Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 1187706
Does management ownership make earnings more kinky?
Does management ownership make earnings more kinky? // 3rd International conference on Decision making for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises : Conference Proceedings / Šebestová, Jarmila ; Šperka, Roman ; Suchánek, Petr ; Čemerková, Šárka ; Rylková, Žaneta ; Matušínská, Kateřina ; Bauerová , Radka ; Mazurek, Jiří ; Dolák, Radim (ur.).
Karvina: Silesian University in Opava, School of Business Administration in Karviná, 2021. str. 622-631 (predavanje, međunarodna recenzija, cjeloviti rad (in extenso), znanstveni)
CROSBI ID: 1187706 Za ispravke kontaktirajte CROSBI podršku putem web obrasca
Naslov
Does management ownership make earnings more kinky?
Autori
Šodan, Slavko ; Visković, Josip ; Miočić, Franko
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u zbornicima skupova, cjeloviti rad (in extenso), znanstveni
Izvornik
3rd International conference on Decision making for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises : Conference Proceedings
/ Šebestová, Jarmila ; Šperka, Roman ; Suchánek, Petr ; Čemerková, Šárka ; Rylková, Žaneta ; Matušínská, Kateřina ; Bauerová , Radka ; Mazurek, Jiří ; Dolák, Radim - Karvina : Silesian University in Opava, School of Business Administration in Karviná, 2021, 622-631
ISBN
978-80-7510-456-4
Skup
3rd International conference on Decision making for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (DEMSME 2021)
Mjesto i datum
Prag, Češka Republika, 13.05.2021. - 16.05.2021
Vrsta sudjelovanja
Predavanje
Vrsta recenzije
Međunarodna recenzija
Ključne riječi
earnings distribution ; earnings management ; management ownership
Sažetak
Prior empirical research documents a “kink” in the earnings distribution, meaning that empirical distribution of reported earnings is discontinuous around a threshold such as zero. Results of these studies show an unusually high frequency of firms with small positive earnings and an unusually low frequency of firms with small negative earnings in comparison to the normal distribution. This phenomenon is usually considered as evidence of accounting manipulation or earnings management practice. Firms that would report a small loss, manipulate earnings to report a small profit and firms that would report a large profit, decrease earnings to evade paying tax. The aim of this paper is analyze discontinuity of earnings distribution for firms owned by managers. We find evidence that earnings distribution of firms with managers’ equity ownership have more pronounced zero-earnings discontinuity. Namely, if managers participate in ownership, they might more often use accounting techniques in order to maximize firms’ net cash flows by evading tax payments. Empirical analysis is conducted on the sample of 32, 346 firms from Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia in 2017.
Izvorni jezik
Engleski
Znanstvena područja
Ekonomija
POVEZANOST RADA
Projekti:
HRZZ-IP-2020-02-9372 - Raščlamba determinanti kvalitete financijskog izvještavanja (DISFRQ) (Aljinović Barać, Željana, HRZZ - 2020-02) ( CroRIS)
Ustanove:
Ekonomski fakultet, Split
