Naslov
Practical reason, morality and robust objectivity: revisiting evolutionary considerations

Autori
Jurjako, Marko

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, ostalo

Skup
Contemporary Philosophical Issues: Society, Agency and Knowledge

Mjesto i datum
Rijeka, Hrvatska, 24.05.2016. - 25.05.2016

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Nije recenziran

Ključne riječi
evolutionary debunking arguments, normative reasons, robust objectivity

Sažetak
The common assumption of evolutionary debunking arguments plausibly involves the idea that some evolutionary story can be adduced that explains why many of our deeply held normative judgments came about and what the mechanisms for their retention are. Derek Parfit in his second volume of On what matters defends robust normative objectivism by challenging the plausibility of the common assumption that evolutionary accounts can provide explanations of the existence of normative judgments with particular contents. In this paper I defend the common presupposition of the evolutionary debunking arguments against Parfit’s objections. In particular, I examine some recent accounts from evolutionary psychology and anthropology that can be used to explain important features of normative judgments.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

POVEZANOST RADA