Naslov
A variant of Wiener's attack on RSA with small secret exponent

Autori
Dujella, Andrej

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, sažetak, znanstveni

Izvornik
ACM Communications in Computer Algebra / Sorenson, Jonathan - : SIGSAM, 2008, 50-51

Skup
Eighth Algorithmic Number Theory Symposium ANTS - VIII

Mjesto i datum
Banff, Kanada, 17.05.2008. - 22.05.2008

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Poster

Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija

Ključne riječi
RSA; cryptanalyis; continued fractions

Sažetak
To speed up the RSA decryption one may try to use small secret decryption exponent d. The choice of a small d is especially interesting when there is a large di&reg ; ; ; ; ; erence in computing power between two communicating devices. However, in 1990, Wiener showed that if d < n^0.25, where n = pq is the modulus of the cryptosystem, then there exist a polynomial time attack on the RSA. He showed that d is the denominator of some convergent p_m/q_m of the continued fraction expansion of e/n, and therefore d can be computed e&plusmn ; ; ; ; ; ciently from the public key (n, e) . In 1997, Verheul and van Tilborg proposed an extension of Wiener's attack that allows the RSA cryptosystem to be broken when d is a few bits longer than n^0.25. For d > n^0.25 their attack needs to do an exhaustive search for about 2t+8 bits (under reasonable assumptions on involved partial convergents), where t = log_2(d/n^0.25). In 2004, we introduced a slight modification of the Verheul and van Tilborg attack, based on Worley's result on Diophantine approximations of the form |alpha - p/q| < c/q^2, for a positive real number c. In both mentioned extensions of Wiener's attack, the candidates for the secret exponent are of the form d = rq_{; ; ; ; ; m+1}; ; ; ; ; +sq_m. We test all possibilities for d, and number of possibilities is roughly (number of possibilities for r) x (number of possibilities for s), which is O(D^2), where d = D*n^(1/4). There are two principal methods for testing: 1) compute p and q assuming d is correct guess ; 2) test the congruence (M^e)^d = M (mod n), say for M = 2. Here we present a new idea, which is to apply "meet-in-the-middle" to this second test. Let 2^(eq_{; ; ; ; ; m+1}; ; ; ; ; ) mod n = a, (2^(eq_m))^(-1) mod n = b. Then we test the congruence a^r = 2b^s (mod n). We can do it by computing a^r mod n for all r, sorting the list of results, and then computing 2b^s mod n for each s one at a time, and checking if the result appears in the sorted list. This decrease the time complexity of testings phase to O(DlogD) (with the space complexity O(D)). We present also some variants of the proposed attack, which might be relevant for its practical implementation.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Matematika

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