Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 1197028
Judicial Interpretation and Competition Rules: Excessively Stringent Standard of Proof as a Threat for Effectiveness of Competition Law Enforcement
Judicial Interpretation and Competition Rules: Excessively Stringent Standard of Proof as a Threat for Effectiveness of Competition Law Enforcement // Jean Monnet Network on EU Law Enforcement, Working Paper Series No. 32/22
Varšava, Poljska, 2022. str. 1-32 (pozvano predavanje, nije recenziran, cjeloviti rad (in extenso), znanstveni)
CROSBI ID: 1197028 Za ispravke kontaktirajte CROSBI podršku putem web obrasca
Naslov
Judicial Interpretation and Competition Rules:
Excessively Stringent Standard of Proof as a
Threat for Effectiveness of Competition Law
Enforcement
Autori
Pecotić Kaufman, Jasminka
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u zbornicima skupova, cjeloviti rad (in extenso), znanstveni
Izvornik
Jean Monnet Network on EU Law Enforcement, Working Paper Series No. 32/22
/ - , 2022, 1-32
Skup
International Conference of the Jean Monnet Network on EU Law Enforcement (EULEN)
Mjesto i datum
Varšava, Poljska, 26.05.2022. - 27.05.2022
Vrsta sudjelovanja
Pozvano predavanje
Vrsta recenzije
Nije recenziran
Ključne riječi
competition law ; legal culture ; judiciary ; post-socialist countries ; Central and Eastern Europe ; Croatia
Sažetak
This article argues that more than thirty years after the democratic and economic transition, the legacy of authoritarian legal culture in the post- socialist EU Member States limits the effectiveness of competition law enforcement. Concentrating on Croatia but mindful of the experience of other Central and East European countries that acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007, we show examples of post-accession case law illustrative of excessive judicial formalism and disassociation between the legal norm and its socio-economic context in judicial interpretation. Also, we explain how the excessively stringent legal standard of proof for cartel agreements, established by Croatian courts post-accession, indicates an incomplete semantic alignment with EU competition rules. Furthermore, we discuss the difference in legal cultures between the judiciary and the competition authority by using the notion of “skewed agencification” and show how slow reception of EU competition law standards by the judiciary adversely impacts the enforcement of competition rules.
Izvorni jezik
Engleski
Znanstvena područja
Pravo
