Naslov
Why computers can't think: Wittgenstein and Searle on consciousness

Autori
Penava, Mate

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni

Skup
Mind and culture

Mjesto i datum
Zagreb, Hrvatska, 05.12.2014. - 06.12.2014

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Podatak o recenziji nije dostupan

Ključne riječi
Wittgenstein ; Searle ; consciousness ; computers ; Chinese room argument

Sažetak
Faced with the ever growing advancement of artificial technology, we have to confront the question of computers being able to mimic the behaviour of people, especially mental behaviour. To answer this questions, the authorities of two philosophers will be consulted. Wittgenstein' s later philosophy will be a starting point, where the philosopher claims that it is nonsensical to attribute mental concepts to machines, because they lack the necessary background that human being have. The argument will then progress to the ideas of J. R. Searle, who is also adamant in refusing the privilege of thinking to machines. According to him, computers can only do tasks that they are commanded to do, without knowing what they are doing. To this purpose he outlines his Chinese room experiment. Every understanding needs consciousness and consciousness uses a special kind of causality, intentional causality, which can be found only in human beings.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

POVEZANOST RADA