Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 1104251
A Normative Justification of the Standards Involved in the Construct of Psychopathy
A Normative Justification of the Standards Involved in the Construct of Psychopathy // THE MANY FACES OF PERSONALITY DISORDER - An Interdisciplinary Conference of the Understanding Personality Disorders Network. Institute of Applied Psychology, Jagiellonian University,
Kraków, Poljska, 2019. (predavanje, međunarodna recenzija, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni)
CROSBI ID: 1104251 Za ispravke kontaktirajte CROSBI podršku putem web obrasca
Naslov
A Normative Justification of the Standards Involved
in the Construct of Psychopathy
Autori
Baccarini Elvio ; Malatesti, Luca
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni
Skup
THE MANY FACES OF PERSONALITY DISORDER - An Interdisciplinary Conference of the Understanding Personality Disorders Network. Institute of Applied Psychology, Jagiellonian University,
Mjesto i datum
Kraków, Poljska, 21.10.2019
Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje
Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija
Ključne riječi
mental disoder ; normativism ; naturalisim ; public reason ;
Sažetak
In this paper we address the problem of establishing the appropriate type of justification of the standards of behaviour, personality traits, and mental life that are relevant for investigating the illness status of psychopathy. Recently, Shane N. Glackin (2015), in criticising Christopher Megone’s justificatory attempt of standards relevant for psychiatric diagnosis (1998, 2000), that is inspired by Aristotelian ideas, has correctly maintained that a justification of mental illness status of certain condition should respect, within the context of a liberal democratic setting, pluralism, should not rely on the “ultimate view” of human nature. In addition, this justification should consider the perspective of those with the condition at issue. We argue that the political philosopher John Rawls (Rawls 1971) has satisfactorily and exhaustively described the reasons for respecting in public justification pluralism and avoiding appeals to ultimate views of human nature. However, we criticise George Graham’s attempt (2013) at justifying mental illness status of a condition by relying on the Rawlsian model of justification. This approach does not do justice to individual differences in the context of psychiatry. Therefore, we elaborate our type of justification, that is inspired by Gerald Gaus’s view of public justification (1996, 2011), and argue that it is compatible with a liberal democratic order, does not rely on any ultimate account of human nature, respects reasonable pluralism and offers the due respect to the perspective of those to whom it is addressed.
Izvorni jezik
Engleski
Znanstvena područja
Filozofija
POVEZANOST RADA
Projekti:
HRZZ-IP-2018-01-3518 - Odgovori na antisocijalne osobnosti u demokratskom društvu (RAD) (Malatesti, Luca, HRZZ ) ( CroRIS)
Ustanove:
Filozofski fakultet, Rijeka