Naslov
How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism

Autori
Pećnjak, Davor

Izvornik
Croatian Journal of Philosophy (1333-1108) 5 (2005), 15; 433-439

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u časopisima, članak, znanstveni

Ključne riječi
Consciousness; computation; mind; computational theory

Sažetak
Concerning the question about consciousness, Georges Rey argues that it does not exist from the success of computational theory of human mind. Everything that such a theory requires can be fulfilled by machines which do not have consciousness. So, according to theoretical parsimony, we do not have to attribute consciousness even to human beings. I wish to offer reasons why we should not doubt the existence of consciousness by showing that computational explanations can be explanations of just one part of an aspect of the human mind. Consciousness is also an explanandum rather than an explanans, and the possible reference of “ what it is like” expression. Epistemic situation regarding possible accesses to consciousness is also considered.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

POVEZANOST RADA