ࡱ> 5@Ҏbjbj22 1XXe.$6668n<L4P (* "L L L L L L 3333333$5R483Q`"L L `"`"3L L L4T&T&T&`"L L 3T&`"3T&T&'2h3L  `~Ny62$~23b404 38%8 383,L L 6T& , fL L L 33$68&6INTERCONNECTION IN A TRANSITION MARKETPLACE Prof. Sanja Steiner, D.Sc., Prof. Ivan Boanjak, D.Sc. University of Zagreb, Faculty of Transport and Traffic Engineering Zagreb, Croatia ssteiner@fpz.hr Denis Glibi, B.Sc. VIPnet, Regulatory Affairs Zagreb, Croatia d.glibic@vipnet.hr ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to provide a general technical and functional interpretation of the interconnection in an unique competitive marketplace for communications and information services. The drivers for accepting this vision and market concept are the same for all the market players: if possible, reducing their network infrastructure and maintenance costs, enabling faster service deployment for the provisioning of enhanced services and therefore creating new sources of revenue. This study discusses regulatory implications in the area of interconnection and explores the positions of different interconnection markets in a transition environment. Finally, concluded recommendation for regulatory views on interconnection market approach has been provided. INTRODUCTION In the telecommunications industry, "interconnection" refers to the establishment of electronic linkages between service providers so that they can conduct business transactions electronically. Historically, interconnect was necessary for one national incumbent to connect a call destined for termination on the network of an incumbent in another country. Since both operators generally enjoyed a monopoly status in their own country, there was clear mutual benefit in interconnecting the two networks. The value of the whole was greater than the sum of the parts, particularly since international calls were premium products and could be charged as such. In a competitive marketplace, there are a number of reasons why service providers need to interconnect with each other: New entrants need access to the networks of incumbents so that they can resell services. Competitive voice, data, and wireless carriers need access to "last mile" facilities to deliver services to end users. All carriers need access to each other's back-office systems to fulfill number portability mandates and to exchange the forms and messages involved in fulfilling customer orders. Traditionally, in the telecom industry, interconnection is not just a way to make business relations easier. It is, literally, the key to competition. Without those linkages, competition would simply not be possible. In this paper, the term marketplace in transition refers to the future competitive marketplace for communications and information services, a marketplace preceded in time by the generations-long monopoly era, ending circa 1990, and the current era of transition from monopoly to competition. The term marketplace in transition represents a unique vision and market concept enabled by different innovative technologies. During the monopoly era the regulator and operator were one and the same. Voice telephony was the only telecommunications service offered. The public switched telephone network exhibited natural monopoly characteristics, where unit costs of operations fall continuously as scale is increased. The rationale for regulatory intervention during the current transition from monopoly to competition is ensuring a level playing field for all market participants by regulating the main control points passed forward from the monopoly era residual market power and network bottlenecks. Learning from these experiences, regulators may view their job in the transition marketplace as something similar: identifying control points and applying the appropriate regulation. Regulators will have to distinguishing between potential control points that promote normal competitive activity, and those that may harm competitive activity. 1. REGULATORY IMPLICATION OF INTERCONNECTION The Access Directive defines interconnection as the logical and physical linking of public communications networks. It is therefore logical to consider what type of regulatory regime to apply when different types of public communication networks in a transition marketplace interconnect with each other. The interconnection of public communications networks seems to imply that all types of traffic are covered when two networks interconnect. Two different approaches can be considered: Uniform regime for all kinds of traffic If there were a set of regulatory requirements for an interconnection service such as call termination, one logical consequence could be to require that all services over an interconnected network to be terminated at the same cost because IP packets would cost the same regardless of their content. If this approach were chosen there would be many interconnection issues. It would not only be necessary to interconnect CS and IP networks in a technical sense, but it would also require the interconnection of different business models. Essentially, the network for volume or time based PSTN services would have to interconnect with the network for flat rate or bandwidth related Internet business model. Taking this approach one step further, there could be significant transition problems where operators that benefit from voice termination revenues would object to a requirement to terminate IP voice packets under a general flat rate arrangement. On the other hand, a general volume based IP termination solution could jeopardise the Internet market. Different regimes for different types of traffic Another interpretation of a network related interconnection approach would be that an SMP designation for operators offering interconnection to a given network would cover all types of traffic, but that the regulators would have the option to differentiate interconnection regimes for different categories of services. This corresponds to current practice, where normal PSTN traffic is interconnected under a time based tariff regime, while interconnection to the Internet through PSTN in some countries is based of a flat monthly rate. Another example is mobile network interconnection where the main focus is on call termination of voice traffic, but where some regulators have used the designation of network interconnection to also regulate SMS interconnection charges. This approach allows more flexibility for regulators compared with the uniform regime described above, but there is still the risk that new and innovative services would be subject to interconnection regulations when there is an SMP designation for operators offering network interconnection even if this were contrary to the intention of the Framework Directive. 2. MARKETS FOR INTERCONNECTION With the new regulatory framework, the type of interconnection obligations that can be imposed will depend on what is established as relevant wholesale markets for interconnection. In contrast to the more uniformly structured PSTN offerings, the variety of service offerings expected over network of future may complicate efforts to define and designate markets which may be subject to ex ante regulation. If the market definitions are too broad, many different types of services could be forced into the same interconnection regime. It will be necessary to characterise potential markets carefully (and sufficiently narrow) in terms of their service characteristics and to recognise that many of the services may represent new offerings with the presumption that ex ante conditions should only be imposed under exceptional circumstances. New and innovative networks will be a general-purpose networks where a telephony service may be seen as one particular option along with Internet, broadcasting and other categories of service. Different network operators are likely to have different views on how such services should be made available and to what extent the services offered should be under central control. Some may choose a fairly open approach comparable to the Internet as it is currently known. They could offer a converged access solution with telephony, Internet and video services under the same subscription. Early implementations of such converged subscriptions are already available on the market. Others may offer a more limited service with superior quality of service and security for voice communication and a selection of Internet type services, but with constraints on outside Internet connectivity depending on the service package selected by the subscriber. Within this wide range of possibilities, there will be many different service markets. For example, future service markets could include: the market for telephony services (characterised by the same quality and functionality as for PSTN) the market for Internet (characterised by best effort IP packet transmission without any quality of service guarantees) the market for video reception services (characterised by a quality of service and bandwidth enabling reception of high quality video and sound) the market for video conferencing (characterised by a quality of service and bandwidth enabling two-way simultaneous transmission of high quality video and sound) Each of these broad service markets could be further divided into sub-markets for interconnection purposes and each could be regulated differently. It makes more sense to accept different types of network interconnection agreements for different market categories defined by their service characteristics rather than by network technology. Some, but not all of these agreements may be subject to significant market power conditions, depending on whether there is dominance in the corresponding market for interconnection. 2.1. Interconnection of telephony services Network interconnection arrangements for telephony services in an transition marketplace environment could if necessary retain many of the principles upon which the present reference interconnection offerings are based. There would, however, be certain additional considerations such as which party should perform the necessary protocol conversion between CS and IP in the transition stage and how to interconnect the signaling functions. A new potential problem would be to maintain voice grade quality of service over the interconnecting IP networks. This can be achieved either through over-engineering the networks so that there is always sufficient capacity for the telephony traffic, or through some form of managed quality of service solution. In the latter case, it would mean that the interconnection nodes would have to distinguish between different categories of service and their corresponding quality of service requirements. It would also mean that the providers would have to map these requirements against their own quality of service implementations and traffic management systems. Bearing in mind that end-to-end quality of service is no better than that of the weakest link, this would obviously be an important problem to solve. Although there are different approaches to achieving a required quality of service in a packet switched environment, there is no consensus yet for a given approach or standards for different quality of service categories. Quality of service in this environment is often about different probabilities of transmission delay and packet loss instead of the traditional noise and blocking problems associated with CS communications. The actual level of service achieved is therefore likely to differ between different networks. While there is some confidence that an acceptable quality of service can be achieved in a single network with a common architecture and single overall network management coordination, it is more difficult to achieve quality of service over interconnected networks through the exchange of quality of service parameters. 2.1.1. Monitoring Quality of Service We must agree that Quality of Service interoperability between networks is a very important issue in future competitive marketplace for communications and information services. Currently, operators define different QoS parameters and classes within their own networks and, with no interoperability in place, there is a danger that the QoS perceived by end-users across networks will deteriorate. Some players even suggest that this is an area where regulatory requirements could be necessary and that it might be necessary for regulators to implement some form of Quality of Service surveillance. Such measurements could also be used in a broader sense to ensure that no parties abuse their market position by not meeting or neglecting interconnect commitments. The practicality of such interception or monitoring points is however questionable, and others have highlighted that in trying to monitor interconnect points regulators might create artificial boundaries that might actually strengthen the position of operators with large networks. Other players claim that no regulatory intervention will be required as such issues are purely contractual matters and that disputes can be solved legally. From a regulatory point of view quality of service raises the following questions: Will interconnection agreements have to include service level agreements? If so, what are the required parameters? Is there a need to ensure that the quality of service provided by a dominant operator does not discriminate between operators? Lack of a good solution for quality of service interoperability across networks would generally work in favour of the bigger networks because it would mean that good quality of service can be assured for on-net but not for off-net communications. Another challenge for regulators will be to reconsider the cost-orientation requirements for call termination in view of the efficiency gains expected from transition to IP telephony. Furthermore, the organisation of an IP based network, regardless of whether the packets contain voice or not, is likely to be quite different from that of traditional telephony in a hierarchical network with local exchanges, transit exchanges and international exchanges. 2.2. Internet interconnection Wholesale broadband access is recommended by the European Commission as a relevant market for significant market power. This does not include the Internet market itself in terms of interconnection. So far these types of interconnection agreement have been concluded by commercial negotiation without the involvement of regulators. This discussion of Internet interconnection is intended to indicate some of the difficulties or at least new challenges that may arise if steps are taken to apply the 2003 acquis to the Internet. It should not be understood as a recommendation for regulation of this market. The basic interconnection arrangement between Internet service providers today is peering with traffic exchanged between peers and terminated without financial settlements in sender keeps all arrangements. In addition, transit interconnection arrangements may be offered whereby backbone network operators carry traffic to be terminated in a third operators network. Not all operators are peers in the sense of being equal in terms of traffic flow, geographic coverage and other possible criteria. Basic peering is therefore supplemented by many other types of arrangements, which often combine elements of peering with payments from the smaller to the larger network operator. The regulatory challenge would be to ensure that interconnection with a potentially dominant operator in a relevant Internet service market would satisfy requirements for non-discrimination. This could require the establishment of criteria for non-discriminatory arrangements. Another consideration is that the Internet business model is probably not yet stable in the sense of providing sustainable and fair payments to all participants in the value chain, including content providers. Many business models are likely to be tried out in the market, with different dependency on termination charges. Dissuasive termination conditions may prevent certain business models from being tested. In this context, premature interconnection regulations could have the effect of regulating one part of the value chain and prevent the market from finding a workable solution. 2.2.1. Content and service providers In an market concept enabled by different technologies, content and service providers will be faced with new opportunities for both distributing traditional content and for deploying new multi-media services. It seems likely that service and content providers will look into both the operator and the handset/terminal space, to gain more control of distribution channels. The expectation that the market with a number of specific technologies will be driven by availability of content and new services means that content and service providers are seen as attractive partners. Access operators will look for ways of sharing the risk associated with new infrastructure investments and this is likely to happen through partnerships or joint ventures with content providers. This trend has been confirmed by both content providers and mobile operators. Some portals and content providers, however, point to the fact that producing content (like movie productions) is becoming an increasingly risky business with huge budgets and limited guarantees on the return on investment. It has been mentioned that content is arguably a riskier business than that of operating and upgrading network infrastructure. This could affect content providers willingness to share risk through joint ventures with operators or manufacturers, meaning that traditional distribution channels (such as cinema, TV and publishing) will remain the preferred means of content delivery. 2.3. Other types of services Telephony is today the main service category (in addition to transmission and access services) that is regulated with ex ante conditions for interconnection. The other main service category, Internet, is not regulated in this way. Other types of services, such as SMS, MMS, WAP and mobile Internet access, are being offered by mobile operators. As new technology framework will be the production platform and distribution system for information society services, it is likely that also other types of services will appear, both in the fixed and the mobile environments. Many of these will combine elements of transmission and content. Such services may require new billing models with different formulas for sharing risks and rewards. Billing models that are viable in the longer term are more likely to develop as a result of market forces than from regulatory requirements. Premature interconnection regulations could interfere in this process and prevent alternative billing models from being tested in the market. This view is in agreement with the presumption in the new regulatory framework that new and emerging services should not be subject to inappropriate regulations. The conclusion is to avoid broad and sweeping categories for defining markets for the purpose of regulating interconnection and instead target narrowly only those specific service markets where it is evident that dominance could create permanent bottlenecks. 2.3.1. Flat-rate access There are claims that flat-rate access arrangements are essential for the further development of Internet and Internet services. Volume or time based mechanisms could constitute a psychological barrier to usage, even if the actual cost are reasonable. Volume based charging (for data in particular) suffers from that fact that the model does not reflect the actual value delivered to the customer. Charges are thus likely to be service based in combination with a charge based on access bandwidth. Initially, this model will apply for data but increasingly also for voice services. Content will be charged separately, but there are however also claims that, at least in the past, similar model was difficult to adopt in Europe mainly due to many operators wanting a disproportionate share of the revenue. Finally, a market based on flat-rate billing for access and transmission leads to better price transparency. This statement does however not necessarily imply that flat-rate billing will be the most prevalent or successful billing model. 3. Interconnection in IP environment Open standards such as IPv4 and IPv6 allow providers to provide transparent packet transport service to other providers, however a number of potential bottlenecks have been identified in the past, which could prevent the free flow of traffic. These bottlenecks included discriminatory pricing and restrictive practices such as the rationing of IP addresses or the blocking of certain protocols. Traditional interconnect agreements on the Internet were based around a hierarchical structure meaning that requirements on "non-discriminatory peering" and interconnect were raised frequently by players who felt discriminated by larger players. Many parts of the industry now claim that commercial mechanisms have been successful in resolving such IP interconnection issues and that the Internet has become much less hierarchical over the last 5-6 years - effectively meaning that the market power of large backbone operators has been reduced. Several operators claim that these developments mean that regulatory measures in the area of interconnection are becoming less necessary. Issues of market power and dominant position are likely to become more related to higher-level specific services than to arrangements for simple traffic exchange. 3.1. Termination rates Termination is an interconnect service that provides a link between a network operators point of interconnection and the subscriber who is being called. The termination rate is the price charged by the network operator to interconnecting operators for the provision of the termination services. The traditional notion of "termination" might be very difficult to apply in an IP environment where it is not possible to easily identify whether traffic is "push" or "pull" and, as consequence, who should be billed for the traffic. IP environment will offer a large variety of business models, which are not based on termination rates. These could include: Capacity based billing Service based charges Revenue sharing Risk sharing (partnerships or ventures with specific agreements on risk sharing) Some operators maintain that termination rates could continue to play a role in the settlement between operators. For traditional voice traffic, termination revenues have played a vital role in the business model for access providers, and also allowed the operators a level of control over the access link. This legacy could mean that many access operators will seek to implement traditional termination charges for IP traffic. IP termination charges would thus fit well with established business models and also allow the access provider to maintain a level of control similar to that for voice traffic. At the moment no one can predict how the markets will look, but it has been suggested that, if necessary, termination rates could be differentiated by Quality of Service classes rather than by specific applications such as "voice termination". CONCLUSION The future competitive marketplace for communications and information services will provide a converged approach where services traditionally carried over different networks and subject to different interconnection regimes will in the future share the same network. To define interconnection obligations for the future innovative networks would seem to mean that regulations could affect all services carried over it. Services that were previously carried over separate networks may represent different service options within single network of the future. Therefore, it would be more flexible to allow different network interconnection regimes to co-exist within the same network. For example, interconnection of the traditional voice circuit switched services as is currently provided in PSTN could, if necessary, continue to be regulated as before, while the interconnection of Internet services could continue to be unregulated even if the two service categories share the same network. It is important to recognise that stable business models for information society services, where each participant in the value chain receives sustainable revenues, have not yet developed and that interconnection requirements, particularly if they involve price regulation, could therefore be premature. As advanced network of future develops, the wholesale markets for interconnection should be narrowly defined in terms of the services requiring interconnection, rather than broadly defined in terms of networks. REFERENCES Guettler, Dame, Schultz; Regulatory implications of the introduction of next generation networks and other new developments in electronic communications, Brussels 2003. WIK-Consult, "The Economics of IP Networks Market, Technical and Public Policy issues relating to Internet Traffic Exchange", May 2002. 2002/19/EC Access Directive European Commission, Brussels 2002. 2002/21/EC Framework Directive European Commission, Brussels 2002. Electronic Networks, Challenges for the Next Decade, EU Cabinet Office, Strategy Unit Report, December 2002.  HYPERLINK "http://www.iec.org" http://www.iec.org The Globalization of Interconnection, 2003.  HYPERLINK "http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/studies/documents/" http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/studies/documents/ , Interconnection, 2003. European Electronic Communications Regulation and Markets 2003, European Commission, Brussels 2003. P. 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An interconnection regime may be unregulated or subject to a set of regulatory requirements.  E.g. FRIACO (flat Rate Internet Access Call Orgination) in the UK.  2002/19/EC - Framework Directive Recital 27  This has already been recommended by the Commission in its Recommendation on Relevant Markets, where Voice call termination on individual mobile networks is one of the relevant wholesale markets.  Commission Recommendation of 11/02/2003 - C(2003)497.  2002/21/EC - Framework Directive Recital 27 PAGE  PAGE 3 01234\]^ STJKLMNÎĎʎˎ͎̎ʾʾʢ΄ʀvpvpvpvevh,G%0JmHnHu hw 0Jjhw 0JUh,G%"hw CJOJQJ^JaJmH sH hw CJaJmH sH hw CJaJmH sH hw CJmH sH  hw CJjhw 0JCJUhw jhw 0JUhw CJaJmHsHhw aJmH sH "hw CJOJQJ^JaJmH sH 'KLŽÎΎώЎюҎ$a$h]h&`#$7$8$H$ $7$8$H$a$͎ΎЎюҎhw CJaJmHsHh,G%hw hw 0J/ 01h. 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