Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 373007
Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Some Preliminary Evidence from the Croatian State-Administered Supplemental Plan
Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Some Preliminary Evidence from the Croatian State-Administered Supplemental Plan // Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, 18 (2008), 115; 24-47 (međunarodna recenzija, članak, znanstveni)
CROSBI ID: 373007 Za ispravke kontaktirajte CROSBI podršku putem web obrasca
Naslov
Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Some Preliminary Evidence from the Croatian State-Administered Supplemental Plan
Autori
Nestić, Danijel ; Vukina, Tomislav
Izvornik
Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika (1330-187X) 18
(2008), 115;
24-47
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u časopisima, članak, znanstveni
Ključne riječi
health insurance ; adverse selection ; moral hazard
Sažetak
In this paper, we conduct simple micro-level econometric tests for the presence of the moral hazard and adverse selection manifestations in the Croatian supplemental health insurance program. Despite the fact that the obtained results are rather preliminary, they seem to be indicating the statistically significant presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard types of problems with various degrees of difficulty that they actually cause to the functioning of the Croatian health insurance system. The obtained results are then used to outline several policy recommendations in the realm of health insurance reform.
Izvorni jezik
Engleski
Znanstvena područja
Ekonomija
POVEZANOST RADA
Projekti:
002-0022469-2465 - Inovacije, ulaganje u ljudski kapital i rast konkurentnosti Hrvatske (Jurlina Alibegović, Dubravka, MZOS ) ( CroRIS)
Ustanove:
Ekonomski institut, Zagreb
Citiraj ovu publikaciju:
Časopis indeksira:
- Scopus
- EconLit
Uključenost u ostale bibliografske baze podataka::
- EconLit
- IBSS - The International Bibliography of the Social Sciences
- EBSCO
