Naslov
Williamson's Ordinarism vs. Inferentialism

Autori
Smokrović, Nenad

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni

Skup
"Mind, Word and Action"

Mjesto i datum
Dubrovnik, Hrvatska, 01.09.2009. - 05.09.2009

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Pozvano predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Nije recenziran

Ključne riječi
Analiticity ; inferentialism ; analitic sentence ; conceptual competence

Sažetak
In his book “Philosophy of Philosophy”, in chapters 3 and 4, T. Williamson argues against philosophical position he calls inferentialism. In those chapters titled ‘Metaphysical conception of Analyticity’ and ‘Epistemological Conception of Analyticity’ Williamson sets fort and criticize the doctrine that analytical propositions has special status in philosophy arguing (in chapter 3) that their truth conditions are basically the same as in the case of synthetic propositions and (in chapter 4) that their grasping or understanding conditions are not special as well. I will call Williamson’s position ordinarizm and argue that it has any adventage over inferentialism.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

POVEZANOST RADA