ࡱ> y{x7 bjbjUU "7|7|ol>>> H ( 8  $(  "6 6 6    _aaaaaa$ (Q     TpP6 6  6 6 _ _(Vq@6  @5$(h  3,0T F"((TTSilva Me~nari Department of Sociology Northwestern University, Evanston IL s-meznaric@northwestern.edu FORCED MIGRATION IN 2002: legacy from the nineties In addition to political chaos, the collapse of Yugoslavia and consequent Balkan wars 1991-1996 led to displacement of (estimated) four and a half million people from Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia. The Kosovo crisis in 1999 caused that nearly 860.000 people left homes seeking temporary safety in surrounding countries. According to UNHCR, in South-East Europe, by the end of 2002, more than one million of refugees and displaced persons are still seeking solutions. For social scientists, a drive to make a sense out of such turbulence was hard to resist. To build a conceptual bridge between the chaos of particular (displacement) and transparency of the whole (migration situation in Europe) regularly, even in the most severe conditions of forced migration, was seemingly first logical step. The Balkan wars (1991-1996) proved to be no exception to that: researches, surveys, estimations of losses and gains, statistics about atrocities, abuse, human rights violations appeared suddenly to be in high demand. The power of research and numbers, of classifications, counting, projections, represented volatile phenomena of war collaterals like population displacements, and urged compiling of reasonable policy models of reception, statistics, and above all conceptual framework for muddling through overlapping definitions of forced, involuntary, non-economic migration flows. Why definitions? Because to define forced migrants, refugees, displacees in a number of instances is a matter of life and death; on a macro level, as would Steven Castles put it definitions are crucial in guiding the policies of government and international agencies towards mobile people. Definitions reflect and reproduce power and none more so than the refugee definition.... It makes a big difference whether people are perceived as refugees, other types of forced migrants or voluntary migrants (Castles 2002, 9). With the beginning of the war in Croatia and Bosnia (Spring 1991 and 1992) nobody either in academic community or within UN agencies has been prepared for the reality which overwhelmed the European world with sheer numbers (Salt and Clark 2002, 25); in a couple of months during the Fall 1991 and Spring 1992, western world received millions of forced, involuntary migrants from the Central Europe and the Balkans. UNCHR covered the problem erratically and, within given possibilities, efficiently, learning the hows and whys on the way. Migrants were soon enough templated as refugees, and basic policies of sheltering in case of such population displacement were deployed. Yet, other collaterals of the war (ethnic cleansing, human rights violations, rape and robberies) were left more or less out of official domain. Some among them with catastrophic consequences; disaster of Srebrenica is one of them. The density of war events and fast growing numbers of displacees, refugees and casualties cause the growing demand for data (any kind of it) and explanations of events. Consumers were journalists, military and civilian agencies, peace mediators, NGOs, physicians, philanthropists, and academics; suppliers were less diversified. In addition to that, not reliable. Since the high demand for explanations of the Balkan conflicts and assorted data was growing understandably enough, the very nature of the events fed prime-time networks, peace makers and human rights agencies it has been saturated by innumerable sources of data. However, the validity of data was not questioned, not even by academic community. The latter had little to say about what such research and data actually represented. In research activities were involved both agencies from non - conflagrating parties as well as agencies pertaining to nationals in conflict. Both sides were taking numerous public opinion surveys, claiming the overall validity of the outcomes in the situation were basic parameters of sampling were impossible to be met. Research and data collection served mostly as justification for different goals of the parties in clash and numerous peacemakers: from registration of ethnic voters for referendums to negotiated population transfers. Hence, the most serious issues like rape, displaced families and destroyed settlements, wounded and mutilated children and ethnic cleansing, got supported by data and research based on erratic observations. As the consequence, statistical products were developed on emotionally loaded estimations and on overgeneralizations of reported individual incidents. Dayton assessment of division of Bosnia par example was based on Yugoslav (last) population Census (April 1991). This Census had been taken at a time of significant turbulence of population, caused by ethnic migration and refusal of certain ethnic groups to be surveyed at all (Albanians); between the onset of the war in Croatia and Bosnia (1991/92) and Dayton agreements (1995) three and a half million of people were displaced, killed and lost. Such a framework did not ameliorate later, nor did it acquire validity after the appeasement since 1995. It appeared that bewilderment both in academia and relieving agencies related to numbers and concepts concerning collaterals of the war survived till today. In spite of powerful machinery of social and statistical sciences promptly activated to serve public opinion, media and military during 1991--1995 Balkan wars, none of the fundamental categories of population displacement has been cleared and data made reliable and valid. We were left with approximations of displaced people, due in a large measure to approximations of concepts. How could we count refugees if we were in doubt how to define them? How could we classify forced migrants if at least three differently defined populations lied on top of each other? It was predictable also that the same framework of uncertainty would have persisted in the future, once the peace would be settled. This prediction proved right and thoroughly supported by the present state of affair (Freeman 1995, Brubaker 1995, Castles 2002). It appears that all kinds of immigration to main receiving Western countries became recently highly salient and emotive issues (Freeman 1995, 883); the asylum crisis during the Balkan wars and expected blast of immigration after the taking away of the Berlin Wall moved immigration to the stage of high politics. It forced the major parties to take stands, which took much of the sting out of the extreme parties but pushed policy to the right (Freeman 1995, 883). In spite of that, in major Western receiving countries, decisions concerning migrant population (particularly asylum seekers) are being done without public being well informed. There are serious barriers to the acquisition of information about immigration ... There is highly constrained process by which immigration issues are debated that distorts the information that is available (Freeman 1995, 883). In an exchange with Rogers Brubaker (1995) Freeman would argue that information about migration is relatively scarce compared to other important matters of public policy... ... whether lack of information raises or lowers opposition to immigration is an untested hypothesis, but it seems reasonable to suspect it leads to quiescence (Freeman 1995a, 911). Therefore a major question still stays with us, that is, is anything like data collection and research feasible in time of emergency particularly under the strain of an ethno-national conflict? Not feasible is rather obvious answer, at least for the time being. Having scarce conceptual and explicatory heritage from such an eventful and recent history of population displacement in the Balkans, we should like to do two things: first, to display how far social science at its best came in targeting the disarray of population displacement, and secondly, how useful would findings be for future analysis of the phenomenon of forced displacement of population. What is forced in forced migration? Facts and quirks Taken socially, the dimension of force in migration stands mainly for its being abrupt. Contrary to the economic migration flows, forced migration lack time to start slow and build over time (Freeman 1995, 883). Taken sociologically, forced migration flows defy customary temporal, spatial and cyclical models of normal migration conceptualization. Whereas spatial or cyclical dimensions could be subsumed under abrupt nature of forced migration, temporal dimension - defined as a slow building up of population movements cannot serve such a purpose. Nevertheless, one should be aware that abruptness of the event has two sides; what appears as abrupt on the side of the object of displacement policy (displacee or refugee), should not be perceived as such on the side of decision makers. Therefore, one could argue that the abruptness of the event or its trigger does not stand for its being sudden; more often than not, when it comes to humanly triggered forced migration, there were hints, rumors; there are certainly decisions taken by authorities related to displacement of a population. For them, forced migrations are not abrupt or sudden, they are not forced either. Authorities have time they need for building up the scheme of population displacement, thus complying with the temporality of the sociological model. Whereas force in movements appears always abrupt on the side of target population. Hence, what concerns us here, on the side of analysts. To them, forced migration is always that what it factually is an overwhelming event of population displacement, often closed to disaster, either triggered by human agent or nature. As a result, analyst finds herself in the limbo of indeterminate facts. If under pressure to produce facts for policy makers, there would be eventually a short step to quirks. The impact of figures thus produced - of how many- related to human disasters more often than not replaces thinking it through, substituting the need of patching up a conceptual network. The Balkan wars and related human disasters were good illustration for that. The need for data urged compilation of various statistical sources and constructions in early 1990s in a situation when sheer notions related to the fact of displacement like: refugee, displacee, expellee, forced migrant vs. economic one, involuntary vs. voluntary migration were mostly unknown in the region. It was evident that data and statistics on human disaster in the Balkans kept being produced in two principal forms of discourse: one, as a parable, numerified story used to illustrate certain humane disasters, with inflated or deflated figures, depending which side the producer was on. And two, as a fair try to assess validity and areas of uncertainty of data. In the space between these two main forms of statistical discourse on violence and human rights dwelled various attempts to serve either, or even both of them simultaneously. Their common purpose was - to make some sense out of chaos created by unexpected and overwhelming events and by the avalanche of sheer numbers. On such grounds grew rather ambitious attempts to draw conclusions about aggregate groups and causality of incidents. The case of figures on rape in Bosnia and Croatia was notorious for that: when first reports started to come out from the Serbian concentration camps in Bosnia (early summer of 1992), statistics of incidents of rapes and sexual assaults varied from 15.000 to 80.000. The gap thus created between these two facts finding discourses never closed; on the contrary, it was growing. Its ramifications were efficiently used by various nationalistic fractions in former Yugoslavia and are still used in defining categories and rights of displaced people by various nationalistic fractions and governments in new Balkan states. Seemingly impenetrable complexity of the Balkans divisions and slaughtering used to be represented and even explained by figures as evidence of precision and rigor. What do we have now is the same old familiar Balkan story about how many and whose refugees and displacees are still being spread over. Just like after the Second World War, never-ending disputes about victims of population displacement are still going on. One of the crucial areas of those disputes is relationship between ethnic cleansing and forced migration. Either in regional disputes or in The Hague Court, it is supposed that this relationship should not be questioned: ethnic cleansing and forced migration are being used interchangeably. However, not every forced migration is ethnic cleansing, while every ethnic cleansing constitutes migration to be forced. Forced migration may be triggered also by environmental incidents thus pushing thousands to migrate, without authorities or states being deliberately involved. Whereas ethnic cleansing by default is deliberate and planned authorities action with forced migration as a consequence of their decision making. Therefore , as a rule, it would follow that solely ethnic cleansing that results in forced migration qualifies as a ground for abuse of human rights and indictments. Regrettably, there are caveats in applying this rule: both ethnic cleansing and foremost forced migration need to be further explained. Migration forced by human agency: Ethnic cleansing On the eve of the Balkan wars, a phenomenon of ethnic cleansing was hardly well studied and documented issue. When it emerged as a humane population displacement strategy in the first third of a war in Bosnia, it was staggeringly new. Its severity stunned both general public and social analysts. There was no previous (academic) knowledge in the area about it, no concepts to even think it through. Official state statistics was no help; state agencies were falling apart because the still existing state - Yugoslavia - was in disarray, the newly proclaimed independent state of Croatia tried to get bits and pieces of old and new institutions together, statistical offices included. When certain stabilization of basic institutions was obtained, there were indices of deliberate concealment or misrepresentation of data on the part of state agencies. Some crucial areas of population turmoil and war casualties were - according to human rights NGOs evidence - misinterpreted or, simply, left out of scope, either of State statistical office or particular state agencies. Thus, figures on displacement of large ethnic groups - ethnic cleansing, disappearing, kidnapping, rape, war crimes and civilian casualties from various political and ethnic affiliations - were being concealed or manipulated. UNHCR statistics proved to be the most reliable source for data on refugees, displacees and returnees at the time. But, with the conflict over, international agencies move out or redefine their roles - and war-torn country has to face reverse transfers of disaster: returning of refugees and displacees, emptiness and death in ethnically cleansed areas, revenge of new political elites, together with the urgent need for housing, employment and education policies. The most important decisions to be taken concerned displaced population, and they were based on what quirk statistics and ill-informed knowledge about population displacement has had to offer. What is ethnic cleansing after all, except being one of the key terms and obscene practices of fin-de-sicle? According to Bell-Fialkoff (1996), ethnic cleansing is a form of population displacement, deployed as a state policy aiming at mass expulsion and population transfers. The scope of related phenomena run from genocide at one end to subtle pressure to emigrate at the other (Bell-Fialkoff 1996: 1). We would agree with Bell-Fialkoff that said extremes are better to be put aside, for various, not only analytical reasons. What we would be left with is operational definition of (population) cleansing, which is a planned, deliberate removal from a certain territory of an undesirable population distinguished by one or more characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, race, class, or sexual preference. These characteristics must serve as the basis for removal for it to qualify as cleansing (Bell-Fialkoff 1996: 3-4). Therefore, forced migration in such a context would be population displacement planned and deployed by authorities (state or international organizations) and forced upon individuals on the basis of their race, ethnicity, religion, class or sexual preferences. Such a displacement qualifies as ethnic cleansing if authorities declare the goal of removal as to permanently and totally move not desired population from a given terrain. To conclude about definitions: not every forced migration is ethnic cleansing, though every ethnic cleansing constitutes migration to be forced. The same is valid for other types of population displacements on the basis of race, religion or sexual preferences. Movement of the population should be deliberately planned by authorities, with the goal of removing undesired social groups from given terrain for good. In such transactions governments or international organizations could negotiate strategies, like for instance humane transfer of populations. Nevertheless, negotiations are not undermining or even replacing the dimension of forcefulness in the population removal and resettlement. Whatever the strategy, it is always against individual will. Could we possibly imagine a target population having referendum on yes or no to their being removed from their homes? Population cleansing in former Yugoslavia and succeeding states corresponds with all mentioned dimensions of cleansing on ethnic and/or religious, sometimes even on class grounds. It was deliberate, planned, deployed by legal governments, in certain instances assisted by international forces and sometimes negotiated between two or three major parties (Serbian Yugoslav and Croatian plus Bosnian authorities). The push out side of these forced migrations was more or less erratic, while the pulling back (euphemism: reintegration) is, on most instances, planned on multilateral or bilateral basis and forced upon local governments. People were pushed out for good; certain areas changed their religious and ethnic profile: from this point of view, ethnic cleansings succeeded. In the meantime, however, return flows became the most important agenda in stabilizing the area. Croatian, Bosnian and Serbian Yugoslav authorities are being required to comply with return and reintegration. From this point of view, ethnic cleansings failed. But the cases in point are individuals and groups exposed to cleansing; for the time being, they are not returning. We do not know, whether they would ever return; all we could speculate about is that for them, the process is over and cleaners on the Balkans achieved their goals. Migration forced by nature: Environmental disasters and population displacement Migration of people is always bound up with power relations; there is always a measurable quantity of power within the complex canvas of migration flows. The more so when talking about humanly triggered forced migration. However, some would argue, there are today more and more significant forced migration flows which are not triggered by human agent: those triggered by environmental changes. The awesome figures again; in the mid-1990s, there were at least 25 million environmental refugees (22 million officially defined as such). Moreover, 200 million could be expected to move or at risk of displacement, thus eliciting as many as 40 million environmental refugees and displacees (Myers 1997, Castles 2002) in this decade. There are doubts, though, among social scientists (Castles, 2002) about the nature of the link between environmental issues and population displacement; is it direct or mediated by power agents. The former approach (Myers 1997) argues in favor of the existence of forced migration caused or at least triggered by environmental crisis, while the latter promotes the idea that there are no environmental refugees as such (Black 2001, in Castles 2002, 2). For those who argue that environmentally caused forced migration does not exist environmental refugees is a myth, a construct that serves highly politicized issues, thus being harmful to the refugees themselves. For Black (2001) there is absolutely no evidence that environmental changes or crisis leads directly to mass refugee flows, especially flows to developed countries (Castles 2002, 2). Why these two schools differ so strongly on this issue? Is it important to review them? According to Castles, it is substantial both for general public and for policy makers to know what in fact lies in these disagreements. The reason for that is that linkages between environment and forced migration have far-reaching political consequences (Castles 2002, 2). Papers and books quoted here have been written in the late nineties. Castles criticism came out in the fall 2002; since then, the most important events in the field of (forced) migration started to unfold, markedly those connected to the war in Iraq, which started in March 2003. We should therefore explain basic differences between these two approaches. According to Myers (1997) millions of people are today at risk of displacement from desertification, deforestation, rising water levels and so on (Myers, 1997: 175). But, says Castles, advocates of this approach do not provide enough evidence on people who have actually been displaced by such problems. Rather, the linkage appears simply as common sense if water levels rise, of forests disappear, it seems obvious that people will have to move (Castles 2002, 3). According to Black (2001), environmentally caused refugee flows are always linked to a range of other political and economic factors, so that focusing on the environmental factors in isolation does not help in understanding specific situations of population displacement (in Castles 2002, 2). Castles finds that disagreements between these two authors are mainly of methodological nature. The issue is above all one of causality, says Castles (2002, 4). Behind every population displacement both authors see a clusters of contributory factors: ethnic tensions, ineffective and mistaken government responses, economic problems and so on (Castles 2002, 4). It is clear that when it comes to operationalization of general concept or to case studies of forced migration, causes of forced migration are treated as multiple in both approaches; nevertheless, when it comes to the explanation, in the (A) approach the complexity of causes is put aside and on an undefined basis, environmental factors are being assigned primacy. Why? asks Castles, and responds: This never becomes clear (Castles 2002, 4). We would therefore agree with Castles, that the notion of the environmental refugee is misleading and does little help us understand the complex process at work in specific situations of impoverishment, conflict and displacement (Castles 2002, 5). Environmentally caused forced migrations are rare; in contemporary world, in which humans are destroying nature on the basis of the global power, one could safely say that a direct link between population displacement and environmental disaster would hardly exist. Therefore, the environmental factor in explaining forced migration is a tip of an iceberg or volcano, underneath which lies multiplicity of causes triggered by human action. This is, for the most part, the root cause of forced migration. Why are such concerns with root causes important? Because the term refugee is defined in international law in a way that someone who flees due to environmental problems does not fall under this definition. Nobody gets asylum just because of environmental degradation (Castles 2002, 8). Since we are at the threshold of major international conflicts that would most certainly play the card of environmental destruction, the war in Iraq for instance, we could safely assume that forced migrants, resulting from politics of disaster (intentionally ignited oil fields, par example) would have no shelter under the international security umbrella. Not counting as refugees, they would thus join the vast population of displaced people with dubious status, like 25 million of internally displaced. Today, there is no legal or institutional regime which one could enforce through international agencies upon local warriors or governments in order to give assistance or protect other types of forced migrants. This means that when it comes to human rights and shelter, the major part of forcibly displaced population in the future could be found redundant. Whatsmore, decision makers who caused disasters in natural environment and eventual migration could not be find responsible for. Conclusion: policies related to forced migration on what grounds? Here is the situation: conflicts related to ethnic cleansing will not stop, but will be more or less under global control and follow their known pace. So would forced migration as the result of them. As to forced migration attributed to environmental causes or conveyed to the environmental issues, they will grow; populations encapsulated in them will be more and more numerous and predictably more often than not, will be displaced (by someones strategic decision) or will flee. Under current international law, such a population would not be entitled to claim refugee status of any kind. What to do in policy terms? There are for the moment three possibilities: To change international law, first of all the definition of refugee status in the 1951 Convention. For many reasons Castles is talking about (2002, 10) such a possibility is not real for the moment. To adapt and make to work whole series of policies proposed by analysts. They are aiming primarily to deal with the root causes of all types of forced migration, and make them unnecessary (Castles 2002, 10; Myers, 1997). The third possibility emerged with the breaking out of the war in Iraq: ironically enough, but the instigator, the USA government, planned the strategies to be used in the case of mass population displacement. It is not known what causes, besides war activities, are included in such a plan; how far, if at all, environmental disaster is counted for as possible trigger of migration. But it is rather obvious that devising strategies for forced migration and displacement becomes part and parcel of world repressive politics in certain areas without responsibility of human agent (decision makers) being articulated, let alone defined. References: Allcock John B. (2002) Explaining Yugoslavia. London: Hurst&Company. Bell-Fialkoff Andrew (1996) Ethnic Cleansing. London: Macmillan. Brubaker Rogers (1995) Comments on Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States. International Migration Review, volume XXIX, No 4, p. 903908. Castles Steven (2002) Environmental change and forced migration: making sense of the debate. Working paper No. 70. Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, p. 14 Cole, Joshua (1994). The chaos of particular facts: statistics, medicine and the social body in early 19th-century France. History of the Human Sciences 3, 1-27. Freeman Gary P. (1995) Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States. International Migration Review, volume XXIX, No 4, p. 881902. Freeman Gary P. (1995) Rejoinder. International Migration Review, volume XXIX, No 4, p. 909-913. Hovy Bela (2001) Statistically correct asylum data: prospects and limitations. Working paper No. 37. New issues in refugee research. Joint ECE-Eurostat work session on Migration Statistics, Geneva, 8-19 May 2000, p. 18 www.unhcr.ch/refworld/pubs/pubon.htm Me~nari Silva (1993) The Rapists Progress: Ethnicity, Gender and Violence. Revija za sociologiju, vol. XXIV, No 3-4, p. 119-129. Myers Nathan (1997) Environmental Refugees. Population and Environment, Vol. 19, No 2, p. 167-182. Salt John and Clark James (2002) Europe s migrant groups, in European Population Committee: The demographic characteristics of immigrant population. Population studies, No. 38. Council of Europe Publishing, p. 17-55.  This paper presents the introductory study for the research: Forced Migration, as a part of the project Colaterals of the War, Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb University, 2002-2004. PAGE  PAGE 16  The collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s precipitated the worst crisis in Europe since the end of World War II. A decade of upheaval produced political chaos throughout the Balkan region, wars which at one point involved not only local antagonists, but also the worlds major military powers, the flight of millions of civilians and a ruthless campaign of ethnic cleansing not witnessed since the dark days of Nazi era (UNHCR The Balkans, www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/balkans March 2003). I quote this part of UNHCR document extensively only because there is a tendency in international politics and social analysis to put the subject of population disasters caused by this war into the archives, without further analysis.  UNHCR The Balkans, on www.unhcr.ch/ by 12 March 2003.  Types of migration: involuntary, voluntary, and forced. Involuntary: disaster generated, ethnically tinged mass migrations; voluntary migrants who are seeking a possibility to realize their occupational and economic capabilities. Forced migrations are induced by political decisions, administrative measures.  Talking solely about one type of forced migrants, the asylum seekers from former communist central and Eastern Europe, between 1984 and 1992 numbers of asylum seekers rose from 25,000 to 421,000. The wars in former Yugoslavia brought sudden and massive forced movements on a scale not seen since the Second World War. By the end of December 1993 they had led to an estimated 4.24 million migrants, including 819,000 refugees, 1.6 million displaced persons and 1.79 million assisted war victims (Salt John and Clarke James 2002, 25).  Before, during and after the Balkan wars population comprised not only the object of statistical observation; it meant, also, the history of particular collectivity. In almost all counting, numbering, and divisions - the origin or statistical continuity of attributes (markers) like ethnicity, faith or sex became decisive for actual or future standing of whole regions and collectivities. Thus population became defined as the effect of its past and the cause of its future (Cole, 1994:7).  Some things did improve lately. As Hovy (2001) put it, information on gender and age of asylum seekers and refugees, as proposed by the UN recommendations, has become increasingly available in UNHCR statistical publications... since 1999 the coverage has been extended to refugees and all other groups of concern to UNHCR. Consequently, the coverage of gender and age of asylum-seekers and refugees in Europe has significantly improved in 1999... However, one of the main constraints in providing a comprehensive coverage of gender and age remains the inability of many industrialized countries to provide this information from their registration systems (Hovy 2001, 3).  Brubaker has differing opinions on that: while Freeman argues that scarce or misleading data on immigration is part of policy making in receiving countries based on constraints, Brubaker thinks that the scarcity of information about immigration ... does not seem to be related to the liberal or nonliberal quality of the polity... (Brubaker 1995, 904). For Brubaker it is the boundaries of the legitimate discussion (1995, 905) in immigration policy debates that are at stakes here. I would certainly agree with him that shifts in the boundaries of legitimate discourse in liberal democracies, related to immigration policies would improve quality and transparency of data on immigration. But not automatically: I would argue that improvement of data and their accessibility is sine qua non for liberal polities when faced with (forced) immigration.  Viewed, of course, from the side of the actor (forced) migrant herself.  That is how we come to the human transfer of population; an incredible construction in the age of human rights.  Discourse (legitimate, illegitimate, constrained, liberal, and populist) on immigration emerged rather recently as the way of theorizing in a field which has been traditionally viewed as too factual for such a post-modern subtleties, as discourse suggests. The sheer fact that it appeared in migration theory via its most outstanding authors implies, seems to me, the push forward of this theory itself. See for instance Brubaker (1995) and Freeman (1995).  About bias of data on intra-ethnic violence see for instance Allcock (2002, 405-6). Also Me~nari (1993, 123-124).  Rather poorly documented reports based on guestimations were not very useful in arguing that rape should qualify as a war crime.  There is uncertain status, pending on definition, of 230.000 Serbian nationals of Croatian origin. The basic definition of their rights in returning back home, or rights and obligations in staying in receiving country, is still not clear. Not to mention Bosnian citizens with both Bosnian and Croatian citizenship who were motivated by Croatian government to move to Croatia, were given Serbian left-behind homes and facilities to enjoy.... they are now circling among Croatia, Bosnia and various European countries seeking for place to settle. By the end of 1996, 837,000 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina had received Temporary Protected status elsewhere in Europe, though many of these have now returned (Salt and Clark 2002, 25). They neither are asylum-seekers, or refugees or economic migrants...nor are they displacees.  In order to alleviate such use of data, the group of experts in various fields - psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, demographers, computer specialists - set out in 1993 to establish non-governmental organization called HEG - Humanitarian Expert Group. The goal was to design and run data base about sources, interpretations, elaborations and methods applied by various agents in collecting and displaying data on refugees, displacees, victims and human rights abuse in war affected area. Data base was designed to collect information from five main sources: (1) statistics released regularly by UNCHR and related agencies based in Croatia and Bosnia, (2) data of NGOs dealing with human rights, (3) data of NGOs and experts dealing with therapeutic work, (4) data based on surveys in shelters executed by social workers, and (5) academic and related written production on war, traumatic stress, displacement and violence. The assumption was that compilation of such database would enable users to compare various sources of information in Croatia, Europe (UK) and Canada, related to the same or similar events or cases. Hence much needed threshold of critical approach to sources and interpretations would be maintained. HEG was conceived as an educational framework for minimal expertise for everybody interested in sources and data about the Balkan wars and their consequences.  Cleansing could be applied to other kinds of social aggregates characterized by religion, gender, race or class.  Genocide, because in its scope and horror the mass murder of our times deserves to be treated as separate category; the not always subtle pressure to leave, because it may grade imperceptibly into pressure by economic necessity (Bell-Fialkoff 1996: 1). Nevertheless, the cutting lines between extremes and mainstream of population displacements are fuzzy. It should be kept in mind that proposed curtailing serves only heuristic purposes and should be regarded as guidelines rather than clear indicators (Bell-Fialkoff 1996: 2).  Hence, according to Bell-Fialkoff, following mass population removals for instance would not qualify as cleansing: slave trade from Africa, because it had mainly economic and not racist basis, the push-backs of American Indians, because they did not have race as a reason, or temporary cleansing like expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo during the 1999 Serbian campaign.  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