Naslov
Sex, Lies and Video Games: Cognitive Mechanisms in Pretensive Reality

Autori
Šekrst, Kristina

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, sažetak, znanstveni

Izvornik
Video Games as a Common Ground conference / - , 2022, 21-21

Skup
Video Games as a Common Ground conference

Mjesto i datum
Zadar, Hrvatska, 02.09.2022. - 03.09.2022

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Domaća recenzija

Ključne riječi
pretensive reality ; cognitive theory of pretense ; self-involving interactive fiction

Sažetak
Self-involving interactive fictions are fictions about those who consume them, differing from canonical fictions such as most novels, TV shows, and films, which might be interactive in a minimal way (Robson and Meskin, 2016). Consumers of canonical fiction have no influence over the structural properties of their objects, while in SIIFs they do (cf. Tavinor, 2012). Walton (1990) differentiates between work worlds, associated with the fictional work itself, and game worlds, occupying propositions only true in the game world. A philosophically interesting point here is a different notion of truth since video games become an extension of the self: “I killed a dragon” is a proposition that is true in the game world. For Asheim (2012), the reality status of make-believe objects in fiction is ontologically different than in video games, consisting of a reference to consciousness. A church could be transformed into a museum or it could look like a hut, but it is still believed to be a church and holds a different value. I will observe this stance from aspects of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. First, I will claim that all the propositions describing the game world are actually shortened propositional attitudes which constitute a meta-layer of discourse. Second, I will connect such mental states to cognitive peculiarities in make-believe studies, from childhood development (Jaswal, 2010) to pretensive reality in adults. Nichols and Stich (2000) argue that pretend play in adults requires 1) establishing a premise 2) inferential elaboration 3) embellishment 4) production of appropriate pretend behavior, while Kapitany et al. (2022) emphasize the socially shared pretense. I will argue that the same cognitive mechanism in both children and adults has philosophically different mental phenomena connected with the same outcome, pretense reality: either a full immersion or with an extra layer of work-world awareness, i.e. knowing consciously that the game world is not true.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija, Kognitivna znanost (prirodne, tehničke, biomedicina i zdravstvo, društvene i humanističke znanosti)

POVEZANOST RADA