Naslov
Well-being without Adaptive Preferences

Autori
Gavran Miloš, Ana

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni

Skup
Well-being, Capabilities and Civic Virtues

Mjesto i datum
Rijeka, Hrvatska, 19.02.2021

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Nije recenziran

Ključne riječi
well-being, value fulfillment theory, subjective well-being, adaptive preferences, capabilitarianism

Sažetak
The aim of my paper is to show that any theory of well-being confronted with the existence of adaptive preferences or values should provide an account of why adaptive values are not good for someone, or why they decrease well-being. The thing is getting more complicated since not all adaptive preferences appear to be bad for us. Therefore, theory of well-being should also provide us with the explanation for this distinction and an account of why some of adaptive preferences have prudential value while others do not. Existence of adaptive preferences particularly raises a problem for subjectivist theories of well-being, namely those according to which an object will have prudential value for a subject iff that subject has pro-attitudes toward the object in question. Since our attitudes might be adapted to oppressive circumstances, it would be certainly better for us if we could change our pro-attitudes based on adaptive preferences or at least be able to get rid of those without prudential value. Since well-being is obviously diminished in cases of oppressive adaptive preferences, subjectivists are faced with a serious problem since most of the theories cannot explain the possibility of error given that the standard for what is good for subject are subject’s attitude. In my paper I want to focus on one of the most promising subjectivist theories that allows for a possibility that subject might be mistaken about what is good for her, Tiberius’ value fulfilment theory. Given the fact that Tiberius claims that we might mistakenly judge what is prudentially valuable for us, she also discusses the issue of adaptive values. I aim to show that Tiberius’ subjective account, by allowing error in the pursuit of well-being, has many advantages, but still lacks resources for dealing with adaptive values/preferences. I argue that well-being standard must be external to person’s system of value but subject also must recognize it as valuable. In my view a possible framework for such an account of well-being can be developed within Nussbaum’s capability approach where her list of capabilities serves as a substantive/objective theory of what is good, but the role of practical reason and subject’s choice captures subjective aspect. Namely, by exercising practical reasoning through (Aristotelian) deliberative desires we express our own conception of well-being and choose which capabilities to develop.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

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