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PROCEEDINGS OF THE
XXVIII SCIENTIFIC
CONFERENCE
EMPIRICAL
STUDIES IN
PSYCHOLOGY
31st MARCH – 3rd APRIL, 2022
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE
INSTITUTE OF PSYCHOLOGY
LABORATORY FOR EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE
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EMPIRICAL
STUDIES IN
PSYCHOLOGY
31st MARCH – 3rd APRIL, 2022
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF
BELGRADE
Institute of Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade
Laboratory for Experimental Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade
Belgrade, 2022
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PROGRAMME COMMITTEE
prof. dr Orlando M. Lourenço
prof. dr Claus-Christian Carbon
prof. dr Agostini Tiziano
prof. dr Lucia Tramonte
prof. dr Maria do Céu Taveira
prof. dr José M. Peiró
prof. dr Gonida Sofia-Eleftheria
prof. dr Laurie Beth Feldman
prof. dr Joana Maria Mas
doc. dr Milica Vukelić
doc. dr Ivana Stepanović Ilić
dr Zora Krnjaić
prof. dr Dejan Todorović
prof. dr Sunčica Zdravković
prof. dr Iris Žeželj
doc. dr Danka Purić
prof. dr Zvonimir Galić
prof. dr Dušica Filipović Đurđević
prof. dr Slobodan Marković
prof. dr Ksenija Krstić
prof. dr Dražen Domijan
doc. dr Oliver Tošković
doc. dr Olja Jovanović
doc. dr Dobrinka Kuzmanović
doc. dr Bojana Bodroža
doc. dr Ivana Jakovljev
doc. Dragan Janković
prof. dr Pavle Valerjev
prof. dr Denis Bratko
prof. dr Petar Čolović
doc. dr Jelena Matanović
dr Janko Međedović
doc. dr Marija Branković
dr Anja Wertag
dr Jelena Radišić
doc. dr Dragana Stanojević
doc. dr Maja Savić
dr Nataša Simić
dr Maša Popović
dr Darinka Anđelković
prof. dr Tamara Džamonja Ignjatović
doc. dr Kaja Damnjanović
dr Marko Živanović
dr Maša Vukčević Marković
prof. dr Goran Opačić
prof. dr Aleksandar Kostić
dr Zorana Zupan
dr Marina Videnović (chairwoman)
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ORGANIZING COMMITTEE
dr Marina Videnović
prof. dr Slobodan Marković
prof. dr Dušica Filipović Đurđević
Olga Marković Rosić
doc. dr Ivana Stepanović Ilić
Ksenija Mišić
Milana Rajić
dr Marko Živanović
doc. dr Kaja Damnjanović
dr Nataša Simić
Teodora Vuletić
Anđela Milošević
Ana Avramović
Natalija Ignjatović
Milica Ninković
Jovan Ivanović
EDITORS
dr Marina Videnović, naučni saradnik
dr Nataša Simić, viši naučni saradnik
doc. dr Ivana Stepanović Ilić
doc. dr Kaja Damnjanović, naučni saradnik
Milana Rajić, istraživač saradnik
Cover photo:
Spring-loaded switch, (E. Zimmermann, Leipzig-Berlin)
from Collection of old scientific instruments, Laboratory for Experimental Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy,
University of Belgrade
Proofreading and layout: Teodora Vuletić
Do Higher-Level Chess Players Rely on Heuristics in General as well as in Chess
Problem Solving?
Marko Antolčić (marko.antolcic@gmail.com)
Department of Psychology, University of Zadar
Pavle Valerjev (valerjev@unizd.hr)
Department of Psychology, University of Zadar
Abstract
It has been confirmed that expert chess players solve chess
positions in a matter of seconds thanks to their ability to match
memorized patterns with positional patterns. This superiority
usually manifests itself in a context of familiar chess positions
and is reflected in speed and accuracy. Chess experts develop
an intuitive approach that is occasionally incorrect, especially
when it needs to be suppressed by a more analytical approach
(e.g. Einstellung effect). This study investigates the intuitive
and heuristic approach developed in chess experts, more
specifically, it compares how they solve problems inside and
outside their domain of expertise. This study was conducted in
several chess clubs across Croatia, and participants were chess
players with various levels of expertise. Cognitive Reflection
Test (CRT) was used to assess general problem solving ability,
and specially developed chess problems were used for domain-
specific problem solving. The results showed that chess players
with greater expertise are more efficient in domain-specific
tasks but this is unrelated with efficiency in general tasks. Also,
participants more accurate in domain-specific tasks were less
accurate in general tasks. Our results suggest that expert chess
players might transfer their cognitive style in broader problem-
solving domains where it is sometimes useless or even harmful.
Keywords: chess problem solving, Cognitive Reflection Test,
expert reasoning, cognitive styles, dual-process theory of
thinking
Introduction
The research literature about chess expertise reveals that
expert chess players are more dominant in their processing
speed than in processing depth when compared to
intermediate or amateur chess players (De Groot, 1978).
Researchers concluded that chess players utilize memory
chunks about chess positions, developed throughout many
years of practice, in a reflexive and automatized fashion.
These memorized perceptual and conceptual chunks are
repeated patterns of chess configuration that can be retrieved
easily while relevant features are observed (Potter, 1993;
Gobet & Lane, 2010). Expert chess players need to observe
only certain segments of a chess position to construct a
mental image from long-term memory, shortening the time
required to elicitate a move, i.e. the mental representation of
the next chess configuration, enabling the probability of a
critical positional evaluation (Gobet, 1998). Such processes
are initially developed consciously, deliberately and slowly
by following chess rules and the knowledge of chess rules.
Expert chess skills evolve in heuristic, intuitive and fast
mechanisms represented in quick and accurate decisions
(Chase & Simon, 1973). The described differentiation in
information processing matches the processing mechanisms
in dual process theory (Campitelli et al. 2015). Specifically,
Type 1 processes (T1) of thinking include chess players' fast
and intuitive decision making in familiar chess positions and
Type 2 (T2), which includes more explicit logic operations,
in less familiar chess positions. T1 and T2 thought processes
have several benefits and drawbacks for the problem solver.
T1 process might skew the inference due to biased
experience, but usually leads to the correct and stereotyped
solution. In contrast, the T2 process requires more resources,
but leads to the correct solution in a more formal manner even
in an unencountered solution. When more general problems
are considered (e.g. Hanoi tower problem) they include lesser
familiarity and therefore elicitate the T2 process (Evans,
2003). According to prior research, there is no or relatively
little (chess) expertise transfer to other fields of problem
solving (Gobet, 2016), meaning that experts' domain-specific
memory and T1 processing are no longer useful, thus more
reliant on T2 processes to solve the problem. It is known that
solving a general logical problem requires reasoning that
includes meta-cognition (Fletcher and Carruthers, 2012),
which may be more developed in those who have more
experience in logical problem-solving (Evans, 2003).
Comparing differences in cognitive styles, the tendency to
solve problems intuitively or reflectively, between those who
have more experience with logical problems in some domains
and those who do not might be of interest. Investigating such
a tendency is possible in a broader context by applying the
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005), which
measures one’s tendency to override intuitive responses and
engage in more reflective cognitive processes. CRT consists
of minimally three problems, sometimes more, each of which
has an obvious but incorrect response. The author assumes
that an incorrect response is elicited by the activation of the
T1 process and the correct response requires the activation of
the T2 process. For the T2 to be activated, one must note that
the first answer is incorrect, which requires reflection on his
one’s own cognition. Investigating the role of cognitive styles
among chess players might provide insight into the heuristics
influencing decision-making in domain-specific, as well as in
general problem solving. This could illuminate the general
nature of chess experts' cognition. Accordingly, it was
expected that expert chess players are prone to be faster and
more accurate - efficient in both areas of problem solving.
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Methodology
Sample
A total of 48 chess players participated in the experiment.
All are members of different chess clubs in Croatia. The
participants’ (N=48, age M=30, 5 female) chess expertise
was displayed on the chess national rating system scale
(ranging from 1547 to 2270 Elo points).
Figure 1: Chess task example.
Design, Materials and Procedure
This study was part of a broader research project on chess
expertise. For this particular study, a correlational research
design was deployed. The parameters of accuracy and
response time in chess and CRT problems were used as
variables. Participants solved 24 chess problems (in all of
them white mates in two moves), followed by three CRT
tasks. All problems were presented on a computer screen. For
examples, see Figures 1 and 2. Participants had three minutes
per chess problem and no time restriction during CRT
assessment. The chess problems were developed carefully in
collaboration with an independent group of chess experts,
with great variance in difficulty and position motives. Each
chess problem was created in order to simulate imaginative
processes, simulating both white moves and black
countermoves.
Participants responded by clicking the starting and ending
square of a given move which triggered response time
measurement.
Results
Due to asymmetrically distributed results, nonparametric
Spearman’s rho correlations were used. The analysis in total
can be seen in Table 1. As expected, the results show that
chess players with a higher Elo rating are more efficient in
chess problem solving, both in accuracy and speed (Elo and
accuracy: rho=.77, p<.001, Elo and response time: rho=-.61,
p<.001). Additionally, we calculated correlations with
specific types of CRT response (reflective vs. intuitive).
These results proved most interesting in this study. They
show that there is a tendency that players with more chess
expertise respond with shorter response time in intuitive
responses to CRT problems than less expert players (rho = -
.32, p<.05). Furthermore, contrary to expectations, it was
shown that chess players more accurate in chess problem
solving, were less accurate in CRT (rho = -.29, p<.05).
Figure 2: CTR task example.
Table 1: Spearmans’ rho correlations among relevant variables
Level of
expertise
Response
time (chess)
Chess
accuracy
CRT
accuracy
Response time -
Reflective
response (CRT)
Response time -
Intuitive response
(CRT)
Level of
expertise
rho
—
Response time
(chess)
rho
-0.611***
—
Chess accuracy
rho
0.771***
-0.598***
—
CRT accuracy
rho
-0.13
0.223
-0.291*
—
Response time -
Reflective
response (CRT)
rho
-0.096
0.470**
-0.144
0.309*
—
Response time -
Intuitive
response (CRT)
rho
-0.319*
0.465**
-0.198
-0.107
0.376*
—
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Method
Discussion and conclusion
The aim of this research was to investigate the relationship
between chess expertise and cognitive styles in general and
in domain-specific problem solving. The hypothesis was that
chess players with a higher rating are more efficient (both
more accurate and faster) in chess and CRT problem solving
and that chess players’ problem solving efficiency will
positively correlate with their CRT efficiency in general.
Results showed a positive correlation between efficiency
(both accuracy and speed) in chess problems and chess rating,
which confirms the well-known conclusion that chess rating
is a precise, established scaling system (Gobet, 1998). It is
expected that higher-level chess players solve chess problems
more accurately and rapidly, because they use the advantage
of mental heuristics based on a vast knowledge base
confirming the validity of their decision (Gobet & Simon,
1996b). Classic research on heuristic reasoning (Simon,
1955; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) showed that people
generally make heuristical and incorrect responses rather
than correct ones. Frederick (2005) indicates a positive
relation with logical reasoning and that CRT results match
moderately with measures of cognitive ability. Accordingly,
chess skill is positively correlated with intelligence and
reasoning (Burgoyne et al., 2016), which implies that more
skilled chess players might have higher scores on CRT as
well. However, the results obtained in this study indicate that
more accurate chess players tend to have lower CRT results,
i.e., a less reflective cognitive style. In other words, it seems
that they are more prone to use an intuitive approach and
heuristics in their decision-making regardless of whether they
engage in chess problems or more general problem solving
(such as one typical for CRT problems). The literature on
chess expertise indicates the frequent of use of heuristics in
chess experts' performance and their difficulties in abjuring
it, as evinced in Einstellung effect (Bilalić et al., 2008). To
conclude, the results suggest that higher-level chess experts
are more mentally rigid than lower-level chess players, and
that they are also less reflective and prone to use heuristics
not only in a specific domain, but in general problem solving
as well. Possible reason for such behavior is that the frequent
usage of successful heuristics leads to a habit of using
heuristics more frequently. In addition, it also instills more
confidence in them when making decisions, which is not only
limited to a familiar domain. Such a cognitive style is, thus,
transferred to other problem solving domains.
References
Burgoyne, A.P., Sala, G., Gobet, F., Macnamara, B.N.,
Campitelli, G., & Hambrick, D.Z. (2016). The
relationship between cognitive ability and chess skill: A
comprehensive meta-analysis. Intelligence, 59, 72-83.
Bilalić, M., McLeod, P. i Gobet, F. (2008). Why good
thoughts block better ones: The mechanism of the
pernicious Einstellung (set) effect. Cognition, 108(3),
652-661.
Campitelli, G., Connors, M., Bilalić, M., & Hambrick, D.
(2015). Psychological perspectives on expertise.
Frontiers in Psychology, 6:258.
Chase, W.G., & Simon, H.A. (1973). The mind’s eye in
chess. In W.G. Chase (Ed.), Visual Information
Processing. Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Carnegie
Symposium on Cognition (pp. 215-281). Academic Press.
De Groot, A.D. (1978). Thought and Choice in Chess
(Revised translation of De Groot, 1946). Mouton
Publishers.
Evans, J.St.B.T. (2003). In two minds: dual-process accounts
of reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(10), 454-
459.
Fletcher, L., & Carruthers, P. (2012). Metacognition and
reasoning. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society B: Biological Sciences, 367(1594), 1366-1378.
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision
making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4), 25-42.
Gobet, F. (1998). Expert memory: a comparison of four
theories. Cognition, 66(2), 115– 152.
Gobet, F., & Lane, P. (2010). The CHREST architecture of
cognition: The role of perception in general intelligence.
Proceedings of the 3d Conference on Artificial General
Intelligence (AGI-10). Atlantis Press.
Gobet, F., Lloyd-Kelly, M., & Lane, P. (2016). What's in a
name? The multiple meanings of “chunk” and
“chunking”. Frontiers in Psychology, 7:102.
Potter, M.C. (1993). Very short-term conceptual memory.
Memory & Cognition, 21, 156-161.
Simon, H.A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69, 99–118.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under
uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124–
1131.
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Duscussion and Conclusion
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PROCEEDINGS OF THE XXIII SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN
PSYCHOLOGY (28; 2022, Beograd)
[Zbornik radova] / XXVIII naučni skup Empirijska istraživanja u psihologiji
31. mart-3.april 2022; Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu; [organizatori]
Institut za psihologiju i Laboratorija za eksperimentalnu psihologiju – 1. Izd –
Beograd: Filozofski fakultet, 2022 – 160 str.
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1. Institut za psihologiju (Beograd)
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