Naslov
Nekoliko napomena o Aristotelovim nominalnim definicijama
(Some Remarks on Aristotle's Nominal Definitions)

Autori
Grgić, Filip

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Sažeci sa skupova, neobjavljeni rad, znanstveni

Skup
Filozofija i filodoksija

Mjesto i datum
Zagreb, Hrvatska, 19.12.2002. - 20.12.2002

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Domaća recenzija

Ključne riječi
Aristotel; definicija; demonstracija
(Aristotle; definition; demonstration)

Sažetak
Let us suppose that we are investigating P (in which P is generally the subject of science, let us say natural kinds), and that we are primarily interested in two things: whether P exists and what P is. The standpoint developed by Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics II.1– 10 obliges him to the following. On the one hand, in order for us to find out what P is, we must know that P exists. Irrespective of the fact that Aristotle offers a short proof for the previous, it nevertheless seems that he presupposes the same as a trivial fact. On the other hand, however, it seems that he is also forced to the contrary claim: we can know that P exists only if we know what P is. This does not follow from the Meno-like context of his discussion alone (if we are investigating whether P exists, how can we know of the existence of what we are investigating if we do not know what P is?) ; Aristotle is forced to take this standpoint also due to certain specific claims from Apo. II.1– 10. Namely, he holds the following: to know that P exists is to be able to demonstrate that P exists ; to be able to demonstrate that P exists is to know the cause/explanation of P ; and the cause/explanation of P is, in fact, the answer to the question what P is: accordingly, to know that P exists is to know what P is. Thus, which comes first – the demonstration of existence or definition? Aristotle considers this to be a difficult and serious problem. It is most often assumed that the way in which he attempts to provide an answer to this question is through believing that the springboard for the investigation of existence and definition is the knowledge of the nominal definition of P, i.e. knowledge of the meaning of “ P” . According to one interpretation, knowledge of the meaning of “ P” does not include the knowledge of the existence of P (or the knowledge of the existence of instances of P), although, since it contains an answer (of some sort) to the question of what P is, it enables us to further investigate existence and (real) definition. According to another interpretation, knowledge of the meaning of “ P” includes the knowledge of the existence of P (or the knowledge of the existence of instances of P), and this knowledge is sufficient for us to further investigate and arrive at the demonstrative knowledge of the existence of P and its real definition. The author’ s paper is negative for the most part. He attempts to show that Aristotle’ s nominal definitions can neither accomplish the above task nor are they intended to accomplish the above task. He also offers an outline of an alternative solution of the problem.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

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