ࡱ> 7 bjbjUU %7|7| ldx8RL<8v((6666:p B8D8D8D8D8D8D8$Q: q<lh8-66h8"668"""( 66B8"B8""b'K6{86 c*  7$848087$<"<8"Prof. dr. sc. Maja Zitinski University of Dubrovnik Cira Carica 4 20000 Dubrovnik Hrvatska Tel: 38520/445734, 38520/450115 GSM 38591/5508563 Fax: 38520/435590 E-mail:  HYPERLINK "mailto:zitinski@unidu.hr" zitinski@unidu.hr  HYPERLINK "mailto:mzitinski@du.htnet.hr" mzitinski@du.htnet.hr The 4th Annual International Scientific Conference The Loinj Days of Bioethics Main topic: Bioethics and the New Era Croatian Association of Philosophy - Section for Bioethics, Mali Loinj, Croatia June 13th 15th, 2005 When Rights Conflict Summary The paper investigates why impartiality or rationality are ideals worth striving for. It deals not only with an inquiry into normative ethical search for valid moral principles, but also for the meaning of key meta-ethical concepts such as autonomy and rights. The portrait of the ideal moral judgment plays an important role in the examination of both: our own views and the views of others. Bioethical genuine quest for a correct method all moral agents ought morally to be guided while answering moral questions, refers to the conviction that coming as close as possible to fulfilling the ideal moral judgment is rational. Rights themselves are distinctive moral commodities, that is, to have a right to anything means to have a very strong moral and legal claim upon it. It is the strongest of all moral claims that all men can assert. Since human rights must be possessed by all human beings and only by human beings, it would be irrational to distinguish among persons, deny human equity and preserve rights only for the few. Rights entail objects and areas within which every human being is entitled to act without further permission or assent. Some philosophers point out to the important connection between the goals of normative ethics and the concept of an ideal moral judgment. The approach to moral questions must be free from fault and error and other objections raised against the considered method in placing a justified limit on how others may treat the person possessing the right. Sa~etak Referat istra~uje zaato su nepristranost i racionalnost ideali vrijedni stremljenja. Referat se ne bavi samo preispitivanjem normativne eti ke potrage za valjanim moralnim principima, nego takoer preispituje i meta-eti ke pojmove kao ato su  autonomnost i  prava . Obrazac idealnoga moralnog suda ima va~nu ulogu u testiranju obojega: naaeg vlastitog motriata i tuih motriata. Bioeti ki istinski zahtjev za ispravnom metodom koja treba biti vodiljom svim moralnim subjektima dok daju odgovore na moralna pitanja, odnosi se na uvjerenje o tome kako jest racionalno pribli~iti se idealnom moralnom sudu ato je viae mogue. Prava su sama po sebi vrijedne i istaknute moralne  stvari , prema tome imati na neato pravo zna i to vrlo sna~no moralno i legalno potra~ivati. Budui da svi ljudi moraju imati ljudska prava, te da ljudska prava pripadaju jedino ljudima, bilo bi iracionalno razdvajati osobe negiranjem ljudske asnosti nekima, te pridr~avanjem prava samo za neke. Prava uklju uju predmete i podru ja u kojima je svako ljudsko bie ovlaateno djelovati bez dodatnoga dopuatenja ili odobrenja. Neki filozofi isti u va~nost ciljeva normativne etike i njihovu povezanost s pojmom idealnoga moralnog suda. Pristup moralnim pitanjima mora biti slobodan ( o iaen ) od neispravnosti i od pogreaaka te od ostalih prigovora prema odabranoj metodi u nastojanju da se odredi opravdana granica o tome kako drugi smiju tretirati osobu koja posjeduje prava. Introduction According to the fact that bioethics is a branch of proactively oriented applied normative ethics, it places no restrictions on the exercise of any moral rights and protective provisions. Every individual is a moral agent, and therefore he or she must have moral rights. Everybody is capable to attain objective moral reasoning scope because the field of ethics concerns issues about all kinds of policies that are desirable in social life. Reflective morality is there to genuinely scrutinize the pattern of virtues and vices exerted in the behavior of the individual when it affects rights of others. That is, reflective morality is intimately concerned with evaluation of character, as well as goals. Although the field of ethics stems from the wisdom of many generations, virtue is on every occasion an individual accomplishment and it always presupposes freedom on the part of the agent. If the autonomous act is to display the virtue of the persons character it must be morally justified, or it must follow reasoning and acting on the basis of moral concern for all involved parties. Bioethics genuinely emerges out from philosophical analysis, drawing directly on moral theory but, in order to provide guidelines for practical conduct, it deserves the effort required for a careful examination of the relationship between theoretical and applied ethics. The right action, if given on a background of earlier moral development, strengthens moral autonomy in return, that is, morality deals with the kinds of persons we should be and become! Since many different reasons influence our character and behavior, moral reasons are exclusive because they derive from both, virtues and principles of conduct. In situations where two or more moral reasons come into conflict, the person is sometimes required to pick one type of morality over another, in order to pursue the right action. This paper also aims to present of how not to confuse various reasons for moral reasons! What are Rights? As morality has significant influence on human actions, the political and ethical theory brings the issue of rights into a dominant focus. Morality consists of both: moral rules, and moral ideals. Hence, it is important to identify: What happens when moral rules are disobeyed? How about failing to pursue moral ideals? Bernard Gert indicated that moral rules refer to acts that must not be done, and moral ideals refer to acts that ought to be done in order to prevent harm! In spite of the fact that failing to follow moral ideals does not require moral justification, the prospective of moral equality for all men is a paradigm in the civic society. Therefore violating, denying, and overriding of this proportion lowers the ideal and brings moral reason in question! Violating a moral rule always requires adequate justification because it involves doing something that would be morally wrong unless one has a moral reason for doing it. Are rights a collection of logically independent propositions? How do we decide and how do we resolve conflicts between two legitimate, but mutually opposed rights when their applicability in circumstances of conflict must be determined such that both rights cannot simultaneously be complied with? An important aspect of a considerate approach is its epistemological component. That is, if we do not develop several meanings of the central claim, the task of resolving the issue will remain vague. In deontological and utilitarian theories principles and rules have been traditionally understood as principles and rules of obligation. This is probably the result of the history, since (as some authors claim), until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, problems of political philosophy were rarely discussed in terms of rights, perhaps because duties to lord, king, state, church, and God had been the dominant focus of political and ethical theory. Although rights have diverse origins, rights were primarily thought as liberty rights, that is, rights were conceived as rights against state intrusion or control, or rights not to be interfered with. Thus, historically, the notion of natural (or human) rights emerged from a need to control the unlimited power of a state. Whether exercised by individuals upon others, or groups upon society, rights were viewed as powerful and justified claims that demand respect! Some authors hold that there are at least two senses in which rights of all kinds can be said to exist. There is first sense in which we inquire whether in a given society there is intellectual or conceptual acknowledgment of the fact that persons have rights at all. Secondly, we inquire to what extent in a society that acknowledges the existence of rights, is there a general respect for, protection of, and noninterference with the exercise of those rights. If the particular society finds acceptable to express hostility against powerless, it will not be clear whether persons who are alike, are fairly acknowledged of each persons well-being and freedom (which are basic propositions of human rights). As Richard Wasserstrom stated, rights are constitutive of the domain of entitlements, that is, a human right is a right possessed by human beings, as well as only by human beings. Because it is the same right that all human beings possess, it must be possessed equally by all human beings. Philosophers typically draw a distinction between positive and negative rights. Positive rights pertain to human well-being, and include something valuable to be provided to honor them. Negative rights are simply rights to not be interfered with. Hence, negative rights imply that people simply have a right to be left alone! Joel Feinberg maintains, negative rights also require, not to be treated in cruel or inhuman ways, and not to be exploited or degraded even in humane ways. Rights can be (a) special, and (b) general: Special rights are of many sorts. They all are contingent on acquired status or a position, and without that special status or position there would be no rights of that sort. General rights are universal. Some authors maintain that these rights are fundamental, because we have them irrespective of merit, just because we are human! Therefore general rights refer to impartial treatment in matters of justice, freedom, equality of opportunity and any violation of them results in decreasing our human dignity and self-respect! Yet, equal legal rights are not equal rights, since legal rights need not be universal! All countries do not have identical legislation. Obviously, the theory of natural rights has not been a single coherent doctrine. This is the reason why some authors indicate that the lack of any ground for any doctrine of natural rights results in the vagueness of almost every formulation of a set of natural rights. The failure of persons to agree upon what ones natural rights are, lead to the desirability of overriding and disregarding of these rights. Martin assumes rights and duties are correlated, but rights rather than duties are morally fundamental! The criteria that are necessary and sufficient conditions of right possession as stated by Tom Regan include all and only free, rational beings who have moral rights. Hence duties arise because humans are moral agents, and therefore they must have moral rights! Yet, humans retain moral rights even in a coma because moral rights are universal. Among various moral rights, the most basic moral rights are human rights simply because we are human beings. Human rights can never be equated with political rights since human rights exist even if they are not recognized. On the contrary, political rights exist only if governments recognize them. The Roots of Bioethical Principles If bioethics is to contribute to the solution of practical problems, specifically to the problem of conflicting rights, than we must seek to develop a theory of moral reasoning that will determine which arguments ought to be accepted. Or, as Martin suggested, most valuable accomplishment of ethical choice is that it liberates us from ignorance and prejudice by fostering the virtues of intellectual honesty, integrity, courage and truthful communication. The problem of conflicting rights in bioethics cannot be labeled as a technical problem, on which only the expert can have an opinion. Bioethics involves questions that affect human beings regardless of their expertise, and an expert is only a man among men. Therefore, bioethics has to bring under examination a number of fundamental human moral problems at once. And these are not narrowly defined issues of bioethics; - or, as Ramsey advocated, of medical ethics alone. Moral growth presupposes activities needed to promote values that do not only advertise what is good, but ordain what is right. Since the progress of the western world has been equated with various dimensions of modern support to the individual, personal autonomy is believed to be the duty to maximize the individuals right to make decisions. Accordingly, value judgments in bioethics make no sense in the absence of freedom, and Hobbs is one among many professionals who assume ethics depends upon choosing, and choosing depends upon freedom, even though the freedom is limited, or finite. Therefore, reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, and happiness of other persons have no morally adequate justification if they usurp the right of these persons to exert rights. The issue of rights is important because it brings into focus such policies that can discriminate against people in occasion when two parties have no compatible goals. Conflict is always a form of communication and even in the case when rights of conflicting parties both capture a very valid prospective, each single prospective is simply partial! Therefore some other obligations are there to justify the course of action in which people are so directly involved. If but only one partys rights were accepted as the exclusive authority, the misuse of a position of power is likely to occur, and no method for resolving difficult cases will be developed. One party model is wrong not only from the prospective of an agent who usurps rights of the other and therefore becomes more and more corrupt! Harming persons who are discriminated against, wrongs them, which is morally unacceptable! That is, moral action involves two sides, the agent and the victim. Therefore, the quest for moral progress always refers to our personal responsibility of how we can make ourselves morally better and achieve our goals but not at the expense of others! In the past, due to the one-way (authoritarian) communicating style, the moral agent was particularly ready simply to refrain from communication rather than to develop options that would benefit both sides. Totalitarian history contributed to such black and white approach, and developed extreme responses to conflict. Moral agents had been expected to confront aggressively on one hand, or withdraw and avoid conflict whenever possible, on the other hand. Both strategies displayed one-way communicating style that produces winners and losers who disregard the other partys concerns. This means that unresponsive communication is morally wrong because it always leads to frustration. Violating rights can be justified only if a morally adequate reason is provided. Consequently, the interfered person who has been put in the position of an object is being treated wrongly because no double standards for rational beings are allowed! If a person is pushed into the position of an object, in circumstances there is no way to fulfill his or her human responsibility to create his or her course of action! That is, moral reason is involved with practical questions, not with the ways things are, but with the way things ought to be. Conflicting rights highlight the problem of moral equality for all humans, because rights of each party as related to virtue and derived from intrinsic values, involve the same right all humans should be recognized to possess! If so, these sorts of rights must be possessed equally! If there is a duty, or a social obligation of the civic society to protect fair equality of opportunity, than conflicting rights should be viewed under the scope of both, personal autonomy and moral autonomy. Since moral autonomy is universal and more specific than personal autonomy, applied ethics should be directed toward the development of moral expertise, and involve greater understanding of moral truth concerning practical issues. That is, as Ruth Macklin points out, a knowledge of theoretical rules is crucial for being able to identify the source of disagreements and for arriving at a resolution of conflicts. Conflicts, no matter what the context, typically provide the rich insights of creative strategies of proposed solutions. If no perfect solution can be found, it is still possible to arrive at the least inadequate answer to the claim. Since reflective morality implies investigation on the basis of a study of the moral reasoning and their logical properties and implications, it is obvious that moral reasons are neither created by laws, customs, or God, nor reducible to laws, customs, or religion reasons. In spite of the fact that the essence of man is imperfection, the reflective morality enables the man to attain possible objective moral reasoning scope! Yet, God is perfect, hence, God is not requested to obey rules, or comply principles, instead God would recognize and appreciate moral reasons as warranting divine commands. The contemporary ethicists who share Kants duty orientation in ethics, when referred to the meaning of categorical imperative still disagree with Kant in respect of its absolute value. It is particularly true in the case of conflicting duties. That is, in a crisis, some duties can be superseded with other duties! But who and how is to decide which duty has a priority in the contrast with absolute (prima facie) duties? Of course, it would be wrong to conceive of prima facie duties as of an absolute value! It is the case when the prima facie duty interferes with an agents right to protect his own life from harm. The moment mans freedom is taken away, absolute virtues (prima facie duties) cease to be a means to achieving values and become rather an impediment. Ayn Rand claims, if mans freedom is taken away, it is fully moral, and in fact mandatory, to lie ones head off as a legitimate means of self-defense. The same is true when you are confronted by a criminal who seeks the money. Telling the truth to criminal men or criminal governments is not rational. That is, the so-called absolute virtues have morally legitimate exceptions because more pressing duties override them. The underlying principle is ones right to ones own life, which means freedom from the initiation of force by others. So, if duties were regarded basic, than for every duty a correlated right must be acknowledged, that is: Lying is wrong in principle, expect in the case when a moral agent has to protect rational values! If I have a duty to tell you the truth, then you have a right to be told the truth. Ayn Rand is one among many contemporary ethicists who share Kants duty orientation, yet holds that virtues are absolute, but not an out of context absolute! In her view religion looks at virtues as at dogmatic rules to be obeyed without regard to context! She argues that the context cannot be dropped when practicing virtues! In this respect dogmatic rules inevitably lead to moral conflicts. (Ayn Rand states: How do you obey the commandment: You should not kill, and yet defend yourself against an aggressor?). Why Ought Anyone have a Right to Anything? Human beings are not simply immersed in the present - everything distinctively and essentially human would disappear from our existence if we would not seek to clarify, organize, and enrich our grasp of principles involved in right and wrong conduct. As contrasting moral perspectives increase moral understanding of ideas, used in shaping responsibility with our daily lives, lacking rights impoverish communication and prevent us to discuss moral issues with one another. Rachels appeals to the existence of rights because unjust denial of these rights denies a man the standing to protest the way he is treated! Denial of rights will prevent persons from having those types of expectations, and will prohibit them from making those kinds of judgments, which a system of rights makes possible. That is, duties without conceiving and recognizing of their correlative rights are not simply mistakes of logic and definition. These are moral mistakes which influence to the decrease of human fundamental dignity and self-respect. If we observe what happens to any person who is required to comply with imposed behavior in order to minimize the likelihood of physical abuse, arbitrary treatment, or economic destitution, than we will realize how important human rights are, and what their denial can mean. Rachels even holds that a society that simply lacks any conception of human rights is less offensive than the one which has such a conception but denies that some persons have these rights. He points out that one among the greatest of all human wrongs is not simply the inequality and unfairness involved in differentiating for the wrong reasons among persons! Moral evil is involved in the belief that there are some persons who do not, and would not desire, or need, or enjoy, those minimal goods which all men do need, desire and enjoy. In Rachels view, it is to discover certain persons, all of whom are most certainly human beings, out of the human race! Justifying Moral Judgments Being morally autonomous means reasoning and acting on the basis of moral concern, that is, on the concern to avoid causing evil to others, sometimes in creative ways. As Martin reminds us, moral autonomy leads creative thinkers to emphasize certain commitments and virtues over others. In this respect Bernard Gert stated that, Immoral action usually involves doing evil to those we do not care about in order to please or benefit ourselves or those we do care about. Therefore, those ethicists who wish to strengthen abilities to reason, research and avoid vagueness and ambiguity, they find not conformity, but moral autonomy a substantial prerequisite of any sound judgment. Personal autonomy is a wider notion than moral autonomy because personal autonomy extends to overall human reasoning, not just moral reasoning. Nevertheless, personal autonomy should be recognized as a sort of human excellency that should be preserved as an intrinsic good because it makes human creativity possible! Yet, Martin asserts, the normative sense of personal autonomy refers to the moral right to exercise personal autonomy, which is essentially the same as the right to liberty the fundamental human right that needs no further justification. But, a real ethical judgment can be morally justified only if it relies upon MORAL AUTONOMY, that is, if it presupposes the quest for moral growth. This is the reason why self-development is a higher duty than self-sacrifice! If self-development were selected as a predominant virtue required when reasonably weighing conflicting moral reasons, than it will include the need to enhance knowledge about people and the world, relevant to making wise decisions. As Martin maintains, it will contribute to preparation for significant work because professions are forms of work devoted to the public good and guided by moral norms. The issue of rights and duties came into a topical focus in moral and political theory due to its extensive violation in recent history. If rights were determined by the reference to the good of the community, than this good is the ultimate value which suppresses rights as such! Violation of rights and duties also involve making distinction between people on the basis of morally irrelevant characteristics. As Cloke & Goldsmith advocate, our experience of conflict is always emotional! Although the reasons we cite for our conflicts are grounded in facts and logic, the language of conflict is full of allusions, metaphors, and symbols, drawn out from our own culture. The aggressive style is typically established on whether politely or impolitely, disregarding the other sides concerns. It is likely to antagonize the other person who, in response will typically react negatively. Power based processes always corrupt because they produce winners and losers. Wahlstrom  assumes, aggressive behavior is characterized by concern for ones self at the expense of others. An aggressive communicator is labeled as a selfish person who will work to destroy the enemy and achieve his or her goal, whatever the cost to the others involved. But if we try to understand the symbolism and hidden meanings of the context, we would acquire a prospective for the assertive style, which can eventually transform the conflict into an opportunity for shifting power-based process into the rights based process. If moral equality for all men were recognized, then accountability to moral reason would warrant the rights interest, since in the civic society rights should be limitations on the exercise of power. Who is to Blame? In spite of the fact that all human beings posses equal humanity, and equal correlative duties and rights, the denial of these same kinds of equality seems to be obvious. It is sometimes exerted on the grounds of physical difference, whether it would be gender, or mere appearance, or even on the grounds of conformity to particular groups. That is, the dichotomizing of human qualities seems to be obvious - women are sometimes referred to as a minority, which they observably are not. Who is to blame? As every human being is equally a human being, this minimal qualification entitles all humans to certain absolute human rights. But how to acknowledge the common humanity with both, the victim and the offender, the oppressed and the oppressor? The victim and the offender, the oppressed and the oppressor are unequal in their power to control the circumstances under which they meet, imbalance occurs typically in favor of the offender and the oppressor. Such both rights cannot simultaneously be recognized as moral rights. As Cloke & Goldsmith advocate, we are all skilled at rationalizing our behavior, and each of us has our own list of perfectly good reasons for avoiding honest behavior. It is because we want to protect one another from the harshness of the truth, and partly because we think honesty will make us vulnerable to our opponents. May be we live in an organizational culture that does not support, or does not value honest behavior. All cultures generate rules for deciding when it is safe to be honest and when it could cost you your job or even your life. Cloke & Goldsmith state that by calling attention to these behaviors, we automatically discourage them! Yet, if the particular social environment lacks the context in which you can find internal allies who will stand with you and external consultants to support you in developing new norms and consolidation new behaviors, the chances for shifting power into rights based processes will be very low. But, moral autonomy and creative decision-making typically lead to the emphasis of certain commitments and virtues over others, and an autonomous agent can decide whether his course of action will be in accordance with deepening understanding and broadening appreciation of values! Although ethics seeks to strengthen the ability to reason autonomously about morality, moral responsibility remains a personal achievement! According to the existence of the two levels of ethical thinking we should take into consideration both levels. First level consists in application of learnt principles which are general and simple; Second level consists in reflective morality or criticism, and possibly the modification of these general principles in the light of their effect in particular cases in which silence appear less risky and more powerful than vulnerability, honesty and shared responsibility. We may hide and repress our true thoughts and feelings because they are too frightening, or too powerful to discuss openly. Cloke & Goldsmith argue, honesty is difficult because we want to avoid blame and make ourselves appear good or right by making others appear bad or wrong, yet the negative consequences we direct at others, ultimately return to us! The deeper reason for not being honest is suspicion from hearing the truth, since serious life consequences may result from it, and force us to change so many things! Honesty is the precondition for transformation! Cloke & Goldsmith consider that searching for quick solutions we fail to listen to the conflict and involve our opponent in a collaborative search for answers that meet both of our needs. As a result, we propose solutions for the wrong problem, that is, our solutions are not well accepted because both sides did not participate in creating them. How to Avoid the Deficient Approach to Moral Questions? Meta-ethics aims to explore the roots of ethics and for this reason the conceptual analysis of key moral concepts represents the first major component of its inquiry. The other component refers to the investigation of the correct method for answering moral questions. As scientific method requires tasks, specifying of how we must approach particular questions if we want to give scientific answers to them, moral questions also demand analogous procedure. Namely, moral disagreement over whether something is morally right or wrong, are not the same disagreements as those in personal tastes and preferences! As Tom Regan advocates, when people say that something is morally right or wrong, it is always appropriate to ask them to give reasons to justify their judgment. Yet, in the case of personal preferences, such requests are inappropriate! Persons feelings belong to the subjectivist realm and the validity of ethical judgments is not determined by the nature of their authors feelings! Ethical judgments are importantly different, that is, ethical judgments must be informed statements of conceptual clarity, rationality, impartiality and information. Although it is not easy to meet the requirements needed for a sound ethical judgment, it is not irrational to move some distance from the starting line. Tom Regan asserts, moral questions cannot be answered theoretically. Moral questions come up in the real world, and a knowledge of the real world setting in which they arise is essential if we are seriously to seek rational answers to them. Rationality here is understood as the ability to recognize the connection between different ideas in the sense that that if some statements are true, then some other statements must be true, while others must be false. Partiality refers to ignoring what justice demands and favoring someone or something above others! If we do not want to recognize that we judge similar cases dissimilarly than our judgment will be clouded by stereotypes and prejudice. Even when we do not explicitly say that rationality and impartiality were ideals worth striving for, these ideals have been constantly used in all our examinations of others behavior and our own behavior! Rationality and impartiality affect our beliefs, values and fundamental commitments. Since rationality and impartiality clearly have a strong and complex influence upon how we understand and shape all our own assessments, justified accusations for biases will endanger all contributions to self-fulfillment and to the social good. The principle of equal opportunity in not only an intrinsic good which is desirable for its own sake, apart from any further appeal to duties or rights, but, as Norman Daniels reminds us, it is a way to protect society against the productivity lost when individuals are not given a fair opportunity to develop their skills and talents. Tom Regan claims that, while the formal principle of justice does not by itself tell us what are the relevant factors for determining when treatment is similar or dissimilar, that principle must be observed if we are to make the ideal moral judgment. Not to observe it is a symptom of prejudice or bias! Rational defects that must be identified and overcome if we are to make the best moral judgment we can. Conclusion Philosophers sympathetic with bioethics hold that moral rights are constituted on the unique worth of the individual. Since moral rights are a useful means of promoting autonomy and thereby the conditions needed for human flourishing, they must be universal. Hence they exist irrespective of merit and refer to impartial treatment in matters of justice, freedom, and equality of opportunity. Moral rights must be equal, since no one person has this value to any greater degree that any other. Thus, violation of moral rights represents an inappropriate archaic behavior. Moral reasons are not created by laws or by Gods will, moral reasons are the result of proactive quest for truth and justice, which are intrinsic values, but not an out of context absolutes! Absolute virtues have morally legitimate exceptions because duty to protect rational values is more pressing. Duties arise because humans are moral agents, and all moral agents must have moral rights. Among the greatest of all human wrongs it is the belief that there are some persons who do not and would not desire those minimal goods, which all men do need, desire, and enjoy. As moral autonomy is a substantial prerequisite of any sound judgment, it presupposes the quest for moral growth. Thus, self-development is a higher duty than self-sacrifice. Violation of rights and duties involve making distinction between people on the basis of morally irrelevant characteristics. The denial of rights leads to diminishing self-respect, and honesty. Moral disagreements must be justified on the basis of conceptual clarity, rationality, and impartiality and it is not irrational to move some distance from the starting line. Even if we do not explicitly say that rationality and impartiality were ideals worth striving for, these ideals have been constantly used in all our examinations. That is way rationality and impartiality are desirable for its own sake. 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Wahlstrom: Perspectives on Human Communication, pg. 139  Kenneth Cloke & Joan Goldsmith: Resolving Conflicts at Work, pg. 128 - 129  Kenneth Cloke & Joan Goldsmith: Resolving Conflicts at Work, pg. 149  Matters of Life and Death New Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy, Second Edition, Edited by Tom Regan, pg. 8  Matters of Life and Death New Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy, Second Edition, Edited by Tom Regan, pg. 12  Norman Daniels: Just Health Care, pg. 42  Matters of Life and Death New Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy, Second Edition, Edited by Tom Regan, pg. 14 PAGE 1 PAGE 13 45C[\})*-/279e ʳʳࠕui6CJOJQJmH sH 56CJOJQJmH sH 56CJOJQJCJH*OJQJCJOJQJmHsHmHsHjCJOJQJU0JCJOJQJjCJOJQJUjCJOJQJUCJOJQJmH sH CJOJQJOJQJmH sH OJQJCJOJQJmH sH )5CS\}+,-./012e$a$$a$  9r s/01:;: < N P e  & F`$a$$a$$a$/01:CD < N 02 6WdHU=KrxyX Y &!'!;!C!q!|!""T#`#p#6&7&&&v'''''')))w)65 j0JUj0JCJOJQJU5CJOJQJCJmH sH 56OJQJOJQJ 6OJQJ6CJOJQJ5CJ OJQJ CJOJQJD "p#$e%)+,C--..//1?3p5/61626W6X6&8:=?A` & F``w))****++,,$-,-1-9-C-R---G.H.......///////00w00110191E122?3E3F3u3{333 4 444"5J526W666Q7R77$899:/:6:;˺˴˺ 6OJQJj0JOJQJU 5OJQJOJQJ>*CJOJQJ6 j0JU5j0JCJOJQJU CJOJQJ5CJOJQJF;Z;[;\;;;<<>>n@t@lDDD7EGvHHOIPI-LHLL4M5M7M8MN,NVN`N OORO_OOO PPQQ0RaRfRRRRRRR-SSST T"UUUU2WZWWWW X]YoYa[k[νη5>*OJQJ 6OJQJj0JOJQJU 5OJQJOJQJ>*CJOJQJ5CJOJQJ CJOJQJj0JCJOJQJU6CJOJQJEA@DGJ7MOSUUUUUWZh]i]j]]]`_3`qaEcdtfik```k[[[f\|\j]]7^8^^^^____3`D`qa|a}abb cEcHcXcd0e`eeeOfafffgggghhhijjkkYl~ll/mooq rr-rsst tpuuuuu$y%yqzzz}B*CJOJQJph0J j0JU>*55CJOJQJ6CJOJQJj0JCJOJQJU>*CJOJQJ5>*CJOJQJ CJOJQJFkkkkkmoJqttuyozpzqzzz *+```}}  %+DĂɂՂ 5Z[VsȊҊ+,:<](ސ4ۑ&VŒ Qؓ!,CJOJQJmHsH6CJOJQJCJ5>*6j0JCJOJQJU5>*CJOJQJ CJOJQJ5CJOJQJ5 j0JUG+,:;<b͐EŒQʓ!;˖!*f.$a$,K%| ;Qt–˖̖͖!"#Xŗ͗*+;V^՘Efghy./@vw~ך ǾǷ 5OJQJ j0JU0J 6OJQJOJQJj0JOJQJU66CJOJQJ CJOJQJCJOJQJmHsH6CJOJQJmHsHF.~ EnŞ OYРrs~&`#$ ›ћ2bۜܜΝ<=>DEFUdnopĞŞƞ "EOPQqٟ,YZ56OJQJ6OJQJmHsHOJQJmHsH 5OJQJ j0JUj0JOJQJU 6OJQJOJQJLZ[ϠРѠDqstz{|}~ CJOJQJ0JmHnHu0J j0JU j0JU 5OJQJj0JOJQJUOJQJ 6OJQJ# 0P/ =!"#$%DyK zitinski@unidu.hryK 2mailto:zitinski@unidu.hrDyK mzitinski@du.htnet.hryK :mailto:mzitinski@du.htnet.hr i0@0 Normal_HmH sH tH D@D Heading 1$@&CJOJQJmHsHuB@B Heading 2$@&6OJQJmHsHu8@8 Heading 3$@& CJOJQJ>> Heading 4$$@&a$ CJOJQJ>@> Heading 5$@&5>*CJOJQJF@F Heading 6$@&`5>*CJOJQJDD Heading 7$$@&a$5CJOJQJ\NN Heading 8$@&`5>*CJOJQJtH u<A@< Default Paragraph Font8 @8 Footer  9r  mH sH u.U@. 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