Naslov
Self-deception, intentions, and the limits of folk- psychology

Autori
Jurjako, Marko

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni

Skup
Contemporary Philosophical Issues 2019

Mjesto i datum
Rijeka, Hrvatska, 16.05.2019

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Nije recenziran

Ključne riječi
Self-deception ; intentionalism ; antiintentionalism ; the selectivity problem ; folk-psychological explanation

Sažetak
Self-deception is a process of acquiring a motivationally biased belief. This type of belief formation is usually considered to be epistemically irrational because it is based on affective and motivational factors. There are two general views on the nature of self-deception. Intentionalists think that a proper explanation of self-deception requires that a self-deceiving person has an intention to acquire a belief that is false or at least contrary to the available evidence. By contrast, antiintentionalists think that intentions are not necessary for explaining self-deception. They see self-deception as a type of motivated reasoning where an agent’s belief forming processes are biased by non-epistemic factors, such as emotions and desires. Antiintentionalists offer a simple and intuitive explanation of how people form self-deceptive beliefs. However, some intentionalists indicate that unlike other kinds of motivated reasoning, self-deception is characterized by a specific selectivity. Not every strong desire that p be the case will cause an agent to start believing that p is the case. This is the so called selectivity problem for antiintentionalists. The question is why some desires bias people’s belief forming processes, while others do not. According to intentionalists only those belief-desire pairs that rationalize forming an intention to acquire a belief can explain why particular cases of self- deception occur. Thus, they argue that intentions are necessary to explain self-deception. In this paper, I investigate whether intentionalists really have the upper-hand with respect to the selectivity problem. I argue that postulating intentions does not solve the selectivity problem. Furthermore, I argue that antiintentionalists might respond to the selectivity problem by expanding their explanatory tool-box beyond the narrow belief-desire psychology. In this regard, I indicate that formulating a proper explanation of self-deception, besides the desiderative profile of a person and her reasoning style, might require including a reference to the agent’s particular character traits.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

POVEZANOST RADA