ࡱ> q`F.bjbjqPqP ;4::% 4MMM8M4MTMw2NNdN(NNNOOO0v2v2v2v2v2v2v$xhzLVvOOOOOVvNN4w T T TOFNN0v TO0v T T0suNBN pl5M PLt"$v w0MwntB3{S3{Du3{ut TOOOVvVvSOOOMwOOOO994 4 HUNDRED STRATEGIES, ONE STRATAGEM AN INQUIRY INTO THE CROATIAN APTITUDE TO STRATEGY PRODUCTION Nenad Starc The Institute of Economics Zagreb Kenedijev trg 7, 10000 Zagreb Phone: ++385 1 2326200; Fax: ++ 385 1 2310467 E-mail: nstarc@eizg.hr Key words: Development strategy, Development policy, Policy makers, Policy implementation 1. DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT A (PRE) TRANSITIONAL PROBLEM Development ought to be managed. Economic and social theories have been written about it and it has long been proved that activities which are rationally undertaken by individuals ordinarily do not merge into a result that is socially rational. Equal individual efforts and adequate cooperation and coordination may accomplish more and in a better way. This is not doubted by theoreticians and certainly not by methodologists who are supposed to come up with methods for accomplishing the most socially acceptable development. Practitioners in ministries and in planning organizations, who have to ensure the said coordination one way or another, are also in no doubt. As for transition Croatia, many will agree that almost everything that is not good, is so because it is not being managed. Further more, since there is no painless and obviously no fast transition, and since too many things go wrong, an ongoing discussion has been developed about economic and social development, about its directions and aims and even more about the means of managing it. Economists that deal with Croatian development notice that their research topic is not going well. Sociologists notice the same, let alone the environmentalists. The more difficult the situation is the fewer are those who will be satisfied with a cold analysis. Anyone, if only a bit sensitive, will try also to do something himself to improve the things he/she studies. Thus, even the academics, untouchable until recently, and the professors, who have always abhorred practice, involved in the discussion. To enumerate the Croatian development judgements and management proposals may take some space. It is claimed, for example, that in Croatia the development is not managed and that policy measures are not well designed. It is claimed, also, that measures are probably well designed, but poorly implemented, and that there is no one to monitor their impacts. It is deduced therefrom that the part of the state administration that has to implement development policy is weaker than the part which creates it. It is claimed that break through transition can hardly be managed and that it simply has to be endured. Besides, we are knocking on the door of the European Union, which is not going to change because of us. We have no choice but study development guidelines that are coming from Bruxelles and implement them. It is claimed, also, that one should not hurry into Europe, that each knock on its door makes us lose a part of our identity, and that, therefore, the genuine Croatian way has to be found. As for terminology, it is usually in inverse proportion to the level of analysis. The vocabulary of the documents that are well corroborated with facts, propositions, analysis and final judgements is simple and familiar. However, the less analysis there is, the more difficult it is to produce a text. One resorts to comparisons and terminological innovations that depend on whether the subject is something favourable or unfavourable. When writing about something unfavourable, the authors resort mostly to medical terminology. "Disturbing symptoms" are noticed, the economy is in a "coma" and it needs an "injection" (financial, of course), the "sclerotic" and vulnerable economic system needs "shock therapy", the "seat of the illness" needs to be eliminated, and so on. The guidelines and measures required to recover and leave the hospital are described with more optimism. In doing so the role of a steersman is assumed, often even inadvertently so one easily falls into socialist industrialization and/or military terminology. Thus the "breakthroughs" that the "development locomotives" and the "production driving-wheels" will make are being determined, for which an adequate "logistics" are required in order to overcome different and, what is more, "entrenched" opinions. All of this is to be undertaken on the basis of a "strategy". The strategy is, without any doubt, one of the best-loved topics in the discussion about Croatian development and its management. Battles have been fought over it ever since the independence of Croatia, while towards the end of the 1990s the remarks that Croatia in fact had no strategy at all and that consequently there was no development, became more and more frequent. As for the ideology, it should not be forgotten that immediately after abandoning the socialist system and acquiring independence, Croatian politicians in charge of development discarded every idea of socialist development management. Consequently, the political requests for abandoning any planning prevailed. In the beginning of the nineties even the spatial planners, who nobody had ever associated with the calamities of socialism, were cautious not to mention planning too much. The war, which could just confirm how much realsocialism was connected with aggressive nationalism, contributed to such a viewpoint. The war legitimised also fast, straight forward decision making and this was felt not only at the front line but also in the changes to the economic system. As for the emotions, one should observe that at transition times everything pre-transitional is regarded as odious or at least unsuitable. One needs reminding here that the request for development management was made long before the transition and even before the socialism itself. Furthermore, the request for managing economic and even social development has been made many times in the course of history and it differed from case to case and from country to country. This fact could not be blurred even by the war and anti-socialist rhetoric. The transitional difficulties convincingly eliminated the statements that growth of the Croatian economy may be left to the unrestricted actions of entrepreneurs in the free market. The discussion about development management, strategies and action plans started as early as the beginning of the 1990s. The actors in economic policy started to refer to development documents prepared at the end of the 1980s, and the first strategy, that is the development document drafted in independent Croatia, appeared in 1991. Very quickly, almost everyone who was dealing with future in his/her ministry, public company, trade union, party, non-government organisation, and other organizations, set about drafting, and preferably enacting officially, documents that carried the title of strategy, strategic development programme, national development programme and similar. In the second half of the 1990s such an inclination (fascination, rather) with strategies became prominent. 2. TOO LONG A BIBILIOGRAPHY Over the past fifteen-odd years, Croatian strategic documents have been written by the order of the state administration (ministries and Government agencies or committees) for public companies, for counties, municipalities and, occasionally for an NGO. They were also written without commissioning, out of the need to make a contribution or, on the other hand, to impose or at least offer it to a ministry or to the Government directly. The Government and the ministries would accept most of such documents, but they did not forward all of them into the procedure of adoption. Some of the forwarded documents were adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia, while others were not. Some of the adopted strategies were subsequently published in the National Gazette, and some were not. As regards the non commissioned, self-developed strategies, the majority of them appeared in professional and even in scientific publications that, of course, did not commit anyone to anything. In any event, this sort of literature in Croatia is neither collected nor listed by anyone. Let us focus here on strategic development documents that deal with particular sectors of the economy or with particular social activities, pertaining to the entire area of the Republic of Croatia and commissioned by an agent of development policy that is a Croatian state administration body. Entering the discussion on the development and its management in this way means also turning to some strategies written before the independence. At the end of the 1980s one could come across development proposals that depicted the Croatian (but not the Yugoslav) economy with many entirely non-socialist characteristics such as privatisation, development of a modern market, new banking system and more. The best example of them is the development project titled Scientific Foundations of the Long-term Socio-economic Development of Croatia, which was undertaken from 1986 until the beginning of 1991. It was a huge task embarked on by a dozen of scientific-research institutions, commissioned by the then Self-Managed Interest Association for Science of Croatia and the Republic Institute for Social Planning. After five years, some 6000 pages of text were written and 22 out of 31 planned studies published. A voluminous summary titled The Concept and Strategy of the Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of Croatia was also produced. Neither the Parliament nor the Government has ever officially dealt with them, and consequently they were not published in the National Gazette. Upon the establishment of the Republic of Croatia the client disappeared and along with him also any obligation to translate the development proposals into action plans and measures. However, even a cursory review reveals that The Concept and Strategy... were equally relevant before and after independence and the push-off into transition. Thus, in the beginning of 1991, the brand new agents of Croatian development policy had at their disposal 22 sectorial strategic documents whose subject was the economic and social development of Croatia. Policy decisions that followed did not provide any evidence that the documents of the 1980s were consulted. There is enough evidence about new strategic documents, however. By the end of 1991 three of them had been adopted: Economic Policy Programme for the year of 1991 Medium-Term Plan of the Development of Croatian Railways, 1991 1995, (National Gazette 38/91) and Plan of Long-term Development of Post and Telecommunications in the Republic of Croatia Until the Year 2000 with the Medium-term Development Plan for the Period from 1991 1995, (National Gazette 51/91) During the year 1991, the newly established company Hrvatske ceste (Croatian Roads) assessed that a long-term development document should be prepared. The document would determine the future of the public roads network in Croatia. Subsequently the Preliminary Financial-Economic Study of the Construction of Motorways in Croatia, Zagreb, Civil Engineering Institute of Croatia, Croatian Roads, Zagreb, 1991, was prepared in the middle of the year, followed by the Plan of Maintenance and Development of the Public Roads Network in the Republic of Croatia for the Period from 1991 to 1995, with Basic Development Elements until the Year 2000 (National Gazette 52/91) In this way, the discussion about development and its management officially included roads. The statement that a road inevitably means development has not to the present day been examined seriously, at least not in official development documents. At the end of the year 1991, the Fundamentals of the Economic Policy at the Turn of 1991 and 1992, with a Programme of Measures, Institute of Economics Zagreb, December 1991, was made serving the needs of the Government of the Republic of Croatia. As early as 1992 the first strategic document followed which dealt with the entire Croatian economy. In March the Concept and Strategy of the Economic Development of the Republic of Croatia, Economic Trends and Economic Policy, National Bank of Croatia and Institute of Economics Zagreb, 10/1992, was made for the Banks internal use. It was conceived macroeconomically and dealt with privatisation, transformation, monetary, banking and financial systems, structural changes in economy, technological development, human resources, the environment and infrastructure. In 1992, the Proposal of the Development Strategy of the Tourism Sector of Croatia, Ministry of Tourism and Trade, Agency for Restructuring and Development, Institute for Tourism, Zagreb, 1992, was produced for the Ministry of Tourism. Of the noncommissioned strategy proposals published in 1992, one came from the highest possible level. It was Traffic Valorisation of Croatia, Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences Scientific Council for Traffic, Zagreb, 1992. The Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences also published documents of a strategic development character later. Despite the reputation of the institution, it was not recorded that the agent of development policy had ever adopted any of the Academy's proposals. By the end of 1992 the Government prepared another: Economic Policy Programme which was adopted in Parliament in December 1992. By the end of the year 1993, however, the Development Strategy of the Croatian Tourism (National Gazette 113/93) was adopted, and the Ministry of Tourism was the first that turned to a foreign drafter. In the same year, a mixed group of Croatian and Austrian experts prepared the Tourismus Masterplan Kroatien, Institute for Tourism and Horvath & Horvath Consulting, Zagreb, 1993. The Croatian Railways followed the example, and turned to a Swedish specialized consulting conmpany. At the end of the year 1993, the Study on the Reconstruction of the Croatian Railways, Swedrail, Zagreb, 1993, appeared followed by the well kown Stabilization Programme, Governemt og the Republic of Croatia, October 1993. Apparently no document of the strategic kind was made in 1994. Quite a few appeared in 1995, however: Development Strategy of Agriculture of the Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and FAO (adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia at the end of 1994, never published in the National Gazette), Long-Term Plan for the Protection of Waters from Pollution (National Gazette, 22/95), Declaration on Environmental Protection in the Republic of Croatia (National Gazette, 34/95), Programme for Reconstruction and Development of the Passenger Fleet in the Period from 1996 to 2000, Jadrolinija, Rijeka, National Programme of Demographic Development of the Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Development and Reconstruction, (adopted by the Parliament in May, 1995, never published in the National Gazette). The production increased over the next years. In 1996, the National Scientific-Research Programme for the Period from 1996 1998, (National Gazette 16/96), was adopted by Parliament. For the needs of the Ministry of Development and Reconstruction and the Ministry of Maritime Affairs, Transportation and Communications, the following documents were prepared: Development Strategy of Road Network in Croatia, Ministry of Development and Reconstruction, Ministry of Maritime Affairs, Transportation and Communications, Zagreb, 1996, and the Development Study of Croatian Harbours, Rotterdam Maritime Group, Zagreb, 1996. In summer of 1996, the Ministry of Economy published the first results of a project initiated two years ago. The project was titled the "Development and Organisation of the Croatian Power Supply Sector PROHES", and entrusted to the "Hrvoje Po~ar" Institute of Energetics. The first document was Fundamentals of the Power Supply Policy of the Republic of Croatia Until the Year 2010, Zagreb, June 1996. As two years earlier, and equally unbindingly, the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences produced two more strategies: Road and Rail Transport Corridors in the Area of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Zagreb, 1996, Present State and Future of Croatian Railways, Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Zagreb 1996. The following year two more strategic development documents were adopted by the Parliament: National Island Development Programme, Ministry of Development and Reconstruction, Zagreb 1997, (adopted by Parliament on 28 February 1997, never appeared in the National Gazette), and the Spatial Planning Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, Institute for Spatial Planning, Ministry of Spatial Planning, Construction and Housing, Zagreb, 1997 (adopted by Parliament on 27th June 1997, never published in the National Gazette). That year a discussion commenced on the routes and length of the future motorways, and the future of railways. The following was prepared: Report on the State and Development Possibilities of the Road Network in the Republic of Croatia, with Reference to a Possible Sequence of Motorway Construction, Croatian Roads Directorate, Zagreb, 1997, Development Strategy of the Rail Transport System of the Republic of Croatia, Transport and Communications Institute, Zagreb, 1997. Development Strategy of the Rail Transport in the Republic of Croatia, Croatian Railways Development and Information Technology Department, Zagreb, 1997. The same year, CANAC, a Canadian consulting company, prepared the Study on the Reconstruction of Croatian Railways, Zagreb, 1997. At the end of December 1997, the Government of the Republic of Croatia took up the matter of gender and adopted a document titled: National Policy of the Republic of Croatia for the Promotion of Equal Opportunities, The Equal Opportunities Commission of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb, 1997. In 1998 the Parliament adopted two development programmes of a long-term character: Horse Breeding Programme in the Republic of Croatia, (National Gazette 99/98), Programme of Return and Taking Care of Refugees and Displaced Persons (National Gazette 92/98). The discussion about roads and railways went on. For the needs of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs, Transportation and Communications, the following was prepared: Development Strategy of Road Network in the Republic of Croatia, Institute of Economics Zagreb, Zagreb 1998, Project of Modernisation and Restructuring of the Croatian Railways, Ministry of Maritime Affairs, Transportation and Communications, Zagreb, 1998. In 1998, the first results of the project started four years earlier by the "Hrvoje Po~ar" Institute of Energetics were published. In the beginning of the year, the National Power Supply Programme: the Introduction, Goran Grani, "Hrvoje Po~ar" Institute of Energetics, Zagreb, 1998., was published, and thereafter MIEE  Network of Industrial Power Efficiency, "Hrvoje Po~ar" Institute of Energetics, Zagreb, April 1998, MAHE  Programme of the Construction of Small Hydro electrical Power Plants, "Hrvoje Po~ar" Institute of Energetics, Zagreb, April 1998, ENWIND  Programme for Wind Energy Usage, "Hrvoje Po~ar" Institute of Energetics, Zagreb, April 1998, SUNEN  Programme for Solar Energy Usage, "Hrvoje Po~ar" Institute of Energetics, Zagreb, April 1998, KUEN zgrada  Programme of Power Supply Efficiency in Building Construction, "Hrvoje Po~ar" Institute of Energetics, Zagreb, April 1998, KUEN cts  Programme of Power Supply Efficiency of Centralised Heating Systems, "Hrvoje Po~ar" Institute of Energetics, Zagreb, April 1998, KOGEN  Co-Generation Programme, "Hrvoje Po~ar" Institute of Energetics, Zagreb, April 1998, GEOEN  Programme for Geothermal Energy Usage, "Hrvoje Po~ar" Institute of Energetics, Zagreb, April 1998, BIOEN  Programme for energy from Biomass and Waste "Hrvoje Po~ar" Institute of Energetics, Zagreb, April 1998, PLINCRO  Gasification Programme of Croatia, "Hrvoje Po~ar" Institute of Energetics, Zagreb, April 1998. This package of programmes had a common mark "the preliminary results and future activities", so that further production of strategic development documents was to be expected in the energetics sector. At the end of 1998, the members of cooperatives also turned out. The Croatian Cooperative Association published the Development Strategy of the Croatian Cooperatives, Croatian Cooperative Association, Zagreb, 1998. The Parliament adopted two more strategic documents in 1999: Traffic Development Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, (National Gazette 139/99) Strategy and Action Plan for the Protection of Biological and Landscape Diversity of the Republic of Croatia, (National Gazette 81/99), According to an obligation arising from the Spatial Planning Strategy of the Republic of Croatia of 1997, the Spatial Planning Programme of the Republic of Croatia, Spatial Planning Institute, Ministry of Spatial Planing, Zagreb, 1999, was produced. Upon the initiative of the Ministry of Health, a foreign drafter was contracted and the Health Care Systems in Transition-Croatia, European Observatory on Health Care Systems, Zagreb, 1999, was published. After the elections of 2 January 2000, and the change in Government, the new Government of the Republic of Croatia published: Programme of Activities of the Government of the Republic of Croatia for the Period from 2000 2004, the Government of the Republic of Croatia, January 2001. The Programme advocated an important change in the development policy in its entirety, and announced reduction in strategy production down to one single strategic document. In the same year, however, the Croatian Roads Directorate, officially, and the Croatian Chamber of Economy, unofficially, provided more contributions to the ongoing discussion about roads and their effects on development. The published studies are as follows: A Consolidated Study of the Financial and Market Feasibility of the Construction of Motorways in the Republic of Croatia, Croatian Road Directorate, Civil Engineering Institute of Croatia, Institute of Economics Zagreb, 2000. Traffic Development Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, Croatian Chamber of Economy, Zagreb, 2000. The following studies were commissioned by the Croatian Railways and the Ministry of Health, respectively: Study of Modernisation and Restructuring of Croatian Railways, RAILPLAN, Zagreb, 2000, Strategy and Plan for the Reform of the Health Care and Health Insurance System in the Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb, 2000. The Croatian Academy for Arts and Sciences initiated and published the Baltic Adriatic Initiative, Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Zagreb, 2000. The implementation of the announced change of the Croatian Governments policy started at the end of July 2000 when the Development Strategy Office of the Republic of Croatia was established (National Gazette 77/2000). The Office was founded as a "professional service of the Government of the Republic of Croatia set to perform technical and administrative tasks related to the development strategy project for the Republic of Croatia: "Croatia in the 21st Century". The Office launched a project that surpassed all the previous. Titled "Croatia in the 21st Century", it was supposed to gather all the people who have something to propose. It was made known that the Office would consider all the proposals sent to it, and eventually produce a single strategy that the agents of the development policy in Croatia would be obliged to implement. The participants to the discussion on Croatian development management were given a unique opportunity to present their views and proposals. The number of proposals that ever reached the Office remained unknown. In any case, after a couple of months the Office engaged 335 various experts with the task of producing 19 sub-strategies and the final long expected single national strategy. A year and a half later 19 sub-strategies did appear covering health care, social care and pensions, transportation, power supply, state administration, international integration, national security, economy, macroeconomics, education, science, tourism, culture, environmental protection, maritime affairs, shipbuilding, alimentation, housing construction and information and communication technology. They are still available at www.hrvatska21.hr. A single strategy, often referred to as THE strategy never appeared. The production went on, however, unhampered by the Office or anyone else. In the year of 2000, Programme of Measures for Economic Reform and Growth, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, February 2000 appeared, followed by National Mine Action Programme in the Republic of Croatia, Croatian Mine Action Centre, Sisak, 2001, Development Programme for Small Trade, 2001 2004, Ministry for Crafts, Small and Medium-Sized Entrepreneurship, Zagreb, May 2001. and the Strategic Plan 2001 - 2005, USAID - United States Agency for International Development/Croatia, Zagreb, January 2001. The agent of the development policy set by the USAID Strategic Plan was not to be a Croatian implementation body but the USAID itself. American experts were supposed to directly support local self-government, democratically oriented political parties, trade unions, media, NGOs, and advise ministries and the deputy prime minister. They also decided to help the macroeconomic and structural reforms that contribute to private sector development, support settling into routine the state treasury and further fiscal decentralisation, help in putting in order cadastre and land register and cooperate closely with the World Bank. No Croatian experts were envisaged in the process. Consequently, the USAID product was published only in American English. The production went on, however. Five new models appeared in 2002, some resulting from the said 19 sub-strategies, some not: Strategy of agriculture and fisheries of the Repunblic of Croatia (National Gazette 89/02) National Strategy for Environmental Protection (National Gazette 46/02) National Environmental Action Plan (National Gazette 46/02) Development Strategy for the Energy Sector of the Republic of Croatia (National Gazette 38/02) Defence Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (National Gazette 33/02) National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (National Gazette 32/02) National Forestry Strategy and Policy (National Gazette 120/03) In 2003 and 2004 only three strategies appeared in the National Gazette: National Strategy for pension system and social care services (National Gazette 97/03) National Strategy of unified policy for disabled persons for the period from 2003 to 2006. (National Gazette 13/03) Development Strategy for Wood and Paper Processing Industry (National Gazette 114/04) The year of 2005 was more fruitful: National Strategy for Prevention of Misuse of Narcotics (National Gazette 147/05) Waste Management Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (National Gazette 130/05) Development Strategy for the official statistics servise of the Republic of Croatia 2004.-20012. (National Gazette 28/05) and so was the year of 2006: Communication Strategy for Informing the General Public on EU accession (National Gazette 13/06) National Programme for Road Transport Security 2006-2010, (National Gazette 24/06) National AntiCorruption Programme 2006 2008. March 2006 (National Gazette 39/06) Strategic Development Framework for 2006 2013, July 2006 Strategic Development Framework was produced by the Development Strategy Office of the Republic of Croatia which in the meantime underwent serious personnel and conceptual changes. The Framework was a substitute for the National Development Plan, a document that on request of the EU is supposed to be produced in every accession country. In 2006 the Government of Croatia also turned to gender issue again. The result was the National Policy for Gender Equality Promotion, The Government of Croatia Office for Gender Equality, Zagreb, 2006. One is not surprised but it should be noted that gender strategy of 2006 makes no reference whatsoever to the gender strategy produced in the same country and by the same Office in 1997. 3. ALL THE PRESIDENTS MEN In the middle of February 2000, immediately after the election of the new president some new features appeared on  HYPERLINK "http://www.predsjednik.hr" www.predsjednik.hr. The president, namely, established five working groups and entrusted them with producing the development documents that would tackle the future of particular sectors of the Croatian society. They dealt with Constitution amendments, agriculture, sports, development of IT, promotion of Croatia and the Croatian youth. In no less then a year they produced the following: Foundations for amendments to the new Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Office of the President, Zagreb, April 2000 . e-Croatia Proposal on the Informatisation Strategy of Croatia, Office of the President, Zagreb, June 2000 Proposal on the Development Strategy for Agriculture and Areas of Special State Concern. Office of the President, Zagreb 2000 Proposal on the development strategy for the areas of special state concern, with special reference to the Danubian region Office of the President, Zagreb, 2000 Development Strategy for Fishery in the Republic of Croatia, Postira, Office of the President, June 2000 Development Strategy for Agriculture in the Mediterranean Area, Office of the President, Pore , June 2000 Proposal on the Development Strategy for Sport in Croatia, Office of the President, Zagreb, 2000 National Programme of protection and promotion of children, youth and young people in the Republic of Croatia in the period of 2001  2002. Office of the President, Zagreb, 12 August 2001 To the bibliography of Croatian strategies, approaching a three-digit number of units after barely fifteen years of production, another 8 development documents thus may be added. It is easily noticeable, however, that not one of the 48 president's men grouped in 5 working groups appears among the authors of the sub-strategies of the project "Croatia in the 21st century". Consistently, none of the authors of the sub-strategies participated in the groups that drafted the president's products. 4. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM Since this is all about the future, one should ask what the listed strategies, long-term programmes and national plans have to contain in order to deserve their titles, and what elements have to be met so that the future they seek becomes about. It is obvious, namely, that a strategic document is only one of the elements of efficient development management, and that it implies also implementation documents, an implementer with implementation instruments in his/her hands who can undertake implementation measures; it includes monitoring the effects of the measures, and supervision of the entire process. An important element is also the participation of the citizens. In a democratic society an insight into the implementation of the adopted strategic orientations has to be made available to everyone. Regardless of the possible value judgements, and even ideology it may implicitly or explicitly advocate, a strategic development document should contain the answers to some basic questions: does the document define basic notions? does it determine the principles of development management? does it define the goals? does it deal with the past and the state of the area/field it deals with? does it make any prognosis, value judgements, projections? does it define instruments and measures; does it propose laws to be passed that would raise the obligatoriness of the measures to the highest level? does it examine the capacity of implementers (if any have been specified)? does it contain an action plan or a management plan, and if it does, are the time limits set, the jobs and tasks distributed, the agents identified, and are the sources and modes of financing determined? is there any monitoring proposed? is it a readable text, a material that shall educate a reader? There are a couple of formal questions too: is it preceded with a law or a decree of the Parliament or the Government of the Republic of Croatia ? who initiated its drafting (a ministry, a public company, etc.)? do NGOs participate in the drafting? did it appear in the National Gazette thus becoming an official, i.e. obligatory development document? Some of the answers may be read directly from the thousands of pages of the Croatian development strategies, some are vague or implied in the text and some are to be found in chapters where they, one would say, do not belong. It may be often indirectly concluded that the authors worked out the main conceptual framework but they did not, regretfully, explicate it anywhere. Barely one half of the collected documents, for example, define in their introduction part the notions which will later be used to express strategic orientations. On the other hand, practically all the documents state development goals and principles. However, an analysis of goals shows that goals and principles may be notionally mixed up, and that particular expected accomplishments get mixed up with processes that need to be established and maintained. That is, it is often not clear whether a goal is understood to be a state that is to be achieved or a development route that must be insisted on. This vagueness later on influences the formulation of the development guidelines. Therefore, it is sometimes difficult to see what the difference is between the stated principles and the derived guidelines at all. The production of strategic documents is most often initiated by ministries and public companies, and rarely by the Government of the Republic of Croatia itself. Since the ministries can rarely assign their own civil servants for such a task, they regularly employ experts and scientists from institutes or faculties, and much more seldom foreign consultants. Due to the fact that the production of a strategic document may last more than a year, and it needs to be coordinated, the ministries and public companies avoid the individual engagement of an expert, and more gladly appoint for the whole task an institute, a bureau, a faculty or similar (NGOs stay out of this business, except in cases of strategic documents in the field of the environment protection). The production of strategies thus does not disturb the everyday life of the civil service, and the responsibility for the result rests entirely with the producer. There are very few documents that had to be produced as a result of a law or a document which prescribe that another law be passed afterwards. A good example is the Law on the Environment, which prescribes the production of a strategy, and on the other hand the National Island Development Programme that prescribes an Island Act to be passed (the environment strategy was produced, and the Law on Islands was adopted in 1999, two years after the adoption of the National Programme by the Parliament). As regards the international conventions that are binding for the Republic of Croatia, they are only referred to by a strategic document that deals with the environment. Out of the collected strategies, programmes and long-term plans, 11 were published in the National Gazette in the 1990s and 16 in the new millennium. What catches the eye is that there are four documents adopted by Parliament, but they were not officially published. The collected strategic documents are at their best in their starting chapters. The evaluation of the past development is usually extensive, whereas economic strategies usually bring chapters with prognoses and projections that do not reach further than 5 years into the future. The strategies in other fields most often are limited to prognoses. What should be done to realise projections and prognoses, this is a question that relatively little attention is paid to. The instruments that are formally at the disposal of the implementer are mentioned in most strategies, but the competence of the implementer is considered in none of them. It remains unknown whether the implementer (whether a ministry or a public company management board) has enough officers at its disposal, whether they are educated and acquainted with the job, whether IT support is adequate, whether the required information is collected and so on. Consequently, none of the collected strategic documents deal with monitoring and evaluation. It remains unknown who shall monitor their impacts and how, what criterion will be applied in evaluating the measures and their instruments and how the measures whose impacts are not satisfactory will be changed. The monitoring and evaluation of instruments and measures is missing even in strategic documents that contain an action plan. This is so even in the case of the strategies in the field of the protection and improvement of the environment, that are produced according to the model of European and American documents of the same kind so that one could expect to find M&E there. In a word, anything that might look like an institutional analysis has been completely missing from the Croatian strategic development documents since 1991 till now days. Strategic documents that determine sources and modes of financing are also rare. The sources that are perhaps mentioned are the state budget and foreign donations, while other possibilities are hardly discussed. Apparently, this aspect of development management is left to the implementer and to his/her ability to find the necessary budgetary means. One will search in vain trying to find the items in the National budget that refer to the implementation of strategies adopted in previous years. Introduction of programming budgeting in 2003 does not seem to have brought any improvements in this sense. Strategies prepared from 2003 onwards obviously require some money for their implementation but this is not to be found in the National Budget. The neglect of financing is partly a result of the neglect of the implementer. Since the guidelines are usually written in the form of "it needs to " and "it is expected to ", without precisely addressing the implementer, the fact that finances are left out is not obvious. Operational summaries, which are a regular practice in foreign production strategies, are rare in Croatian ones, there is no accepted bibliographic standard that the editors adhere to, the language is usually dull, the vocabulary technical and unfamiliar to the uninitiated reader. The strategies can be placed into different groups. As one would have expected, the most frequent topic is the economy and how to improve it. Five strategic documents on the construction of roads may surprise only those who are not familiar with the construction industry sector in Croatia and its influence on development decisions. Seven railways strategies may surprise only those who are not familiar with the state of Croatian Railways. On the other hand, social issues are poorly covered. One of 24 ex-socialist studies from 1990 is about education and one had to wait for ten years to find something similar. Croatia in 21 Century project contains sub-strategies on education, health (the Ministry of Health produced a separate one, as well), culture, and social care. Two strategies on gender equality are recorded. There is also the Programme of Return and Taking Care of Refugees and Displaced Persons from 1998, and that is all. The social aspects of overall development which need most careful programming have been payed least attention. Old ideas about growth which necessarily brings development seem to be still alive, even kicking. Among the producers of the strategies that were not commissioned by the state administration the majority are economists, and a particular place is taken by the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences. In spite of the proverbial shortage of money the Academy works in, it produced four documents of strategic importance. A strategy, as it is often emphasised, in its original meaning is the "art of conducting a war". Moreover, one may find in vocabularies that it is "manoeuvring forces into the most advantageous position prior to actual engagement with the enemy". This is, so it seems, an exclusive male business, so it does not hurt to investigate how many women have been involved in it. The two biggest projects in the field may be used to illustrate this, the Scientific Foundations of the Long-term Socio-economic Development of Croatia, from the end of the 1980s, and Croatia in the 21st Century from 2001. Thumbing through the nowadays already dusty volumes of the Scientific Foundations, one will notice that 239 collaborators and 86 collaboratresses (73 : 27) worked on the project. Since the coordinators and the editors were listed separately from the authors, one may notice that there were also 204 authors and 80 authoresses (61 : 39). Among 31 sub-editors there were 4 women (87 : 13), and among 10 coordinators two were women. Some ten years later "Croatia in the 21st Century" and its 19 strategies were initiated. The coordinators composed the Central Council of the project. Browsing through the site www.hrvatska21.hr, one notices that 18 coordinators and a male president of the Council make company to only one woman. Some participants in discussion about development and its management would call this a gentleman's trend. Fifteen years ago on average 4 male coordinators would hold one lady's coat, and nowadays they are as many as 18. The situation is no better even among those who do the actual job. The share of authoresses fell from 39% to 29%. The questions that need to be asked when standing in front of a hundred strategic development documents are not yet exhausted. One of the more important is definitely on internal consistency. Namely, if a strategy is internally inconsistent even the best functioning implementation mechanism would not help. However, this is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition since internal consistency does not guarantee per se that the strategy is good and acceptable, but only that the tasks before the implementer are not adverse to each other. If a strategy is internally consistent, only the first step on the way to the successful development management has been confirmed. The remaining steps will depend on the implementer. It is not easy to answer with certainty how many strategies of the ones collected are internally consistent, and how many are not. A document picked up at random show that the authors controlled their work and that the final instructions are harmonised among themselves. Almost each of the examined strategies may be implemented if only it were supplemented with an action plan and supported with an adequate budget. The question that definitively has to be answered is the one about the internal consistency of a pile of strategies that has been growing ever since 1990. Although it is difficult to assume that almost a hundred strategic documents (the coordinated documents are only those from the Scientific Foundations project of 1990, and those from the Croatia in the 21st Century project) may be mutually harmonised, one should at least hope that sub groups of strategies produced about the same topic, that is within the same sector, could be harmonised. An insight into sub groups shows, however, that they are equally inconsistent as the big pile they belong to. Between the strategic documents in the same sector that are supposed at least to refer to the previous ones but do not, there are two strategies on health care that need to be singled out (the strategy of the Ministry of Health and the one from the "Croatia in the 21st Century"), as well as the majority of the already mentioned road and railway strategies. It is readily observable that inter-harmonisation avoids precisely those documents for which one would expect mostly to be the case the documents that predominantly or exclusively deal with the environment. The Spatial Planning Strategy of the Republic of Croatia of 1997, for example, explicitly and extensively deals with the Croatian islands and the preservation of the insular space, without mentioning the National Island Development Programme at all, although it had already been adopted by the Parliament at the time the strategy was written. The reason for it are not potential conceptual disagreements, but simply the low level of communication culture that is a characteristic of the majority of the producers of the Croatian strategic documents. Namely, the comparison of the Strategy and the Island Programme reveals that both documents refer to the more or less same principles of island development management, and that their development policy proposals are compatible. By referring to the National Island Development Programme, the Spatial Planning Strategy would have been better argued and definitely more convincing. Environmental protection is a suitable field for questioning the coordination of strategy production. The environment is, more or less, directly or indirectly, the topic of the majority of strategic development documents, and those which deal with the environment directly, rely on, at least in words, international conventions. However, the often-quoted principle that we have to take care of the environment as a public good together and in co-ordination, is not being implemented. Namely, the production of two strategic documents on the environment began during the year of 2000 and ended with joint appearance in the same issue of the National Gazette in spring 2002. The first was produced within the already mentioned "Croatia in the 21st Century" project as a sub-strategy and eventually titled the National Strategy for Environmental Protection. The second was produced by the then Ministry for Environment Protection and Spatial Planning in cooperation with the World Bank and its experts. It is titled the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP). Having put them one next to the other, the two documents definitely deserve a little bit of attention. The Environmental Sub-strategy for the 21st Century was produced by seven collaborators, three editors and one project director. The document has 84 pages. In contrast to these eleven people, the NEAP had a Managing Council composed of eight members and headed by the Minister for the Environment, two coordinators, a Project Unit in the Ministry for Environment Protection and Spatial Planning composed of 7 members, a World Bank team of two members and 139 collaborators who were organised in 10 working groups, and these into 29 sub-groups. The document produced has 298 pages including supplements (not even 2 pages per person). The two environmental strategies were produced simultaneously, but separately. Comparing the lists of authors, it turns out that only three of them worked on both projects, and the documents do not refer to one another at any stage. The differences that were, for that reason, inevitable may be noticed in contents and in the weight given to particular aspects of environment protection. A comparison of these two texts shows that eleven authors that needed 84 pages to produce the Environmental Sub-strategy were sufficient to determine strategic orientation, to put together instructions for their implementation, to determine the action priorities, and to make a SWOT analysis of a system that should materialise all of this. The scope of the NEAP (this production was, obviously, many times more expensive) may be, on the other hand, justified with the emphasis on the action plan and the importance and space dedicated to the priorities. The comparison also reveals that both strategies are based on the concept of sustainable development, but that the sustainability is not equally defined, that they are not terminologically harmonised, and that NEAP's priorities are not well thought out. The best example of this is the approach to one of the largest burdens on the environment of the Republic of Croatia land mines. The sub-strategy disregards the fact that 4,500 sq km of the country is contaminated with about a million mines (however, it is the only one that deals with genetically modified organisms), while the NEAP dedicates only two paragraphs to it: one in the section covering agriculture and forestry, and the other in the section on the influence of pollution on health. Thus demining appears in the list of measures to be taken. "Perform demining of agricultural areas within the period of 2 5 years" and "perform the strategy of demining of forests within 2 years" appears in the chapter 4.1.3. on agriculture and forestry. "Perform demining throughout the entire territory of Croatia within 2 years" says the chapter 5.4., which deals with environment and health. The state budget, the county budgets, the city and municipal budgets, the economic sector and international sources, all are listed as possible sources of financing this task without any specifications or dynamics. It should be mentioned that the National Mine Action Programme of the Republic of Croatia published in 2001, envisages that this work be done, at very best, in 10 years. The quotation of financial sources is characteristic of both strategic documents, as well as for the most of the other documents produced since 1990. The sub-strategy claims that finances are necessary, but it does not quote a single figure, whereas the NEAP has doubts about the figures it states. In the Chapter 9, when referring to implementation expenses it is reported that only 0.2 to 0.3 % of GDP in Croatia is allocated directly for the environmental protection today. The text goes on to say that the implementation of the NEAP requires at least 1% and that this is almost impossible to achieve. In any case, a comparison of the two documents shows that the task could have been performed faster and cheaper by forming a pool of authors, and that had there been coordination it could have been internally consistent, even harmonised with other strategic development documents. The next question that has to be asked is seemingly a trivial one. It is rarely clear in the collected strategies and programmes WHOSE job it is. The answer: the strategy is ours, and we are all realising it, may satisfy only inasmuch as the document that has a prefix "national" or a suffix "of the Republic of Croatia" concerns all of us, so we are all interested in its realisation. At this point the general arrogation stops. The strategy that cites goals, that demands their accomplishment and names necessary instruments and measures, has to determine also who shall accomplish them and what are the consequences should they fail to do that. In this respect, the predominant number of Croatian strategic documents remains unclear, reflecting one of the problems that shall continue to burden the economies in transition and their societies in general: lack of readiness to analyse the institutional mechanisms necessary for the implementation of any kind of strategy, programme or economic and social policy in general. Present creators of the Croatian strategic documents still tend to address the task to an "implementer", to an "agent of development policy", to "the relevant ministry" and the like as if they were writing the document in the 1950s or 1960s when it was safe and normal not to mention the untouchable implementer. The problem is to a great extent overcome only in cases when the strategic document adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia requires that a law be enacted. The ordered strategic jobs and tasks thus are raised to the highest possible level of obligatoriness, and a law can hardly be enacted if it does not contain stipulations about controlling its implementation, time limits and necessary financial sources. Since 1990 up until now there have been more laws adopted in Croatia that determine the instruments and measures of the development management, than there have been development strategies written. They invoke the Constitution and/or some other law, but not a strategic development document. In addition the enacting procedure does not guarantee mutual alignment of the enacted laws. It does not even guarantee that the law shall be internally consistent. The amendments, in fact, depend on the deputies' vote, and there is no mechanism that would automatically prevent voting of an amendment that is contrary to another one, just voted for. An inconsistency thus can slip through, and even a cursory insight into the legislation that regulates development management points that it happens quite often. Another point that the implementation of laws makes disputable is standardised last article which states that the law "Shall come into force on the day of the publication in the National Gazette" or "Shall come into force on the eight day following its publication in the National Gazette". This routine provision contains several preconditions necessary for the enforcement of laws, and with this also of development policy. It is presumed that all those who are supposed to start enforcing the law as of the day it is published, know what they have to do, that they are all present, that they have assigned the required time for it, established the necessary organisational scheme and provided the equipment. Regretfully, these suppositions are realised hardly anywhere and hardly ever, so that most of the laws start their life with difficulties and slowly, discovering the already mentioned inconsistencies along the way. The research on the enforcement of development legislation and its efficiency in Croatia is almost non-existent. The laws come and go, and there is nothing to draw a conclusion from whether they were beneficial or not. The trust in the efficiency of law, the expectations of significant improvements that new laws are to bring along, and everything else that comes under the term normative optimism do not have much backing in the Croatian practice. More than a hundred development strategies, never undergoing the process of harmonisation and definitely not harmonised and a part of the development legislation arising thereof, obviously are not a solid base for the management of Croatian development. However, development decisions are still being made. The final question to be tackled here is: how? 5. TOWARDS A STRATAGEM? Standing in front of a bookshelf with a hundred disharmonised strategies, one could ask himself/herself what directives and what aims the many decision-makers of more or less important development decisions dispersed in various ministries, in the Government, public companies, and elsewhere, have in mind. If the strategies were lacking, their ability to make strategically sound decisions would have been questioned. Since the strategies are in abundance, what should be questioned is their capacity and willingness to act as democratically elected policy makers are supposed to. In the years of the war and the beginning of the transition the question would have been answered straightforwardly since democratically elected policy makers where under quite a pressure. The circumstances were changing much faster than any one could manage to change strategies, action plans, laws, regulations and the rest and whoever was in charge had to act and only act. This was one of the reasons (not the only one, however) that led to the establishment of the semi-presidential system introduced by the 1990 and 1997 Constitutions. In 1997, the Defence and National Security Council (DNSC) was formed, a body whose members the president could appoint at his own discretion. The DNSC consisted of his advisors, the most important generals, the prime minister and some ministers, the Speaker of the Parliament, the governor of the National Bank of Croatia, and so on. In this way, all the decisions relevant for an overall development of the country could have been made at one table and under one coordinator. These could have been strategic or purely operational decisions, and their implementation was guaranteed by the composition of the Council itself. The President of the Republic, invoking the Constitution to remain the president of the party that had a majority vote in the parliament, could plan, induce, direct and even oversee all procedures and decision-making flows when deciding on the development of the country. The DNSC members promptly implemented everything that was agreed on in the sessions. If a piece of legislation was needed for the purpose, the authority of the Government to pass decrees with legislative powers and a legalised emergency parliamentary procedure allowed for a fast enough institutionalization of whatever was decided about at the DNCS. Although more than 50 strategic documents had already been piled up, they were scarcely referred to by anyone, while the important development decisions were made in a non-transparent manner and could not be found anywhere. Many would agree that the wartime management of peacetime development had too many snares to be successful in the long run. They would also agree that its immanent lack of democratic features makes it completely unacceptable in a market economy environment. A minority would, however, adduce few of the wartime decisions that resulted in exceptionally favourable effects, as well as many peacetime decisions that brought nothing good at all. The best example to support this type of thinking and, seemingly, legitimise the autocratic decision making, is the still topical anti-inflationary policy implemented in Croatia in the autumn of 1993. The new millennium brought the new Constitution and the power of the president was significantly reduced. The new presidents newly formed working groups readily started producing strategies showing, perhaps, that those who have executive power do not need strategic documents whereas those who lack power produce them. The decision making went on, however, so that one has to turn to the Government, main ministries and headquarters of the main political parties where decision makers have concentrated after the DNCS disbanded. At the beginning of the new millennium draft laws, government decrees, and other pieces of legislation that define taxes, fines, incentives, government spending and other instruments of economic policy have been designed and approved right there. Decentralization of decision making and its shift towards democratic institutions implies involvement of much more agents than there were in the DNCS. It also implies democratic procedures, transparency and able public administration. One should not forget, however, that the public administration where the instruments are designed and approved is composed of professional civil servants, who mostly keep their jobs after the elections, and of politicians who get appointed every four years. In countries where the civil service is developed, the tasks of these two groups are elaborated and separate. The civil servants, helped by external advisors and collaborators prepare background materials for decisions, elaborate options for possible solutions and simulate the consequences of any given decision. A politician in power who has to make a final decision needs to evaluate the submitted options and their effects from a political point of view, and finally accept one of them. As for transition Croatia, these tasks are not well apportioned. Civil servants are not necessarily competent or well organised, and decisions often have to be made quite abruptly. In such an environment politicians do not get (or can not wait for) enough input to make a good decision. The decisions actually adopted, on the other hand, too often bear testimony of a prevalence of short-term and pragmatic political interests over expert opinions. Therefore, in the past fifteen years, successful development management agent had to be quite a person. A successful minister of finance, for example, had to know everything about finances and economic policy and how to deal with his subordinate civil servants. He also needed to be a very able politician and survive in an environment of constant struggle for power, because the implementation of a measure or a so-called package of measures usually takes more time than the usual mandate would allow for. An agent of development management surrounded by the unknowns of transition process who wishes to do something, must be a leading expert, an exceptional manager and a very accomplished politician. Unfortunately, persons of such a renaissance reach have been rare in Croatian ministries and governments so that the chain that starts with a strategy and ends with a proper policy implementation have always missed a link or two. Thus, it is no surprise that first six years of the new millennium brought 55 new strategic documents and hardly any implementation improvements. As well, it is no surprise that no one from the public administration ever reported any implementation results and that hardly any question on monitoring and evaluation of those who have to implement strategic documents has ever been posed in the Parliament. In the course of fifteen years production of strategies has estababnuv    * + 9 : O P v z )-GSst ,(,p,ôӨӘwhwhwhwhwhwhwhwhc5CJ\aJmH sH "hShc5CJ\aJmH sH h4hcCJaJmH sH h(mhc5CJaJmH sH hcCJaJmH sH h# hcCJaJmH sH h# hc5CJaJmH sH h(mhcCJaJmH sH hc5CJaJmH sH h(mhc5CJaJmH sH #abnO P ( SZ}J#g#'.h0000 dd[$\$gdcgdc$a$gdc--D.p,,=-A--- ..H.c.i.q.z..-/./h00012a33e4}5 6678Q99b:;;;;<Z<=h==>>a>>?A,BBZCDD`DFxG4H"I~I4J>a>>??M@@ dd[$\$gdc@'AA,BBZCDD`DFxG4HH"I~I4Jh dd[$\$gdch&N) Վ6bɏ /A^ & Fdd[$\$gdc & F dd[$\$gdc dd[$\$gdc͍̍LMԎ<?בśț/9ux^_ em[t{ |     !!!$!hc5\mH sH hcmH sH U"hShc5CJ\aJmH sH hc5CJ\aJmH sH O^ڴIGqSz]2!!!!$a$gdc$0^`0a$gdc dd[$\$gdclished itself as an autonomous activity whereas those that had to implement them took the liberty of equally autonomous decisions making. The purpose of strategies is thus fulfilled regardless of their quality, internal consistency and clearness. They appear as false indicators of a well managed development, look good in public and keep experts dependent on politicians. The fact that production of strategies is ordered, financed and adopted by those that are not implementing them tempts one to go back to the same military dictionary that the development terminology has been picked from. Next to strategy a term stratagem can be found there with an explanation that it is an artifice or trick in war for deceiving and outwitting the enemy or even a cleverly contrived trick or scheme for gaining an end. A glance at the list of strategic documents reveals that they have been more frequent in last couple of years and that they much more frequently appear in the National Gazette. Initial awe of producing something so important and nationally significant as well as initial bond that something that has appeared in the National Gazette is compulsory have disappeared. After fifteen years of facing no consequences for not implementing anything, one feels quite safe. BIBLIOGRAPHY Starc, N, (2001): Fascination with the future planning, decision making, managing in Starc, N, ed.: Human Development Report Croatia 2001, Zagreb, UNDP Baleti, Z. (1999), Concept of Regional Economic Development of the Republic of Croatia, Institute of Economics Zagreb, Working Paper, 1999 (1999) Economic Guidelines for the Development of Croatian Agriculture, Symposium with International Participation, Cavtat 1999  Proceedings with Reports and Summaries, Croatian Agricultural Society, Zagreb, 1999. Vojni, D, (1992): Development Concept and Strategy in the Light of Transition Economy and Policy, Institute of Economics Zagreb, Zagreb, 1992. Miljenovi, $!e!z!!"""""# #####$$$$%%%%%%**b*** ++(+2+@+H+J+X+Z++++,,,,,- ---Ƚ뽲ю뽌ѽ뽀hzhc5mH sH Uh2hcmH sH h*hc56mH sH hc56mH sH h.hcmH sH h!RhcmH sH hc5mH sH h*hc5mH sH h2hc56mH sH hcmH sH h2hc5mH sH 2!g!!! ##$$%%**++-- - -------- -"-&-gdc$0^`0a$gdc}. (1996) Stability and Growth: the Croatian case, National Bank of Croatia and Institute of Economics Zagreb, Working Paper Anuai, Z., Rohatinski, }., `onje, V. (1995): A Road to Low Inflation, The Government of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb Zduni, S, (1995), Strategy of the Reconstruction of Production and Growth, Stjepan, Institute of Economics Zagreb, Working Paper, 1995,     Session Name (Please DO NOT CHANGE THIS TEXT) Seventh International Conference on  Enterprise in Transition PAGE 18 PAGE 1 -------"-$-(-*-.-----. .... .".$.(.*.6.8.:.<.>.B.D.F.ȶwwhc0JmHnHu h0Jjh0JUh6CJ]aJmHnHuhH}d6CJ]aJmHnHuh"hx{ h6CJ]aJmHsH#h6CJ]aJmHnHsHuhcjhcUhH}dhch^ymH sH h}hcmH sH !&-(-,-.--- . .$.&.(.>.@.B.D.F.gdc$hh]h`ha$gd hh]h`hgd &`gd(p$&dPa$gdx{ &dPgdx{ 901hP:p. 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