Naslov
Brentano on Self-Consciousness

Autori
Hanžek, Ljudevit

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Poglavlja u knjigama, znanstveni

Knjiga
Perspectives on the Self

Urednik/ci
Berčić, Boran

Izdavač
Sveučilište u Rijeci

Grad
Rijeka

Godina
2017

Raspon stranica
171-187

ISBN
978-953-7975-57-9

Ključne riječi
Brentano ; inner observation ; inner consciousness ; attention ; phenomenology ; regress problem ; self-representation ; unconscious mental states

Sažetak
Franz Brentano distinguishes inner observation of one's own mental states, or introspection, from the peripheral awareness of one's own mental states, or inner consciousness. He claims that introspection is impossible, while inner consciousness is a basic feature of human experience, and the foundation of scientific psychology. He argues that the phenomenology of experience supports the claim that subjects are incidentally aware of their own mental states, by those very mental states, while being focused on non-mental objects. The mental states, therefore, represent themselves. Furthermore, such a model of self-consciousness is the only one capable of explaining the infallibility of self-consciousness, which Brentano holds evident. Finally, it is the only model, according to Brentano, that can avoid the postulation of unconscious mental states. In this paper, I analyze Brentano's arguments and find them insufficient. I also bring forth some independent problems for his theory.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

POVEZANOST RADA