Naslov
Cooperativeness in duopoly from an evolutionary game theory perspective

Autori
Vrankić, Ilko ; Pejić Bach, Mirjana ; Herceg, Tomislav

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u zbornicima skupova, cjeloviti rad (in extenso), znanstveni

Izvornik
Zbornik petnajstega simpozija operacijskih raziskav SOR'19 na Bledu = Proceedings of the 15th International Symposium on Operational Research / Zadnik Stirn, I. ; Kljajić Borštar, M. ; Žerovnik, J. ; Drobne, S. ; Povh, J. - Ljubljana : Slovensko društvo informatika, 2019, 611-616

ISBN
978-961-6165-55-6

Skup
15th International Symposium on Operations Research in Slovenia (SOR '19)

Mjesto i datum
Bled, Slovenija, 25.09.2019. - 27.09.2019

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija

Ključne riječi
Evolutionary game theory ; duopoly ; cooperative strategy ; dominant strategy ; reactive strategy

Sažetak
In a duopoly analysis companies can partake in different mutual relations. In case when quantity of production is a decision variable, the equilibria can be of either Cournot, Stackelberg or cartel type. In these market structures companies pick different behavioural patterns, thus making different profits. In cooperative equilibrium both companies have an incentive to cheat since an unanimous move can improve their own profit, but since it lowers competitor’s profits in the same time, this equilibrium collapses to Cournot equilibrium where profits are lower. In Stackelberg equilibrium a dominant company yield greater profits on the expense of the lower follower’s profit and the total industry profit in Cournot equilibrium. Therefore this paper is looking for the best long-term behaviour pattern of a company, using a new perspective unifying microeconomic analysis of market structures and evolutionary game theory ; it is assumed that companies pick, with certain probabilities, either cooperative, reactive or dominant strategies. Companies in time adapt their choices by increasing the choice probability of those strategies which fitness is greater than the average profit, applying the replicator dynamics. It is also shown that long-run decisions of companies strongly depend on the starting set of strategies.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Ekonomija

POVEZANOST RADA