Naslov
KRIPKENSTEIN IS WITTGENSTEIN: ON THE LEGITIMACY OF KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN

Autori
Penava, Mate

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u zbornicima skupova, cjeloviti rad (in extenso), znanstveni

Izvornik
What Can Be Shown Cannot Be Said Proceedings of the International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, Zagreb, Croatia, 2021. / Skelac, Ines ; Belić, Ante - Berlin : Lit Verlag, 2023, 91-100

ISBN
978-3-643-91637-2

Skup
International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium

Mjesto i datum
Zagreb, Hrvatska, 02.12.2021. - 03.12.2021

Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje

Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija

Ključne riječi
rule following ; criteria ; community ; agreement

Sažetak
In his celebrated book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [6], Saul Kripke presents a novel interpretation of the argument against privacy in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. This argumentation goes against the received view, which places the discussion on privacy in PI, I 243-315, and claims that the argument against privacy is developed in the previous paragraphs of PI I, namely those dealing with rule following (143- 242). This line of argumentation is not unique to Kripke, as Fogelin [4] and Hintikka & ; Hintikka [5] share a similar view. However, due to the specificity of Kripke’s argumentation, it has sparked many responses from noted philosophers that claim Kripke is fundamentally wrong in his construal of Wittgenstein’s ideas. Some notable examples include Davidson, McDowell, Wright and Horwich. The aim of this paper is to show, following Kusch [7] and some other authors, the legitimacy of Kripke’s argumentation and argue that it should not be discarded as a way of construing some of the key elements of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

POVEZANOST RADA