Naslov
Deflating Self-Authorship: Luck and the Lack of Ultimate Responsibility

Autori
Čeč, Filip

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni

Skup
Agent Causation, Powers, and Sourcehood

Mjesto i datum
Zagreb, Hrvatska, 24.05.2018. - 26.05.2018

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija

Ključne riječi
Luck, Justice, Ultimate responsibility, Moral responsibility

Sažetak
It has been argued that one is ultimately responsible for an action if that action stems from his own will which has, at some point, been formed by the person herself. This notion has been heavily criticized and often discarded as impossible (Strawson 1994). Various attempts, in line with the compatibilistic approach in the free will debate, have been suggested in order to replace the notion of ultimate responsibility with less demanding ones (Frankfurt 1988, Fischer and Ravizza 1998, Wolf 1990 for example). These have been criticized on the grounds that they are unable to provide a sufficiently robust notion of the self that will grant that action is up-to- the- agent and thus, that the action flowing from such a self will not be a product of an agent’s will but rather an occurrence arising from circumstances over which the agent has no control. Having the desires or beliefs one has is something one cannot control and consequently is a matter of luck. Praising or blaming someone therefore represents an unjust act (Smilansky 2000). By analyzing the notions of luck and justice involved in the above mentioned argumentation and by presenting some cases involving anti- social behavior I will try to dismantle the argument by arguing that an improper analysis of the notion of luck is involved in the argument and thereby affirm that we can safely rely on a less demanding notion of the self which will justify the praxis of ascription of moral responsibility flowing from it.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

POVEZANOST RADA