Pregled bibliografske jedinice broj: 1177524
Deposit insurance, banking stability and banking indicators
Deposit insurance, banking stability and banking indicators // Ekonomska istraživanja, 35 (2022), 1; 1-18 doi:10.1080/1331677X.2022.2033130 (međunarodna recenzija, članak, znanstveni)
CROSBI ID: 1177524 Za ispravke kontaktirajte CROSBI podršku putem web obrasca
Naslov
Deposit insurance, banking stability and banking
indicators
Autori
Suljić Nikolaj, Stella ; Olgić Draženović, Bojana ; Buterin, Vesna
Izvornik
Ekonomska istraživanja (1331-677X) 35
(2022), 1;
1-18
Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Radovi u časopisima, članak, znanstveni
Ključne riječi
Banking system, deposit insurance, bank risk, European Union, Southeast European countries, dynamic panel analysis
Sažetak
The deposit insurance system is a form of banking regulation that protects depositors and provides stability in the banking system. It is an important part of the financial safety net, especially in times of economic turmoil, as it provides explicit depositor protection and prevents a ‘bank run’. However, there are some negative effects on banking stability associated with the increase in bank risk, i.e., moral hazard, adverse selection and the principal-agent problem. The functioning of the deposit insurance system depends on its determinants, but also on the characteristics of the national banking system, supervision, legal and cultural framework and the general development of the country. Considering that the banking systems in EU and especially in comparison to Southeast European countries are very different, the aim of this paper is to study the impact of the deposit insurance system on bank stability depending on the characteristics of banks. Bank stability is analysed using bank risk variables: z-score and ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. By applying a dynamic panel analysis using the GMM Arellano–Bond (AB) estimator to a sample of EU countries and selected Southeast European countries, we provide further evidence on the deposit insurance system over the period from 2005 to 2014. The results provide evidence that large and systemically important banks behave in a riskier way, distorting the purpose of the deposit insurance scheme and jeopardising the safety of banking systems.
Izvorni jezik
Engleski
Znanstvena područja
Ekonomija
Napomena
Rad je financiran znanstvenim projektima: uniri-
drustv-18-61; ZIP-UNlRl-130-5-20; uniri-mladi-
drustv-20-13.
POVEZANOST RADA
Projekti:
--uniri-drustv-18-61 - Efikasnost i regulacija financijskih institucija u funkciji razvoja hrvatskog gospodarstva (Olgić Draženović, Bojana) ( CroRIS)
--ZIP-UNIRI-130-5-20 - Model optimalnog institucionalnog rasta Republike Hrvatske u vrijeme krize uzrokovane pandemijom COVID-19 (Buterin, Vesna) ( CroRIS)
NadSve-Sveučilište u Rijeci-uniri-mladi-drustv-20-13 - Regulacija banaka i sustav osiguranja depozita u postizanju bankovne i financijske stabilnosti (UNIRI projekt) (Suljić Nikolaj, Stella, NadSve ) ( CroRIS)
Ustanove:
Ekonomski fakultet, Rijeka
Citiraj ovu publikaciju:
Časopis indeksira:
- Current Contents Connect (CCC)
- Web of Science Core Collection (WoSCC)
- Social Science Citation Index (SSCI)
- SCI-EXP, SSCI i/ili A&HCI
- Scopus