Naslov
Feeling in private

Autori
Domazet, Mladen

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni

Skup
1st Philosophy Graduate Conference at the Central Eastern University

Mjesto i datum
Budimpešta, Mađarska, 18.03.2006. - 19.03.2006

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija

Ključne riječi
rationality; emotions; private language argument; scepticism

Sažetak
It can be assumed that if any part of our mental life is innate it could in principle be developed in private, i.e. is not of necessity a social product. According to de Sousa’ s 1980 account emotions can be subjected to rationality assessments, making them a part, albeit special (borderline), of our ‘ rational life’ . Contribution of emotions to conduct of ‘ rational life’ is important, as the characteristics of belief and action most commonly associated with rationality do not provide sufficient grounds to guide an organism towards any particular course of action. By asking whether emotions (such that are still subjectable to minimal rationality assessments) can be developed in private (in a sense of Wittgenstein’ s Philosophical Investigations) we are asking whether there can be any part of our ‘ rational life’ that could be innate, and thus not a result of social conditioning. A brief survey of the related issue of interpretation of Wittgenstein’ s arguments against private language and rule-following reveals that the issue is not whether socially non-conditioned emotions could be experienced (exist), but whether we would ever, given the absence of ‘ investigation independent standards of correctness’ , be able to know that they are or are not.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

POVEZANOST RADA