ࡱ> % Objbj%% .dGG}C;l$$$.R$vvvZ Z Z 8  4,2 ("000 >I] +++++++$- /,9vi  ii,evv00R,eeeiv0v0+ei+e e+ r*Tvv+0 inr Z #+++h,0,9+0#B0+evvvvImpact of Stability and Growth Pact on Economic Development of EU economies Saaa Drezgi, M.Sc. University of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics, I. Filipovia 4, Rijeka, Croatia  HYPERLINK "mailto:sdrezgic@efri.hr" sdrezgic@efri.hr Abstract: Recent studies suggest that fiscal rules set in the Treaty of Maastricht and the Stability and Growth Pact may induce negative effects on economic growth of the EU economies. First of all, these rules are considered as excessively binding constraint for appropriate counter-cyclical action and could cause more rapid slowdown in case of recession. There is also a possibility of permanent reduction of the public sector's contribution to the capital accumulation. Based on experiences of the EU economies, some lessons can be drawn for the Croatian economic policy. Key words: Stability and Growth Pact, EU, economic growth, public capital, Croatia Introduction Fiscal policy of the member countries of the EU preserved certain level of autonomy. Manoeuvre space for fiscal operations of governments is constrained by fiscal rules imposed by Maastricht Treaty and Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). But, there is more and more pronounced criticism on the fiscal obligations imposed by their provisions. The majority of criticism is focused on possibility of negative impact of these constraints on rates of economic growth and employment across the EU area. It is considered that the mechanism for such negative impact has its roots in fiscal consolidation process that reduced public investments and therefore lowered the productivity of private sector production. In this paper some empirical evidence of influence of the fiscal consolidation process on public investments and economic growth is given. The empirical analysis is performed on the bases of data for eight EU economies. On the bases of these experiences some lessons are drawn for shaping the strategy of Croatian fiscal and economic policy. After introduction, in the first part of the paper some general features of EU fiscal rules are described. Impact of fiscal rules on GDP growth rates, central government debt, public investments and gross capital formation are examined afterwards. At the end, some recommendations for conducting the Croatian fiscal policy are provided. Fiscal rules of the EU Institutional framework for Europes monetary union is provided within the Maastricht Treaty. Provisions set up by the Maastricht Treaty regulate framework for inflation, exchange rate, interest rate and goals of fiscal consolidations within the area of the EU. Constraints were imposed on share of the total public debt and budget deficit in GDP of the EU economies. Respective limits are 60% for public debt and 3% for budget deficit. The most important reason for introducing the convergence criteria is the goal for preserving the stability of the common EU market. Fiscal policy of the EU members that is not subjected to constraints could lead to excessive public debt and rising the interest rates and undermining the stability of EU monetary system. Some of the member countries could expect bail-out procedure by the European Central Bank. The one post-Maastricht element, finalized at the June 1997 meeting of the European Council in Amsterdam, is the Pact for Stability and Growth. Rationales for SGP were to prevent inflationary debt bailouts, to neutralise inflationary pressure more generally, to offset political bias towards excessive deficits, to internalize international interest rate spillovers, to encourage policy co-ordination. The Stability Pact consists of two Council regulations, one on the Excessive Deficit Procedure and another on surveillance, and a European Council resolution that provides guidance to the Council and member states on the application of the Pact. The two Council regulations have the force of law. Excessive Deficit Procedure demands that fiscal positions have to be balanced or in surplus in normal times. It urges stronger surveillance of medium-term fiscal positions with the goal of providing an early warning signal that the 3% reference value for budget deficit is at risk. It clarifies the conditions under which participants in the monetary union will be allowed to exceed the 3% deficit ceiling without being determined to have an excessive deficit. Countries will be automatically exempt only if their GDPs declines by 2% and the excess deficit is temporary and small. Those in which GDP declines by between 0,75% and 2% could also be exempt, but only with the concurrence of the Council of Ministers. Countries with even milder recessions will be found to have an excessive deficit and forced to make mandatory deposits that are transformed into fines if the fiscal excess is not eliminated within two years. SGP consists of more restrictive set of provisions than those laid down by the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty says only that the general government deficit may not exceed its reference value (3% of GDP) unless the deficit has declined significantly and continuously to where it is close to that reference value, or the excess of the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the deficit remains close to the reference value. It says nothing, about the size of the output decline producing that exceptional and temporary excess deficit, or the period over which must occur. In this sense the SGP implies less flexibility than the Maastricht Treaty. Impact of fiscal rules The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is increasingly held responsible for the inability of the euro area economy to sustain demand and maintain growth. The slowdown in economic activity is widening budget deficits throughout the euro area Portugal has exceeded the 3 per cent limit in 2001, Germany in 2002. The excessive deficit procedure the process initiated by European Commission and which may end in sanctions if countries are unwilling or unable to reduce the deficit promptly has been opened for Portugal and Germany. The empirical evidence of the possibility that a declining share of public investment in GDP could have adverse consequences for economic growth over the long term is inconclusive. There are a number of reasons why the many studies on this topic, do not yield clear-cut conclusions. First, it is difficult to control for all the factors, in addition to public investment, that affect growth over the longer term. Second, a sizable portion of public investment is directed to supporting broad functions of government, including redistribution and provision of social services, maintaining law and order, and administration, which do not directly boost productive potential. And third, the lumpy nature of much infrastructure investment implies that the full impact of investment on roads, telecommunications, and other infrastructure on growth can only be realized with considerable lags, once effective networks have been established. There is, however, evidence that public investment has fallen because of fiscal adjustment, and on this count there are reasons to be concerned. There is cause for worry either if cuts in public investment are not reversed, and thus fiscal adjustment contributes to declining public investment ratios, or if cuts are reversed and there is substantial volatility in public investment instead (which can reduce the efficiency of both public and private investment). For OECD countries, Roubini and Sachs (1989) observe that public investment is often quickly and drastically cut during periods of restrictive fiscal policy. More specifically for the euro area, it has been claimed that the SGP deficit limits have contributed to the recent decline in public investment in Europe. Of the various reasons why a monetary union may wish to impose fiscal rules upon its members, the Pact only deals with one: the possibility that governments might be tempted to run larger budget deficits once the exchange rate and interest rates no longer respond to the fiscal actions of a single country. But there are important issues the SGP does not address. In particular, the SGP puts no pressure on EMU members to reduce current government spending, so as to lower tax rates and make room for higher public investment. From the viewpoint of the Pact it is indifferent whether a country meets it by rising spending and taxes, or by lowering both. By imposing that the budget deficit, including interest, is balanced over the cycle, the SGP eventually drives the ratio of debt to GDP to zero. There are good arguments for preventing the public debt from disappearing: for instance, public debt can be an instrument for carrying out transfers between generations, or it may be issued to finance public investment projects with a large enough social rate of return. In the paper 8 members of the EU are analysed. These countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. They were chosen on the basis of availability of the data. Source of the data are the IMFs Government Finance Statistics Yearbook for data on public investment and International Financial Statistics Yearbook for data on gross domestic product, gross capital formation and central government debt. Data cover period from 1972 to 1998 and are expressed in local currency units and deflated by GDP deflator. Total growth rates of the central government debt, GDP, public investment and gross capital formation in analysed countries are presented by figure 1. In general it can be concluded that growth rates of public investment and central government debt have fallen rapidly from the beginning of the 1990-s. At the same time GDP growth rates remain on the stabile low level. It is surprising that growth rate of the gross capital formation kept positive pace although the dynamic of public investments was in the opposite direction. Figure 1: Growth rates of central government debt, GDP, public investment and gross capital formation of selected EU economies  Source: IMF: Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, different years, IMF: International Finance Statistics Yearbook, 2003. More detailed insights can be seen from figures 2, 3 and 4. Figure 2 presents share of the central government debt in GDP of analysed economies. Positive trend of this ratio for all of the observed economies is obvious in spite of the differences between the growth rates of the ratio. Figure 2: Share of the central government debt in GDP of selected EU economies  Source: IMF: Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, different years, IMF: International Finance Statistics Yearbook, 2003. Ratio of the public investment and GDP presented in figure 3 shows negative dynamics in almost all of the economies. Only Finland, among all, has positive slope of this ratio in the past decade. It has to be noted that, according to data, reduction of public investments is present from the 1970s. Figure 3: Share of public investment in GDP of selected EU economies  Source: IMF: Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, different years, IMF: International Finance Statistics Yearbook, 2003. Gross capital formation in the observed economies has also been reduced from the 1970s and that reduction was intensified in 1990s. The question is whether the reduction of public investments caused such negative trend for capital accumulation generally. Figure 4: Share of the gross capital formation in GDP of selected EU economies  Source: IMF: Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, different years, IMF: International Finance Statistics Yearbook, 2003. Data on the public investments and gross capital formation of the observed economies show obvious negative trend. If we presume positive elasticity of these variables on GDP growth rates the question of future EU economic prospects rises. It has to be noted that even a fraction of a percentage point of the growth rate can become important when allowed to accumulate over time. Some simulations suggest that, after accumulation over the last two decades, levels of real output would have ended 5% lower in France and the U.K., and 9% lower in Italy. It can be concluded that reduction in the level of public investments resulted in further decrease of gross capital formation at whole. That fact has opposite tendency in case of Croatian public investment activity. Observed decreasing tendencies in formation of gross capital in EU economies cannot be stopped in circumstances given by orientation of present economic and fiscal policy. Fiscal rules in this moment cannot provide the change of these tendencies. There is no proof that any of the EU economies in phase of the consolidation process succeeded to increase the rate of growth and volume of the fixed capital. Research conducted on the economies of the OECD have showed that decrease of gross GDP for 1% automatically lead to deficit increase of 0,6%. The danger is that the SGP will divert effort from fundamental reforms needed for step up the pace of the economic growth. Fiscal rules in connection with the provisions of SGP by no means is not capable to provide radical swerve in European economic growth. In such circumstances the SGP could become even more binding, and have additional negative impacts on increasing the volatility of output, further depressing growth. This could open the mechanism of some kind of vicious circle and keep the EU member states trapped at the low-level equilibrium of economic activities. Conclusion SGP is legally binding only for member states of the EU. So, Croatia till the moment of entering in the EU is not obligated to conduct fiscal policy strictly according the provisions of Maastricht and SGP criteria. Nevertheless, there is a constant pressure for tight fiscal policy mainly imposed by IMF. Political pressures will certainly be more explicit by completing the stages of the accession process. Negative trend of public investments and gross capital formation observed in EU economies that was especially intensified from the 1990s present warning signs on prospective on long-term economic development of EU area. Fiscal consolidation process certainly contributed for such dynamics. In such contest new proposal of the formation of free zone of trade or expanding of the CEFTA. Neither of these solutions will not be successful in the perspective of present economical situation in EU. The reason for that is in destruction of capabilities of these integration systems caused by domino effect. Fiscal rules imposed by the EU have number of provisions that could exert negative effects on growth and employment but on the way to the EU accession Croatia has no alternatives but to adjust its fiscal policy to respective provisions. Empirical analysis of EU economies show that fiscal consolidation processes do not impose same effects in particular economies. If that is a fact, further research should be oriented towards examining the important elements of economic system that enable utilization of public debt and public investments that lead to higher growth rates of the economy. References: Allan, William, Parry Taryn: Fiscal Transparency in EU Accession Countries: Progress and Future Challenges, IMF, IMF Working Paper, 2003. Blanchard, Olivier, Giavazzi, Francesco: Improving the SGP through a paper accounting of public investment, CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 4220, 2004 Eichegreen, Barry and Wyplosz, Charles: The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?, Economic Policy, 1998, p. 66-113 Fatas, Antonio: Does EMU needs a fiscal federation?, CEPR, 1997, p. 1-31 Ferretti-Milesi, Gian Maria, Moriyama, Kenji: Fiscal Adjustment in EU Countries: A Balance Sheet Approach, IMF, IMF Working Paper, 2004. Green, W: Econometric Analysis, 5th Edition, Prentice Hall, 2002. Gupta, Sanjeev et al.: What Sustains Fiscal Consolidations in Emerging Market Countries?, IMF, IMF Working Paper, 2003. Hamilton, James Douglas: Time Series Analysis, Princeton University Press, New Yersey,1994 IMF: Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, different years IMF: International Finance Statistics Yearbook, 2003. Leibfritz, Willi et al.: Fiscal Policy, Government Debt and Economic Performance, Economic Department Working Papers No. 144, OECD, Paris, 1994. Levit, Malcolm and Cristopher Lord, The Political Economy of Monetary Union, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 2000 Ter-Minassian, Teresa, Allen, Mark: Public Investment and Fiscal Policy, IMF, 2004.  HYPERLINK "http://www.mfin.hr" www.mfin.hr Sa~etak: Recentne studije pokazuju da fiskalna pravila postavljena Maastrichtskim ugovorima te Paktom o stabilnosti i razvoju mogu dovesti do negativnih u inaka na gospodarski rast ekonomija EU. Prije svega, smatra se da navedena pravila predstavljaju pretjerano ograni enje za voenje primjerene anticikli ke politike te bi, stoga, mogla uzrokovati br~e opadanje stopa rasta u slu aju recesije. Takoer postoji mogunost stalne redukcije doprinosa javnog sektora akumulaciji kapitala. Na temelju iskustava izabranih zemalja EU, mogue je izvui pouke za voenje hrvatske ekonomske politike. Klju ne rije i: Pakt o stabilnosti i razvoju, EU, ekonomski rast, javni kapital, Hrvatska  The author is gratefull to Ivo Sever, Full Professor at the University of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics on valuable comments and suggestions.  Implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, available at http://www.eu.int/scadplus/printversion/en/lvb/125020.htm  Public finances in Member States in 2004, available at http://www.eu.int/scadplus/printversion/en/lvb/125071.htm  Ter-Minassian, Teresa, Allen, Mark: Public Investment and Fiscal Policy, IMF, 2004., p.6  Blanchard, Olivier, Giavazzi, Francesco: Improving the SGP through a paper accounting of public investment, p.10 Eichegreen, Barry and Wyplosz, Charles: The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?, Economic Policy, 1998, p.68.  see, Levit, Malcolm and Cristopher Lord, The Political Economy of Monetary Union, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 2000 PAGE  PAGE 10 rtZr""<#=#+(,),*,,-$.%.&..!0"0#00111224477799:I@U@BBDFEE H*mH sH  jhU jBU jU CJmH sH  jUj0JUmH sH 5\mH sH 0JjU jU5\mH sH  j0JU@r56X  $hdh^ha$dh $ & Fdha$$dha$$dha$dh`KNOlm)*YZrs2 3 @#A#%%p'q')++(, z^`z $ & Fdha$$dha$(,*,q,,,--$.&.m.../!0#0j00111E2225577 $dh`a$$a$$dha$7999::;;==G@H@I@U@V@@rAA5BBCxCCDFD $ & Fdha$ $dh^a$ $ & Fdha$$dha$dhFDDGEEEEEFFJJ`K?LL.MMMsNNNNNNOOh]h&`#$ L^`L$dha$ $ & Fdha$EEEEEEEFF`KbK?L@LLL.M/M0MMMMMMMMrNsNtNNNNNNNNNNOOOOOȽ0JmHnHu0J j0JU j0JU5\mH sH  0JmH sH jUmH sH mH sH jUmH sH )OOOO$dha$,1h/ =!"#$% DyK sdrezgic@efri.hryK Hmailto:sdrezgic@efri.hryX;H,]ą'c'Dd ? 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