Naslov
Naturalism and the capacity-first approach to normative reasons

Autori
Jurjako, Marko

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni

Skup
Ethical Issues: Theoretical & Applied

Mjesto i datum
Bled, Slovenija, 06.06.2022. - 10.06.2022

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Nije recenziran

Ključne riječi
normative reasons ; capacities ; primitivism about reasons ; animal cognition

Sažetak
In recent decades the reasons first approach to normativity has been very influential in metaethical discussions. This approach promised to provide a unified account of various normative phenomena with an ultimate goal of reducing normative facts to facts about reasons for belief or action. The reasons first approach construes reasons as facts that count in favor of something. However, it often leaves open what these facts are supposed to be, how they get their normative status, and how we determine what counts in favor of what. Indeed, some prominent authors adopt a primitivist view ac-cording to which reasons as considerations that count in favor are primitive facts that cannot be explained in other terms. However, from a naturalistic perspective, the reasons first approach raises several puzzles. First, such an approach relies on intuitions about reasons, without giving principled grounds for determining them. This leaves open the question where these intuitions come from and how they can be justified? Second, are these reasons facts only normatively fundamental and primitive or they can be reduced to other non- normative facts? If so, which non-normative facts they would relate to? Third, this approach does not answer the question whether and in what sense non-human animals could possesses normative reasons. I argue that turning to a capacity first approach to reasons and rationality, may provide advancement on these fronts. According to the capacity first approach, facts about reasons should be explained in terms of our capacities for epistemic and practical rationality. This approach presupposes that facts about normative reasons can be explained in terms of the capacity of reason whose proper function is determined by the principles of rationality. I argue that this approach is attractive from a naturalistic perspective for the following reasons. First, it can connect the narratives about normative reasons with naturalistic accounts of our reasoning and rational capacities. Second, it can provide a naturalistically plausible explanation of what determines proper functions of the capacity of reason and how consequently reasons emerge. Third, it can answer the question whether animals and cognitively less sophisticated creatures have reasons for action and in what sense this might be the case.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

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