ࡱ> |~wxyz{'` bjbj * m%   :D,ppp8$ xh,"NNN)r,$Ph=p))=ppNN2ooo pNpNoooRppN 32sH0xVfV<lVp3@ o==78x(~)(pppppp Flexicurity through normalization? Changes in scope, composition, and conditions in temporary employment in Croatia Teo Matkovi, Social Policy Unit, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb ( HYPERLINK "mailto:teo.matkovic@pravo.hr" teo.matkovic@pravo.hr) -draft, June 2012- Introduction Through the 2000s the concept of flexicurity expanded from its Danish and Dutch roots and became enshrined in the EU agenda as a policy approach and a labour market setup (see also chapter X by OConnor in this book). By drawing upon social partnership and maintaining a "golden triangle" of labour market flexibility, social security, and active labour market policies, the flexicurity approach supposedly has a capability to follow the "high road" to competitiveness  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"21mkr3b71b","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(European Commission, 2007; Viebrock & Clasen, 2009; Wilthagen & Tros, 2004)","plainCitation":"(European Commission, 2007; Viebrock & Clasen, 2009; Wilthagen & Tros, 2004)"},"citationItems":[{"id":956,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/QJ7TTJ6T"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/QJ7TTJ6T"],"label":"page"},{"id":929,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/8ZEZQPVV"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/8ZEZQPVV"],"label":"page"},{"id":957,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/ZQ7I9GS6"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/ZQ7I9GS6"],"label":"page"}]} (European Commission, 2007; Viebrock & Clasen, 2009; Wilthagen & Tros, 2004), without entering the pitfalls of increased wage inequalities of liberal countries  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"dn0FQqbE","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(DiPrete, Goux, Maurin, & Quesnel-Vallee, 2006)","plainCitation":"(DiPrete, Goux, Maurin, & Quesnel-Vallee, 2006)"},"citationItems":[{"id":304,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/T3AHC29G"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/T3AHC29G"]}]} (DiPrete, Goux, Maurin, & Quesnel-Vallee, 2006) or labour market segmentation through partial deregulation at the periphery. The later approach had become endemic in continental and Mediterranean regimes as they struggled against high unemployment and Eurosclerosis during 1980s and 1990s  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"4togm9m75","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Barbieri, 2009; Esping-Andersen & Regini, 2000)","plainCitation":"(Barbieri, 2009; Esping-Andersen & Regini, 2000)"},"citationItems":[{"id":891,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/CRGRUSA9"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/CRGRUSA9"],"label":"page"},{"id":309,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/KIZ9JGV2"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/KIZ9JGV2"],"label":"page"}]} (Barbieri, 2009; Esping-Andersen & Regini, 2000). There is little evidence that such flexibilization at the margins in those countries bore much impact on employment rates  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"1kk1vvdu7c","properties":{"unsorted":true,"formattedCitation":"(Kahn, 2010; just one off hitch according to Boeri & Garibaldi, 2007)","plainCitation":"(Kahn, 2010; just one off hitch according to Boeri & Garibaldi, 2007)"},"citationItems":[{"id":944,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/36AQFMPH"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/36AQFMPH"],"label":"page"},{"id":961,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/K4MCNCTJ"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/K4MCNCTJ"],"label":"page","prefix":"just one off hitch according to"}]} (Kahn, 2010; just one off hitch according to Boeri & Garibaldi, 2007) while increasing numbers of peripheral workers got trapped with little employment security and disproportionally in bad jobs  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"184a0427gb","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Barbieri & Scherer, 2009; Blanchard & Landier, 2002)","plainCitation":"(Barbieri & Scherer, 2009; Blanchard & Landier, 2002)"},"citationItems":[{"id":924,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/AFIUIUT3"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/AFIUIUT3"],"label":"page"},{"id":886,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/AVJ68R6M"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/AVJ68R6M"],"label":"page"}]} (Barbieri & Scherer, 2009; Blanchard & Landier, 2002), worse training opportunities  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"2lNSZqLq","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Cutuli & Guetto, 2012)","plainCitation":"(Cutuli & Guetto, 2012)"},"citationItems":[{"id":888,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/4IQ54JD6"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/4IQ54JD6"]}]} (Cutuli & Guetto, 2012), greater health risks  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"1Hh857nS","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Virtanen et al., 2005)","plainCitation":"(Virtanen et al., 2005)"},"citationItems":[{"id":934,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/J6464RT7"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/J6464RT7"]}]} (Virtanen et al., 2005), and higher in-work poverty (Van Lackner chapter), all pointing to low work quality. Success in the transplantation of flexicurity principles through the EU countries proved to be rather limited  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"WdIw4MXM","properties":{"unsorted":true,"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf (Viebrock & Clasen, 2009; even some retrenchment in J\\uc0\\u248{}rgensen, 2011)}","plainCitation":"(Viebrock & Clasen, 2009; even some retrenchment in Jrgensen, 2011)"},"citationItems":[{"id":929,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/8ZEZQPVV"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/8ZEZQPVV"],"label":"page"},{"id":903,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/T7X6UPTV"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/T7X6UPTV"],"prefix":"even some retrenchment in"}]} (Viebrock & Clasen, 2009; even some retrenchment in Jrgensen, 2011). Post-communist transitional countries followed either full-blown liberalization or a partial deregulation of employment protection  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"24ppch6098","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Cazes & Nesporova, 2007; Tonin, 2010)","plainCitation":"(Cazes & Nesporova, 2007; Tonin, 2010)"},"citationItems":[{"id":96,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/XX54WIE6"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/XX54WIE6"],"label":"page"},{"id":959,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/7XJCV534"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/7XJCV534"],"label":"page"}]} (Cazes & Nesporova, 2007; Tonin, 2010), but in either case, there were few advances in terms social security for the unemployed or active labour market policies. Contracts of limited duration became commonplace in Poland, Slovenia, and (to a lesser extent) Croatia. However, not much is known about the use of fixed-term jobs and the position of fixed-term employees in transitional countries. The notable exception being LFS-based work of Baranowska and Gebel  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"B7FhMVIf","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(2008)","plainCitation":"(2008)"},"citationItems":[{"id":389,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/F6VGTKFC"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/F6VGTKFC"],"suppress-author":true}]} (2008) who found a substantively higher status gap between temporary and permanent employees in transitional countries than in Western Europe and higher concentration of temporary employment among the youth and within the small business sector. However, in Slovenia and Poland, the two countries with the greatest prevalence of temporary employment youth were eve more likely to be in fixed-term employment, while education gap was modest, as well as status differences. Our contribution within this collection on destandardization of employment in Europe aims at extending this framework and adding temporal dimension to those findings by tracking the number, structure, and relative position of temporary employees in Croatia between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s. Croatia emerged from the 1990s with a legacy of a four-year war and highly informal economy, followed by a decade of persistent economic growth and upgrading in governance capabilities coinciding with the EU accession process through the 2000s. During the early 2000s, a change in regulatory framework occurred, with some convergence between fixed-terms and permanent employment, modest increases in the coverage of the unemployment benefit system, and some extension of active labour market policies. The key issue explored in this chapter is whether those modest steps along the four flexicurity pathways  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"13ho5km2jl","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(European Commission, 2007)","plainCitation":"(European Commission, 2007)"},"citationItems":[{"id":956,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/QJ7TTJ6T"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/QJ7TTJ6T"]}]} (European Commission, 2007), coupled with the backdrop of sustained growth, increase in governance capacity, formalization of economy, and weakening of trade unions have brought convergence in working conditions between temporary and permanently employed workforce. In terms of analytical distinction of Serge Paugam (2000) laid out in the introductory chapter of this volume as a theoretical backbone of our effort, the question we ask in this chapter is whether normalization and reinforcement of of non-standard had brought relative improvement in the work dimension for temporary employees in Croatia. To that cause, we follow a three-step strategy. In the first section, we aim to identify the extent to which the policies enacted and the Croatian institutional setup adhere to the flexicurity framework and how much the 2002-2003 reforms contributed in this respect. The second and third goals are empirical in nature, resorting to LFS microdata. Our second goal is to establish whether the prevalence or composition of temporary employment had changed in the post-reform period. A trend towards either normalization or segmentation could be inferred from the shift in participants' demographics or change in occupations and employers where fixed-term employment is common. Third, we will take a turn towards the work dimension. In particular, we are interested in establishing whether 2002-2003 reforms led to a decrease in the work quality gap between temporary and permanent employment with respect to job status, wage, working conditions, training, and security, as expected from normalization of atypical work under the flexicurity principle. In order to control for compositional differences, a propensity score matching technique will be applied. Croatian labour market developments and flexicurity components As the socialist regime crumbled, the Croatian economy followed the general pattern found in most post-socialist countries  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"NycnfHPK","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Nesporova, 2002)","plainCitation":"(Nesporova, 2002)"},"citationItems":[{"id":964,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/TNTV2NQE"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/TNTV2NQE"]}]} (Nesporova, 2002), with first years of the transition process characterized by a dramatic decline in output and total employment due to the shedding of hidden unemployment from the socialist era. This effect was intensified by the war following the dissolution of Yugoslavia (1991-1995). In second half of the 1990s, a jobless recovery emerged, trailed by increasing unemployment. For our case, it is important to stress the substantial role of the informal economy during the initial transition period, in conditions of high unemployment and overall uncertainty due to war-time conditions, inadequate legal framework, and weak enforcement. During the 1990-1995 period, the unofficial economy accounted for about 25 per cent of GDP  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"xavsM5zu","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Ott, 2002)","plainCitation":"(Ott, 2002)"},"citationItems":[{"id":655,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/3G7XSNIH"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/3G7XSNIH"]}]} (Ott, 2002), while the proportion of the undeclared work in total employment at the time was estimated at 26 per cent (Crnkovi-Pozai 1997). Such activities were already in decline during the 1996-2000 period, down to an average of 10 per cent GDP. The 2000s brought major improvement in the economys performance as well as in Croatias international position, including the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 2001, achieving EU candidate status in June, 2004. After the regional recession in late the 1990s, the economy improved and for the period of 2000-2008, the yearly average growth rate was at 4.5 per cent. Such a stable and respectable growth rate was trailed by a significant decrease in unemployment and an increase in the employment rate throughout the period (Table 1), thus improving employment security at the population level. However, even during best of the times, the employment rate was still well below Lisbon targets. While the 2000s (up until emergence of crisis) led to some improvements in labour markets in general, several authors have identified acute vulnerabilities and an insider-outside divide akin to the labour market segmentation present in Mediterranean countries  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"pIST2rPQ","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf (Frani\\uc0\\u269{}evi\\uc0\\u263{}, 2008; Ra\\uc0\\u269{}i\\uc0\\u263{}, Babi\\uc0\\u263{}, & Podrug, 2005)}","plainCitation":"(Frani evi, 2008; Ra i, Babi, & Podrug, 2005)"},"citationItems":[{"id":50,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/CAV6SCSJ"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/CAV6SCSJ"],"label":"page"},{"id":386,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/VAV43EIQ"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/VAV43EIQ"],"label":"page"}]} (Frani evi, 2008; Matkovi, 2010; Ra i, Babi, & Podrug, 2005). With respect to employment structure, the entrenchment of the private sector was well underway during the observed period, as the share of employees working in the private sector greatly increased. As well, there was a significant structural change towards industrial sectors which are seasonal in nature (i.e., tourism, construction, and agriculture increased from 13.8 per cent to 17.1 per cent of total employment) or where use of temporary contracts is common (i.e., trade and other services growing from 16.9 per cent to 20.3 per cent). Government effectiveness, regulatory capacity, and control of corruption, as measured by World Bank WGI, all improved between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s, potentially enabling for more efficient interventions and policies and making informal employment more costly. Table 1: Labour market, economic and governance indicators 1997-2008 1997-92000-22003-52006-8Employment rate (15-64) a55.452.054.256.7Unemployment rate a11.615.613.69.8Private sector employees (%)a38.247.355.960.6Employees in sectors that often resort to the use of temporary workforce a,e31.632.736.337.0Worldwide governance indicators b (range -2,5 to 2,5)  Government effectiveness 0.100.370.500.59 Regulatory quality-0.010.170.490.45 Control of corruption-0.380.170.200.11Real GDP growth c2.64.14.54.2Unemployment benefits (% GDP) d0.330.390.340.25Labour market policies (% GDP) d0.070.080.140.05Note: three-year averages. Sources: a Labour Force Survey b The World Bank Group Worldwide governance indicators c Croatian Central Bank d. Calculations based on Public Employment Service yearbooks e. NACE sectors: tourism, construction and agriculture, trade and other services After sketching the broader economic picture, we will focus on examination of the four components of flexicurity as articulated by European Commission  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"2aegtcsl5k","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(European Commission, 2007)","plainCitation":"(European Commission, 2007)"},"citationItems":[{"id":956,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/QJ7TTJ6T"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/QJ7TTJ6T"]}]} (European Commission, 2007), exploring their development in Croatia since the mid-1990s. The first component regards developing flexible and reliable contractual arrangements, through modern labour laws, collective agreements, and work organisation. On the formal level, labour relations inherited from socialist times were reformed rather late during the transition, as the Labour Act that introduced the legal framework for contemporary forms of labour flexibility came into effect only in 1996  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"206mutv5bu","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf (Ra\\uc0\\u269{}i\\uc0\\u263{} et al., 2005)}","plainCitation":"(Ra i et al., 2005)"},"citationItems":[{"id":386,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/VAV43EIQ"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/VAV43EIQ"]}]} (Ra i et al., 2005). The law modelled employment relations after the German template and introduced a high level of employment protection for the core workforce (OECD EPL index of 2.8 for individual, 4.3 for collective dismissals) but rather flexible regulation (2.3) for hitherto constrained fixed-term employment  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"qIUtBq0Q","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf (Matkovi\\uc0\\u263{} & Biondi\\uc0\\u263{}, 2003)}","plainCitation":"(Matkovi & Biondi, 2003)"},"citationItems":[{"id":16405,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/2J99MVDE"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/2J99MVDE"]}]} (Matkovi & Biondi, 2003). Thus, de facto flexibilization started in the second half of the 1990s. However, dismissal procedures, advance notice periods, and severance payments for layoffs of permanent employees were perceived as high by employers, possibly facilitating the use of fixed-term contracts  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"W9PSCsDF","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf (Ra\\uc0\\u269{}i\\uc0\\u263{} et al., 2005)}","plainCitation":"(Ra i et al., 2005)"},"citationItems":[{"id":386,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/VAV43EIQ"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/VAV43EIQ"]}]} (Ra i et al., 2005). After long negotiations, composite EPL was decreased from 3.6 to 2.8 through the Labour Act reform of 2003. This is a moderate level by EU standards, but among the stricter in the context of transitional labour markets. While the reform reduced advance notice periods and severances for regular layoffs (from 2.8 to 2.6), as well as obstacles for collective dismissals (from 4.3 to 3.5), the liberalization in regulation of fixed-term contracts was slight (some relaxation of conditionality wording, increase in maximum total duration from two to three years but greater enforceability), and did not reflect on the calculated value of EPL (2.3) for this type of employment (Matkovi & Biondi, 2003). This was effectively a step towards tackling contractual segregation, likely multiplied by improvement in government effectiveness and corruption control (Table 1) which made informality and avoidance of contractual obligations more expensive. Wide-reaching collective agreements and trade union involvement are likely to strongly affect temporary employment patterns as well  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"dovzAF5h","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(as likely to affect temporary employment patterns as EPL according to Baranowska & Gebel, 2008; Kahn, 2007; Polavieja, 2006)","plainCitation":"(as likely to affect temporary employment patterns as EPL according to Baranowska & Gebel, 2008; Kahn, 2007; Polavieja, 2006)"},"citationItems":[{"id":389,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/F6VGTKFC"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/F6VGTKFC"],"prefix":"as likely to affect temporary employment patterns as EPL according to"},{"id":942,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/K3ZKN2WN"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/K3ZKN2WN"],"label":"page"},{"id":9429,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/MW4T63ME"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/MW4T63ME"],"label":"page"}]} (Baranowska & Gebel, 2008; Kahn, 2007; Polavieja, 2006). In Croatia, those are unlikely to have facilitated segmentation, as both were on the decline through the period, privatization greatly decreasing number of workers in state-owned firms, while sectoral collective agreements in the private sector were very basic  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"2gdoa2916e","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf (Nesti\\uc0\\u263{}, 2010)}","plainCitation":"(Nesti, 2010)"},"citationItems":[{"id":609,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/8E3E3W6G"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/8E3E3W6G"]}]} (Nesti, 2010) and collective bargaining mostly plays out at the firm-level  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"1c024tiv26","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf (Frani\\uc0\\u269{}evi\\uc0\\u263{}, 2008)}","plainCitation":"(Frani evi, 2008)"},"citationItems":[{"id":50,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/CAV6SCSJ"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/CAV6SCSJ"]}]} (Frani evi, 2008). The second flexicurity component is comprehensive lifelong learning strategies. The participation of adults in education and training is persistently low. Croatia was deemed as one of countries that have recorded little or no progress in improving their extremely low levels of participation (EC, 2011, p.35), as only about 2 per cent of the population aged 25-64 participated in education or training in any given quarter through the 2000s, considerably less than 9.5 per cent EU average, and of the order of magnitude behind the participation rate in top performing countries. This deficiency might be of greater consequence to temporary employees, in particular if they are excluded from training opportunities  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"jao5ep2su","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Cutuli & Guetto, 2012)","plainCitation":"(Cutuli & Guetto, 2012)"},"citationItems":[{"id":888,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/4IQ54JD6"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/4IQ54JD6"]}]} (Cutuli & Guetto, 2012). We will get back to this in the analytical section. Effective active labour market policies are the third component of EC flexicurity recipe. Active labour market policies in Croatia are very limited in scope and participation and are plagued by discontinuities, indiscriminative participation criteria, and lack of evaluation  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"uG6IKlkx","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf (Matkovi\\uc0\\u263{}, 2008)}","plainCitation":"(Matkovi, 2008)"},"citationItems":[{"id":60,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/JG8DCTZT"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/JG8DCTZT"]}]} (Matkovi, 2008). Despite persistently high unemployment, less than one pro mille of GDP was devoted to ALMPs in most years, about five times below EU-27 average and substantially less than most transitional countries (Cazes & Nesporova, 2007; more recently, Rutkowski & Mad~arevi-`ujster, 2010). However, some improvement might be evident through the 2000s, both with respect to evaluation and targeting and in participation. The share of unemployed who participated in active labour market substantially increased from 2.0 per cent in the 1997-2001 period to 4.8 per cent in the 2004-2008 period  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"BCc71Wg2","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf (Matkovi\\uc0\\u263{}, 2008)}","plainCitation":"(Matkovi, 2008)"},"citationItems":[{"id":60,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/JG8DCTZT"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/JG8DCTZT"]}]} (Matkovi, 2008). Although Croatia is lagging in adherence to this flexicurity component, some improvements are evident, potentially enhancing transition security for temporary employees. Modern social security systems are the last component of European flexicurity recipe, with the goal of providing income support while encouraging employment and facilitating labour market mobility. Although the main social protection schemes are contribution-based, healthcare protection is de facto universal with coverage provisions for employed, unemployed, and inactive citizens, pending some administrative procedures following the change in employment status. The pension system guarantees retirement income for all retirement-age employees with more than 15 years of contributions, and this should cover all but those temporary workers with the most precarious careers. Child care facilities do discriminate against the children of parents who are unemployed at the time of application (more likely for temporary workers), but do not discriminate between types of contracts or for already enrolled children. No major changes in any of those systems relating to the type of employment contract occurred during the 2000s. However, there were some changes in the unemployment benefit system that directly affected income security. Up until 2002, the unemployment benefits were out of reach for persons who had less than twelve months of continuous employment in the eighteen months preceding the unemployment, thus excluding the majority of fixed-term employees. With the 2002 unemployment legislation reform, the benefit eligibility criterion was relaxed, so that nine months of contributions during the previous twenty-four months now suffice to qualify for three months of unemployment benefits. While the unemployment benefit floor was set up as 20 per cent of the average wage, the nominally generous replacement rate has been administratively capped since 1996. The cap was not following the wage growth, and declined from 43 per cent of average wage in 1997 to only 23 per cent of average wage in 2008  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"n9gGzltO","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf (Matkovi\\uc0\\u263{}, 2008)}","plainCitation":"(Matkovi, 2008)"},"citationItems":[{"id":60,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/JG8DCTZT"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/JG8DCTZT"]}]} (Matkovi, 2008), effectively turning unemployment insurance into flat-rate benefit. To sum up, eligibility criteria became relaxed with the 2002 reform, thus including many temporary employees who used to be locked out from insurance benefits, but the generosity shrivelled, thus increasingly failing to provide income security. What was observed here is admittedly low level of flexicurization, starting from the position of informality and partial deregulation, but slowly advancing via the pathway of tackling the contractual segmentation, as some improvements favouring temporary employees can be seen in three out of four flexicurity components. It is not level of flexicurity per se (which is admittedly low), but the observed trend leading our expectations about improvement in both composition and work quality of temporary employment in Croatia after 2002-2003 reforms were introduced. Changes in prevalence and patterns of temporary employment in Croatia All the results in the sections that follow are based on the pooled and harmonized micro data from Croatian Labour Force Surveys (LFS) for the 1997-2008 period, based upon 1 per cent of the population (40, 000) each year. First, a year-by-year prevalence of temporary employment will be portrayed. In this case, we will focus on directly contracted (non-agency) temporary employment, including fixed-term contracts, which accounts for the majority of temporary employment. This choice is led by practical considerations, as temporary employment accounts for a large majority of employees in atypical employment in Croatia. Figure 1: Temporary employment among all employees and new hires 1997-2008  Source: Labour Force Survey and Public Employment Service Even at the outset of the observed period, the prevalence of temporary employment was far from negligible, as seasonal contracts and substitutions for maternity leaves were commonplace even prior to modernization of labour legislation. Fixed-term contracts are the only atypical contractual form where a substantial change was observed over the period. Using the LFS estimates (Figure 1), in 1997, just after the initial modernization of the Labour Act and post-war demobilization, about 9.9 per cent of employees were engaged in temporary employment. The share declined to 8.5 per cent in 1999, likely due to first-line shedding of temporary workforce as the crisis set in. An unabated increase of temporary employment started in 2000 at an annual increment of 0.5 per cent. By 2002, when unemployment started declining and sustained growth ensued, 10.9 per cent of employees were working with temporary contracts. This trend escalated to 12.9 per cent in 2006, dipping only slightly afterwards, as unemployment rates declined to below 10 per cent. During past decade, both prevalence and pace of change in temporary employment in Croatia has followed the EU-27 average (see ANNEX of the book). As well, during the period, an increasing majority of newly employed persons left the Croatian Public Employment Service register through fixed-term contracts. The share of such trajectories increased from 50-60 per cent in the mid-1990s, up to 80 per cent in 2001 and peaked at about 86 per cent of all the new contracts in 2005  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"1990nklcqd","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf (Matkovi\\uc0\\u263{} & \\uc0\\u352{}o\\uc0\\u353{}i\\uc0\\u263{}, 2007)}","plainCitation":"(Matkovi & `oai, 2007)"},"citationItems":[{"id":16443,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/D2BTC3AI"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/D2BTC3AI"]}]} (Matkovi & `oai, 2007). It seems that most substantive expansion of temporary employment happened mostly prior to 2003 labour market flexibilization and 2002 relaxation of unemployment insurance eligibility conditions. It might be the case that increasing prevalence of fixed-term employment have induced a public push towards support for fitting social protection policies  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"2h9e2bi3kp","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Burgoon & Dekker, 2010)","plainCitation":"(Burgoon & Dekker, 2010)"},"citationItems":[{"id":922,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/3G7KIV5W"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/3G7KIV5W"]}]} (Burgoon & Dekker, 2010), and such reforms were introduced as a reactive measures to adjust to new circumstances at the field  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"tlvas1756","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(not unlike emergence of part-time regime in Visser, 2002)","plainCitation":"(not unlike emergence of part-time regime in Visser, 2002)"},"citationItems":[{"id":879,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/IPXQSBFS"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/IPXQSBFS"],"prefix":"not unlike emergence of part-time regime in"}]} (not unlike emergence of part-time regime in Visser, 2002). The increase of employment benefit replacement rate in 2009 might be understood in this fashion as well. Where is fixed-term employment concentrated There was a noticeable increase in the prevalence of fixed-term employment between the 1997-2001 and the 2004-2008 period, growing from an average of 9 per cent to an average of 12 per cent of all employees. But it is no less important to establish where this expansion materialized. Is this change a result of compositional sectoral change in employment, emerging from considerable expansion of private employment and flexible sectors as tourism and construction? If not, has the change happened along the entire occupational and sectoral structure, or is temporary employment increasingly concentrated in the peripheral sectors and occupations? In order to account for different practices of industrial relations in public and private sectors, as well as considerable privatization through the observed period (cf. Table 1), temporary employment in the public and private sectors will be portrayed separately Unlike many European countries (cf. chapter O'Connor), temporary employment in public sector was never really widespread. Actually, between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s, the incidence of fixed-term employment in the public sector declined. Entire growth of temporary employment ensued in the fast growing (Table 1) private sector (Table 2a), as one in six private sector employees worked on fixed-term contract in the late 2000s, up from one in eight in late 1990s. Four logit models (Table 3) contribute some analytical grounding to observed differences (Tables 2a and 2b), helping to disentangle compositional effects and identify the contribution of individual independent variables. In most cases, the covariate effects in multivariate models are consistent with the observed differences and remain stable in both observation periods, especially in the public sector. Table 2a: Observed prevalence of temporary employment in various industries and occupations. Private and public sector, prior 2002 and post 2003 Private sectorPublic sectorPre-reform (1997-2001)Post-reform (2004-2008)Pre-reform (1997-2001)Post-reform (2004-2008)Fixed term incidence in percent (period average)11.615.97.26.5SizeMicro (up to 20)13.317.09.08.8Small-mid (20-100)11.614.67.66.4Larger than 1007.813.26.05.5OccupationOfficials and managers4.81.36.76.6Professionals7.510.48.17.7Technicians9.712.06.46.1Clerks7.410.65.34.2Service and sales13.920.67.86.0Agricultural workers22.419.912.214.9Craft workers10.714.05.65.7Plant and machinery operators10.415.86.56.0Elementary occupations20.527.38.610.0Industrial sectorAgriculture and extraction (ABC)17.817.56.910.7Manufacturing (D)8.613.16.15.9Construction (F)14.316.06.46.0Trade(G)9.915.26.29.7Hotels and restaurants (H)18.225.311.112.5Transport and communications (I)21.821.74.74.6Banking and business services (JK)9.912.44.87.6Health, education, government (ELMN)7.85.9Other services (OP)16.320.712.68.8Subsample size19,91131,76624,31320,505Source: Labour Force Survey With respect to the size of firms that are likely to employ a temporary workforce, prior to 2001, the pattern was simple: the smaller the firm, the more frequent the use of temporary contracts. Post-2003 use of temporary contracts in the private sector has substantially increased in firms of all sizes, but the most notable catch-up happened among large firms. Whereas prior to 2002, large private firms were as unlikely to use temporary employment as large public ones, in the recent period, the gap has narrowed significantly. Unlike any of the other transitional countries where differences persisted  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"2m6j4gv9he","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Baranowska & Gebel, 2008)","plainCitation":"(Baranowska & Gebel, 2008)"},"citationItems":[{"id":389,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/F6VGTKFC"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/F6VGTKFC"]}]} (Baranowska & Gebel, 2008), all other observed covariates being equal, in the 2004-2008 period, there was no effect of firm size in the private sector with respect to use of temporary employment (Table 3). As far as the prevalence of temporary employment by occupational groups is concerned, such arrangements are frequent in service, agricultural, and elementary occupations, while being rather uncommon among professionals, clerks, and, in particular, among managers. This fits the "flexibility at periphery" notion quite well. Post 2003, in the private sector a rather homogenous and substantive increase (by 25-50 per cent) in temporary employment happened over the entire occupational range, apart from managerial occupations where it actually became less common. This is supported by the findings of logistic regression, as after controlling for other covariates, the only occupational group in the private sector whose relative risk has decreased substantially in comparison with others were managers. Temporary contracts are not equally common in various sectors of industrial activity, neither was the recent expansion in private sector balanced. Yet, it seems that recent developments have brought convergence among industrial sectors with respect to prevalence of temporary employment (Table 2a). Controlling for the effect of other covariates, the stronger association with temporary employment of those employed in agriculture, construction, and other services evident between 1997 and 2001 disappeared in more recent period, with only the transport and hospitality sectors remaining a hotbed of private sector temporary employment. Who participates in temporary employment Switching the focus from "where" to "who", have the labour market outsiders, such as young workers, women, or those on the bottom of education ladder, became less likely to be temporarily employmed in relative terms as EPL and protection gap declined  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"4plskics6","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Kahn, 2007)","plainCitation":"(Kahn, 2007)"},"citationItems":[{"id":942,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/K3ZKN2WN"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/K3ZKN2WN"]}]} (Kahn, 2007) while traces of flexicurity emerged? From the descriptive statistics (Table 2b), it is evident that not all groups of workers have the same chance of being employed in temporary jobs. Table 2b: Observed prevalence of temporary employment in various demographic groups. Private and public sector, prior 2002 and post 2003 Private sectorPublic sectorPre-reform (1997-2001)Post-reform (2004-2008)Pre-reform (1997-2001)Post-reform (2004-2008)Fixed term incidence in percent (period average)11.615.97.26.5Education levelLower secondary or less13.217.07.05.4Vocational secondary12.116.67.16.6Technical secondary11.616.07.26.1General secondary8.215.17.37.2Professional tertiary10.014.95.55.3Academic tertiary8.810.78.47.9GenderMale12.215.86.75.8Female10.915.97.77.2Years since leaving educationLess than 526.338.737.442.05 to 915.122.814.919.510 to 199.915.07.36.620 to 297.811.33.23.230 to 396.68.62.42.0More than 4014.99.47.03.0Subsample size19,91131,76624,31320,505Source: Labour Force Survey With respect to the level of education achieved, different patterns can be observed in the public and private sectors. Whereas in the former, the probability of temporary employment is similar, regardless of the level of education achieved, and has slightly declined for everybody, in the private sector the chance of temporary employment gets lower as the level of education increases. After controlling for other individual and job traits in logistic regression models (Table 3), both public and private sectors demonstrate little association between education and temporary employment prior to 2000, but post-reform some evidence on divergence can be observed, as secondary education graduates became more likely to be in temporary employment in comparison with employees with an academic tertiary education. Academically trained workers were "spared" of temporary employment expansion, in line with core-periphery assumptions. In the gender dimension, the incidence of temporary employment increased for both sexes evenly, but there are divergent underlying mechanisms involved. In the private sector, women used to be temporarily employed less often than men (an effect that disappeared after controlling for other covariates), but caught up in the recent period. In the more feminized public sector, women used to be and still are in temporary employment more often than men, most often through the maternity replacement posts. Croatia adheres to the CEE temporary employment prevalence pattern, with no differences in terms of gender differences to be observed (see Van Lancker and O'Connor chapters). The more commonly temporary employment is found at the beginning or end of the career, the stronger the support for its peripheral role; although, it might function as a "bridge", acting as a selection device for new labour market entrants  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"o51cdi836","properties":{"unsorted":true,"formattedCitation":"(Baranowska, Gebel, & Kotowska, 2011; Gebel, 2010; but not in Barbieri & Scherer, 2009)","plainCitation":"(Baranowska, Gebel, & Kotowska, 2011; Gebel, 2010; but not in Barbieri & Scherer, 2009)"},"citationItems":[{"id":911,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/PU4V65IV"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/PU4V65IV"],"label":"page"},{"id":914,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/HSR3TF89"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/HSR3TF89"],"label":"page"},{"id":924,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/AFIUIUT3"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/AFIUIUT3"],"label":"page","prefix":"but not in "}]} (Baranowska, Gebel, & Kotowska, 2011; Gebel, 2010; but not in Barbieri & Scherer, 2009). Along this line, regardless of the ownership sector, both in the late 1990s and the mid-2000s, temporary contracts were concentrated among persons who had completed education within the past ten years, and in particular, among those who were in the first five years of their career. Prevalence of temporary work for labour market entrants declines considerably as they gain a foothold in their careers (cf. Matkovi, 2010). As well, after controlling for other covariates (Table 3), the relative risk for senior workers of being in temporary employment decreased in the recent period in both public and private sectors. Second, it is in the public sector, with a stagnant share of temporary employment, but centrally bargained collective agreements and strong employment guarantees, the temporary employment risk actually became increasingly concentrated among the recent school leavers, becoming an ever more common entry pathway. Table 3: Patterns of selection to fixed-term employment in public and private sector. Pre and post-reform periods. Odds ratios from logistic regressions Private sectorPublic sectorPre-reformPost-reformPre-reformPost-reformFirm sizeUp to 20 employees (reference)20-100 employees0.951.040.82***0.74***More than 100 employees0.76***1.040.65***0.67***OccupationOfficials and managers0.55*0.13***1.59**2.63***Professionals (reference)Technicians1.301.100.961.04Clerks1.050.970.940.82Service and sales1.68***1.84***0.940.90Agricultural workers3.01***2.30***2.48***2.69***Craft workers1.70***1.47***1.041.42Plant and machinery operators1.61**1.81***1.35*1.58**Elementary occupations3.29***3.39***1.98***3.35***Industrial sectorAgriculture and extraction (ABC)1.65***1.130.991.75***Manufacturing (D) (reference)Construction (F)1.52***1.091.060.74Trade(G)1.011.050.811.71**Hotels and restaurants (H)1.75***1.65***1.65***2.51***Transport and communications (I)2.37***1.86***0.60***0.82Banking and business services (JK)1.150.970.61***0.91Health, education, government (ELMN)1.57***1.44***0.880.88Other services (OP)1.38**1.131.42***1.22Education levelLower secondary or less1.34*1.77***1.39*1.25Vocational secondary0.981.31**1.161.74***Technical secondary0.991.46***1.101.45**General secondary0.911.77***1.65**3.39***Professional tertiary1.051.51***1.071.23Academic tertiary (reference)Gender: female0.991.021.22***1.33***Years since leaving education0-4 years3.48***3.75***9.26***13.83***5-9 years1.68***1.69***2.52***3.66***10-19 years (reference)20-29 years0.71***0.71***0.38***0.38***30-39 years0.55***0.47***0.29***0.21***More than 40 years0.930.42***0.61***0.28***Constant-2.87***-2.73***-2.79***-3.25***N19,91131,76624,31320,505pseudo R20.0800.0870.1510.215Ll-6478.49-12495.00-5076.27-3825.86Note: * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 In summary, the differences in patterns of distribution of temporary employees between two observed time periods are far from overwhelming. There is some convergence with respect to firm size, occupations, and industries in the private sector, but with respect to demographic traits associated with temporary employment, the relative risk of temporary employment among the oldest workers with most experience, the university educated and those in managerial positions has declined. As those are groups with highest human capital and in core positions, it is fair to claim that normalization of temporary employment had not reached the top of employment structure. Social security and job satisfaction of temporary employees Neither the net growth of incidence in temporary employment nor compositional changes are sufficient to infer whether such arrangements increasingly belong to the isolated and precarious periphery of the labour market, or had became normalized and integrative, encroaching upon all segments in a similar fashion. To that cause, we turn towards the work dimension: whether social security and job quality of temporary workers improved, in comparison with similar workers working in similar jobs but with permanent contracts. We will apply a propensity matching technique  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"1u9k71s215","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008)","plainCitation":"(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008)"},"citationItems":[{"id":69,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/NI2XUQCK"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/16811/items/NI2XUQCK"]}]} (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008), comparing job quality indicators among temporary workers, matched to their statistical twins. For each outcome, we will establish an average treatment on the treated (ATT) effect of temporary employment, for pre- and post-reform periods. Differences in outcomes during the pre-reform period of jobless growth and weaker governance capacity (1997-2001) will be compared with differences established during the post-reform period (2004-2008) characterized by economic growth, privatization, declining unemployment, and modest application of flexicurity policies. Comparison will be made with respect to several indicators of social security (having contributions paid among the employed, receiving unemployment benefits among the unemployed), employability (participating in training), or job quality (international socioeconomic index score [ISEI], monthly wage, intent on changing jobs, and involuntarily accepting the fixed-term job). Thus we will try to establish whether normalization of working conditions and status had emerged over time, net of compositional changes in temporary employment. In descriptive terms, between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s, gross differences between permanent and fixed-term employees have changed in all the outcomes observed, apart from participation in education, which is barely present among Croatian employees of any kind (but it can be credibly claimed that fixed-term employees are in greater need of such device). The observed advantage of the permanently employed has increased considerably with respect to hourly wages, from 10 per cent to 23 per cent, and to a lesser extent with respect to average ISEI job score, but in other outcomes the gap has decreased. Table 4: Observed social security coverage, job quality and job satisfaction among permanent and temporary employees, pre and post-reform Observation window1997-20012004-2008Contract typePermanent TemporaryPermanent TemporaryAverage job ISEI41.838.741.937.6Hourly wage (in Kuna)15.213.822.117.9Recent participation in education (%)1.5a1.8 a1.2 b1.5 bAmong the short-term unemployed: receiving cash benefits (%) (previous contract type)46.923.236.124.0Health and pension insurance contributions from job (%) (private employment only)98.970.099.490.0Intent on changing job (%)11.538.86.028.8Works fixed-term because no permanent job could be found (%)64.454.6Notes: Average values over the entire period (1997-2001 and 2004-2008 respectively). See table 5 for respective N. a reported training during the in past month. b reported training during the past 3 months An overall trend of improvement among both permanent and temporary employees is evident with respect to job change intention, but net decline is stronger among the later. While social (pension and health) insurance coverage used to be almost universal among permanent employees before 2000, it was rather patchy among temporary employees. Post-reform, coverage of temporary employees became considerably better, but is still short of being universal. With respect to both indicators of job change and insurance, temporary employees retained a higher risk of bad outcomes than persons with permanent contracts. As for collection of unemployment benefits among the short-term unemployed, in late 1990s, persons who used to have temporary contracts were twice less likely to collect them than others. Surprisingly, their chances did not improve post-reform, despite relaxation of eligibility conditions, but convergence happened as short-term unemployed who used to work with a permanent contract became less likely to receive unemployment benefits. Gross observed differences in unfavourable outcomes make for a poor test of effect, in particular keeping in mind that fixed-term employees were more likely to be employed in the private sector, in peripheral occupations and industries, within smaller firms, and among less educated and less experienced population. Thus. it is only fair to measure the effect of temporary versus permanent employment by comparing employees who are similar with respect to traits important to selection in temporary employment and achieving the above-mentioned outcomes. This can be achieved by the propensity score matching technique, where treatment (fixed-term) and control (permanent contract) group cases are matched based on a propensity score derived from logistic regressions shown in previous section (Table 3). Comparing cases balanced in such a fashion accounts for bias between the temporary and permanently employed with respect to the above-mentioned individual and job traits, without extrapolating effects out of the observed space. The strategy here is to estimate effect of temporary jobs in comparison to permanent jobs with respect to all outcomes in the pre-reform period, and then compare it with the effect observed in post-reform period. Table 5: Propensity score matching ATT estimates. Pre and post-reform effect of fixed-term job on social security coverage, job quality and job satisfaction. Treatment: Fixed term job, Control: permanent jobObservation window1997-20012004-2008ISEI score-0.31 N:44,223-0.54** N:52,253Log hourly wage (Kuna)-0.019*** N:23.275a-0.031*** N:45,924Recent participation in education (%)0.0005 N:44,0510.003 N:52,224Among the unemployed: receiving cash benefits (previous contract type) b (%)-0.139*** N:938-0.065** N:2,064Health and pension insurance contributions from job (private emp.only) (%)-0.272*** N: 19,704-0.085*** N: 31,475Intent on changing job (%)-0.246*** N: 44,147-0.189*** N: 52,244Notes: Average effect of Treatment on the Treated (ATT) values reported. Propensity matching done with set of covariates used in table 3, additionally balancing for year of observation and public/private sector. Nearest neighbour matching (5) used, with caliper 0.05. Average bias in ATT reduced down to 3.7 or less. Standard errors estimated by 500 repetition bootstrap. N reported accounts for all the "on support" cases (on treatment and control). * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 a Question on income was not included in LFS rounds 1998 and 1999. b The unemployment benefits propensity estimation was not balanced for characteristics of previous job. The propensity score matching resulted in estimation of moderately lower ATT effects of fixed-term contracts than ones visible from the gross observed differences, but findings are consistent in general (Table 5). Workers employed in fixed-term jobs used to and still have lower wages, lower chance of health and pension contributions, lower chance of receiving unemployment benefits once unemployed, and greater motivation to exit a job than their comparable peers who were employed with permanent contracts. That being said, it is evident that a strong reduction in penalty associated with temporary employment occurred with respect to three observed indicators. Being in temporary work is not as bad as it used to be in terms of social security and job attractiveness, such findings being consistent with improvements in tackling contractual segregation. Quantitative expansion and normalization of temporary employment, together with the maturing of regulatory quality and the rule of law in Croatia might have led to relative improvement for this group of workers, as they emerged from the grey area into the regulated commonplace of the labour market. However, some changes in demographic patterns, with senior workers and university educated workers becoming less likely be employed with temporary contracts, as well as increased wages and job status gaps (evident even after matching) is telling of increasingly peripheral role of temporary employment. Conclusions Employment regime in Croatia had inched towards adopting flexicurity components between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s. Some progress was evident with respect to flexible and reliable contractual arrangements (reducing protection gap between permanent and temporary employment, reinforcing governance capability), active labour market policies (though still from being effective and comprehensive), and the social security system (with some improvement in eligibility for temporary employees, but lagging in the replacement rate until 2009), with only lifelong learning not showing any progress during the period. Did this lead to change in prevalence, convergence in composition, or improvement in position of the temporary employed in Croatia? Results of analysis presented here suggest that temporary employment in Croatia is more likely to be found among the periphery of the private sector of the labour market, such as low-paid service sectors (hotels and restaurants, trade, personal services) and in sales, agricultural, and elementary occupations, while being rather uncommon among professionals, technicians, clerks, and managers. As well, temporary arrangements are heavily concentrated at the beginning of the career and among the workforce without university education. With respect to social security, wages, and job satisfaction, temporary employees are on average substantially worse off than permanent employees working in similar jobs. Therefore, temporary employment might be seen as having the dual function: on one hand, serving as a screening device for entry career positions, but on the other being a peripheral reservoir for bad and poorly paid jobs in non-essential routine occupations prone to external numerical flexibility practices. However, the growth of fixed-term employment had slowed down and levelled off just below the EU average in years after the reforms were enacted. In line with expectations of normalization, sectoral prevalence of temporary contracts in the private sector has converged in comparison with what it used to be in the pre-reform period, and large firms have joined in the practice. Yet, the difference between the public and private sectors with respect to temporary employment has mounted, establishing another aspect of segmentation. As well, no convergence in temporary employment occurred with respect to occupations, with routine manual and service workers remaining overrepresented and managers actually escaping the fray. Actually, the composition of employees in temporary employment in Croatia has moved towards labour market periphery with young and less educated workers becoming more likely to be employed under such arrangements. Finally, the developments in work dimension for temporary employees are ambiguous. On one hand, the work quality gap between permanent and temporary employees with respect to both indicators of social security coverage has diminished between turn of the millennium and mid-2000s. There was improvement in indirect subjective measures of work quality, as involuntary temporary work declined and the gap in intent to change jobs became weaker. However, the gap observed in structurally important indicators, hourly wage and job ISEI, had actually increased. Taken together, it seems that the humble reform steps towards flexicurity might have diminished incentives for employers to engage the temporary workforce, staunched the worst excesses of precariousness for temporary employees, and prevented the deepening of contractual segregation on the bottom. However, as university graduates and experienced workers became less likely to participate in temporary work and temporary jobs having slipped slightly towards being worse paid and lower-status than they used to, changes in work dimension for temporary employees in Croatia between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s cannot be considered really integrative. Literature:  ADDIN ZOTERO_BIBL {"custom":[]} Baranowska, A., & Gebel, M. (2008). Temporary employment in Central- and Eastern Europe: Individual risk patterns and institutional context. MZES Working Papers, 2008(106). Baranowska, A., Gebel, M., & Kotowska, I. E. (2011). The role of fixed-term contracts at labour market entry in Poland: stepping stones, screening devices, traps or search subsidies? Work, Employment & Society, 25(4), 777793. doi:10.1177/0950017011419705 Barbieri, P. (2009). Flexible Employment and Inequality in Europe. European Sociological Review, 25(6), 621628. doi:10.1093/esr/jcp020 Barbieri, P., & Scherer, S. (2009). Labour Market Flexibilization and its Consequences in Italy. European Sociological Review, 25(6), 677692. doi:10.1093/esr/jcp009 Blanchard, O., & Landier, A. (2002). The perverse effects of partial labour market reform: Fixed-term contracts in France. The Economic Journal, 112(480), F214F244. Boeri, T., & Garibaldi, P. (2007). Two Tier Reforms of Employment Protection: a Honeymoon Effect?. The Economic Journal, 117(521), F357F385. Burgoon, B., & Dekker, F. (2010). Flexible employment, economic insecurity and social policy preferences in Europe. Journal of European Social Policy, 20(2), 126141. Caliendo, M., & Kopeinig, S. (2008). Some practical guidance for the implementation of propensity score matching. Journal of Economic Surveys, 22(1), 3172. Cazes, S., & Nesporova, A. (2007). Flexicurity: A relevant approach for Central and Eastern Europe. Geneva: International Labor Office. Cutuli, G., & Guetto, R. (2012). Fixed-Term Contracts, Economic Conjuncture, and Training Opportunities: A Comparative Analysis Across European Labour Markets. European Sociological Review. doi:10.1093/esr/jcs011 DiPrete, T. A., Goux, D., Maurin, E., & Quesnel-Vallee, A. (2006). Work and pay in flexible and regulated labor markets: A generalized perspective on institutional evolution and inequality trends in Europe and the U.S. Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, 24(3), 311332. doi:10.1016/j.rssm.2006.04.001 Esping-Andersen, G., & Regini, M. (2000). Why deregulate labour markets? Oxford University Press, USA. 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(2007). Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and better jobs. Frani evi, V. (2008). Decent work country report - Croatia. Geneva: International Labour Office Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia. Retrieved from Gebel, M. (2010). Early career consequences of temporary employment in Germany and the UK. Work, Employment & Society, 24(4), 641660. doi:10.1177/0950017010380645 Jrgensen, H. (2011). Danish Flexicurity in CrisisOr Just Stress-tested by the Crisis? International policy analysis. Stockholm: Fridrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Kahn, L. M. (2007). The Impact of Employment Protection Mandates on Demographic Temporary Employment Patterns: International Microeconomic Evidence*. The Economic Journal, 117(521), F333F356. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02059.x Kahn, L. M. (2010). Employment protection reforms, employment and the incidence of temporary jobs in Europe: 1996 2001. Labour Economics, 17(1), 1 15. doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2009.05.001 Matkovi, T. (2008). Politika zapoaljavanja i nezaposlenost [Employment policy and unemployment]. In V. Puljiz (Ed.), Socijalna Politika Hrvatske (pp. 163 218). Zagreb: Pravni fakultet Sveu iliata u Zagrebu. Matkovi, T. (2010). Recent developments in the education system and school-to-work transitions in Croatia. MZES Working Papers, (138). Matkovi, T., & Biondi, I. (2003). Reforma zakona o radu i promjena indeksa zakonske zaatite zaposlenja [Reform of the Labour Law and Change of the Employment Protection Legislation Index]. Financijska teorija i praksa, 27(4), 515 528. Matkovi, T., & `oai, V. (2007). EU integration and Croatian labour market flexibility. Der Donauraum, 47(1-2), 69 85. Nesporova, A. (2002). Why unemployment remains so high in Central and Eastern Europe ( No. 2002/43). Employment Paper. Geneva: International Labour Office. Nesti, D. (2010). Croatia: Moving towards a more active minimum wage policy. In D. Vaughan-Whitehead (Ed.), The minimum wage revisited in the Enlarged EU (pp. 85 112). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. Ott, K. (2002). Neslu~beno gospodarstvo u Republici Hrvatskoj 1990.-2000 [Informal employment in Croatia 1990-2000]. Financijska teorija i praksa, 26(1), 1 30. Paugam, S. (2000). Le Salari de la prcarit. Les nouvelles formes de l'integration professionelle, Paris: Presses Universitaires. Polavieja, J. G. (2006). The Incidence of Temporary Employment in Advanced Economies: Why is Spain Different? European Sociological Review, 22(1), 61 78. Ra i, D., Babi, Z., & Podrug, N. (2005). Segmentation of the labour market and employee rights in Croatia. Revija za socijalnu politiku, 12(1), 4565. Tonin, M. (2009). Employment protection legislation in central and east European countries. South East Europe Review, 2009(4), 477491. Viebrock, E., & Clasen, J. (2009). Flexicurity and welfare reform: a review. Socio-Economic Review, 7(2), 305331. doi:10.1093/ser/mwp001 Virtanen, M., Kivimki, M., Joensuu, M., Virtanen, P., Elovainio, M., & Vahtera, J. (2005). Temporary employment and health: a review. International Journal of Epidemiology, 34(3), 610. Visser, J. (2002). The First Part-Time Economy in the World: A Model to Be Followed? Journal of European Social Policy, 12(1), 2342. doi:10.1177/0952872002012001561 Wilthagen, T., & Tros, F. (2004). The concept of flexicurity: a new approach to regulating employment and labour markets. Transfer: European Review of labour and research, 10(2), 166186.   According to Vuj i (1994), in 1988 hidden unemployment, i.e. the number of redundant workers that were kept employed for social or political reasons, was around 300 000; 10 percent of the working age population.  The major contribution to this flexibil,Rd $ \B048NtV2jnr2NPRkm3HJK L | ~       軷h|Id5OJQJ\^Jh|IdhcQjhBhz{U hBhUhBh/M6] hBh/MhBhz{6] hBhz{ hBh|IdhBh|Id6]=    6Kh]hgd} &`#$gd (gd_7gdgdMfgd}igd)$d7$8$H$a$gdz{   J L R V     567UJKLaźů򙑙{h|hcIhnmHsH h:[hnhnmH sH hhnmH sH hhnmHsHheB+hnmHsHhRhnmHsHhnOJQJ^Jh}ihnmHsHUhnOJQJ]^J hv "hnhnjhWrhn0JU/ization is the regulation of temporary agency work, which did not exist until 2003. However, the use of this type of contract never became widespread and LFS data indicates some decline in this form of employment during recent years (from 0.8 per cent down to 0.5 per cent of employees between 2007 and 2010).  Nominal level of benefits was set up as 60 per cent of previous wage up until 2002 and then increased to 100 per cent of previous wage.  Only with most recent changes becoming effective in 2009, the association between contributions and benefits was effectively reinstated.  Other atypical employee arrangements are rather rare and stable in level, with agency workers making up less than 1 per cent of total employment and part-time employees accounting for a further 2 per cent. The only other substantive type of atypical employment is self-employment, which persistently accounts for about a fifth of total employment.  For understanding incidence of temporary employment in Croatia, it is important to stress the substantial size of tourism, construction and (to lesser extent) agriculture sectors, as total employment rate is about 4 per cent higher in summer than in winter. Fixed-term employment accounts for much of this seasonal variation, as during the last decade temporary employment stood at average as high as 12.2 per cent of all employees in July, and as low as 9.3 per cent in February.  This pattern repeated itself in 2009, as temporary work among employees declined from 12.6 per cent to 11.6 per cent.  In similar and consistent fashion, administrative firm-survey of employees in incorporated business has seen increase in use of fixed-term contracts from 7.2 per cent in 1997 to 13.3 per cent in 2007.  However, so far no attempts have been made to establish which extent is such employment being offered as a screening device (stepping stone), and how often such arrangements lead people circulating back to unemployment, relegated to secondary labor market.     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