Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 951784
Statistical Model Checking of Distance Fraud Attacks on the Hancke-Kuhn Family of Protocols
Statistical Model Checking of Distance Fraud Attacks on the Hancke-Kuhn Family of Protocols // Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy, CPS-SPC '18
New York (NY): The Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2018. str. 60-71 doi:10.1145/3264888.3264895 (predavanje, međunarodna recenzija, cjeloviti rad (in extenso), znanstveni)
CROSBI ID: 951784 Za ispravke kontaktirajte CROSBI podršku putem web obrasca
Naslov
Statistical Model Checking of Distance Fraud
Attacks on the Hancke-Kuhn Family of Protocols
Autori
Alturki, M.A. ; Kanovich, Max ; Ban Kirigin, Tajana ; Nigam, Vivek ; Scedrov, Andre ; Talcott, Carolyn
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u zbornicima skupova, cjeloviti rad (in extenso), znanstveni
Izvornik
Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy, CPS-SPC '18
/ - New York (NY) : The Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2018, 60-71
ISBN
978-1-4503-5992-4
Skup
4th ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security & Privacy (CPS-SPC)
Mjesto i datum
Toronto, Kanada, 15.10.2018. - 19.10.2018
Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje
Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija
Ključne riječi
Distance-bounding protocols ; Distance fraud ; Probabilistic rewriting ; Statistical model checking ; Maude
Sažetak
Distance-bounding (DB) protocols protect against relay attacks on proximity-based access control systems. In a DB protocol, the verifier computes an upper bound on the distance to the prover by measuring the time-of-flight of exchanged messages. DB protocols are, however, vulnerable to distance fraud, in which a dishonest prover is able to manipulate the distance bound computed by an honest verifier. Despite their conceptual simplicity, devising a formal characterization of DB protocols and distance fraud attacks that is amenable to automated formal analysis is non-trivial, primarily because of their real-time and probabilistic nature. In this work, we introduce a generic, computational model, based on Rewriting Logic, for formally analyzing various forms of distance fraud, including recently identified timing attacks, on the Hancke- Kuhn family of DB protocols through statistical model checking. While providing an insightful formal characterization on its own, the model enables a practical formal analysis method that can help system designers bridge the gap between conceptual descriptions and low-level designs. In addition to accurately confirming known results, we use the model to define new attack strategies and quantitatively evaluate their effectiveness under realistic assumptions that would otherwise be difficult to reason about manually.
Izvorni jezik
Engleski
Znanstvena područja
Matematika, Računarstvo
POVEZANOST RADA
Projekti:
HRZZ-UIP-05-2017-9219 - Formalno rasuđivanje i semantike (FORMALS) (Perkov, Tin, HRZZ - 2017-05) ( CroRIS)
Ustanove:
Sveučilište u Rijeci, Fakultet za matematiku
Profili:
Tajana Ban Kirigin
(autor)
Citiraj ovu publikaciju:
Časopis indeksira:
- Web of Science Core Collection (WoSCC)
- Conference Proceedings Citation Index - Science (CPCI-S)