Naslov
The criminal responsibility of persons within the autistic spectrum

Autori
Bošnjak, Mladen

Vrsta, podvrsta i kategorija rada
Ocjenski radovi, diplomski rad, diplomski

Fakultet
Filozofski fakultet

Mjesto
Rijeka

Datum
28.09

Godina
2021

Stranica
66

Mentor
Malatesti, Luca ; Jurjako, Marko

Ključne riječi
Mental disorders ; High-functioning autism ; Criminal responsibility ; Accountability ; Neurodiversity movement ; Harmful dysfunction ; Executive functions ; Duress

Sažetak
This thesis investigates, from a philosophical perspective, whether high-functioning autists are legally responsible for their crimes, with a focus on the legal defense by insanity. According to the Croatian Criminal Code, but also criminal codes adopted in many other countries, the legal responsibility of the person is undermined due to insanity when two conditions are satisfied. The first can be called the incapacity requirement. It states that a person, at the moment of committing the crime, exhibits cognitive or volitional incapacities, which are relevant for criminal responsibility. The second, let us call it the mental disorder requirement, states that the exculpatory incapacities are due to the presence of a mental disorder. Regarding the application of the mental disorder requirement to high- functioning autists, the philosophical challenge is that of offering a satisfactory account of mental disorder. I argue that mental disorder requirement is a justified legal condition of exculpation. Thus, addressing the issue whether functioning autists can be excused due to insanity requires investigating whether they have a mental disorder. I argue that Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction theory of mental disorder is a plausible account of mental disorder to be used in this investigation. I argue that the list of basic psychological capacities offered to George Graham adequately clarifies the notion of harm that is left rather underdeveloped in the Wakefield account. I argue that the question of whether high-functioning autism is a disorder should be decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on an assessment of the harm caused by it. Regarding the application of the incapacity requirement to high- functioning autists, the philosophical challenge is that of explaining how the empirical neuropsychological data about high-functioning autists can be related to legal requirements concerning exculpating incapacities. I use the theory of criminal responsibility offered by Hirstein et al., which is based on executive functions to bridge these two domains. I thus claim that criminal responsibility of autists may be diminished due to impairments in executive functions but that they cannot be excused. I argue that the notion of duress, elaborated by Carl Elliott in the discussion of the moral responsibility of the people with volitional disorders, can also be applied in cases of criminal responsibility of autists.

Izvorni jezik
Engleski

Znanstvena područja
Filozofija

POVEZANOST RADA