setting for ones decisions in its entirety. If employees subordinate themselves to an authority, they free themselves in part of the need to reflect on all the external circumstances, thus shifting part of their decision-making to others. These others may include their direct superiors or specialised corporate units. They may apply information provided by specialised staff and teams, or even from external sources. It is evident that such capacities are usually only available to ordinary staffers to a limited extent. Here, the evident feature of Simons approach must be mentioned: all of the mechanisms of asserting the organisations goals into individuals conduct referred to so far (authority, material rewards, and organisational loyalty) work in interaction and influence each other. An important element in an organisations decision-making, according to Simon, is the necessity to focus on the specific, above all strategic aspects. It is considered appropriate to apply a rational calculation and modelling of possible situations rather that try to react on the complex external reality. Simplification can be made so that the employees focus on the various specific component goals. Focusing on one of the organisations goals, or one of a units goals, may be one form of such simplification.  Simon admits that, due to limited cognitive capacities, the exact form of the goals depends on the available measurable indicators such as profits, growth, market share, etc. Even though these quantities are mere approximations, they are appropriate for the decision-making process, where they substitute the realistic but immeasurable human goals, and their reflections in the organisations goals. Simon emphasises that the desire of employees on all levels to bear responsibility for the outcomes, not only to stick to the rules, is an important determinant of an organisations rate of success. The acceptance of responsibility depends on both rewards and organisational identification. Co-ordination An insight into loyalty, organisational identification and authority makes it possible to explain why an organisation can be productive even though there is no direct link between the organisations goals and employees rewards. Simon sees the empirically established non-existence of significant differences in effectiveness and productivity between organisations in the profit and non-profit sectors as a weighty argument in support of his views. At the same time, no significant differences have been found between companies directed by their owners and those with dispersed ownership. Other authors deal with the issues of organisation and peoples motivation under economic theory. Arrow is one of them. Conflict of Goals Like Simon or Cyert and March, Arrow focuses on motivating people involved in organisations. The company is one example of organisation. Arrow considers the general prevalence of authoritative decision-making to be one of the main characteristics of organisations. In organisations of all types and sizes, some of those involved make the decisions and others execute them. Authority has its limits, but the following applies within the limits: one says what others should do; this is a signification feature of the functioning of organisations. Arrow distinguishes between personal authority, i.e. the actual issuance of orders and instructions, and impersonal authority, i.e., rules of conduct for all members of an organisation under various possible circumstances. Since personal authority cannot be omnipresent, the existence of such rules is inevitable. Such rules are an instrument of and supplement to personal authority; their advantage is in their better predictability, and their drawback is their lower degree of flexibility. The company is the authority for its employees, however limited it is. Arrow refers to Simon to emphasise the employment contract as one in which the employee accepts the authority. That is how the employment contract differs from ordinary purchasing and selling; the contract establishes an authoritative relationship rather than a market one. Of course, this authority is limited by the freedom to quit the employment. However, that requires some costs, and the significance of such authority is therefore not negligible. The problem of responsibility is connected to the question of authority. Arrow observes that a corporations responsibility towards its shareholders is in fact fictitious. The question of responsibility towards shareholders is extended by the radial demands for responsibility towards other members or the corporation: the employees and the consumers. Authority typically resists higher responsibility demands. Arrow considers the following five points to be crucial: the value of authority the conditions for its acknowledgement the value of responsibility the conditions for its achievement ways to achieve an equilibrium between authority and responsibility The Value of Authority In an organisation, authority is required to co-ordinate the members activities. Arrow observes two contradictory factors: increased productivity and complexity of common production on the one hand, and the existence of information exchange costs on the other hand. Arrow formulates four additional theses: Since individuals activities influence each other sometimes as substitutes, sometimes complements common decision-making is better than separate. The optimal common decision depends on the spread of information among the members. As information exchange induces costs the use of resources and above all time it is cheaper and more efficient to concentrate information in a central location than to disperse information among members. It may be cheaper for the organisations management to make a decision and hand over the outcome rather than to spread all the information that the decision is based on. Arrow regards authority and centralised decision-making as tools to render information flows more efficient.  Arrow assumes that consensus is the alternative to authority. In this respect, he asks whether consensus can be a substitute to authority. For organisations whose members share equal interests and identical information, consensus is the obvious spontaneous and effective result, because each one follows the same common interest. In cases where the interests or the information differ, the costs of reaching a consensus increase and the value of consensus decreases relative to the value of authority. The Achievement of Authority In the view of economic theory, authority is not needed as long as the pricing mechanism functions ideally, in which case all aspects of a transaction can be treated in a contractual fashion. An organisation with an authority is a solution for where the pricing mechanism fails. Of course, the enforcement of authority is an important issue. The hiring and layoff of staff can become a tool for a company to enforce authority. However, the existence of such sanctions is not a sufficient condition for the authority to be respected. If all employees fail to adhere to rules, it is difficult to force them to as the replacement of all employees is too costly. Thus, Arrow touches on the problem of sanctions and control: an individual will break the rules if they expect the others to do the same. At the same time, control increases the costs. Respect to authority has a positive effect: it reduces uncertainty. And this is where we can return to Simon and his solutions for motivating people. Arrow points out sources of opportunism and cheating. Simon, to the contrary, emphasises the fact that people do not cheat even in cases where rules may be set to allow making decisions according to circumstances, and cheating would be the rational behaviour. The Value of Responsibility Responsibility belongs to authority; Arrow points out the possible problem of authority without responsibility. Such authority would be difficult to accept by those who are mere subjects to the authority. In terms of organisation, the problem of authority without responsibility is connected to the possibility of errors resulting from uncertainty and information problems: information is insufficient, or conversely, its capacity exceeds that of the authority. Arrow says that impersonal authority, based on norms, has less capacity to handle information. This also applies in cases where rules are set to allow making decisions in light of current circumstances of a given situation. Nevertheless, there are important limits to the flexibility of rules. What Arrow means here is mainly the need to formulate rules so that they reflect all possibilities. This is very costly in terms of required effort, and especially in terms of sufficient information, mainly concerning the possible contingencies and their effects. It is precisely the implementation of the conditional, or strategy, in rules where information is required, which may be very costly, especially if the rules are to be duly complex. The authority may be criticised on justified grounds for the fact that some subjects within the organisation have better information than others. Moreover, Arrow points out that the loss of effectiveness due to excessive information is boosted by the tendency to filter information according to subjective assumptions, thus also preconceptions. Accepting exclusively information with high probability of correctness is absolutely the rational behaviour where information is overabundant. The Achievement of Responsibility There is no organisation that lacks the element of responsibility. Each organisation has a limited scope. In extreme cases, quitting the organisation is always an option, however it usually induces some costs. Therefore, authority has to take the members possible quitting into consideration. Arrow says that if the customers consider themselves members of the organisation, the classic economic view of competitors as regulators of authority can be regarded as a special case of quitting the organisation. For an organisation, it is vital to reach an equilibrium between its authority and responsibility. Correction of errors has to be the function of responsibility, but it must not destroy the core of the authority; too much responsibility would negate the authority. Arrow points out that in order to preserve authority, responsibility has to be exerted occasionally, periodically; especially where the outcomes depart too far from the expectations as a result of more profound study, or at regular intervals. There is no doubt that all the above will be reflected in an information system, for example in decision-making rules. Arrow observes that authority is undoubtedly indispensable in order to achieve the organisations goals, but it has to be linked to responsibility: either by a form of anchored and planned assessment, or by the employees tendency to disrespect the authority. Conclusion Particularly in companies complex organisations consisting of various interest groups the traditional motivation instruments derived from purely economic indicators can only be applied to a limited extent. Traditional economic theory also provides tools to resolve problems of motivating people under uncertain conditions. The application of the agency theory is one of the options. However, for a truly adequate analysis of corporate behaviour, it is necessary to include processes inside the company and to see the company as an organisation consisting of individuals and groups with their own interests. Such subjects have to communicate and co-ordinate their activities as well as be motivated effectively to act in the interest of the company as a whole. It is an important element of good management to establish an appropriate motivation and communication system. Arrow, K.J.: The Limits of Organisation, W.W. Norton and Company, 1974 ( in Keasey, Thompson, S., Wright, M.: Corporate Governance, Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999, ISBN1 85898 871 3) Berle. A.G.-Means, G.C.: The Evolution of Control, The Diverence of Interest Between Ownership and Control, The New Concenp of The Corporatrion, 1968 ( in Keasey, Thompson, S., Wright, M.: Corporate Governance, Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999, ISBN1 85898 871 3) Coase, R.H.:The Nature of the Firm, 1937 (in Langois, R.N, T.Fu.Lai Yu, Robertson P. Cyert.R.M,- March. J.G.: A Behavioral Theory of Organizational Objectives (1959, in Langois, R.N, T.Fu.Lai Yu and Robertson P.: Alternative Theories of the Firm, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002, ISBN 1 85898 758 X Kaldor, N.: The Equilibrium of the firm, Economic Journal, XLIV, March 1934 (in Casson,M.: The Theory of the Firm, Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996, ISBN 1 85278 715 5) Simon, H.A.: Organisations and Markets, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1991. 5(2), Spring. ( in Keasey, Thompson, S., Wright, M.: Corporate Governance, Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999, ISBN1 85898 871 3) Simon, H.A.: Theories of Decision Making in Economics and the Behavioral Sciences. American Economic Review, June 1959  These Simons ideas are followed e.g. by Arrow, who emphasises the importance of responsibility linked to authority and an equilibrium between authority and responsibility; see below for more detail.  See Simon 1991, Williamson, O.E.: Markets and Hierarchies, New York, The Free Press, 1975 Williamson, O.E.: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, The Free Press, 1985  For instance, a secretary does not typically care to which business partner (customer) she is writing the letter, and she is indifferent to its contents. The manager understands that this one letter may influence the companys manufacturing portfolio for months.  Or otherwise formulated company goal  In this respect, Simon quotes an illustrative example: the stonewalling of unhappy airport examiners who merely slave to the rules, resulting in delays to passengers.  All that is said about reward as motivation can be applied to non-profit organisations; see Weisbrod 1988 and 1989.  See Simon H.: Administrative Behaviour, Macmillan, New York, 1947., 3rd ed. 1976  According to Simon, peoples behaviour derives from natural selection: selfishness is more common than altruism; obedience and loyalty result from selfishness too. An example: loyalty to nation protects during wars. Obedience is used to establish loyalty and corporate pride. These motives are based on the differentiation of us from them be it a family, nation, company, or sports club. Identification with a group conceived as us means satisfaction (increased profit) from success.  Simon quotes some research results whereby each manager considers the main problems of an organisations to be those in their unit: the financial manager sees finance as the biggest issue; it is the sales for the sales manager, production for the production manager, etc.  Simon points out the importance of cultural differences which are of great significance in the nonmaterial aspects of motivation; such differe0    # $ % & 3 4 F _   * + = > ¸sj_jSh*RCJaJmH sH h*R56mH sH h*R5mH sH h*R5CJ\mH sH h*R5CJ\mH sH h*R0JCJmH sH !jh*RCJUmH sH jh*RCJUmH sH h*RCJmH sH h*R5\mH sH h*R5CJ\aJ mH sH h*R6>*\]mHsHh*R6\]h*R56>*]h*R % & ? @ > @ R T de$`a$$a$ 7n J d$a$$a$A3Y> ? 8  : < > @ R dpA!B!%%''''l((((((++++1177;;鷬uuuuujh*R0JUmH sH h*R0J<mH sH h*R5CJ\mH sH  h*R5CJOJQJ\mH sH h*R\aJmH sH h*R5CJ\h*RmH sH h*R0J5CJ\jh*R5CJU\h*R5CJ\h*Rh*R5mH sH h*RCJmH sH .wxjk  C!D!{#|#$${$|$$`a$$a$$a$$a$|$%A%j%%%%%%&&&&''((((+++..$h1$7$8$H$`ha$$a$ $1$7$8$H$a$$ & F1$7$8$H$a$$a$...0011355374708183:4:;;<<<<>>m?n?oApA$a$$`a$$a$;<<II"KXKKKRRRZZZ\\\\____a bDbXbbbeemhhlllnnnrrr sissssSzuzjQŇ<=AB ĉʼn͊Ίh*R h*Rhh*R6mH sH h*R5mH sH h*R0JmH sH h*R6CJ\mH sH jh*R0JUmH sH h*R5CJ\mH sH h*RmH sH CpABB=C>CMENEqFrFGGHH!K"KXKYKZK\L]LOORRSSX $ & Fa$$`a$$a$XXZZ[\\\\+_,_____aaeefffqgrgg $^`a$$^a$$a$$a$gggh(hlhmhhhiiiQjjukl lllmmmmn$ & F1$7$8$H$a$$a$$a$ $1$7$8$H$a$$ & F1$7$8$H$a$nnnnooqqssss~ttuuavbvwwixjxxxSzuz$a$$a$ $ p#a$$a$$^a$uzvzr|s||}}}~~πЀij!'|QŇ=>? & Fx1$7$8$H$$`a$$a$ $ p#a$$a$?@A gÉĉ͊kG_ph~߰235689;<>*$  $a$_akl_`pqhi~߰234679:<=?@FGHJKQRTUVYZɸh?0JmHnHu h*R0Jjh*R0JUjh*RUh*RUh*RH*mH sH jh*R0JUmH sH h*RmH sH +nces are easy to observe thanks to joint ventures and other forms of international corporate expansion.  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