Naslov
Conditional Political Budget Cycles in the EU – Where Do They Originate From and Do They Pay Off?

Autori
Mačkić, Velibor

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, ostalo

Skup
55th Annual Meetings of the Public Choice Society

Mjesto i datum
Charleston (SC), Sjedinjene Američke Države, 01.03.2018. - 03.03.2018

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija

Ključne riječi
political budget cycles ; dynamic linear and non linear panel models ; re-election ; European union

Sažetak
Elections test all three functions of public finances, but the most important effect is shown vis-à-vis the stabilization function. Thus, are elections a mechanism by which voters choose responsible politicians, who do not create budget deficits, or do they actually contribute to the incumbents opportunistic behaviour? Employing data for 9 European Union member states over 1995– 2016 period in a dynamic linear and non-linear panel model, this paper addresses these two empirical questions. Estimation results reveal that fiscal decentralisation, government structure and fiscal rules influence on what level do the political budget cycles occur that are recorded at the general government level. Furthermore, election-motivated policies do not have a significant positive effect on the probability of re-election.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Ekonomija

POVEZANOST RADA